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In A Course of Six Lectures on the Chemical History of a Candle (1861), the printed
version of his Christmas Lectures given at the Royal Institution in London, Michael
Faraday constantly encourages his audience to be researchers on their own: \We come
here to be philosophers; and I hope you will always remember that whenever a result
happens, especially if it be new, you should say, \What is the cause? Why does it
occur?" and you will in the course of time ¯nd out the reason." I too came to Utrecht
to be a `philosopher', eager to answer the `whys' of a project which was then entitled
The Dynamics of Trust. In the `course of time', I was able to ¯nd out the reason for
some of these `whys' while leaving others unanswered. As a consequence of me trying
to be a `philosopher', the project slightly changed to what has eventually become this
book on Trust and Exchange. A book on whether one should invest resources in the
face of uncertainty and how the product of such investments is split between actors if
they can negotiate its division.
The main chapters of this dissertation were presented at various occasions inside
and outside the ICS. A slightly di®erent version of Chapter 2 has been published in
Rationality and Society (vol. 12, 2000). An adapted German version of Chapter 3
is forthcoming in Modelle Sozialer Evolution, edited by Andreas Diekmann and Ben
Jann. Braun and Gautschi (2001), on which Chapter 5 is partly based, is currently
under review.
My supervisors Werner Raub, Chris Snijders, and Jeroen Weesie have invested quite
some resources in the course of this project. Even though the focus of the project has
changed, I hope they ¯nd the surplus I produced worth their investments. I may have
not always appreciated their comments and suggestions. This might thus be the place
to apologize for being stubborn and not always following their advice. However, their
input has not gone unnoticed and has signi¯cantly improved the quality of this book. I
would like to thank them for spending more time on my supervision than I could have
hoped for and for showing con¯dence in my work even in those times when progress
was slow.
Regardless of his busy schedule, Werner always freed up time to read and comment
on anything I handed in. Even though I did not always agree with his remarks on
¯rst sight, I had to realize that his comments were generally rooted on solid grounds.
Werner's input has been very important for this project. He was also always able to
structure my thinking and writing, telling apart the important from the unimportant.
viiviii Preface
From all I have learned from Werner, I will especially remember to think things over
thoroughly before writing them down.
Chris always had time to listen to my questions. Whenever I dropped by, he was
willing to help out right away, unless he was playing chess with Gerrit Rooks. In
retrospect, I unfortunately made way too little use of Chris' willingness to share his
knowledge and thoughts. Whenever I showed up with a problem, however, he was able
to provide a solution or at least put me (back) on the right track. Also I would like to
thank Chris for writing Chapter 4 with me. Besides his contribution to the text, his
advice and comments on the statistical analyses were very helpful.
Jeroen I owe my thanks for his relaxed and humorous way of giving crucial advice.
My feeling was always that he was looking at my ideas and writings (or the world in
general?) from the `Weesie point of view'. Do not ask me to de¯ne it|I only know it is
a view on things di®erent from the one the rest of us has, but which resulted in Jeroen
seeing mistakes that otherwise would have remained unnoticed. Especially, however, I
thank Jeroen for his advice and support on statistical matters. For some time, he even
supplied `long{distance advice and solutions' on the statistics of Chapter 3, which was
written while Jeroen was working at Stata Corporation in Texas.
Many ICS colleagues have provided social and academic advice. I therefore owe
thanks to a lot of the ICS members and especially the Utrecht members. I experienced
the ICS as a stimulating and vivid surrounding to conduct my graduate studies. First of
all, I am indebted to my yeargroup '97: Miranda, Johan, Marc and Ren¶ e, who has been
my roommate over the last four and a half years. They made moving from Switzerland
to the Netherlands a positive experience and have become good friends. Among other
things, they introduced me to the Dutch culture. This included things so di®erent as
`kroketten', de Efteling, and walks on the windy beaches of Schiermonnikoog. Despite
all their e®orts, some parts of the Dutch culture still remain a mystery to me (e.g.
grown{ups with Mickey Mouse socks) while to others I show a remarkable resistance
(e.g. `erwtensoep'). Nevertheless, I appreciated and enjoyed all their e®orts and I hope
you will never give up trying to turn me into a `real Dutchman'. I hope we can continue
our regular `jaargroep uitjes'.
My thanks also go to Vincent for discussions on trust and exchange and for untir-
ingly solving all the L ATEX problems I could not master myself. Vincent and Johan have
been my dart partners over the last couple of years. Our games provided the necessary
breaks from work. I just hope the university will never hold us responsible for all the
nice little holes in the wall of Ren¶ e's and my (former) o±ce. And, I hope that my (one
time thrown) `one hundred and eighty' will remain unreachable for you! My roommate
Ren¶ e, of course, I would like to thank for never loosing temper when confronted with
my ups and, especially, downs. I very much appreciated our discussions on both our
research topics. Finally, I thank all the members of the Pionier research program \The
Management of Matches" who provided critical comments on my work. I will always
remember our Friday afternoon Pionier seminars where sometimes the title of a paper
already triggered discussions lasting several minutes. I would also like to thank thePreface ix
Netherlands Organization for Scienti¯c Research (NWO) for ¯nancial support through
the Pionier program \The Management of Matches". MariÄ elle I want to thank for
helping to solve problems inside and outside the ICS and Arnout for translating my
English draft of the Dutch summary.
Andreas Diekmann o®ered me my ¯rst scienti¯c position at the University of Bern
without which I may not have been here now. In Bern, I also met Norman Braun
with whom I still share a (scienti¯c) friendship. I thank both of them. To Norman I
owe many more thanks for our discussions and our joint work during my ICS time of
which not only Chapter 5 is proof but also our phone bills. Norman's untiring scienti¯c
devotion provided lots of new ideas and triggered thinking about various serious and less
serious sociological problems. His enthusiasm for scienti¯c work is `infectious'. Many
thanks also for being a generous host during my stays in MÄ unchen and for providing
the facilities to run the experiment reported in Chapter 3.
Despite my early plans of just being a `philosopher', life in the Netherlands has
turned out to be more than writing a dissertation. Social get{togethers so di®erent
as playing soccer or hanging out in cafes turned out to be the necessary balance to
work, thanks to Anne{Rigt, Miranda, Frank, Gijs, Johan, Marc, Mattijs, Ren¶ e, Rudi,
Willem{Jan, and especially Wilfred. He has become a good friend and biking partner.
He always allows me to at least beat him to the tops of the Swiss mountains. Thanks
for leaving my `Heimvorteil' untouched!
A couple of weeks a year my social life also takes place in Switzerland. Chrigu,
Golda, JÄ urg, Martin, Markus and Rachel, Susi, PeschÄ a, Viviana, and especially David,
Mike, Noah, Pam and Tim are always making `coming home' a pleasant experience.
Others have been important to me for di®erent reasons: Jill, who unfortunately was on
the wrong side of the Atlantic most of the time; Amika and Kim, who always reminded
me of my social life when my sofa looked too cosy; and Sonja for keeping her ¯ngers
crossed during the last few months of my work on this book.
Last but not least I thank my parents Margrith and Samuel for always and without
hesitation supporting me in various ways and in everything I have or have not done. I
owe you a great many thanks for continuously providing resources for the production
of many surpluses. I hope I will ¯nally be able to give you a large piece of it back.blubContents
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Introduction: Providing and
Dividing a Surplus
1.1 Introduction
This book is about the provision and division of a surplus. How a surplus is provided
and divided often rests upon bilateral relations. Two examples may help make this
clear. Suppose two ¯rms are working separately on the development of a new product.
The complexity of the product requires investments into research and development,
for example, e®orts of engineers as well as production capacity. These investments are
beyond the possibilities of each ¯rm separately. One ¯rm might have the technical
know how but not the production capacity to implement it, the other might have the
necessary production facilities but not the crucial knowledge. The two ¯rms could join
forces in an R&D alliance to combine both their knowledge, work force, and production
capacity. It would be the only way for them to have a good chance of successfully
developing the product. The cooperation gain earned by selling or licensing the new
product constitutes the surplus. In situations of this kind, prior agreements often
regulate the fair division of the surplus. However, how sure can either ¯rm be that
the surplus will indeed be divided according to the agreement once the surplus has
materialized? Is it wise to join forces if problems on the division of the surplus are
to be expected? As another example, take two hunters. In the ¯rst example, joining
forces is the only way to produce a surplus. In the second example, each of the two
hunters could kill some game on their own. Neither of their kills (e.g. a rabbit) would
be enough to feed their families. If they hunt together though, the kill, for instance a
mammoth, will be large enough to feed both their families. The `additional' meat a
mammoth provides, compared to two rabbits, constitutes a surplus. Now faced with
the dead mammoth, how should the hunters divide it? Who gets the larger share and
why?
These two scenarios on providing and dividing a surplus di®er in various respects.
As we discuss below, this leads to di®erent research questions this book addresses.
Common to both scenarios, however, is the provision and division of a surplus in
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interactions between two actors. They can be individual actors (i.e. natural persons)
such as the hunters, or `corporate actors' (Coleman 1990: 540) such as the two business
¯rms. In this book, we analyze the provision and division of a surplus as abstract
games between two actors. In these games, the provision and division of a surplus is
conceptualized as exchange between two actors. Consequently, a surplus is not generally
referred to as a cooperation gain, a mammoth, or the like. Throughout, a surplus is an
`additional something' which, if produced, can be divided between two actors in some
way with the division leaving both actors better o® than if they had not produced and
divided the surplus. In the literature on division problems, the surplus is often referred
to as `cake' or `pie'. We therefore use surplus, cake, and pie as synonyms.
The provision and division of a surplus as presented in this book is based on two
di®erent basic scenarios. In one part, we analyze how a surplus is provided and divided
in the context of delayed exchange. In short, this means one actor needs to make a
one{sided advance concession, not or not fully secured by legally enforceable contracts,
without which it is impossible to provide the surplus. An example of this kind of one{
sided advance concession is the knowledge transfer from one ¯rm to the other in our
R&D example. If the second actor can then divide the surplus, this kind of one{sided
concession entails a certain risk for the ¯rst actor. The surplus could be divided in such
a way that only the second actor pro¯ts. We will argue that providing and dividing a
surplus through delayed exchange can be seen as a trust problem between two actors.
Our focus is on `placing trust', the move by the ¯rst actor making the provision of
a surplus possible, rather than on `honoring trust', the division of the surplus by the
second actor later on. In the second part of the book, we neglect questions related to
the provision of a surplus. In this part, we assume the production of a surplus does
not pose any problems since, for instance, no one{sided concessions are necessary. The
basic scenario in the second part of this book assumes that an encounter between two
actors `produces' a surplus. For instance, two hunters successfully kill a mammoth.
The focus is then on the division of the surplus rather than its provision. Unlike
the delayed exchange scenario, the second scenario gives both actors a right to co{
determine the division of the surplus. It is supposed that they determine their shares
by bargaining where a delay in agreement on how to divide the surplus entails cost
for both actors. These costs determine the actors' bargaining powers, which crucially
a®ect the bargaining outcome.1 Besides the focus on the interaction between two
actors, there is another aspect common to both scenarios: a focus on the e®ects of
1Since the whole book is about provision and division problems in a dyad, we always focus on two
actors. We use a female pronoun to refer to one of them and a male pronoun to refer to the other.
In the scenario of delayed exchange and trust, the provider of the surplus is called `she' or `trustor'
and the divider of the surplus is called `he' or `trustee'. In the scenario of delayed agreement and
bargaining, we can no longer distinguish between a provider and a divider. We tell the actors apart
by calling the actor who starts the bargaining process `ego' or `he'. The second actor is consequently
called `alter' or `she'.1.1 Introduction 3
delay. Either a delay in exchange as in the trust problem or a delay in agreement as
in the bargaining problem.
We now introduce the research questions addressed in this book. For this, it is helpful
to brie°y discuss some assumptions on the scenarios addressed in this book. First, we
consider three assumptions regarding the provision and division of a surplus as delayed
exchange, that is, as a trust problem between two actors. Assume (1) that an actor's
utility is given by the actor's share of the cake and that an actor prefers a larger
share of the cake to a smaller one.2 We model delayed exchange using an abstract
game describing the interdependent situation between the two actors. As we will see in
Section 1.2, this game is a Trust Game (Dasgupta 1988; Kreps 1990a). Assume (2) that
actors behave according to game theoretic rationality or follow some other principle
of incentive guided behavior. Game theoretic rationality is basically conceptualized in
this book as Nash equilibrium behavior (Nash 1951). This means roughly that each
actor maximizes utility, given the other actor's behavior (see for instance Rasmusen
1994: 22{28 for technical details). Last, assume (3) an `isolated encounter' between
two actors in the sense that their delayed exchange is not connected in any way with
previous or future exchanges or any interaction between the two actors or between
other actors. That is, we consider a one{shot Trust Game. Then, as will be shown
below, the prediction would be that trust is not placed and, if nevertheless placed,
would be abused. Thus, the surplus would not be provided. If it had been provided,
it would have been divided in such a way that only the dividing actor would pro¯t.
Empirical results from systematic research and everyday observations, however, show
that sometimes trust is placed, and sometimes it is also honored: surpluses are, at
least sometimes, provided and more or less fairly divided in the framework of delayed
exchange. In this book, we investigate whether and how this can be explained if we
relax assumption (3) above but adhere as far as possible to assumptions (1) and (2).
We consider situations where two actors repeatedly meet over time and exchange is
embedded (Granovetter 1985). More precisely, we assume temporal embeddedness
(Raub and Weesie 2000b) of exchange in a sequence of exchanges between the two
actors. Thus, the original exchange between the two actors is connected with other
exchanges between them. In terms of the abstract Trust Game, this means the game is
repeated a ¯nite or in¯nite number of times. As the discussion in Section 1.2 will show,
such a temporal embeddedness of actors is a sociologically relevant extension of the
one{shot situation (e.g. Blau 1964; Emerson 1972, 1981; Granovetter 1985; Voss 1982,
1985). The ¯rst part of the book (i.e. Chapter 2 through Chapter 4) then addresses
the general research question:3 Given that the provision and division of a surplus is
conceptualized as a situation of trust between two actors, which aspects of temporal
2If the cake to be divided solely consists of money, then `utility is own share of the cake' translates
into the familiar `utility is own money'.
3The research questions introduced in this chapter are formulated as `descriptive' questions. The
accompanying explanatory questions (`why questions') are implicitly contained.4 Chapter 1 Introduction: Providing and Dividing a Surplus
embeddedness a®ect the placement of trust and how (i.e. positively or negatively) do
these aspects a®ect the placement of trust?
A similar line of reasoning leads to the research questions on the division of a sur-
plus as a delayed agreement. Consider again three assumptions. The ¯rst pertains to
providing the surplus and assumes (1) that the provision of the surplus does not pose
problems for the two actors. For example, the surplus is available to them beforehand.4
As in the previous scenario, assume (2) that an actor's utility is given by the actor's
share of the cake and the actor prefers a larger share of the cake to a smaller one. Since
the scenario of delayed agreement is also based on an abstract, game theoretic represen-
tation of alternating o®ers bargaining, assume again (3) that actors behave according
to game theoretic rationality. As we will discuss more extensively in Section 1.3, it
follows from assumptions (1) to (3) that the division of the surplus depends on the
relation between the bargaining powers of the two actors such that the actor with the
higher bargaining power receives the larger share of the surplus. We assume that the
actor who bears lower costs when the agreement on the division of a surplus is delayed
has an advantage. The scenario of delayed agreement, however, does not contain any
information on the costs to the actors if the agreement on the division of the surplus
is delayed. We know the division of the surplus is a function of the actors' bargaining
powers, but we do not know the bargaining powers. Nor does the scenario of delayed
agreement give any indication of where di®erences in bargaining powers could come
from. However, a sociologically relevant source of bargaining power has been suggested
by Emerson (1972, 1981). It rests on the realization that an exchange between two
actors should not be viewed as independent of their relations to other actors. We
therefore embed our two actors in a network that also includes other actors. Following
Emerson, this network embeddedness can be seen as an important source of the ac-
tors' bargaining powers. From an actor's point of view, networks either determine or
prevent dyadic exchange alternatives. Consequently, networks de¯ne di®erences in op-
portunity structures between actors that are re°ected in the actors' bargaining powers.
The second part of the book (Chapter 5) addresses two research questions. First, we
ask: How does an actor's embeddedness in a network of negotiation partners determine
his or her share of the surplus in relations with his or her partners? Being embedded
in a network means that actors with more than one partner have access to di®erent
bargaining partners with whom a division of a surplus is possible. In some networks,
actual exchange may be restricted to one relation due to exogenously stipulated rules,
such as for example monogamy. The research question stated above then leads to a
second one: With whom of his or her connected partners does an actor divide a surplus
if restrictions in a network prescribe that the actor can only divide one surplus at a
time?
4The example of the two hunters is a situation where the provision of the surplus, that is, killing
the mammoth, poses no problems. Another situation where a surplus is available is in laboratory
experiments where the experimenter provides the subjects with the necessary surplus and they in
turn can divide it.1.1 Introduction 5
Embeddedness e®ects thus play a prominent role throughout this book. In addition
to the focus on dyadic exchange and on e®ects of a delay in exchange or agreement,
respectively, there is now a third common feature in the analyses of the two scenarios:
the focus on e®ects of embeddedness. On the one hand, we ask whether we can explain
the provision of a surplus, that is, the provision of the necessary resources for a produc-
tion of the surplus, in terms of e®ects of temporal embeddedness. On the other hand,
we seek to explain how the division of a surplus between two actors is a®ected by their
network embeddedness. Even if we do address e®ects of embeddedness, the book still
focuses on the outcome within a dyad. In this sense, we are interested in micro{level
outcomes. This is immediately clear with regard to the scenario in the ¯rst part of the
book. Beyond the dyad, there are no other actors involved. In the second scenario,
however, networks play a prominent role. They remain relatively small though and,
as Chapter 5 will show, only the immediate vicinity of the dyad under investigation
is important. We therefore see the `micro{level' as including two or at most a few
actors, such as a dyad and third parties or small networks a®ecting the behavior of
the actors in the dyad. Consequently, we view social settings beyond dyads or small
networks as the macro{level, with society as a whole being one example. This book ne-
glects macro{level consequences of micro{level behavior and questions on `aggregated
individual behavior' are beyond its scope.
There is literature that examines the e®ects (dyadic) trust has on society as a
whole. Cook (2001), Fukuyama (1995), Knack and Keefer (1997), Misztal (1996), or
Putnam (1993) present arguments on the bene¯cial e®ects of trust on the micro{level
for outcomes on the society level. In short, the argument is that society vastly pro¯ts
from trust on the micro{level because economic institutions such as laws or contracts
do not provide a \[...] su±cient basis for both the stability and prosperity of postin-
dustrial societies" (Fukuyama 1995: 11). However, trust on the micro{level can also
have harmful e®ects on the macro{level. Think of the `bads' in°icted on society by
organizations that base their success on trustful relations between their members like
the Cosa Nostra or organized crime in general (e.g. Hess 1986; Raith 1994, 1995), ter-
rorist associations, or cartels. Not only can the bilateral provision of surpluses exhibit
harmful e®ects on the macro{level, so can the micro{level division of these surpluses.
One of sociology's main questions is concerned with these consequences: inequality
and the unequal distribution of resources in society (e.g. Ultee, Arts, and Flap 1996:
chs. 2 and 3). Engels (1845) or Marx (1867), witnesses to the Industrial Revolution,
noticed that individual behavior related to the division of surpluses will increase in-
equality in society. Lenski (1966) highlights the distributive system throughout the
history of mankind and seeks to explain who gets what and why based on the speci¯c
developmental stage of a society and its individuals.
In the remainder of this chapter, we give further details on the two scenarios introduced
above. Section 1.2 discusses the provision and division of a surplus as delayed exchange
and addresses the importance of temporal embeddedness of the actors. The main focus6 Chapter 1 Introduction: Providing and Dividing a Surplus
lies on the question whether or not the surplus is provided. Division is less prominent in
the scenario of delayed exchange. Chapters 2 to 4 are about the provision and division of
a surplus as delayed exchange, that is, as a trust problem. In Section 1.3, we introduce
the division of a surplus as a series of o®ers and countero®ers, and thus as a consequence
of delayed agreement. This scenario is expanded to include the sociologically relevant
idea that network structure a®ects the division of the surplus. Here, the focus lies on
the division rather than the provision aspect. Chapter 5 discusses in depth the division
of a surplus as bargaining between two actors.
1.2 Delayed Exchange and Trust
Assume there is a surplus|say, a chocolate cake|to be divided between the trustor
and the trustee and that one of them|in our case the trustee|has been given the right
to divide the chocolate cake. His options are either to keep the whole cake himself or
divide it more equally among the two of them. So as a result, either both actors
pro¯t or only the trustee pro¯ts.5 This game is known in the literature as the Dictator
Game.6
Let us now expand this scenario and incorporate how the surplus materializes.
Assume the trustor has all the necessary ingredients for a chocolate cake but misses the
recipe. She can keep the ingredients and nothing else will happen.7 Alternatively, she
can give the ingredients to the second actor, thereby providing the necessary resources
to produce a surplus. In this case, the trustee bakes the cake and consequently decides
on how to divide it in a Dictator Game{like manner. If he splits the cake more or
less equally, both actors pro¯t. Thus, the trustor who provides the ingredients prefers
a fair share of the resulting cake to keeping her ingredients. If the trustee keeps the
chocolate cake to himself, the trustor loses her investments (i.e. chocolate, milk, °our
etc.) and does not pro¯t from the surplus.8
5Assume that both actors assign a utility of 30 to their respective shares of the cake if it is split
equally. If the trustee keeps the cake himself, he values eating the whole cake with 50. That is
less than two times 30 since the last few pieces of the cake are less enjoyed than the ¯rst ones due
to diminishing marginal utility. Since the trustor gets nothing of the cake, she values this outcome
with 0.
6Normally, a Dictator Game allows the trustee in the role of the dictator to divide the cake as he
pleases. We can simplify it and con¯ne ourselves in the ¯rst part of the book to a situation where the
dictator can only keep the whole cake or split it more evenly between himself and the trustor.
7An outcome giving each of the actors a utility of 10. Since, for instance, the trustor might use her
ingredients to make pancakes which, however, she values less than a share of a chocolate cake. The
trustee, on the other hand, has to have an old mu±n that he also values less than a piece of chocolate
cake.
8We could assume that losing the ingredients and not pro¯ting from the surplus makes the trustor's
utility negative. For the sake of argument, we need only assume that the utility of losing the investment
is smaller than the utility of keeping the investment.1.2 Delayed Exchange and Trust 7
The same underlying structure emerges in more complex situations. Remember that
a surplus can for example be a cooperation gain that two ¯rms can realize by joining
forces. Assume Airbus Industries and Boeing plan to jointly develop a supersonic
airplane. Neither Airbus nor Boeing can build the plane on their own. However, with
both companies' know how and Boeing's production capacity, it is feasible. At the
start of the project, Airbus sends ¯ve hundred of its most skilled engineers to Boeing's
Commercial Airplane Headquarters in Seattle. In other words, Airbus invests in the
provision of a surplus. If the project succeeds and the airplane is built and sold, a gain
(surplus) can be expected and can be equally divided. However, Boeing might abandon
the joint project after accumulating enough of Airbus' know how on supersonic planes
and produce the plane on its own. Even if the cooperation between Boeing and Airbus
has been secured by legal contracts, Boeing knows a monetary ¯ne for breaking the
contract is less than the expected gains if it produces and sells the plane. If this
happens, Airbus is giving away valuable know how without getting its share of the
surplus.
Each of the two situations, baking a chocolate cake and producing a supersonic
airplane, has a similar structure. The trustor who has important resources for pro-
ducing the surplus makes a one{sided advance concession. This investment leaves the
trustee with an opportunity for opportunistic behavior since the investment is either
not secured by a legal contract (chocolate cake) or it is incompletely secured by a
legal contract (supersonic airplane). The production and division of the surplus is
only feasible after the trustor's investment. Consequently, there is a time asymme-
try between providing the resources and dividing the surplus (a delay in exchange).
This time asymmetry creates a crucial power di®erence in favor of the trustee. He
is at an advantage since he can decide how the surplus is divided, as in the Dictator
Game. Therefore, the trustor who provides the resources faces the incentive problem
of whether to make them available to a partner who can use them for his own bene¯t.
The trustor cannot be sure of the future size of her share of the surplus and thus has
to anticipate the possible division. If the actors are each only interested in their own
share of the cake, and if they each prefer more to less, the outcome could be that no
surplus is produced. The trustor might anticipate not receiving a `reasonable' share of
the surplus, and hence keep the resources to herself.
This scenario of delayed exchange is a situation of trust. Coleman (1990: 97{99)
speci¯es four characteristics of this type of situation. First, the trustor placing trust
(i.e. providing the resources) makes an action by the trustee possible that otherwise
would not have been possible. He can divide the surplus once it is produced. Second,
the trustor bene¯ts if trust is placed and honored. She values a fair share of the cake
more than she values her resources. However, she regrets it if trust is placed and then
abused. Third, placing trust is a voluntary action by the trustor. And fourth, the
trustor and the trustee move sequentially thus creating the crucial time{lag and the
incentive problem of the trustor.8 Chapter 1 Introduction: Providing and Dividing a Surplus
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Figure 1.1 Extensive form of the Trust Game (R1 >P 1 >S 1 and T2 >R 2 >P 2;
double lines indicate equilibrium path of play) and a numerical example which refers to
the chocolate cake example (see page 6).
To describe this type of situation of trust, we use a simple game theoretic formal-
ization introduced by Dasgupta (1988) and Kreps (1990a). The game is known as
the Trust Game or one{sided Prisoner's Dilemma Game (Rasmusen 1994: 129{131).
Figure 1.1 depicts the game with general payo®s and a numerical example that refers
to the provision and division of a chocolate cake (the example on page 6). The ordinal
ranking of the payo®s for the trustor is R1 >P 1 >S 1 and for the trustee T2 >R 2 >P 2.9
Once the resources are provided|the trustor has placed trust|the trustee would pre-
fer a division of the surplus in his favor to a more equal division since T2 >R 2.A sa
result, he has an incentive to choose to abuse trust over honoring trust. However, the
trustor should be able to anticipate this kind of behavior. She thus has an incentive
not to provide the resources, that is, not to place trust since S1 <P 1. The outcome of
a one{shot Trust Game is then the Nash equilibrium where the trustor withholds trust
and the trustee abuses trust if it has been placed. But this outcome is Pareto inferior
to an outcome where the surplus is produced and divided in such a way that both
actors pro¯t. The Trust Game is thus an example of a social dilemma|a situation
where individual and collective interests clash and rational and sel¯sh actors end up in
an ine±cient (Pareto inferior) equilibrium.
A great deal of research has been conducted on situations where individual ratio-
nality in the sense of equilibrium behavior clashes with a socially desirable outcome.
Predictions and experimental tests often focus on the (one{shot) Prisoner's Dilemma
9We refer to a speci¯c combination of the trustor's and trustee's payo®s as the payo® structure of
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Game (for an overview, see for instance Dugatkin 1997: chs. 1 and 2).10 Some recent
research also uses the Trust Game to more adequately address the time asymmetry
between the trustor's and the trustee's moves. Even though the results (i.e. rates of
placed trust, cooperation rates) di®er across experiments, one ¯nding seems robust.
Numerous experimental subjects do not behave in accordance with the game theo-
retic prediction as explained above, that is, trust is withheld but would be abused if
placed in the Trust Game, or mutual defection should be observed in the Prisoner's
Dilemma Game. Ahn et al. (1998), for example, report cooperation rates in a Pris-
oner's Dilemma of around 20%. The exact number varies with various features, such
as the payo® structure of the game. In a series of Prisoner's Dilemma Games by Ahn
et al., an increased di®erence between P and S (labelled `fear': P ¡ S), and between
T and R (labelled `greed': T ¡R) had negative e®ects on the cooperation rates. Find-
ings reported in the literature about placing and honoring trust are often similar. For
instance, in experiments with 36 one{shot Trust Games with di®erent payo®s, Snijders
(1996: Table 4.1) ¯nds that on average trust is placed in 37% of the cases and honored
in 36% of the cases. As in Ahn et al.'s experiment, trust rates vary with the payo®
structure of the game. Snijders notes that the probability of placing trust decreases
in the monetary risk to the trustor and the monetary temptation to the trustee.11 On
average, the cooperation rates he found are somewhat higher than in Ahn et al.'s exper-
iment on the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. More results from experimental play of simple
dilemma situations (e.g. Prisoner's Dilemma, Trust Game etc.) can, for instance, be
found in the books by Davis and Holt (1993), Dugatkin (1997), and Kagel and Roth
(1995) or in a paper by Hayashi et al. (1999) and especially in working papers of
Bruno S. Frey's and Ernst Fehr's Institute for Empirical Research in Economics of the
University of ZÄ urich.12
Thus, experimental results often contradict game theoretic predictions that follow
from the three assumptions on delayed exchange as introduced on page 3. The literature
contains various suggestions as to how this could be explained. Mostly, the assumption
10In a Prisoner's Dilemma Game, two actors simultaneously choose one of two strategies. An actor
can choose to defect, which in terms of the Trust Game means that trust is not placed and abused
if the other does. On the other hand, an actor can choose to cooperate, which means placing trust
and honoring trust if the other actor places trust. If both actors cooperate, they each earn R.I f
they both defect, they both receive P. If one cooperates and the other defects, the former receives
S and the latter earns T. The ranking of the payo®s is T>R>P>Sfor both actors. Individual
rationality thus prescribes defection (defection maximizes an actor's payo® irrespective of the other
actor's behavior) even though mutual cooperation would yield a Pareto superior outcome in terms of
the payo®s.
11Snijders shows on the basis of a model of non{sel¯sh utility that the payo® ratios Risk := P1¡S1
R1¡S1
and Temptation := T2¡R2
T2¡S1 represent the in°uence of the payo®s on the subjects' behavior.
12Working papers by Frey, Fehr, and colleagues can be downloaded from http://www.iew.unizh.ch.10 Chapter 1 Introduction: Providing and Dividing a Surplus
that `utility is own share of the cake'13 is relaxed in favor of considerations about
fairness (e.g. Rabin 1993; Nelson 2001), relative payo®s (e.g. Bolton and Ockenfels
1998, 2000) or other, `psychological' aspects (see for instance Camerer 1997; Kelley and
Thibaut 1978; Rabin 1998; Snijders 1996). These approaches often generate better
corroborated predictions on subjects' behavior in laboratory experiments. However,
the probability of either cooperating or defecting is then generally seen as a result of
individual traits. People are assumed to have di®erent social orientations (e.g. egoistic,
altruistic) that guide their behavior. In this book, however, we are not primarily
interested in di®erences between individuals but rather in e®ects of di®erent social
situations on individual behavior. From a sociological point of view, an explanation of
individual behavior in terms of the situation (e.g. one{shot game versus repeated game,
di®erent payo®s, third{party information etc.) itself would be more desirable, possibly
in addition to social orientations. In other words, we would not like to challenge
assumptions about utility but rather investigate the role of social conditions. In this
book, this means studying the e®ects of temporal embeddedness on the probability that
trust is placed, that is, that the necessary resources for the production of a surplus are
provided. The research question addressed in the ¯rst part of the book therefore reads:
Given that the provision and division of a surplus is conceptualized as a situation of
trust between two actors, which aspects of temporal embeddedness a®ect the placement
of trust and how (i.e. positively or negatively) do these aspects a®ect the placement of
trust?
1.2.1 Temporally Embedded Trust
In a one{shot Trust Game, explaining individual behavior in terms of `the situation'
means explaining behavior speci¯cally in terms of payo®s.14 Analyses of this kind
are limited in one important aspect: human interaction hardly ever takes place in
isolated, one{shot encounters but is embedded temporally as well as socially. For one
thing, people meet repeatedly, for another, they interact within a social network (e.g.
Burt and Knez 1995; Buskens 1999; Raub and Weesie 1990). We start our analysis
of embeddedness e®ects by bypassing the network aspect and focus ¯rst of all on the
e®ects of repeated interactions on placing trust.
To conceptualize temporal embeddedness, we consider the situation where the one{
shot Trust Game is repeatedly played by the same trustor and trustee. The question
we would like to answer is: Which aspects of temporal embeddedness a®ect whether or
not trust is placed in a dyadic relation between the trustor and trustee? That temporal
13Since in experiments the payo®s of a game typically correspond to monetary outcomes, `own share
of the cake' should be read here to mean `money'.
14Individual (e.g. age, sex, education) or contextual (e.g. cultural background) variables may help
explain behavior as well. Theoretically, we nevertheless overlook them. In addition, subjects partic-
ipating in laboratory experiments usually constitute a homogenous population (e.g. Dutch freshmen
in sociology) in such a way that e®ects of individual and contextual variables are less expected.1.2 Delayed Exchange and Trust 11
embeddedness can help facilitate cooperative behavior in dilemma situations has been
noted by numerous researchers (e.g. Axelrod 1984; Coleman 1990; Granovetter 1985;
Schelling 1960; Voss 1982, 1985). As the research question indicates, the focus of the
following three chapters is on `placing trust' and hence on the trustor's rather than the
trustee's behavior. This means we address the provision of the surplus and thus the
trustor's move to provide the necessary resources. Nevertheless, assuming incentive
guided behavior, it is obvious that the trustor's behavior depends on her anticipation
of the trustee's behavior. So, incentives for the trustee enter our explanation for the
behavior of the trustor as well.
In a one{shot Trust Game where trust is placed, an abuse of trust bears no further
consequences for the trustee since the relationship ends after one encounter. A rational
and sel¯sh trustee would see no need to honor trust that has been placed. If there are
repeated interactions, the situation changes. The repeated Trust Game is similar to
social exchange in the sense of Blau (1964; see also Emerson 1972, 1981; Thibaut and
Kelley 1959). Basically, social exchange exhibits a simple pattern: by helping another
person, a person creates an obligation the other person ought to discharge by doing
something for the person who initiated the exchange (reciprocity). This in turn leaves
the ¯rst person indebted to the second one and obligates her to reciprocate the favor,
and so forth. Each of the actors pays the other back in kind. Partly because each
reciprocation of a favor creates a new obligation, Blau (1964: ch. 4) and Emerson
(1981) argue that social exchange can only be properly understood if the focus is on
repeated interactions. Even though the situation of a repeated Trust Game is similar
rather than identical to this conceptualization of social exchange, the mechanism of
reciprocity that keeps social exchange going can also facilitate a repeated provision
and division of a surplus in Trust Games.15 Temporal embeddedness will weaken the
trustee's advantageous position of having the second move. The trustor will most likely
make her placement of trust dependent on the trustee's previous behavior. Gouldner
(1960) assumes a universal and generalized norm of reciprocity, prescribing that in
social exchange \people should help those who have helped them" and \people should
not injure those who have helped them" (p. 171). Consequently, failure to behave in
accordance with this norm is subject to sanctions by the trustor herself as well as by
others. The question in the ¯rst part of the book is not whether there is such a norm
of reciprocity. The question will rather be whether reciprocal behavior will evolve even
under incentive guided behavior by the actors. Voss (1985: especially chs. 2 and 4),
15There is a speci¯c reason why the repeated Trust Game \is only similar" but not identical to
social exchange. In social exchange, reciprocating a favor creates a new obligation that requires a
reciprocal move by the indebted person. In a repeated Trust Game, honoring placed trust can be
viewed as a reciprocal move. By the same token, abusing placed trust means failing to reciprocate.
However, by honoring trust if placed, the trustee does not create a new obligation towards the trustor.
The trustor need not place trust in a new game, as would be the case if a repeated Trust Game was
identical to social exchange. Nevertheless, the trustee's reciprocal move may increase the chance of
the trustor placing trust again in the next game.12 Chapter 1 Introduction: Providing and Dividing a Surplus
for instance, discusses whether or not reciprocity can be endogenously established and
stabilized.
We agree with Blau (1964: 97) that failing to discharge an obligation \[...] has
a number of disadvantageous consequences, several of which do not depend on the
existence of a norm of reciprocity." Failure to reciprocate a favor can simply hamper
future social exchange. Applied to the scenario of a repeated Trust Game, this means
a trustee who fails to reciprocate by honoring placed trust eventually runs the risk of
impeding any future provision of a surplus linked to `his' trustor. In other words, a
trustor whose trust has been abused is less likely to place trust in a future game. She
sanctions the trustee by withholding trust, no further surpluses will be produced, and
neither actor can pro¯t in the long run. In the words of Blau, the \[...] disinclination to
do favors [serves] as a punitive reaction against a violator" (p. 97) which helps people
protect themselves from being abused.16 We use Blau's analysis of `punishment' in
social exchange to our advantage in studying the repeated Trust Game.
The trustor's option for punishing deviant behavior and, similarly important, the
trustee's anticipation of this punishment is one important aspect in the study of e®ects
of temporal embeddedness on trust. Schelling (1960: 45) claims that mutual agreements
based on trust are only enforceable because of the recognition of future opportunities.
However, the future not only makes it possible to sanction deviant behavior. It also
makes it possible to reward cooperative behavior. If the trustee honors placed trust, he
increases the chances of a trustor once again providing resources for a new surplus. In
this book, we refer to this aspect of the future as the control e®ect (Buskens 1999; Raub
1997) of temporal embeddedness (Blau 1964; Emerson 1981; Gouldner 1960; Homans
1961). In the literature, it is also referred to as conditional cooperation (Taylor 1987)
or `tit{for{tat' (Axelrod 1984). If a trustee recognizes that the future o®ers possibilities
for obtaining shares of (many) more surpluses, which will not be produced if he falls
prey to the temptation of the short{term gain, the trustor can e®ectively steer the
outcome in a current situation.
We not only focus on this control mechanism but we also argue that control e®ects
may be more or less severe or e®ective depending on the `kind of future'. Temporal
embeddedness is conceptualized in terms of a repeated Trust Game. The future, with
respect to the current Trust Game, is therefore the number of Trust Games still to be
played. To study the e®ect of the `kind of future', we use Trust Games with di®erent
payo® structures. Let us assume that control e®ects increase or decrease in the earnings
the trustee foregoes if the trustor withholds trust. Punishment, for example, can then
16Even though Blau's view of punishment exists independently of a norm of reciprocity, he sees
this type of norm as reinforcing punishment. And, this norm makes the trustee feel guilty and thus
subjects him to additional `internal' sanctions independent of the actions of others. However, little or
no attention is devoted in this book to the trustee's possible bad conscience. In addition, Blau argues
that failure to discharge an obligation produces distrust and makes social exchange become economic
exchange since now the actors will only help each other again for payment in advance. We will note
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be seen as being less severe or e®ective if the trustee's payo® in the event that trust
is withheld (i.e. P2) is close to R2 or even T2, the payo®s the trustee may realize
if trust is placed.17 In sum, we assume that two aspects characterize the future in a
repeated Trust Game. First, the expected length of the mutual future between the
trustor and the trustee. Length is conceptualized as the number of possible games to
punish deviant behavior or to reward cooperative outcomes. And second, the kind of
future conceptualized by the payo® structure of the future games.
The trustor need not solely rely on the control e®ect of the future. She can base
her decisions on the past as well. In a stable dyad, a shared past allows for learning
about the trustee (Raub 1997).18 A mutual past of the trustor and trustee can provide
di®erent kinds of information. Learning as presented in the literature re°ects di®erent
approaches for dealing with this kind of information. Many of these approaches can be
summarized as `inductive learning' (Holland et al. 1986) in which subjects construct
and update representations of their world as they discover regularities in the course of
their interactions. Examples of models like this can be found in Lazaric and Lorenz
(1998a, 1998b), Rivaud{Danset (1998), Sako (1998), or Schelling (1960).
We will, however, use a concept of learning more related to rational learning of
game theoretic actors. In the beginning of their mutual relation, a trustor does not
know the `type' of the trustee. Put simply, a trustor does not know whether or not the
trustee is trustworthy.19 A trustee may be a person who always abuses placed trust: a
`bad trustee', so to say. Or, he may be the type who always honors trust if placed, that
is, a `good trustee'. However, he might also be a `bad trustee' in disguise: a trustee
who gives the impression of being a `good trustee' by honoring placed trust in the ¯rst
instance, so as to be able to abuse trust as soon as the trustor provides more and more
valuable resources for the production of ever larger surpluses. As long as trust has not
yet been abused, how can a trustor tell a `bad trustee in disguise' apart from a `good
one'? In other words, game theory assumes that the trustor holds prior beliefs about
the type of the trustee. After the trustor sees the trustee taking action, she updates
her beliefs by applying Bayes' Rule (e.g. Rasmusen 1994: 52{56). It says that the
trustor, depending on the outcome she observed, increases or decreases the probability
with which she up to now assumed to play a certain type of trustee, for instance, a
`good trustee'.
17Punishment can be costly for the trustor as well since she might forego a possible gain (i.e. R1¡P1)
by withholding trust.
18Neglecting the trustor and trustee's network embeddedness prevents other learning e®ects. For
instance, reputation e®ects are an important source since they serve as a generalized commodity that
can spread in a network and help trustors to learn something about a speci¯c trustee (e.g. Burt and
Knez 1995; Buskens 1999; Lahno 1995a, 1995b; Raub and Weesie 1990). In a network, a trustee
should remember that \[...] one incentive not to cheat is the cost of damage to one's reputation"
(Granovetter 1985: 490).
19For a more precise game theoretic de¯nition of `a player's type' and further discussions, see for
instance Rasmusen (1994: 48{62).14 Chapter 1 Introduction: Providing and Dividing a Surplus
We use a concept of belief learning, especially in Chapter 3. Beliefs, however, are
not updated strictly rationally as is prescribed by Bayes' Rule.20 A trustor in this book
is a belief learning entity but not a strictly rational one such as game theory prescribes.
She also holds beliefs on who the trustee is and how he is apt to behave in a given
situation. In Chapter 3, we argue that these beliefs constitute the basis of the trustor's
social capital in relation to the trustee. Initially, these beliefs re°ect experiences from
other relationships which are generalized to the current setting. Belief learning then
simply refers to the trustor adjusting her social capital stock with each past outcome
she observes and with each change in the characteristics of the future. Beliefs in our
approach are not, as in game theory, purely history dependent.
1.2.2 Overview
We have presented arguments showing why the provision of a surplus, conceptualized
as a one{shot Trust Game, is problematic. To facilitate the provision of necessary re-
sources, we then suggested temporally embedding the trustor and trustee in a sequence
of similar exchanges. However, we have not yet provided empirical evidence that this
kind of temporal embeddedness does indeed facilitate the provision of resources by the
trustor. Chapter 2, by using evidence from simple dilemma situations such as the
Prisoner's Dilemma Game or the Trust Game, sheds some light on the issue of whether
temporal embeddedness a®ects behavior. We do know of some models that typically
emphasize the importance of the `shadow of the future' in a®ecting behavior in social
dilemma situations (e.g. Axelrod 1984; Maynard Smith 1982). However, less is known
about how the past, also referred to as `history' or `shadow of the past', in°uences
a subject's current behavior in social dilemma situations. To see whether temporal
embeddedness can accelerate the provision of resources for the production of a surplus,
Chapter 2 ¯rst of all investigates whether the past a®ects current behavior in social
dilemma situations. We therefore compare dilemma situations that are equal in all but
one aspect: one situation has a history while the other has none. A simple theory is
developed that predicts no e®ects of the past on current behavior in these dilemma
situations. We present experimental evidence on behavior in social dilemma situations
that is in con°ict with this theory, demonstrating that history e®ects do indeed in°u-
ence a subject's behavior. Two main elaborations on the theory are suggested, namely,
more complex utility arguments and more complex information structures. Since we
would not like to challenge assumptions about utility any further, we concentrate in
the following chapter on the `information structure' as a way to learn from the past.
20Boyd and Richerson (1985) argue that whatever rules subjects follow if they learn, they do not use
Bayes' Rule and learn in a completely rational way. The only living beings that have been observed to
follow Bayes' Rule are birds and statisticians. However, there are also learning models that propose
simple stimulus{response mechanisms (e.g. Bush and Mosteller 1955). For a related approach to
learning in games that does not assume fully rational, but still `sophisticated' players, see Fudenberg
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Having established that the `shadow of the past' and the `shadow of the future'
both matter, Chapter 3 addresses how the provision and division of the surplus are
a®ected in a temporally embedded relation. We conceptualize temporally embedded
trust situations as a repeated Trust Game played by two actors without exit options.
We simultaneously study the e®ects of the actors' mutual past and common future
on the trustor's behavior. We discuss a simple model of trust depending on a dyadic
social capital stock which, in turn, is based on learning and control by the trustor.
It is assumed that past outcomes and the expected future are translated into social
capital the trustor uses to make her decisions about whether or not resources for the
provision of a surplus should be invested. This model makes it possible to derive
hypotheses about the behavior of the trustor under di®erent conditions of temporal
embeddedness. Laboratory experiments are used to test these hypotheses.
While Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 present analyses from laboratory experiments,
Chapter 4 uses survey data to investigate the e®ects of temporal embeddedness on
the provision of resources for the production of a surplus. We analyze data of buyer{
supplier relations in the Dutch IT{business (for the data set, see Buskens and Baten-
burg 2000). A transaction between the buyer and the supplier is interpreted as a
variant of a Trust Game, with the buyer being the trustor and the supplier the trustee.
The buyer's investment in the provision of a surplus is mirrored in her investment in
managing the transaction: the contract. The more complete a contract is, the more
expensive it is for the buyer and, consequently, the smaller the possible surplus, that
is, the utility of a working product minus the investment in management. A complete
contract leaves little room for opportunistic behavior by the supplier and thus leaves
him with a smaller share of the surplus as well.21 On the other hand, an incomplete
contract would save costs on the buyer's side|thus increasing the possible surplus|
but also increase the risk of the supplier behaving opportunistically, for instance, by
supplying inferior products since this would increase his share of the surplus. The
buyer's investment in securing a transaction with the supplier can therefore be seen
as a measure of the lack of trust in the buyer{supplier relation. The main question is
thus whether or not the buyer should substitute written and legally enforceable but
costly contracts for trust and how this decision is in°uenced by the buyer's and sup-
plier's temporal embeddedness. Predictions on the buyer's behavior in relation to the
supplier are based on the theory formulated in Chapter 3. The survey data used in
Chapter 4 also make it possible to test whether the results from these data correspond
with the experimental results presented in Chapter 3.
21A complete contract can be seen as a situation where the buyer places no trust in the supplier.
As such, it would correspond to the (P1;P 2){outcome in the Trust Game. However, one could see
contracts as hostages in the sense of Schelling (1960). The buyer{supplier relation could then be seen
as a Hostage Trust Game rather than as a simple Trust Game. See, for instance, Snijders (1990) for
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1.3 Delayed Agreement and Bargaining
Unlike the ¯rst part of the book, the second part (Chapter 5) implicitly assumes that
an encounter between two actors provides a surplus and addresses the division of the
surplus. In Chapter 5, we discuss a situation in which both actors have a right to
determine how the surplus is to be divided between them. An important aspect is
that neither of the actors can make a claim on any part of the surplus based on an
exogenously given right or on physical power. For instance, neither actor has a claim
on the larger part of the pie because he happens to be older, more in need, or in a
superior position, for example, being the boss or the trustee in a Trust Game, and thus
favored by the structure of the game. We again assume that both actors care about
nothing but how much of the surplus they get and that they prefer larger shares to
smaller ones.
A feasible and simple formal description of how a surplus can be divided was pro-
posed more than half a century ago. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) introduced
a game now known as the Ultimatum Game or `splitting the dollar' (e.g. Binmore 1992).
Actor 1, let us call him ego, and actor 2, we call her alter, can divide a dollar between
them.22 The game runs as follows. Ego makes a proposal to alter on how to divide
the dollar in whole cents. Alter can then either accept or refuse. If she accepts, the
dollar is divided according to ego's proposal. If she refuses, the game ends with alter
and ego earning nothing. Assuming the dollar can only be split in whole cents, the
game has two subgame{perfect Nash equilibria. Note that alter is indi®erent between
accepting or refusing a proposal of zero cents since she gets nothing either way. The
¯rst equilibrium thus prescribes that ego o®ers nothing and that alter accepts. In the
second equilibrium, ego o®ers 1 cent and alter accepts.23
The Ultimatum Game is a simple bargaining game which mirrors the kind of real
world behavior that can be observed millions of times a day. Whenever someone intends
to buy something in a Western store, she plays an Ultimatum Game. The seller writes
down a price and the buyer either accepts it or walks away.24 The game has been studied
22Of course, any other surplus is also possible. Ego and alter could divide 100 dollars, 15 euros, or
just 24 points. As long as they only care about their share of the surplus (i.e. they are risk neutral
and their von Neumann{Morgenstern utility of x dollars is worth x utils), nothing changes.
23Note that any split of the dollar in whole cents is supported by a Nash equilibrium. This, however,
leaves the question open which of these equilibria should be implemented by two rational and sel¯sh
actors? To rule out equilibria based upon incredible threats, we demand that an equilibrium is sub-
game{perfect (Selten 1965). Assume that alter threatens ego to deny any o®er smaller than 60 cents.
If ego now o®ers an amount smaller than 60 cents, alter should refuse. Neglecting this o®er, however,
would be irrational on the part of alter since it would leave her with nothing. Refusing any o®er
smaller than 60 cents is therefore an incredible threat: a threat a rational alter does not carry out
once it is her turn to accept or deny ego's proposal.
24Think of the buyer's share of the surplus as the di®erence between what she is willing to pay and
the actual price. The seller's share is then the di®erence between the price he sells the good for and
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in laboratory experiments. The ¯rst Ultimatum Game experiment was conducted by
GÄ uth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze (1982). They found the modal demand of ego to be
half the cake. On average, ego kept a little more than 50% of the cake and no demands
for 100% were observed. Other experiments also demonstrated ego's tendency to give
away signi¯cant fractions of the cake. On average, ego's observed o®ers were between
40% and 50% of the cake (e.g. Binmore, Gale, and Samuelson 1995; Forsythe et al.
1994; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986; Roth 1995; Roth and Erev 1995).25 As
in the case of the Trust Game or Prisoner's Dilemma Game, scholars seek to explain
the subjects' deviation from equilibrium play by means of, for instance, fairness (e.g.
Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Forsythe et al. 1994; GÄ uth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze
1982) or sometimes by means of unintended procedural features in the experiment (e.g.
Ho®man et al. 1993).
If a given surplus is divided according to the rules of the Ultimatum Game, how
come ego has the privilege of making the proposal on how to split the surplus? Why
cannot alter make the proposal and ego accepts or refuses?26 Of course, ego and alter
could toss a fair coin and let chance decide who should have the privilege to submit
the proposal. Instead of arguing about who should make the one and only proposal,
we could slightly relax the strict procedure of the Ultimatum Game and allow for a
countero®er by alter if she turns down ego's proposal on how to divide the surplus.27
Two{stage Ultimatum Games of this type have been studied by, for instance, Binmore,
Shaked, and Sutton (1985) or GÄ uth and Tietz (1988). Moreover, experimental tests
also employed three or ¯ve{stage Ultimatum Games (e.g. Neelin, Sonnenschein, and
Spiegel 1988) and ten{stage games (e.g. Bolton 1991; Ochs and Roth 1989). In later
rounds o®ers and countero®ers have been found to tend towards a ¯fty{¯fty split of the
surplus. For further information and experimental evidence on ultimatum bargaining,
I refer the reader to the overview article by Roth (1995) and chapter 5 in Davis and
Holt (1993).
Adding a ¯nite number of stages to the Ultimatum Game may reduce some of
ego's advantage of making the ¯rst and only proposal in the original game. However,
why should ego and alter stop making o®ers and countero®ers after a given number of
stages? In the second part of the book, we explain the division of the surplus if ego
and alter can negotiate about its distribution as long as they please. In terms of our
25Again, the working paper series of the Institute for Empirical Research in Economics of the
University of ZÄ urich (Bruno S. Frey and Ernst Fehr, see http://www.iew.unizh.ch) gives many more
experimental results for the Ultimatum Game.
26Why cannot the buyer propose a price she is willing to pay and the seller either accepts and sells,
or refuses and keeps his goods? At least among my friends, this is how matters are sometimes settled.
27One could argue that it would be possible to alternate the role of the trustor and trustee in the
repeated Trust Game as well. It would probably even help to establish mutual trust more easily.
Although this is worth investing, it is beyond the scope of this book. A game somewhat similar to
a repeated Trust Game where the trustor and the trustee switch roles is the Centipede Game (e.g.
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example, we are not interested in the price of a good in the Western store. Instead, we
are now interested in the price of the same good, say a carpet, on sale at an oriental
bazaar. The buyer knows the maximum price she is willing to pay. The seller, on the
other hand, has a clear conception of the minimum price he will still accept and sell the
carpet for. If the price the buyer is willing to pay exceeds the seller's minimum price,
a surplus is created and can be divided. In general, the seller and buyer then make
o®ers and countero®ers until the bargaining process eventually leads to an agreement
on the price. They do not have to stop bargaining after an exogenously given number
of o®ers. However, bargaining may break down if they cannot agree on a price. Their
roads might part without a surplus being divided. Mostly, however, bargaining leads
to an agreement with the buyer paying less than she would have been willing to pay
and the seller getting more than the minimum price he would have still sold the carpet
for. Both get a share of the surplus. The buyer and seller have taken turns making
o®ers and countero®ers until an agreement was reached.
Chapter 5 examines the division of a surplus in a game of o®ers and countero®ers
without a ¯xed number of rounds: roughly speaking, an Ultimatum Game with an
in¯nite number of stages known as the Alternating O®ers Game (Rubinstein 1982).
The game goes as follows. In the ¯rst time period, ego starts by making an o®er on
how to split the dollar. If alter refuses, she makes a countero®er in the second time
period which can then be accepted or refused by ego. If he refuses, it is his turn to
propose a division of the dollar in the third time period, which alter can accept or
refuse, and so on. Delaying an agreement on the division of the surplus, however, is
not to the advantage of ego and alter. They would rather divide the cake now than
later. A delay in agreement in°icts costs upon the bargaining actors. These costs
are introduced in the model via discount factors. The higher an actor's costs, the less
patient this actor can be in delaying the agreement and the smaller the actor's discount
factor.28 As in the Ultimatum Game, any split of the surplus is supported by a Nash
equilibrium and we can again ask which of these equilibria will be implemented by two
rational and sel¯sh actors. Common sense says that `good things come to those who
can wait' and one would thus intuitively expect the division of the surplus to depend
on the actors' patience in delaying an agreement. An impatient player can and will not
argue long about the division of the surplus and, compared to a more patient actor, is
thus content with less. As Rubinstein (1982) shows, this is exactly what happens: the
Alternating O®ers Game has one unique subgame{perfect equilibrium where ego and
alter split the dollar in the ¯rst round and the equilibrium split only depends on ego's
and alter's discount factors. Binmore (1985: 273) explains that being patient can be
28The longer ego and alter argue about the division of their surplus, the less they value their
respective shares once they agree on an division. An actor's utility of getting the share x of the
surplus at time t =0 ;1;2;::: is discounted using a discount factor 0 <±<1 and thus taken to be
x±t. Actors who are very patient have a discount factor close to one and rather impatient actors have
a discount factor close to zero.1.3 Delayed Agreement and Bargaining 19
translated into bargaining power. In equilibrium, the actor with the higher bargaining
power thus receives the larger share of the surplus.
The Alternating O®ers Game captures the essentials of bargaining and we use
the game in Chapter 5 to capture ego's and alter's negotiation process over a given
surplus. The outcome of the negotiation process is re°ected in the relation of ego's
and alter's bargaining powers, which rest in turn, on their respective discount factors.
Concrete predictions on the division of a given surplus require information about ego's
and alter's bargaining power. Bargaining powers can of course be assumed by the
researcher. This is not really satisfactory. We therefore follow Emerson (1972, 1981)
whose idea, roughly speaking, was that an actor's success in exchange depends on his
or her embeddedness in a larger network of other actors. Consequently, we use network
embeddedness to determine an actor's patience in delaying an agreement. This leads to
the ¯rst research question of Chapter 5: How does an actor's embeddedness in a larger
network of negotiation partners determine his or her share of the surplus in relations
with his or her partners?
1.3.1 Embedded Bargaining
A network structure is a set of bargaining relations between a set of actors. Say, there
are four actors: A, B, C, and D. A network is established if, for example, A is linked to
B, B is linked to C and D, and C and D are linked to each other. This network is known
as Stem.29 Figure 1.2 depicts this structure. Embedded bargaining simply means
that connected actors can engage in exchanges with each other. While Thibaut and
Kelley (1959) and Blau (1964) studied social exchange almost exclusively within two{
party systems, Emerson (1972, 1981) shifted the focus from dyadic exchange to more
complex exchange systems, such as the example above. He stressed that a network
structure gives actors an opportunity to participate in several exchange relations. In
the Stem structure, for instance, B has three opportunities to engage in exchange,
namely, with A, C, or D. Actor A, however, is at the periphery of the network and
can only exchange with B. From A's point of view, opportunities are scarce and the
network restricts his choices to exchanging with B. Eventually, A is even worse o®
than in a simple dyad with B since B now has alternatives to an exchange with A.
As a result, A's expectation about a lengthy and successful negotiation process with B
should be small. A delay in agreement will be very costly for A and A thus tends to
be impatient and his bargaining power can be expected to be small.
Emerson (1972, 1981) proposed a theory of social exchange centered around the
concept that actors' success in their exchanges depends on the network structure they
are embedded in. His point of departure is a simple one. Actors are involved simul-
taneously in many exchange relations but the actors di®er as regards the number of
29Actors C and D are structurally equivalent and thus generally referred to as C1 and C2; Chapter 5
will adopt this labelling scheme. For the sake of clearness of the example, we nevertheless adhere to
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Figure 1.2 Stem network structure where lines indicate possible exchange relations.
exchange relations they are in. The power of one actor over the other is determined by
the dependency of the latter on the former. In Emerson's theory of exchange, opportu-
nities to substitute between partners are the central source of power. Our approach to
bargaining power rests on Emerson's idea of dependency. Actors' positions in a given
negotiation network can be de¯ned by the number of their possible exchange relations.
These exchange relations determine the actors' patience in negotiating the division of
a surplus, which translates into bargaining power. In the Stem example given above,
A only has B to negotiate the division of a surplus with. B, however, has two other
possible exchange partners, namely C and D. Assume B can obtain the same good in
all his relations. A is fully dependent on B for exchange but C and D can at least
exchange with each other. B is in a very advantageous position and A is in a very
unfavorable one. C and D are somewhere in between. B can therefore be very patient
in negotiating a surplus. A must be very impatient and C and D can be more patient
than A but less patient than B.
However, A is only highly dependent on B for exchange if all of B's partners, from
B's point of view, are alternatives. Emerson (1972: 70{71) refers to this type of relations
as negatively connected. An example is a sports network where connected actors can
and want to play squash with each other. A only has B to play squash with. If B and
C choose to play each other, because they agree on the `prize money', A and D have
no choice but to stay home. If B plays D, A and C stay home. A is not in an enviable
position. C and D, in turn, are in a somewhat better position. They do not depend
fully on B for exchange. If B and A decide to play squash, C and D can still play
each other. Whatever couples form to play squash, B will always be in the game. B is
thus in the most favorable position if the Stem network of Figure 1.2 is negatively
connected. However, Emerson also argues that relations can be positively connected.
This means exchange in one relation tends to stimulate exchange in another one. Say B
can only exchange with C or D if he obtains a speci¯c good from A ¯rst. For instance,
A has two squash rackets and B has none. If B wants to play C or D, he ¯rst has to
exchange with A. Even though A is at the periphery of the network, he is important
for exchange in the whole structure. This puts a positively connected A in a better
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Summing up, Emerson (1972, 1981) claims that networks are important even if the
focus is on dyadic exchange. Networks determine the alternatives or restrictions that
produce di®erences in power. In Chapter 5, we use Emerson's logic of dependency in
network exchange to de¯ne the bargaining power of actors in a negotiation network.
The di®erence in bargaining powers between actors represents di®erences in the actors'
positions in the network and whether the actors are negatively or positively connected
(relational assessment). The equilibrium outcome of the Alternating O®ers Game
informally described in the previous section depends on these bargaining powers. So,
the answer to the research question `who gets how much of the surplus', is the result of a
negotiation procedure where o®ers and countero®ers are sequentially made in bilateral
sessions. The outcome of this negotiation process is in accordance with the solution of
Rubinstein's Alternating O®ers Game.
1.3.2 Overview
Emerson's initial work on network exchange was further elaborated in Cook and Emer-
son (1978). Eventually, their ideas evolved into the research program of sociological
exchange theories (for an overview see Willer 1999). These theories adopt the idea
that position and relational assessment contribute towards determining an actor's bar-
gaining success. Research on exchange theories thus seeks to explain how structure
a®ects negotiated outcomes between rational and sel¯sh egoists. The focus is generally
on negatively connected networks where a resource transfer in one relation prevents
transfers in others. To test theoretical predictions, experimental situations are used
where actors are placed in an exogenously given network that limits feasible matches
between bargaining partners. An example is the Stem structure introduced above. In
this type of experiments, connected actors typically negotiate|generally via computer
terminals|the division of a surplus of 24 points. The experimental protocol prescribes
negotiation rules that closely match alternating o®ers bargaining. Since experimental
subjects are stimulated to maximize their earned points, network exchange experiments
match the theoretical approach of embedded bargaining as presented in Chapter 5. To
answer our research question and determine the empirical relevance of our approach,
Chapter 5 thus uses published experimental data from network exchange theory.
Following Thibaut and Kelley (1959), Gouldner (1960), and Blau (1964), Emerson's
primary focus was on social exchange and therefore on reciprocity as the driving force
behind exchange. According to Emerson, actors seek to discharge obligations created
by the reciprocal behavior of others. They do not want to remain indebted. Moreover,
actors try to decrease power di®erences between each other by initiating further ex-
change, including exchange with new partners if it diminishes their interdependence.
Finally, initially more powerful actors become dependent on less powerful ones if they
engage in repeated exchange with the latter. In the long run, dyadic exchange re-
lations thus tend to become balanced. In other words, the actors become equal in
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cess consequently changes network structures over time. For Emerson, social structure
is therefore a dependent variable (see also Cook and Whitmeyer 1992): negotiation
outcomes a®ect the structure.
We start from the assumption that the structure a®ects negotiation outcomes. Our
contribution to sociological exchange theory, however, does not regard exchange as a
consequence of reciprocal behavior but merely as a rational and sel¯sh way of negotiat-
ing the division of a surplus. After all, such utility maximizing behavior is stimulated in
experimental subjects. If a given network structure changes, it is not due to Emerson's
balancing process that seeks to minimize power di®erences between actors. Instead,
rational and sel¯sh actors strive to maximize their power|and hence, the power dif-
ferences between them|by eventually permanently breaking some of their existing
negotiation links if it improves their bargaining power. As a consequence, some real-
ized exchange structures may deviate from the given negotiation structures. The ¯rst
research question pertains to who gets how much of the surplus depending on his or
her network embeddedness. In negatively connected networks where exchange in one
relation prevents exchange in other relations, a second research question becomes rel-
evant: With whom of his or her connected partners does an actor divide a surplus if
restrictions in a network prescribe that the actor can only divide one surplus at a time?
The network exchange model in Chapter 5 thus also addresses the change of a given
network structure due to breaks in certain negotiation links.30
1.4 Structure of the Book
The following three chapters all focus on the provision of a surplus and temporal em-
beddedness. Chapter 2 ¯rst of all addresses the question whether the past in any
way a®ects behavior. Experimental evidence from social dilemma situations is used to
elaborate on this question. Chapter 3 then uses these experimental ¯ndings, combined
with the better known idea that the future does a®ect behavior in current situations, to
study how temporal embeddedness in°uences the provision of a surplus. We conceptu-
alize the provision of a surplus as a Trust Game. Experimental evidence from repeated
Trust Games is used to test the hypothesized e®ects of temporal embeddedness on the
provision of a surplus: that is, whether or not trust is placed. Chapter 4 builds on the
theory formulated in Chapter 3 but tests the predictions using survey data on buyer{
supplier relations in the Dutch IT{industry. The amount of trust the buyer places in
the supplier is measured as his investment in managing the current transaction with
the supplier. We study how the buyer's and supplier's temporal embeddedness a®ect
this investment in management. Chapter 5 ¯nally addresses the division of a surplus
as a game of alternating o®ers. We focus on networks of bargaining actors and predict
30Unlike Emerson (1972, 1981), however, we do not consider situations where actors initiate new
exchange relations beyond the ones given in the initial negotiation structure. We thus do not address
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who gets how much of the surplus in each relation. To test these predictions we use
existing experimental evidence from network exchange theory.
All chapters of this book are self{contained and can be read without knowing the
content of the other chapters. Consequently, a certain amount of overlap between
Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4, all focusing on the provision of a surplus, could
not be prevented.blubChapter 2
History E®ects in Social Dilemma
Situations¤
\For no man giveth, but with intention of Good to himselfe; be-
cause Gift is Voluntary; and of all Voluntary Acts, the Object
is to every man his own Good; of which if men see they shall be
frustrated, there will be no beginning of benevolence, or trust; nor
consequently of mutuall help; nor of reconciliation of one man to
another; and therefore they are to remain still in the condition
of War; which is contrary to the ¯rst and Fundamentall Law of
Nature, which commandeth men to Seek Peace."
Thomas Hobbes (1651: 105)
2.1 Introduction
Some scholars have argued that a dynamical analysis of trust typically reveals an
asymmetry between a slow emergence and a swift decline of trust (e.g. Blau 1964;
Coleman 1990; Dasgupta 1988). Intuitively, it seems reasonable that building up a
trust relation is more time consuming than ruining such a relation. This is based on
the understanding of trust relations as a risky situation for at least one person, namely,
the trustor, the person who decides to place or withhold trust (Coleman 1990: 97{99).
`To trust someone' inheres the possibility to become disappointed. Once trust is placed,
it can either be honored or abused by the trustee. Therefore, as long as the trustor
sees a chance that the trustee abuses trust if placed, she should be `careful'. Since we
assume that trust is a binary decision (i.e. trust is either placed or withheld), `to be
careful' means therefore, that one keeps a probable loss due to wrongly placed trust
small (i.e. only place trust if the outcome at stake is small). Taking this risk to trust
can be worthwhile, however, since it is the only way to obtain information about the
trustee's incentives. Further, placing and subsequently honoring trust secures a payo®
to both players which is larger than their payo®s when trust is withheld (surplus). This
suggests that the risk a trustor takes by placing trust should increase after the trustee
¤A slightly di®erent version of this chapter has been published in Rationality and Society 12 (2):
131{162, 2000.
2526 Chapter 2 History E®ects in Social Dilemma Situations
has proved himself trustworthy by honoring placed trust. On the other hand, once
betrayed, the trust relation normally ends swiftly. It then has become obvious that the
trustee is, in fact, not trustworthy and it makes sense to try to ¯nd others, who are
more worthy of our trust. Alternatively, one may make use of safeguards (cf. Schelling
1960) which make it unfavorable for the trustee to abuse trust. Unfortunately, we
do not dispose of any hard evidence that this theoretically plausible asymmetry does
indeed exist empirically.
The assertion about the asymmetry in the emergence and decline of trust is mainly
based on two straightforward foundations: the importance of both the past and the
future in a trust relation. That is, a relation where an investment of resources bears the
risk of an unfavorable outcome for the investor. While the past assumably shapes the
experience of the trustor about the e®orts and incentives of the trustee and possibly
reduces the investments into the trustor's current `risk management' (e.g. complex
and lengthy contracts in business relations or extensive and costly searches for new
trustworthy partners), the future will allow the trustor to control and sanction the
actions of the trustee (e.g. Buskens 1999: ch. 1). Such future{e®ects are normally
referred to as reciprocal behavior (e.g. Blau 1964) or conditional cooperation (e.g. Taylor
1987).1 While these potential e®ects of the `shadow of the future' are relatively well
known (e.g. Axelrod 1984; Maynard Smith 1982; Trivers 1971), this does not hold
for the `shadow of the past'. Whether subjects take into account past occurrences or
not and how these occurrences in°uence their behavior is not very well understood.
An example of an exception, showing that past e®ects may a®ect current behavior,
can be found in Rapoport (1988). He compared, among other things, the level of
cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game. He assigned the subjects to two groups, one
group playing a Prisoner's Dilemma after they participated in another social dilemma
situation, the other group playing the Prisoner's Dilemma before they were confronted
with the other social dilemma situation.2 The latter group showed a smaller percentage
of cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. This ¯nding could, to some degree,
1That is, if the past indeed shapes expectations about the (future) behavior of the partner, then
ongoing cooperative exchange needs a way to react and/or sanction any violation of these expectations.
However, in doing so, the system also needs a method of absolution (Deutsch 1958).
2Brie°y, this social dilemma situation represented a Tragedy of the Commons game where subjects
could, in each round, simultaneously claim a share of a common resource (pool). The game lasted
for seven rounds and subjects played in groups of four persons. Subjects were informed about the
number of rounds to be played but, while the game lasted, not about the individual shares taken out
of the pool. The remaining resource in the pool was doubled after each round and made common
knowledge. However, the game only continued as long as the sum of the subjects' shares did not
match or even exceed the resource in the pool. Consequently, an empty or overdrawn pool ended the
game. A collectively rational strategy would therefore be to equally split the pool in the last round
while it would be individually rational to claim the whole pool in the second to the last round, given
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be understood as an e®ect of the past (i.e. playing another social dilemma game) on
the present (i.e. playing the Prisoner's Dilemma).3
Using three data sets on experimental social dilemmas, this chapter addresses the
question whether we can ¯nd any proof that past e®ects exist. The remainder of
the chapter is structured as follows. The next section presents a simple theory which
allows to compare a subject's behavior in social dilemma situations with and without a
past, where the present and the future are kept constant. The theory predicts similar
behavior in both situations. Hence, a possible di®erence in behavior in the `non{history'
and the `history' situation has to be due to the past. Section 2.3 presents results from
three data sets on experimental social dilemmas. The results show that we indeed ¯nd
evidence of past e®ects in all cases. Therefore, the game theoretic models underlying
the experiments are ill suited to explain these e®ects. The last section o®ers intuitive
theoretical reasons why these history e®ects occur. Moreover, we come up with some
suggestions on how to model them.
2.2 History E®ects in Simple Games
This section discusses behavior in two simple and similar situations and its implications
in connection with past occurrences. These situations will further be referred to as
Game A and Game B. Even though the games can be understood in terms of game
theory, we abstain from a game theoretic analysis of the situations since it would only
add more complexity without bringing about an additional insight into the e®ect of the
past. We will, nevertheless, come back to game theory later in this section (and in the
discussion section) and link our `theory' to game theory under complete information.4
Let us ¯rst in general describe Game A and Game B. In the third section, we will specify
the characteristics of Game A and Game B chosen to execute the three experiments.
2.2.1 Situations With and Without a History in General
We de¯ne a Game A to be a game of nA ¸ 1 players, where every active player disposes
of at least two actions, leading to a unique strategy for every player of the game, telling
him which action to choose at every node of the game. The game ends with a speci¯c
3Some of the early studies on trust also addressed, to some degree, the question whether or not the
past a®ects the present. Boyle and Bonacich (1970), for example, found support for their assumption
that subjects' current expectations about the outcome in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game will change
in the direction in which experience is di®erent from their previous expectations. In the same vein,
Deutsch (1958), amongst other ¯ndings, shows that an experienced benevolent rather than malevolent
treatment in the past leads subjects to be more likely to act benevolently when in charge of the outcome
of a Prisoner's Dilemma Game. Finally, Swinth (1976), based on evidence from two{times repeated
Prisoner's Dilemma type games, argues that a commitment period in which good intentions can be
signalled is enough to establish trust.
4The data at hand is based on simple game theoretic models but can, for our purpose, be analyzed
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payo® for every player in the game (i.e. active as well as inactive players). We assume
the game to be one of complete information (e.g. Rasmusen 1994: ch. 2).
Game B resembles the situation captured by Game A but is characterized by pre-
ceding actions of k · nB players, with nA · nB allowing for the introduction of new
players in Game B. This will extend Game A such that it becomes a subgame of the
larger Game B, now referred to as Game AB (read: \Game A in B").5 We require that
Game AB and Game A are the same in terms of players, actions, and payo®s. Hence,
the `preceding actions' in Game B can extend Game A in two ways. First, Game B
may be a repeated version of Game A. Second, for at least one player the `preceding
actions' are actions which were not available to him in Game A and which give him the
possibility to form other strategies.6 Therefore, Game B becomes a game where Game
AB forms one of several possible subgames.
What we assume throughout the whole chapter is that every player has all infor-
mation necessary for a decision in every node of Game A and Game B and also applies
it with perfect rationality.7 Hence, a player's decision on what strategy to play in
Game A as well as in Game B should only be based on his expected payo®s.
The `extension' of Game A which makes up the larger Game B as discussed above
is precisely what is considered to be the `history' of the game. Loosely speaking, it
denotes (i) anything which has occurred before subgame Game AB was reached, and
(ii) anything which could have happened if Game AB had not been reached. Again, we
assume that the history is known to all players.
What we are interested in is the comparison between the strategy chosen by a
player i in Game A and the strategy chosen by (the same) player i in Game AB. Note
that this means that Game A and Game AB are not only similar with regard to players,
actions, and payo®s, but also with regard to i's decision problem. Since we are solely
interested in the comparison of i's decision in Game A and Game AB, we do not have
to discuss the other possible subgames of Game B.8 Following, we sketch a simple
argument which generally describes what a player i should do in a situation which
resembles a Game A and a Game B. As we explain in some detail below, behavior in
Game A and Game AB should be identical.
5For a formal de¯nition of a subgame see, for example, Rasmusen (1994: 94). Loosely speaking,
a subgame is the game which follows the history of the (whole) game played so far and requires that
the subject who moves next precisely knows what has been `going on' so far in the game.
6Note that we do not exclude the possibility that this can also be a new player, not having played
Game A at all.
7It will be su±cient to de¯ne rationality as maximizing one's own interests, that is, choosing the
alternative which yields the largest utility. When discussing the theory and the experiments, we
assume that the utility for any actor increases (decreases) with a higher (lower) payo® to himself and
is independent of the payo®s of the remaining actors (i.e. `utility is own money').
8Even though under a game theoretic analysis the characteristics of these subgames are important
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2.2.2 A Simple `Theory' on History E®ects
As explained above, Game A is similar to the subgame Game AB of a larger game
Game B. Therefore, the only di®erence between Game A and Game AB is that the latter
represents a situation with a history. The important point to make is that this history
brings about no further information necessary for a decision by i once he reaches
subgame Game AB. He ends up in the same situation we denoted as Game A, facing
the same players, actions, and payo®s. Therefore, an actor i has precisely the same
information to base his decision on in subgame Game AB as he would have in Game A
where no preceding actions take place. From this point of view, the incident which
forms the history of Game B is irrelevant for a decision of i in Game AB. Therefore,
the behavior of an actor i in subgame Game AB should be the same as in Game A.
We ¯nd the same argumentation in Harsanyi and Selten (1988). In connection with
subgame consistency, they remark: \After all, once the subgame has been reached all
other parts of the game are strategically irrelevant." (p. 90).9 We already put forward
the arguments leading to this conclusion, but let us in short summarize them.
² Actor i actually faces the same alternatives, leading to the same payo®s whether
he is in a Game A or in a Game AB. Therefore, Game A and the subgame Game
AB are similar with regard to i's decision problem.
² Actor i is rational and sel¯sh and, therefore, his behavior is only contingent on
the payo®s of the game.
² The action(s) which extend Game A to become Game B form what we call the
history of the subgame Game AB.
² The information i gains from the history is irrelevant for his decision in subgame
Game AB since it is not re°ected in the payo®s of Game AB.
² Hence, i's behavior in Game A and Game AB should be the same.
However, let us brie°y mention one aspect of i's rationality. It is important that all
actors are opportunistic in the sense that they seek to improve their own monetary
9A note on the di®erence between subgame perfectness and subgame consistency seems appropriate
here. Especially since our argumentation about `no di®erence between Game A and Game B should
be found' actually hinges on the criterion of subgame perfectness (Selten 1965) but we have just cited
Harsanyi and Selten (1988) on subgame consistency. However, subgame perfectness and subgame
consistency di®er to some extent. Even though related, subgame consistency applies whenever a
game has no proper subgames and, in addition, Bayes' Rule cannot be applied since at least one
information set is not reached with positive probability in the course of the game. For weaker notions
of consistency (i.e. if Bayes' Rule can be applied), we speak of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (e.g.
Kreps 1990b). In short, every subgame{perfect equilibrium is also a Bayesian equilibrium, and every
Bayesian equilibrium is also subgame consistent. Harsanyi and Selten (1988: 90®, 344®), however,
do not make a di®erence between the de¯nition of a subgame and a proper subgame. Together with
the fact that Bayes' Rule can always be applied to the situations we focus on, there is no di®erence
between subgame perfectness and consistency with respect to the simple games under consideration.30 Chapter 2 History E®ects in Social Dilemma Situations
utility. Otherwise it is possible that the history might indeed disclose some relevant
information to i (e.g. about some other actor(s) having positive sentiments towards
the i{th actor).
What we are further going to do in this chapter is compare situations which resemble
a Game A with situations which resemble a Game B and Game AB, respectively. That is,
situations where a subject faces the same decision in both games but `bears the burden'
of an irrelevant (from a rational decision point of view) history in Game B. Hence, these
situations are theoretically identical and should therefore lead to the same outcome.
But what if we indeed ¯nd di®erent behavior in those two situations? Since the
situations re°ect a simple decision problem and the only di®erence between them is
the history of Game B, we have to explain possibly di®erent behavior in Game A and
Game AB by the existence of its history. If the experiments analyzed in Section 2.3 do
show di®erent behavior in Game A and Game AB, we need to take into account that
people may not only base their decision on the payo®s alone. But what would a theory
say about Game A and Game B which assumes that actors are fully rational in their
behavior?
2.2.3 Game Theory and Its Prediction for Game A and Game B
We have so far considered a theory whose assumptions come close to game theory
under complete information.10 We will now lay out under what conditions (a variant
of) game theory would predict the same behavior in Game A and Game AB. However,
the aim of this chapter is not to make a contribution to game theory but to analyze
simple experimental situations based on game theoretic understanding.
² If we assume that Game A and Game B are games with complete information such
that there exists a unique (subgame perfect) equilibrium, Selten's (1965) theory
of subgame perfection trivially predicts that the behavior in Game A and Game
AB is indeed the same (see, e.g. Rasmusen 1994: 93{95).
² If there are multiple (subgame perfect) equilibria in Game A, this prediction
no longer holds. Predictions would then depend on the equilibrium selection
arguments to be applied to the games. Consequently, it need not be true that
the same equilibrium is predicted for Game A and Game AB (for an example, see
Rasmusen 1994: 95{96). The existence of multiple (subgame perfect) equilibria
especially becomes a problem if Game A itself is a (in)¯nitely repeated game (Folk
Theorem, see e.g. Rasmusen 1994: 123{126).
² Some authors have discussed the validity of subgame perfectness, which is espe-
cially relevant in the case where the subgame Game AB is not on the equilibrium
10See for instance Rasmusen (1994: ch. 2) for a discussion of information requirements in games and
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path of Game B (e.g. Kreps 1990b: 432{437). What should rational actors con-
clude when they arrive at Game AB although they know they should not have?
Subgame perfection is a strictly forward{looking re¯nement of Nash Equilibrium
that assumes that players believe they arrived at Game AB `by coincidence' and
do not take into account whether it is at all likely that they end up in that partic-
ular decision node (for a discussion on Nash re¯nements, see, e.g. Kreps 1990b:
417{443). The theory of forward induction (e.g. Kohlberg and Mertens 1986)
which was developed in a context of signaling games (e.g. Rasmusen 1994: 165®),
argues that rational actors would in fact modify their beliefs when `impossible'
(i.e. probability zero) events indeed occur. Hence, this would very much question
whether the predictions for Game A and Game AB would be the same or not.
If we seek to model games like Game A and Game B using game theory, the question
is of course what would be an appropriate model? If we would model the situations
using games with incomplete information, game theory would not necessary predict
any longer that players should behave the same in Game A and Game AB. Under the
assumption of incomplete information, players may, for example, learn something about
the incentives of each other from playing the part of Game B that leads to Game AB.
2.3 Empirical Analysis of History E®ects
In this section, we present an analysis of three di®erent data sets. Even though not
speci¯cally designed to test history e®ects, they are nevertheless well suited for our
purposes. The setup of all three experiments is similar. Each employs a simple game
theoretic representation of a social dilemma situation which allows for a Game A{Game
AB comparison. If history e®ects do not play a role in a®ecting the subjects' behavior,
we should then not ¯nd di®erent results in any of the Game A and Game AB under
study in this section.
2.3.1 Experiment 1 (Snijders and Keren 1997)
This experiment tests the most simple case we would regard as `history e®ects'. It
will be checked whether subjects play di®erently if confronted with a simple choice
out of two alternatives (Game A) or the same choice, but with a history (Game AB).
Before we describe the games in more detail, we ¯rst lay out some characteristics of
the experiment.
Background: The experiment was conducted by Snijders and Keren at Utrecht Uni-
versity. The results presented here are based on one out of ¯ve experiments executed.
For an overview of all experiments see Snijders and Keren (1997).
Subjects: 172 students from Utrecht University participated in an experiment re°ect-
ing a Game A and a Game B. For their participation, students were paid NLG 11 (Dutch
Guilders, approximately
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lasted for about 45 minutes. The participants received written information as well as
a graphical representation of the games.
Setup: Participants were randomly assigned to one of ¯ve conditions, from which we
only consider the relevant four. Two games represent a Game B whereas the other two
conditions represent a Game A, identical to the subgame Game AB of Game B. We will
further refer to these game{couples as Game A{1 and Game B{1 and Game A{2 and
Game B{2, respectively. The games are depicted in Figure 2.1:11
Game A{1: This game represents a decision situation where actor j is asked to split
an amount of money either equally between himself and actor i (choosing right) or in
favor of himself (choosing left). Subjects were asked whether they would choose right
or left as actor j. Note that this game it the Dictator Game discussed in Chapter 1.
Game B{1: This game represents the same choice situation for actor j as A{1 but this
time, actor i is an `active' player. He can choose between splitting a smaller amount
of money equally between himself and j (choosing left) or let j split a larger amount
of money (choosing right). Players i and j move sequentially, i before j. Again,
subjects were asked whether they would choose right or left as actor j. Note that if i
chooses right, j is confronted with Game A{1. Game B{1 is the Trust Game discussed
in Chapter 1.
Game A{2: This game represents a decision situation for actor k where he is asked
to split an amount of money either equally between himself and the actors i and j
(choosing right) or in favor of himself (choosing left). Subjects were asked whether
they would choose right or left as actor k. This is a Dictator Game with three actors.
Game B{2: B{2 represents the same choice situation for actor k as described by Game
A{2 but this time, actors i and j are `active' players. Actor i chooses to either split
a smaller amount of money in favor of himself (choosing left) or lets j decide to split
this amount of money (choosing right). Actor j can then choose between splitting the
amount of money in favor of himself (choosing left) or let k split a larger amount of
money (choosing right). Players i, j, and k move sequentially, i before j and j before
k. Again, subjects were asked whether they would choose right or left as actor k. This
is a Trust Game with three actors.
Design: The setup of the experiment, assigning the students randomly to one of ¯ve
groups, leads to a `between{subjects' design in which all students only played either
a Game A or a Game B. This allows for two `Game A{Game AB' comparisons of the
following kind:
² Situations described by Game A{1 and Game A{2 are simple decision situations
for the subjects.
² Situations described by Game AB{1 and Game AB{2 (i.e. the subgames of Game
B{1 and Game B{2, respectively) denote precisely the same decision situation for
11In Figure 2.1 and all following ¯gures, payo®s following from a certain combination of actions
are represented as vectors. Those vectors should be read top{down, ¯rst indicating player i's payo®,
then player j's payo®, and, at the bottom, player k's payo®.2.3 Empirical Analysis of History E®ects 33
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Figure 2.1 Four games representing a choice situation for j in Game 1 and k in
Game 2.
the subjects as in Game A{1 and Game A{2 but this time with a history. The
history consists of the moves by i (and j, respectively).
² Subjects (playing as actor j in Game B{1 and as actor k in Game B{2) are able
to conclude from the game played so far that i (and j) must have chosen `right'
to give them the possibility to actually perform an action (i.e. choose between
`left' and `right'). This history is known to all actors. According to our theory,
this `shadow of the past' should neither in°uence j's (Game B{1) nor k's (Game
B{2) decision to choose between right and left since their decisions should only
be based on the payo®s of the game. And these payo®s are precisely the same as
under conditions Game A{1 and Game A{2, respectively.
² Hence, based on our simple theory, we expect the same percentage of subjects
choosing right or left in Game A{1 (Game A{2) and Game B{1 (Game B{2).
Before we discuss the results of the experiment, let us in short lay out the game theoretic
solution to these games.
Game Theory: Game B{1 is a two{stage Trust Game (Dasgupta 1988) with a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium where both i and j choose left and both earn 40. Game
A{1 represents the only (proper) subgame of this Trust Game, starting with the node
where j has to make a decision.12 Game B{2 is a three{stage Trust Game which follows
the same logic as the (two{stage) Trust Game (i.e. Game B{1). It also has a unique
12Note that Game A{1 is a Dictator Game. Normally, in a Dictator Game j would be given the
possibility to split an amount of money as he pleases. Here, he is given the possibility to split the
money equally between him and actor i or in favor of himself.34 Chapter 2 History E®ects in Social Dilemma Situations
Table 2.1 Choosing `Right' in games representing situations with and without a
history in experiment 1.
A{1|B{1 Comparison A{2|B{2 Comparison
Game A{1 Game B{1 Game A{2 Game B{2
Right 35.5% 73.5% 25.8% 60.0%
NRight 11 25 8 21
Ntotal 31 34 31 35
Notes: Comparison of behavior shows signi¯cant di®erences between Game A{1 and Game B{1
(Â2(1) = 9:4986;p<: 005) and between Game A{2 and Game B{2 (Â2(1) = 7:8630;p<: 01).
subgame perfect equilibrium where i, j, and k choose left. This leads to a payo® of
40 for i and 10 for j and k each. Again, Game A{2 presents the last subgame of the
three{stage game, starting with the node where k gets to choose an action. We assume
that the utility for an actor increases (decreases) with a higher (lower) payo® to himself
and is independent of the payo®s of the remaining actors.
Even though game theory predicts that j in games A{1 and B{1, respectively k in
games A{2 and B{2 should choose `left', we do not focus on testing this game theoretic
prediction.13 We only want to stress that if someone chooses `left' in the subgame{only
version, he should|under mild conditions|also choose `left' if confronted with the
whole game tree. The same holds true for someone choosing `right'. Put di®erently, we
want to pinpoint the fact that the history should not in°uence the decision to choose
between `left' or `right'.
Results: The relevant results of the experiment are summarized in Table 2.1. Con-
trary to what our theory predicts, subjects who were confronted with a game and its
history (Game B{1 and Game B{2) showed a signi¯cantly higher percentage of choos-
ing `right' (73.5% and 60% versus 35.5% and 25.8%) than did the subjects who played
Game A{1 and Game A{2, respectively. This ¯nding is neither in line with our theory
nor with game theory, according to which everybody should have chosen `left'.
Discussion: Even though the results go against our theory, there seems to be a
common sense explanation, stemming from the history of the game. It seems reasonable
to assume that the history of the game contains some information which is not re°ected
in the payo®s of the B{games. Even though a rational actor should, according to our
theory, base his decision on the monetary payo®s and neglect anything not represented
13If we deal with strictly rational players, no i in B{1 and B{2 (and, additionally, also no j in B{2)
should ever choose `right'. Any j in B{1 and k in B{2 should thus be very well aware that they will
never have the chance to move. The reader may now argue that this resembles the situation of an
`impossible' event where Kohlberg and Mertens' (1986) forward induction theory applies. However,
since the situation is one of complete information, forward induction is irrelevant and no j in B{1 (or
j and k in B{2) would want to change his strategy of always choosing `left' just because i in B{1 (or
i and j in B{2) for whatever reason now played `right'. Even though games A{1 and A{2 are not on
the equilibrium path of the larger games B{1 and B{2, respectively, it does not a®ect our conclusions.2.3 Empirical Analysis of History E®ects 35
by them, this seems not to be what happened here. In the situation described by Game
B{1 and Game B{2, subjects can easily see that they are dependent on the decision of
one, respectively two, other actors. In Game B{1, the other actor could have chosen
`left' to secure himself a `safe' payo® since he can foresee that a rational subject should
always choose `left' after he has chosen `right', which would leave himself with the
worst possible payo®. The same, of course, holds true for Game B{2, where i and j
should choose `left' if confronted with a rational k who goes for `right' if the subgame
is reached. Any subject in the role of j in Game B{1 and k in Game B{2, respectively,
sees that if he indeed reaches the node where he is to decide how to split the money,
the other actor(s) must have chosen `right' and thereby running the risk of a possible
`loss', namely, the di®erence between what they could have gotten by playing `left' in
the ¯rst place and what they get if j in Game B{1 (k in Game B{2, respectively) plays
`left'.
What might have happened is that the subjects honor this outcome (viz. reaching
`their' subgame) by reciprocal behavior. Many subjects turned out to be fair enough
to split the amount of money equally instead of grabbing the bigger piece of the cake in
the B{games. The situations without a revealing history (exposing the fair character
of the other players) leave no room for reciprocal behavior since the situation only
asks to split the money (un)equally between oneself and an unknown other (or two
unknown others, respectively). It seems that subjects are more sel¯sh in situations
where they do not know anything about the character of the other subject(s). Why
should I share the pie equally if I do not have any evidence that the other is worth that
gesture? Put di®erently, the results speak in favor of some history dependent altruism
(or history driven reciprocity) but would question the existence of a general norm of
reciprocity (Gouldner 1960). If the latter indeed exists, we would then be in need to
explain why 26.5% and 40% of the subjects in Game B{1 and Game B{2, respectively,
played uncooperatively?
As this simple experiment shows, the history of the game is not only capable of
revealing some information (about the other players, in the situation at hand) not
re°ected in the payo®s, but also that the subjects do indeed take this additional `piece
of evidence' into account when choosing which alternative to perform: a ¯rst hint that
our theory may need revision.
2.3.2 Experiment 2 (Snijders 1996)
Compared to Experiment 1, the history of the game presented here is a bit more
complex. Nonetheless, from a rational point of view, it will again be irrelevant for a
proper decision. Let us again ¯rst discuss the setup of the experiments.
Background: The experiments were conducted by Snijders at Groningen University
and Amsterdam University. The results presented here are only a small fraction of
several experiments by Snijders. With regard to a Game A{Game B comparison, only
two experiments are of relevance. For more details, see Snijders (1996: 65{84).36 Chapter 2 History E®ects in Social Dilemma Situations
Subjects: 106 students from Groningen University and 102 students from Amsterdam
University participated in an experiment re°ecting a Game A and a Game B. The
subjects were promised a minimum of NLG 10 (approximately
e 4:50 or US$ 6 at the
time of the experiment) for participating. In addition, about 15% of the subjects would
earn more (up to a maximum of NLG 120 or
e 54:50) depending on their performance.
All participants were orally instructed by the experimenter about the task to perform.
In addition, they also received written instructions and a graphical representation of
the games to be played.
Setup: Each subject in Groningen and Amsterdam played ¯ve times a Game A and
later ¯ve times a Game B. The A{ as well as the B{games only di®ered in terms of
their absolute payo®s. This does not change the characteristics of the games since the
ordinal ranking of the payo®s assigned to each combination of alternatives remained
the same in each Game A as well as in each Game B. Subjects were asked to make a
decision in each Game A and Game B as an actor i as well as an actor j. To be able
to make an appropriate comparison with respect to the history e®ects, we are only
interested in the participants' behavior as actor i. Game A and Game B are depicted
in Figure 2.2:
Game A: This game represents a decision situation for actor i where he is asked to
split an amount of money equally between himself and another actor j (choosing left)
or handing over the decision to split a larger amount of money to j (choosing right).
Actor i knows that actor j must then choose between two alternatives, namely, splitting
this larger amount of money equally between himself and i (choosing right) or in favor
of himself (choosing left). Subjects were asked whether they would choose right or left
as actor i.
Game B: This game again represents the same choice situation as described by Game A,
but preceded by an additional move by actor j. He has to decide whether or not to
`post a hostage', a good over which j voluntarily renounces disposal and which changes
(due to its value) his incentive structure such that opportunistic behavior on his behalf
becomes unattractive (or at least less attractive).14 If posted by j, the hostage is lost
(i.e. goes to a third party or the opponent) in case of opportunistic behavior by j.I fj
does not post a hostage, subgame Game AB will be played. If j does post a hostage, a
`new' subgame Game CB will be played which di®ers in payo®s compared to Game AB if
i chooses right and j consequently chooses left. The relevant question for our purpose
is: \If you were actor i and actor j had not posted a hostage, would you then choose
left or right?".
Design: The setup of the experiment, letting each subject play (¯ve times) Game A
as well as (¯ve times) Game B leads to a `within{subjects' design. A `Game A{Game B'
comparison of the following kind can be made:
14See, for example, Schelling (1960) for an intuitive discussion of hostages in social interactions, Raub
and Keren (1993) for a theoretical analysis and prior experimental evidence, and Raub and Weesie
(2000a) and Weesie and Raub (1996) for a general discussion on hostages and incentive problems.2.3 Empirical Analysis of History E®ects 37
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Value of hostages: Hi =0 ;H j > 0 in Groningen, and Hi = Hj > 0 in Amsterdam.
Figure 2.2 The two games representing a choice situation for i in experiment 2
(Tj >R i = Rj >P i = Pj >S i).
² Situations described by Game A are simple decision situations for the subjects
playing as actor i.
² Situations described by Game B re°ect the same decision situation for the subjects
(playing as actor i)a si nGame A if actor j does not post a hostage. The hostage{
option for j forms the history of the subgame Game AB.
² A subject playing as actor i knows that a posted hostage would reduce j's temp-
tation to choose left (i.e. splitting the money in favor of himself) after he has
chosen right, that is, letting j split the money. They could both bene¯t from the
situation compared to the situation where no hostage is posted. If j does not
post the hostage the choice situation for i remains the same as in the Game A.
² Hence, all subjects choosing right (left) as actor i in Game A should also choose
right (left) in Game B where j does not post a hostage.
We present the game theoretic solution of the two games before we discuss the results
of the experiments.
Game Theory: Game A is a (two stage) Trust Game such as discussed in the ¯rst
experiment (there it was named Game B{1). Due to the ordinal ranking of the payo®s
(see Figure 2.2), it has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where i and j choose left
and both earn the punishment{payo®s Pi and Pj. Game B is a Hostage Trust Game
with a subgame perfect equilibrium depending on the hostage value. If the value
of the hostage is smaller than the gain from defection, Hj <T j ¡ Rj, the subgame
perfect equilibrium is such that j does not post a hostage and consequently plays left
while i also plays left. The outcome is the same as in Game A, both earning Pi and Pj,38 Chapter 2 History E®ects in Social Dilemma Situations
respectively. On the other hand, if Hj ¸ Tj¡Rj, j will post a hostage and consequently
play right, while i also chooses right. Both players will earn the reward payment Ri
and Rj, respectively.
Again, as in Experiment 1, the relevant task here is not to test the game theoretic
equilibrium. Since i was asked to make a decision in Game AB under the assumption
that j refrains from posting a hostage, the choice situation for i is the same as in
the `two{stage' Trust Game, that is, Game A. We want to know whether not posting
a hostage in Game B leads the subjects playing as actor i to change their strategy
compared to Game A. Our theory would predict that who chose left (right) in Game A
should have also chosen left (right) in Game B as well.15
Results: The results of this experiment are summarized in Table 2.2. The predictor
`Game AB' shows a negative e®ect, disclosing that less subjects (actors i) chose to
play right in the subgame Game AB when no hostage was posted by j compared to
the otherwise similar Game A. The column `Marginal e®ect' reveals that the estimated
probability of playing right decreases by 0:10 to 0:03 (0:13 ¡ 0:10) in Game B.16 Put
di®erently, the data unveils a tendency to trust less in a Hostage Trust Game where no
hostage was posted than in the Trust Game. According to our theory, the coe±cient of
the predictor `Game AB' should actually be zero.17 Since ¯ve Game A and ¯ve Game B
with di®erent payo®s were played, it might be relevant to check whether the magnitude
of the payo®s might have in°uenced the behavior of the subjects playing the part of
actor i. In short, the predictor Temptation (roughly, monetary gain for j from playing
`left') says that the more j would earn by playing `left', the less willing should i be
to play `right' in the ¯rst place. The regression coe±cient for Temptation, however,
shows no e®ect of such a monetary gain for j on the behavior of the subjects in the role
of i. The predictor Risk (roughly, monetary gain given up by i if playing `right'), on
the other hand, shows a statistically signi¯cant and negative e®ect on choosing `right'.
The higher a possible loss becomes, the less likely it is that i hands over the decision
to split the money to j. However, in connection with our analysis, it is necessary to
mention that the in°uence of both predictors (i.e. Temptation and Risk)o ni's
behavior turns out to be quite similar in the analysis of Game A (cf. Snijders 1996:
15Under some of the conditions in Snijders' (1996) experiments (i.e. payo® matrices and hostage
values such that Hj ¸ Tj ¡ Rj), it would indeed have been rational for an actor j to post a hostage.
Note, however, that this is not the point of interest here. Moreover, since subjects in the role of
actor i were literally asked to make a decision given that j has refrained from posting a hostage, a
game theoretic argumentation about actor j's rational behavior regarding hostage posting is beyond
the scope of the chapter and, thus, irrelevant for the further discussion.
16On how to calculate marginal e®ects in logistic or probit regression see, for instance, Long (1997).
17Due to the `within{subjects' design of the experiments, we are able to compute the size of the
history e®ect (i.e. the coe±cient of the predictor Game AB). In Experiment 1 and its `between{
subjects' design, we could only show that an e®ect stemming from a mutual history exists (see Snijders
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Table 2.2 Probit analysis that actor i chooses right in Game AB of Game B.
Predictorsy Coe±cient p{Value Marginal e®ect
Game AB -0.48¤¤ 0.00 -0.10
Risk -2.08¤¤ 0.00 -0.44
Temptation -0.02 0.95
Constant -0.62 0.33 0.13
N = 1883, Pseudo R2 = :29, L = ¡668:3
Notes: ¤¤ = signi¯cant at 1%{level
y Only relevant predictors of Table 6.5 (Snijders 1996: 158) are reported here.
99, Table 4.5). The smaller probability of choosing `right' in Game AB compared to
Game A is, therefore, consistent across di®erent levels of payo®s.18
Discussion: As already seen in Experiment 1, history a®ects behavior. Due to the
`within{subjects' design of the experiment, we can even compare the decisions of the
same subjects. The theoretically unimportant e®ect of a hostage that `could have but
was not posted' negatively a®ects the choice to perform the action `right'. By not
posting a hostage, actor j seems to become less trustworthy in the eyes of an actor i.
Subjects in the role of actor i may have had a reason to conclude from j's decision
that such behavior eventually prevented a more positive outcome for both actors (i.e.
both earn the reward payo® R). In other words, a given hostage would have been a
signal of trustworthiness, but the signal `no hostage' might work the other way round.19
Moreover, not posting a hostage when one could have might even be a stronger and
more distinct signal of untrustworthiness than posting a hostage can be a signal of
trustworthiness. It seems again clear from this experiment that the payo®s alone are
not the sole basis for the subjects' decision which alternative to choose. Not placing a
hostage seems to contain important information not re°ected in the payo®s.
18All other predictors from Snijders' (1996) analysis are omitted in Table 2.2. Their regression
coe±cients are also roughly similar in both games, revealing that they can neither be responsible for
the fact that less subjects chose right in the subgame Game AB (for a more detailed discussion of the
results, see Snijders [1996: 96{100 and 157{159, especially Table 4.5 and Table 6.5]). One might,
however, argue that the probability of actor i choosing `right' in Game B decreases with an increasing
value of the not posted hostage. Even though the probit{coe±cient con¯rms this assumption, it is
by no means statistically signi¯cant (p =0 :34). The fact that the i{th actor chose to play `right' less
often can, therefore, be explained solely by j's binary decision whether or not to post a hostage.
19Hostages are apparently only one possible form of commitments in mixed{motive games. There
exists experimental evidence that communication e®ects serve a similar purpose. That is, verbal (and
even non{verbal) communication without a binding and enforceable character can facilitate the devel-
opment of cooperation and trust in a proceeding mixed{motive game. The e®ect of communication is
stable in two{person as well as multi{person games. For a short overview see Colman (1995: 141{142,
218{221).40 Chapter 2 History E®ects in Social Dilemma Situations
2.3.3 Experiment 3 (Mlicki 1996)
The last experiment we discuss runs along the same lines as Experiment 2. The main
di®erence lies in the fact that another dilemma situation is re°ected in the games. Let
us again start by focusing on the setup of the experiment.
Background: The experiment was conducted by Mlicki, Raub, and Weesie at Utrecht
University. The experiment was originally designed to test the in°uence of di®erent
factors (e.g. transaction costs) on posting a hostage, and hence, on the equilibrium
outcome of the games (for a discussion and results, see Mlicki 1996). Manipulations
were partly present in what we consider to be Game B but in none of the Game A's.
By only taking into account those Game B's where the manipulations were omitted, we
are able to use the experiment for a proper `Game A{Game B' comparison.
Subjects: 216 students participated in an experiment re°ecting a Game A and Game B
situation. The subjects were promised at least NLG 11 (approximately
e 5o rU S $7a t
the time of the experiment) for participation in the study. Depending on their perfor-
mance they could make more than NLG 20. The experimental games were played on
computers hooked up to a network and subjects were instructed that they would play
against another subject on the network. In fact they unknowingly played a prepro-
grammed computer which always played the equilibrium strategy according to game
theory. Instructions were partly displayed on the computer screen and partly given on
paper. In addition, an experimenter was present in the computer lab for assistance.
Due to the fact that we only consider subjects who played the Game B without any
of the manipulations (e.g. transaction costs) present, we are restricted to N =2 3
subjects, a fairly small number of subjects compared to the ¯rst two experiments.
Setup: Each subject played a Game A and later a Game B. Participants were only
told that they would play a Game B against the same other player after Game A was
played. As in the preceding experiments, Game AB is a subgame of Game B reached by
a speci¯c history. The social dilemma situation represented by the games is completely
symmetric with regard to the players' actions and payo®s. In addition, they also
had to make their decision simultaneously. Therefore, actors i and j are actually
interchangeable. The games are depicted in Figure 2.3:20
Game A: This game represents a decision situation where i has to choose between
two alternatives, left and right. The same holds true for j. Since i and j move
simultaneously, they do not know what the other chooses to do, but they do know
what the opponent's options are. If both choose `left' they split an amount of money
equally. If both choose `right' they split an amount of money equally which, however,
is larger than the amount they split by mutually choosing `left'. If i chooses `right'
(`left') and j chooses `left' (`right'), i (j) receives the lowest payo® possible and j (i)
earns the largest payo® possible. Subjects were now asked whether they would choose
20The dotted lines in Figure 2.3 represent `information sets', the set of di®erent nodes in the game
tree that j knows might be the actual nodes but cannot with certainty distinguish between them. In
the games of Figure 2.3, j's information sets are used to represent simultaneous moves by i and j.2.3 Empirical Analysis of History E®ects 41
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Figure 2.3 The two games representing a choice situation for i in experiment 3.
right or left if they play as an actor i.
Game B: This game represents the same decision situation for actor i as described by
Game A but this time preceded by an additional move by i and j. Both actors can
decide whether or not to post a hostage. If neither of them posts the hostage, the
subgame Game AB will be played. If at least one of the two actors decides to post
a hostage, a di®erent subgame will be reached.21 After i and j have simultaneously
decided about their hostage option, decisions will be made public and they again have
to decide whether to play `right' or `left'. We are interested in the decision of those
subjects i who themselves denied to post a hostage (the computer never posted a
hostage under the condition we examine here).
Design: Letting each subject play a Game A and a Game B leads, as in Experiment 2,
to a `within{subjects' design. A comparison of the following kind can be made:
² The situation described by Game A is a simple choice situation for actor i (where
his payo®s are also dependent on j's behavior).
² The situation described by Game B re°ects the same decision situation for actor
i as in Game A if neither j nor i post a hostage. The hostage option of both
players forms (part of) the history of the game. To be precise, the history of
Game AB is twofold. On the one hand, it is given by the `¯rst' Game A, played
21Actually, the combination of posting and not posting a hostage leads to four di®erent subgames,
namely, Game AB if neither i nor j post a hostage, Game CB1 and Game CB2 if only one actor posts a
hostage and Game CB3 if both post a hostage. Again, we are only interested in those Game B's where
the history leads to the subgame Game AB.42 Chapter 2 History E®ects in Social Dilemma Situations
immediately before Game B and, on the other hand, the possibility to post a
hostage in Game B.22
² Actor j (viz. the computer program) never posts a hostage. Hence, each actor
i who does not post a hostage makes sure that the subgame of interest, namely,
Game AB, is played.
² Hence, all subjects choosing right (left) in Game A should also choose right (left)
in Game AB after they denied to post a hostage.
Before we present and discuss the results, let us, in short, again focus on the game
theoretic solution of Game A and Game B.
Game Theory: Game A re°ects the well{known Prisoner's Dilemma with its unique
Nash equilibrium where both actors choose `left'. Game B is a Hostage Prisoner's
Dilemma such that subgame Game AB is reached when neither actor posts a hostage.
The hostage mechanism in the experiment was such that the hostage (with a value
of NLG 4) was lost if placed and subsequently followed by a `left'{move (identical
to `defection' as it is normally referred to in the Prisoner's Dilemma).23 Remember
that the decision of i and j with regard to their choice about the hostage was made
public before they had to choose between `right' or `left'. Posting a hostage makes
`right' the dominant strategy but, if the other player does not post a hostage and plays
`left', choosing `right' leads to the worst possible outcome. A rational actor should,
therefore, deny to post a hostage, leading to Game AB and subsequently play `left'.
Hence, Game B has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium which leads to the same
outcome as in Game A.
As pointed out throughout this whole section, we are not interested in analyzing
those subjects who played in accordance with the game theoretic prediction. However,
in this case, our interest coincides with the equilibrium{behavior of the subjects. For
the analysis, we restrict ourselves to those subjects who indeed reached the subgame
Game AB in the hostage game Game B. Only then we can again compare their behavior
in Game A with their behavior in Game AB which, according to our theory, should be
equal, that is, either `right' or `left' in both games.24
Results: While from the subset of those subjects who reached Game AB, 73.90% chose
`left' in the prior Game A, 91.30% of them played `left' in Game B. Put into the parlance
22Note that the history in this experiment slightly di®ers from the history in the two preceding
experiments. Due to its twofold character, di®erent behavior in Game B, if found, can hinge on either
one of these two `di®erent' histories. Statistically, it is not possible to precisely tell apart up to which
degree the outcome in Game A and/or the not posted hostage in Game B a®ect possible deviating
behavior in Game AB.
23For the impact of the hostage value on the payo®s of the three Game CBx subgames, see Figure 2.3.
24We do not have to worry about the actions of player j (i.e. the computer) since `he' did not post
a hostage and, what is irrelevant to our analysis, played `left'. Therefore, the computer makes sure
that subgame Game AB can be reached.2.3 Empirical Analysis of History E®ects 43
of the Prisoner's Dilemma and considered from the perspective of cooperation, a little
bit more than one fourth cooperated in the Prisoner's Dilemma (i.e. Game A) while less
than one in ten cooperated in Game AB as part of the larger Hostage Prisoner's Dilemma
(i.e. Game B). Again, we ¯nd a di®erence (McNemar's Â2( 1 )=8 :33;p<: 005;N= 46)
in the two games, even though they are identical with respect to payo®s.
Discussion: Even though we found the same result as in the previous experiments,
the explanation seems not to be as straightforward as in Experiment 1 and 2. This
time, the history of Game B could be twofold. One the one hand, we have the history
consisting of additional moves by the actors in Game B. This is what we so far referred
to as `the history of a game' and also examined in the two preceding experiments. It
seems not too farfetched if we again assume that the hostage that `could have but was
not posted' by the other subject positively in°uenced, that is, increased the likelihood
to choose `left' in the subgame Game AB.
On the other hand, we have another game played against the same opponent,
namely, Game A.25 It might very well be that the subjects took their experiences from
Game A into account when deciding on an action in Game AB. Hence, this would mean
that Game A becomes part of the history. Since all actors had complete information,
even this `enlarged' history should theoretically not change the predictions based on
our theory. But we must assume that the subjects were able to learn from the outcomes
of Game A that only playing `left' saves them from being ripped o® by their opponent.26
Moreover, having experienced actor j playing `left' in the preceding Game A and now
seeing him refraining from posting the hostage may just be the last hint needed by i
to con¯rm that j cannot be trusted. Therefore, it might be that a decision by actor i
in Game B is subject to three history e®ects. First, j's behavior in Game A, second, j
refraining from posting the hostage, and third, an interaction between these two e®ects.
Unfortunately, we are not able to (statistically) tell apart which e®ect (the outcome of
Game A or `not posting a hostage' in Game B) can be hold responsible for the di®erent
behavior in Game AB. But, the important conclusion we draw from this experiment
runs along the same line as earlier: history a®ects behavior.
As the three experiments clearly show, all the results are in contradiction to the theo-
retical prediction. We assumed that actors are rational with respect to their decision
and only consider the information inherent in the payo®s to be relevant for them. This
25Of course one could argue that in Experiment 2 we also had a Game A played before a Game B was
played. But there, the two games were not linked together as this is the case in Experiment 3, where
the subjects were explicitly told that they now play another game against the same opponent. Here,
Game A and Game B can be considered as being part of one larger situation. In Experiment 2, Game A
and Game B were considered to be separated situations. Subjects were confronted, loosely speaking,
with the following: \Let's assume you are playing a Game A. What would you do?" Later they were
confronted with a new situation: \Now, let's assume that you are playing a Game B. What would you
do?" There was no link between Game A and Game B, except that Game A was also identical with
the subgame Game AB of Game B.
26Whatever the other actor does, by playing `left' an actor is better o® than by playing `right' in
the Prisoner's Dilemma. Game theoretically, we say that `left' is the dominant strategy.44 Chapter 2 History E®ects in Social Dilemma Situations
theory was not supported by the experiments and it must be concluded that a theory
which does not take the history of a game into account leads to inadequate predictions
about the behavior of the subjects. Therefore, in one or the other way, the informa-
tion which was disclosed by the history must be re°ected in a theory (model) about
behavior in Game B. The last section summarizes the ¯ndings and sketches a possible
place to look for such an extension of the theory.
2.4 Discussion
In this chapter we studied whether the past a®ects behavior in situations where the
present and the future were kept constant. For this purpose, we compared situations
we referred to as Game A and Game AB, a subgame of Game B. We argued that simple
game theoretic models with complete information predict no di®erence in behavior
between Game A and Game AB. In other words, no `history e®ects' are to be expected.
However, in three analyses of experimental data we did ¯nd substantial history e®ects.
For each of these e®ects we came up with, admittedly, ad hoc arguments to explain
the divergent behavior in Game A and Game AB. In the following, we summarize these
arguments and discuss some suggestions on how to model them.
To begin with, let us take a look at the most simple game we studied, namely,
the Trust Game and its subgame (see Figure 2.1, games A{1 and B{1). In Game
B{1, any actor i who is choosing `right' (as we assumed he did to put j into the same
situation as described by Game A{1) runs the risk to end with less than he could have
gotten by choosing `left'. One could now argue that actor j honors this risk taken
and plays `right' because he wants to reciprocate i's cooperative behavior. But, to
apply this sort of `tit{for{tat' behavior, an actor j must ¯rst know that there is at
least one other actor on whom he is dependent and, second, that this actor has been
cooperatively. But reciprocity out of fairness is not explained easily if we stick with the
assumption made in the beginning of this chapter, namely that `utility is own money'.
For an explanation of the subject's behavior in our experiments we need to amend this
assumption. In addition, we need to introduce incomplete information (e.g. Rasmusen
1994: ch. 2) in explaining the results of Experiment 2 and 3.
One possible way to work around the `utility is own money' assumption is by em-
ploying the so called social orientation models. In these models, how much someone
cares for the well{being of another subject is expressed by his social orientation pa-
rameter. Therefore, a subject's utility is not only a function of his own (monetary)
payo®s, but also takes into account the payo®s of his opponent, weighted by his social
orientation. Experimental evidence for such behavior can, for example, be found in2.4 Discussion 45
Liebrand (1984) or McClintock (1972, 1978).27 We assume that actor j's utility is
de¯ned as follows (with general payo®s Tj >R j >P j and Ri >P i >S i):
Uj(right) = Rj + µjRi (2.1)
Uj(left) = Tj + µjSi (2.2)
where ¡1 <µ j < 1 denotes actor j's social orientation (i.e. how much he cares for actor
i's well{being).28 Hence, in explaining the results of Experiment 1, reciprocal behavior
in Game B{1 would demand that Uj(right) >U j(left) and thus µj >
Tj¡Rj
Ri¡Si =: µ¤
j.
But as can be seen easily, the same inequality can also be derived from the payo®s
of Game A{1 since the `additional' punishment payo®s (Pi and Pj) are not even taken
into account. Consequently, social orientation models do not explain the ¯ndings of
Experiment 1. Put di®erently, the outcomes from Experiment 1 speak in favor of a
history dependent fairness norm. New experiments to test whether or not a player's
social orientation µk is also a function of this player's history|moreover, histories with
di®erent characters|and not only a `personality trait', could easily be set up and would
allow for some interesting conclusions.29
On the other hand, a simpler way to model divergent behavior in Game A and
Game AB is to assume that actor j gains some additional utility for reciprocal behavior.
The di®erence between this approach and the social orientation model is that actor j
only earns an additional payo® in case he cooperates out of reciprocity considerations.
Hence, Uj(left) remains unchanged. A utility function for actor j in the Trust Game
then looks as follows:
Uj(right) = Rj +¢ j (2.3)
Uj(left) = Tj (2.4)
where ¢j denotes j's additional utility (`reciprocity revenue') in case of reciprocal
behavior and is only de¯ned in case of a preceding action by another actor i. That is,
27For a more detailed discussion of social orientation models, see for example Braun (1998) or Weesie
(1994).
28Usually, it is assumed that the own monetary payo®s are also weighted by some parameter ¡1 ·
#j · 1, the individual orientation of j, that is, how much he cares for his own well{being. Di®erent
combinations of these two orientation parameters lead to di®erent behavioral orientations, for example
discussed by Herkner (1991). For several reasons discussed by Braun (1998), it su±ces to restrict the
orientation parameters to #j = 1 and ¡1 <µ j < 1.
29A similar conclusion can be drawn by specifying a so{called guilt model with Uj(left) = Tj ¡
°j (Tj ¡ Sj) and Uj(right) = Rj (see also Snijders 1996). Actor j feels guilty if abusing placed trust.
Even though the social orientation model cannot be transformed into a guilt model, the conclusions
remain comparable. If the guilt parameter °j >
Tj¡Rj
Tj¡Sj =: °¤
j is also supposed to be history dependent,
comparing both models shows then that fair behavior is more easily found under the assumption of
the guilt model (as speci¯ed in this note) since °¤
j <µ ¤
j always holds. On empirical grounds, this
seems even plausible since `guilt' is a stronger behavioral mechanism than `fairness'. Loosely speaking,
°j (Tj ¡Sj) is equal to the amount an actor j is willing to pay to obtain the privilege of being abusive.
Note, however, that di®erent speci¯cations of the guilt part of the utility function are possible and
consequently lead to di®erent conclusions.46 Chapter 2 History E®ects in Social Dilemma Situations
¢j is a function of i's behavior and, therefore, history dependent. Following, we try,
in short, to explain the empirical ¯ndings by applying such a ¢j{parameter.
Experiment 1: The Trust Game
If we only consider the subgame A{1 of the two{stage Trust Game B{1, we see that
an actor j can choose between left and right, earning Tj and Rj, respectively. Since
the temptation payo® Tj is always larger than the reward payo® Rj, a rational actor j
will play left. In Experiment 1, about two third chose to do so. Consider now an
actor j who is confronted with the `whole' two{stage Trust Game. Playing left still is
the dominant strategy and secures him the payo® Tj. But if he chooses to reciprocate,
therefore playing right, we will assume that he earns Rj +¢ j. Depending on the
value of ¢j, the temptation to play left becomes smaller or even vanishes completely.
Something along those lines could have been happening in Experiment 1 since in Game
B{1, after trust has been placed by actor i (he plays right) only about one fourth of
the subjects keep playing left. The same results are found in Game A{2 and Game B{2.
Our argumentation about ¢j would imply that the smaller the payo® di®erence
between Tj and Rj becomes, the more likely it is that an actor j plays cooperatively
in Game AB. Such a statement could easily be tested by setting up Trust Games
with di®erent payo®s. Snijders' (1996: ch. 4) analyses support this hypothesis to some
degree. Although the introduction of ¢j may seem ad hoc from a rational point of view,
it at least produces predictions which are in line with the experimental results presented
in Section 2.3. Moreover, ¢j can be linked to the guilt model (cf. note 29) if we assume
that, for example, ¢j ´ ±j (Tj ¡Rj). In contrast to the guilt model, a subject receives
some additional bene¯t from being reciprocative instead of paying the debts for being
abusive. Even though it is, as it has already been stressed above, obvious from the
results in the experiment that the parameter ±j (or °j in the guilt model) are history
dependent, it leaves open the question to which degree history a®ects the parameter.
Moreover, since such a transformation of utilities takes place in the mind of the actors,
it brings about the more psychological question about how players transform their
given matrix into an e®ective matrix (Kelley and Thibaut 1978).
Experiment 2: The Hostage Trust Game
While we only employed pure utility arguments to explain the di®erent outcomes in the
games of Experiment 1, for Experiment 2 we need an additional argument in setting up
an explanation for the behavior found there (since j moves before and after i moves).
We assume that actor i has some belief about j's value of ¢j, without being completely
sure about it. Technically, we model Game A and Game B as games with incomplete
information (e.g. Rasmusen 1994). Note that in Experiment 2 we are concerned with
the behavior of actor i. In explaining Snijders' (1996) ¯ndings, we need to show that
it is possible that actor i in the Hostage Trust Game where no hostage was posted by
actor j (Game AB) is more often inclined to play left compared to his behavior in the
corresponding Trust Game (Game A).2.4 Discussion 47
Setting up the two games under incomplete information leads to a simple condition
on when an actor i plays `right' in Game A: ¼A >
Pi¡Si
Ri¡Si =: ¼¤, where ¼A denotes
the probability that he faces an actor j who will reciprocate.30 Assume that Pi ¡ Si
measures the potential loss of actor i due to unjusti¯ed trust and Ri ¡ Pi, in turn,
denotes i's gain due to justi¯ed trust. Hence, above inequality precisely resembles
Coleman's (1990: 97{102) assertion about whether or not actor i should place trust
(i.e. choose to play right):
p
1¡p > potential loss
potential gain, where p denotes the probability that
a trustee is trustworthy (i.e. our ¼A), reduces to ¼¤ if we substitute the loss and risk
terms into the righthand side of Coleman's inequality and solve for p. What needs to
be shown in explaining Snijders' results is that by adding ¢j to j's payo®s, we can ¯nd
an equilibrium in Game B in which actor i's assessment about facing an actor j who
will reciprocate even after not posting a hostage, is lower than ¼¤: actor i's assessment
¼A of facing an actor j who reciprocates needs to be smaller in Game B, implying that
i would then indeed choose to play `left' more often than in Game A. Gautschi (1999)
shows that there exists an equilibrium in Game B which supports the empirical ¯ndings.
Unfortunately, there is no straightforward equilibrium in this Hostage Trust Game
with incomplete information where all game theoretic types of actors j refrain from
placing a hostage and i's assessment about a reliable trustee would indeed fall short
of ¼¤.31 Nonetheless, Game B has an equilibrium in which all game theoretic types
of actors j are mixing with the same positive probabilities in an open interval (0;1)
over whether or not to post a hostage and actor i withholds trust: he plays `left', as
long as ¼G and ¼M (cf. note 31) together are not exceeding
Pi¡Si+Hi
Ri¡Si+Hi.32 Yet, we would
need to consider a situation where no hostage is posted. However, without a®ecting
the equilibrium, it can safely be assumed that the probabilities for each of the game
theoretic types of actors j to provide a hostage are close to zero. Therefore, we have a
situation where hostage posting by any of the trustees is possible but highly unlikely to
occur. Due to the fact that there exists an actor j with probability ¼M who reciprocates
only after posting a hostage, ¼G can, in equilibrium, indeed be smaller than the similar
probability ¼A in Game A. Hence, in equilibrium the condition ¼G <¼ A <¼ ¤ can be
ful¯lled (for more details and a numerical example, see Gautschi 1999).
30Due to the introduction of incomplete information, Nature moves ¯rst and decides on the prob-
abilities with which actor i faces a speci¯c game theoretic type of j, depending on their values of
¢j.I nGame A, i plays an actor j who reciprocates with probability ¼A and an actor j who will not
reciprocate with probability 1 ¡ ¼A.
31Due to the additional introduction of a hostage, Nature now distinguishes three di®erent game
theoretic types of actors j in Game B. With probability ¼G actor j reciprocates whether or not he posts
a hostage (this is the same game theoretic type as the one who occurred in Game A with probability
¼A; therefore, call him `good trustee'), with probability ¼M actor j only reciprocates after he has
posted a hostage (call this one `mediocre trustee'), and with probability ¼B =1¡ ¼G ¡ ¼M he never
reciprocates (hence, call him `bad trustee'). For more details, see Gautschi (1999).
32A second equilibrium, in which all game theoretic types of trustees are mixing with di®erent
probabilities in the open interval (0;1) over whether or not to post a hostage, also supports the
empirical ¯ndings. However, the conditions for a trustor to withhold trust are less straightforward.48 Chapter 2 History E®ects in Social Dilemma Situations
The introduction of the ¢j parameter again leads to predictions which support
the experimental ¯ndings. However, the theoretical solution is less straightforward
than in Experiment 1. Due to the more complex nature of the history of the game in
Experiment 3 (see the discussion of the results) we refrain here from discussing possible
implications on the behavior of i in this experiment by also introducing a ¢j parameter.
However, we expect that a theoretical model, even though more cumbersome than in
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 (since ¢j would be dependent on the outcome of the
¯rst Prisoner's Dilemma as well as on the hostage decision in the second Prisoner's
Dilemma), would provide a possible explanation for the empirical ¯ndings.
Summing up, we have seen that the shadow of the past clearly in°uences an actor's
current behavior. Unfortunately, we are not yet equipped with a model to convincingly
explain these empirical ¯ndings. The introduction of a reciprocity parameter ¢j leads,
on the one hand, to predictions which are in line with the experimental results but, on
the other hand, remains to some degree ad hoc and yet lacks a proper argumentation.
As long as the considerations about such an additional `fairness payo®' (or guilt payo®)
cannot be put on a proper foundation (e.g. explaining j's moral disposition and where
it comes form), it will always bear the negative connotation of just being an ad hoc
argument which happened to ¯t the purpose best.
It seems, however, likely that such a reciprocity parameter must be history depen-
dent. This would then be a hint that an analysis of such situations is probably more
easily done in the context of simple learning games (e.g. Bandura 1977; Bush and
Mosteller 1955; Fudenberg and Levine 1998; Macy 1989, 1993, 1996). The setup of
the experiments is unfortunately limited with respect to a proper application of learn-
ing models (too few repetitions of the dilemma situation). And, in connection with
learning models, one may have to abandon the assumption of rational Bayesian learn-
ers. Applying Bayes' Rule in ¯nding the equilibria of Game B in Experiment 2 leads
to outcomes which are far from simple `common sense' understanding (see Gautschi
1999). Moreover, it has been argued by, for example, Boyd and Richerson (1985) that
subjects in situations with incomplete information do not at all update their beliefs
according to Bayes' Rule.
Even though this chapter has only scratched the surface of an interesting problem
without yet giving a satisfactory solution, there have been some modest ¯rst steps
done in the right direction. An elegant approach is presented by Rabin (1993). He
sets up a model in which feelings of altruism or envy are triggered by actions (or
intentions) of others. The idea is actually as simple as the underlying assumptions
of our ¢j parameter or the guilt parameter. Rabin also assumes that positive or
negative feelings towards the opponent add to the own monetary utility. His model,
however, has two desirable features. First, feelings of sympathy become less important
as monetary payo®s increase. Second, preferences for being fair or not are explicitly
based on beliefs about the opponent's behavior. Therefore, Rabin's (1993) fairness part
of the utility function has a proper foundation while our assumptions with respect to
the role of history remain vague. Rabin's model is, however, restricted to two{person2.4 Discussion 49
(normal form) games of complete information.33 Extending the approach to multi{
person, sequential games under incomplete information might be problematic or even
change the implications of the model (Rabin 1993: 1296). A model which would be
applicable to (multi{person) games of incomplete information but employs a di®erent
approach of fairness is due to Bolton and Ockenfels (1998, 2000). They argue that
subjects are motivated by their monetary payo®s as well as their own relative payo®s.
The latter measures how an individual's monetary payo® compares to that of the rest
of the players. The aspect of fairness is such that ego wants to be treated fairly and
not that ego treats alter fairly due to some reason. Unfortunately, relative payo®s only
refer to the current game and not the entire history which would be necessary in our
context.34
It must be concluded that the game theoretic models highlighted in this last sec-
tion have desirable features to explain behavior which seems irrational at ¯rst sight.
Unfortunately, the shortcomings of all models (the one proposed here as well as those
by Rabin (1993) and Bolton and Ockenfels (1998, 2000)) are yet too severe to be able
to provide satisfactory answers about the impact of history e®ects on current behavior.
33An example of such a situation is given in Experiment 1 (i.e. the two{stage Trust Game B{1). Em-
ploying Rabin's (1993) model shows that there exists no fairness equilibrium for the payo®s speci¯ed.
Its prediction is such that monetary incentives outperform any sympathy aspects and the subjects
reach the subgame perfect equilibrium. However, this is not what we observed in Experiment 1. Rabin
(1993: 1296{1297) reaches a similar conclusion and suggests the incorporation of additional emotions
into such models.
34On grounds of experimental evidence stemming from four mini{ultimatum games with di®erent
cake divisions, Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (1999) conclude that responders (in either accepting or
turning down a proposer's o®er) do not only take into account the proposer's actual o®er but also
the set of available, but not chosen o®ers. They conclude that the models by Rabin (1993), and
Bolton and Ockenfels (1998, 2000) are incomplete since the former does not capture distributional
concerns (however intentions) while the latter does not take into account the fairness of the proposer's
intentions (but only distributional concerns).blubChapter 3
Trust over Time: The E®ects of
Dyadic Social Capital
\Again, one of the Contractors, may deliver the Thing contracted for on
his part, and leave the other to perform his part at some determinate time
after, and in the mean time be trusted; and then the Contract on his part,
is called Pact,o rCovenant: [...] he that is to performe in time to come,
being trusted, his performance is called Keeping of Promise, or Faith; and
the fayling of performance (if it be voluntary) Violation of Faith.
[...] For he that performeth ¯rst, has no assurance the other will performe
after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle mens ambition,
avarice, anger, and other Passions, without the feare of some coÄ ercive Power;
which in the condition of meer Nature, where all men are equall, and judges
of the justnesse of their own fears, cannot possibly be supposed. And ther-
fore he which performeth ¯rst, does but betray himselfe to his enemy."
Thomas Hobbes (1651: 94, 96)
3.1 Introduction
Many transactions are characterized by a sequence of moves with a time{lag between
the `delivery of' and the `return on' an action. Such transactions carry the burden
that, because of the time{lag, there is an obvious risk of actions being delivered, but
not reciprocated. When enforceable contracts are not available or feasible, trust is
often seen as an aid to this problematic aspect of `social exchange' (Blau 1964). In
a recent book, Misztal (1996) reviews and summarizes a large body of literature and
identi¯es several functions of trust. One of these functions is `trust as a lubricant for
cooperation' (Arrow 1974) which has mainly been analyzed using a Rational Choice
framework. This research can be summarized in three categories: trust in one{shot sit-
uations, in repeated situations, and within networks. Repeated situations and network
embeddedness are often considered to provide the trustor1 with helpful `clues' as to
1The trustor is the individual who decides whether or not to place trust while the trustee needs
to decide whether or not to honor given trust. Trustor and trustee are sometimes also referred to as
principal and agent, respectively.
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decide whether or not to place trust, knowing that the trustee has a certain temptation
to abuse trust.
Snijders (1996) presents research on one{shot trust situations with and without the
use of credible commitments in the form of hostages, as proposed by Schelling (1960).2
Besides hostages, Coleman (1990), Blau (1964), Granovetter (1985), and especially
Voss (1982, 1985) have analyzed how trust problems can be overcome by embedding
the actors in a framework of repeated interactions. Most research on repeated games,
however, employs the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. And, some of these studies explicitly
interpret mutual cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game as trust (e.g. Ahn et al.
1998, 1999; Ahn, Ostrom and Walker 1998; McCabe, Rassenti, and Smith 1996). The
literature on the (repeated) Prisoner's Dilemma Game and cooperation via reciprocity
is vast. Dugatkin (1997: ch. 2) nicely summarizes many theoretical perspectives on
the emergence of cooperation between subjects which have been published over the
last twenty years. Repeated games re°ecting true trust problems in the sense that
they contain a time{lag between the actors' moves have been used to experimentally
test predictions about placing and honoring trust by, for example, Kollock (1994) and
Camerer and Weigelt (1988).
Networks o®er additional possibilities to actors that need to overcome problems of
whether or not to place trust. Third parties, for instance, provide the trustor with the
possibility to gain control over the own trust relation(s). Actors can collect or spread
information about the behavior of the partner or simply substitute an untrustworthy
exchange partner for another, supposedly more trustworthy one (e.g. Burt and Knez
1995; Buskens 1999; Lahno 1995a, 1995b; Raub and Weesie 1990; SchÄ ussler 1989;
Boone and Macy 1999).
Although this literature o®ers insight into cooperation and trust under di®erent
conditions, it hardly ever addresses the question of what precisely induces actors to
either act cooperatively or defectively in a given situation. Put di®erently, systematic
explanations regarding an increase or decrease in mutual cooperation or trust are often
not treated explicitly. By and large, the literature reports percentages of cooperative or
defective moves without focusing on the question of what precisely leads to an increase
or decrease of these observed or predicted percentages. Of course, there are notable
exceptions which do not only focus on the outcomes but also on the reasons behind the
observed behavior (e.g. Burt and Knez 1995; Buskens 1999; Kollock 1994). Lewicki and
Benedict Bunker (1995) and Boon and Holmes (1991) present an elaborated description
of the development of trust within personal relationships. However, both models are
adapted to the very speci¯c situation of close personal relationships and therefore o®er
explanations on the development of trust only in such a setting.3
2See, for example, also Keren and Raub (1993), Mlicki (1996), or Raub and Keren (1993) for
hostage analyses in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game or Raub and Weesie (2000a) and Weesie and Raub
(1996) for a general theoretical analysis of Hostage Games.
3Hardin (2001) distinguishes between relations of trust based on bene¯cial acquaintance and based
on love or close friendship, respectively. The latter are less problematic since they are based on strong3.1 Introduction 53
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Figure 3.1 Extensive form of the Trust Game (R1 >P 1 >S 1 and T2 >R 2 >P 2;
double lines indicate equilibrium path of play) and an example as used in the experiment.
In this chapter, we will try to gain more insight into the trustor's decision of placing
trust. The basic scenario follows Coleman (1990: 97{98) who de¯nes a situation of trust
by four distinct elements. First, placing trust by the trustor allows an action of the
trustee otherwise not possible. Second, placing trust puts resources in the hand of
the trustee which he can use to his own or to the mutual bene¯t. Third, the trustor
voluntarily puts resources at the trustee's disposal without any safeguard by the trustee.
And, fourth, there exists a time{lag between placing trust and the action of the trustee.
Dasgupta (1988) and Kreps (1990a) provide a game theoretic representation of such
a trust situation (see Figure 3.1). This Trust Game is sometimes referred to as a
one{sided Prisoner's Dilemma Game (e.g. Rasmusen 1994: 129{131). It is a game
of complete and perfect information. Actors in the Trust Game move sequentially.
The trustor moves ¯rst and decides between placing trust or withholding trust. If
the trustor refrains from placing trust, the game ends and both actors receive their
punishment payo®s Pi (i =1 ;2). If the trustor decides, for whatever reason, to place
trust, the trustee must in turn decide between honoring trust or abusing trust. The
game ends after the trustee's move. If the trustee abuses placed trust, he walks away
with the temptation payo® T2 while the trustor earns the sucker's payo® S1. If the
trustee reciprocates by honoring placed trust, both actors receive their reward payo®s
Ri. The ordinal ranking of the payo®s (T2 >R 2 >P 2) makes it favorable for the
trustee to abuse trust whenever placed by the trustor. The trustor, on the other hand,
would prefer an outcome where trust is placed and honored over trust not being placed
since R1 >P 1 >S 1. However, since the trustor knows that a rational and sel¯sh
moral commitments. Since most trust relationships cannot bank upon such moral commitments of
others, the focus should, according to Hardin, be on the former.54 Chapter 3 Trust over Time
trustee abuses trust if placed, she is better o® by withholding trust beforehand. The
outcome of the Trust Game is the subgame{perfect Nash equilibrium formed by the
strategy combination (withhold trust; abuse trust if placed).4
In the remainder of this chapter, we focus on the explanation of the behavior of
the trustor, namely, on her trustfulness in a setting of ¯nitely repeated games without
exit options. The trustor's decision on whether or not to place trust in a current game
is then based on di®erent aspects of temporal embeddedness: the trustee's observed
behavior in past games, the trustor's anticipation of the trustee's behavior in possible
future games, and the trustor's anticipation of the trustee's behavior in the current
game. When talking about trust, we thus refer to the trustor's decision to `place trust',
not to the entire relationship, as it is often used in commonplace. Relationships of
reciprocal trust|or in our simple scenario of placed and honored trust|will be referred
to as trustworthiness (for a conceptual discussion of the term `trust', see Hardin 2001;
Snijders 1996).
This chapter is structured as follows. The next two sections will discuss the tempo-
rally embedded situation of the two actors and present a social capital interpretation
of trust. Several hypotheses are put forward which will be tested using experimental
data. The fourth section presents and discusses this empirical evidence. We conclude
with a discussion of the results, highlight some connections to game theory and re°ect
on some restrictions of the chosen approach.
3.2 Trust and Dyadic Social Capital
In general, situations of trust do not simply occur once but repeatedly over time.
Consequently, the actors share a common past and future. In addition to the e®ect
of the current game's incentive structure, such a situation gives rise to two additional
types of e®ects which may in°uence the trustor's behavior (e.g. Buskens 1999; Raub
1997). A common past allows the trustor to obtain information about characteristics
of the trustee, such as for instance his trustworthiness. Learning thus o®ers the trustor
the possibility to update her assessment about the trustworthiness of the trustee. A
common future, on the other hand, allows the trustor to in°uence the trustee's current
behavior through sanctions (if anticipated by the trustee) in future games. This is
referred to as the control e®ect.
The focus of this chapter is on repeated interactions of one trustor and one trustee.
The trustor's behavioral guideline is that she takes into account past outcomes and
future opportunities while keeping in mind the incentive structure of the current game.
The trustee, of course, has to take decisions as well. He too bases his moves on certain
characteristics of the game and the behavior of the trustor (e.g. payo®s of the current
game, past outcomes, credible threats of the trustor concerning future sanctions) to
4As long as the ordinal ranking of the payo®s is maintained, the punishment and reward payo®s of
the trustor and the trustee need not be equal. Throughout this chapter, including the experimental
setup, we use symmetric payo®s, P1 = P2 and R1 = R2, and subscripts are thus dropped.3.2 Trust and Dyadic Social Capital 55
decide between short{term bene¯ts (`golden opportunities') from abusing trust and
future °ows of gains from honoring trust.
With these cornerstones in place, we need a suitable concept to `summarize' the
essential e®ects of such a temporally embedded two actor situation. We argue that such
a concept is social capital (e.g. Coleman 1988, 1990). Coleman (1990: 302) de¯nes
social capital as those resources from interpersonal relations which make it possible to
achieve certain ends. The notion of social capital, however, not only refers to social
networks (on social capital and networks, see for instance Burt 1992, 2000; Flap 1988,
1999; Flap and Boxman 1999; Flap and De Graaf 1986; Lin 2001). Coleman (1988,
1990), Luhmann (1979) and Putnam (1995) argue that trust between two persons
likewise accumulates as a sort of social capital. We will thus interpret `resources' as a
trustworthy partner in a given dyad and `certain ends' as mutual cooperation, in the
sense of placed and honored trust, in this relation. Hence, we focus on dyadic social
capital embodied in the relation between the trustor and the trustee and neglect social
capital that is embodied in relations with third parties.
Social capital is often seen as the sum of shared experiences in a number of relations
(e.g. Coleman 1990: 300®.). This, however, would point to the fact that social capital
\is accumulated history" (Sandefur and Laumann 1998: 482) which forms a potential
stock of social capital. If such a social capital stock is a function of the past, modeling
such a stock variable could be related to basic models on expectation formation in macro
economic theory (e.g. Neumann 1996). These `reaction models' assume that actors
extrapolate past experiences into the future or adapt their expectations about future
outcomes by the di®erence between expected and observed current outcomes (adaptive
expectations). See also Becker (1996) and Becker and Murphy (2000) for the use of
social capital in economics. The basic idea of a capital stock and its formalizations in
sociology (e.g. Lahno 1995a, 1995b; Snijders 1998) likewise assume that the formation
of expectations is based on past observations or outcomes only.
This is not the conceptualization of a stock we will use. In the following, we rather
advocate the idea that the social capital stock is a function of the temporally embedded
situation of the trustor and the trustee as a whole, including not only the past through
learning, but also the future through control. The possibility of adding considerations
about the future into the concept of social capital seems to be supported by Sandefur
and Laumann (1998: 483) who stress that social capital allows for control and social
in°uence. From our point of view, social capital is therefore the trustor's belief with
respect to the behavior of the trustee. Updating the capital stock is therefore belief
learning. Such an interpretation indicates that a trustor enters a relationship with
some amount of social capital, re°ecting experiences from other relations that she
now generalizes to the current setting (e.g. Coleman 1990). E®ectively, social capital
denotes the trustor's expectation that the trustee will use his resources, at least to
some extent, to pursue both his and the trustor's interest.
The following section develops an approach to trust as dyadic social capital. The
general idea is that the past outcomes and the expected future form the trustor's capital56 Chapter 3 Trust over Time
stock. In deciding whether or not to place trust, this capital stock will be put into
relation to the peril the current game poses, namely, the consequences of misplaced
trust. That is, the more severe the consequences of misplaced trust in the current
game, the more social capital is needed to induce the trustor to place trust.
3.3 Social Capital and Temporal Embeddedness
3.3.1 Isolated Encounters: E®ects of Risk and Temptation
Isolated encounters are the most simple two{party trust situations. In the absence of
temporal embeddedness, the only characteristics describing and distinguishing di®erent
trust situations are the payo®s of the game to be played. If the trustor and the trustee
behave in accordance with `utility is own money', any trustee would abuse placed trust
since T>R . In anticipation of such behavior, any trustor would withhold trust since
P>S . However, it applies to both inequalities that, in some games, the di®erence
between the respective payo®s can be small(er) while in other games the di®erence can
be large(r). This means that if, for instance, P is close to S, a trustor loses little when
placed trust is eventually abused. The peril to place trust is thus not necessarily the
same across di®erent games. Both the trustor and the trustee should take into account
such possible di®erences in payo® di®erences when making their moves. The behavior
of the trustor in a Trust Game then depends on what she can win or lose, but also on
what she knows about what the trustee can win or lose. The behavior of the trustee, on
the other hand, will by assumption follow from a model of guilt. These considerations
lead to an approach which predicts behavior by payo® di®erences and ratios thereof
(e.g. Coleman 1990: ch. 5; Rapoport and Chammah 1964: ch. 1; Rapoport, Guyer, and
Gordon 1976).
We introduce two payo® ratios which we use to measure the peril a trustor faces
when having to choose whether or not to place trust in the current game (see also
Snijders 1996: ch. 2). The ¯rst ratio P¡S
R¡S is denoted as Risk. It can be derived
from a Subjective Expected Utility (SEU; Savage 1954) consideration. If the trustor
withholds trust, her payo® is P. However, if she places trust, her expected payo® is
pR +( 1¡ p)S, where p denotes the trustor's subjective probability that the outcome
of the game provides her with payo® R (i.e. p is the probability that a trustee honors
trust). Rearranging the inequality pR +( 1¡ p)S>Pshows that a trustor should
place trust if p>P¡S
R¡S =: Risk. It is the ratio of the potential loss of the trustor
due to unjusti¯ed trust (P ¡ S) and her gain due to justi¯ed trust (R ¡ S). Risk
corresponds to Coleman's (1990: 97{102) assertion about when a trustor should place
trust. Taking this analysis literally, a trustor should place trust if and only if she
assesses the probability of facing a trustworthy trustee to be larger than Risk.W e
propose that a trustor's inclination to place trust in a Trust Game increases as Risk
becomes smaller and, by the same token, decreases as Risk becomes larger.3.3 Social Capital and Temporal Embeddedness 57
We represent the trustee's inclination to abuse trust by the payo® ratio T¡R
T¡S =:
Temptation. Temptation can be derived, for instance, from a model of guilt (e.g.
Snijders 1996: ch. 2). Assume that the trustee's utility from abusing trust is not
the temptation payo® T but T ¡ ° (T ¡ S). Abusing trust triggers a bad conscious-
ness and reduces the trustee's utility by (a fraction of) the di®erence of his and the
trustor's payo®. How large the reduction in utility is depends on the size of the guilt{
parameter ° 2 [0;1]. In such a guilt model, the trustee honors placed trust whenever
R>T¡ ° (T ¡ S) and hence if the guilt{parameter °>T¡R
T¡S. A trustee with a
small guilt{parameter will abuse trust while a trustee with a large guilt{parameter will
not. As with Risk, we propose that the trustor's inclination to place trust decreases
in Temptation. Snijders (1996) presents experimental evidence that the trustor's
trustfulness decreases in Risk and Temptation in one{shot Trust Games.
We sketched our general idea of social capital as being the stock of past outcomes
and expected future encounters. How the stock variable is precisely in°uenced by the
past and the future will be addressed in more detail in the following subsections. Before
we go into the details, it is useful to list the basic premises on how a trustor decides
between placing or withholding trust. The trustor comes to a decision regarding the
placement of trust by comparing the stakes of the current game to the stock of dyadic
social capital `available' to her. She places trust whenever the stock outweighs the peril
of the current situation as indicated by the stakes of the current game.
² The stakes of the current game are represented by the payo® ratios Risk and
Temptation.
² The stock of social capital emerges as a function of the mutual past and future
of the trustor and the trustee (see below for a discussion of this stock).5
² The larger Risk and the larger Temptation of the current game, the more social
capital is needed to induce trust (i.e. the larger the trustor's capital stock needs
to be).
Consequently, a small amount of social capital means that games of relatively low
stakes already pose a problematic situation in which trust will not be placed, while a
larger endowment of social capital can lead to a placement of trust even in high stakes
situations.
Having addressed the relation between the stakes of the current game and the
capital stock, we now present two conceptualizations of the stock variable.
A Simple Stock: The trustor sees as `ingredients' to her stock the outcomes of the
past games (i.e. was placed trust abused or honored), the length of the past (i.e.
5 We do not exclude that trust likewise depends on a natural inclination or tendency of the trustor
to trust a (yet unknown) trustee based on past experiences gathered in similar situations (e.g. Coleman
1990). Neither do we exclude that variations due to personal characteristics a®ect the probability of
placing trust. We do take these features into account in the empirical analysis.58 Chapter 3 Trust over Time
the number of games played before with the trustee) and the length of the future
(i.e. the number of games expected to be played).
A Complex Stock: A more complex conceptualization of the stock additionally takes
into account the incentive structure of the past and future games as represented
by Risk and Temptation. The past is a function of the length and outcomes
of the past games as well as the stakes of these games. Furthermore, the future
is no longer interpreted as simply the number of games to be played but also
depends on the stakes of the future games.
Both versions of the capital stock are based on the assumption that outcomes of past
interactions lead to an increase or decrease of the capital stock. Similarly, futures
that di®er in terms of length and eventually stakes should have di®erent impacts on
the stock. Below, experimental data are used to test whether the more elaborated
conceptualization of the stock better explains the behavior of the trustor. Obviously, we
prefer a more parsimonious theory that explains the data as well as a more complicated
theory. Hence, we will prefer the complex conceptualization of the social capital stock
only if it explains the data better than the simple version of the stock.
Independent of the conceptualization of the stock, it should hold that the capital
stock must `cover' the risk of getting placed trust abused. Therefore, we should always
observe less trust in games of high stakes.
Hypothesis 3.1 [Simple and Complex Stock] The probability that the trustor
places trust in the current game decreases in the stakes of the current game, as repre-
sented by the payo® ratios Risk and Temptation.
3.3.2 Repeated Encounters: E®ects of the Past
The e®ect of a positive past is frequently discussed in the literature. Positive experi-
ence leads to a positive adjustment of the beliefs about the trustee's trustworthiness.
Granovetter (1985) argues that, in general, there is no better information about a
partner's reputation than information \from one's own past dealings with that person"
(p. 490). While ignored in standard economic assumptions on, e.g. forward{looking
maximizers and sunk cost, individuals do rely on their knowledge from past relations of
individual transactions (p. 491). Schelling's (1960: 134{135) argument that trustwor-
thiness often evolves simply by the continuity of a relation seems to be based on the
implicit assumption that past outcomes were more or less successful, while relations
with unsuccessful outcomes were terminated. A similar point on the e®ect of the past
is favored by Hardin (2001) and the authors in Lazaric and Lorenz' (1998a) book on
trust and economic learning. In general, these authors promote that trustworthiness
can only emerge through a process of learning via direct interactions.
Since we employ repeated games without possibilities to communicate, information
about the trustworthiness of the trustee must stem from the observable outcomes of
the past games. Situations in which trust was placed and subsequently honored will,
by assumption, increase the stock while abused trust will decrease the capital stock.3.3 Social Capital and Temporal Embeddedness 59
Hypothesis 3.2.1 [Simple and Complex Stock] The probability of placing trust
in the current game increases with positive past experience, that is, placed and honored
trust.
Hypothesis 3.2.2 [Simple and Complex Stock] The probability of placing trust
in the current game decreases with negative past experience, that is, placed but abused
trust.
Two points related to these hypotheses need to be addressed brie°y. First, deviant
behavior of the trustee of course induces the stock of social capital to shrink and the
smaller the stock, the less willing the trustor will be to place trust. Consequently,
placing trust should then only be observed in games of relatively low stakes while in
games of higher stakes, the trustor will withhold trust as long as the stock is not yet
large enough (again).
Second, the e®ect of additional information diminishes, especially after a longer
stream of information of the same kind. For example, the more trust is honored by
the trustee, the less information each additional cooperative move provides to the
trustor since her assessment about the probability of the trustee being trustworthy is
already considerably large and not much in°uenced by yet another cooperative move.
However, such cooperative moves are necessary to maintain trust. On the other hand,
a non{cooperative move by the trustee after a long series of honored trust may be
of little e®ect on the stock precisely for the same reason. The trustor's assessment
about the trustee being trustworthy will not be a®ected too much. If a seemingly
trustworthy trustee surprisingly abuses trust, one may not believe that he indeed is
`the bad guy'. Rather one believes that he had a `bad day' and forgets the incident. If
he honors placed trust, one will likewise not be surprised since this is what constantly
happened in the past. Such moves by the trustee bear little new information. Schelling
(1960) argues that successful long{term relations form a focal point from which it is
hard to deviate. If he is right, then an occasional defection should not immediately
drive the relationship away from mutual trust. Not though, however, if defection
starts to happen repeatedly. Social capital would decline and one's assessment about
the trustworthiness of the trustee would be more severely adjusted downwards. As a
consequence, one would no longer trust him.6
Earlier in the paper we argued that the trustee's decision whether or not to honor
placed trust depends on the payo® ratio Temptation. This consideration will be taken
into account regarding the in°uence of the past on the complex capital stock. We argue
that the trustor adjusts her stock based on good or bad past outcomes (Hypothesis 3.2.1
and 3.2.2). In the more complex de¯nition of the stock, however, she will also take
into account the Temptation of the past game.
We argue that the stock increases when the trustee honors trust, and the more
so the higher the Temptation. Similarly, the stock decreases when placed trust is
6This is a long run e®ect which we may not be able to observe in the experiments.60 Chapter 3 Trust over Time
abused, but this decrease should be smaller with higher Temptation. Assume trust
is placed. The trustor knows that the trustee's inducement to abuse trust clearly rises
in Temptation. Therefore, she values honored trust more the higher Temptation,
that is, the larger the potential short{term gain the trustee foregoes by honoring trust.
By the same token, the stock decreases if trust is abused by the trustee. The higher
Temptation, the less an abuse of trust comes as a surprise. Hence, the stock should
shrink less. However, if trust is abused in a situation of low Temptation, that is,
where little is to gain from abusing trust, it shows the sel¯sh nature of the trustee and
the stock should decrease more. The incentive structure of the past games, therefore,
contains additional information beyond the information of the outcome itself.
Hypothesis 3.3.1 [Complex Stock] Assume Hypothesis 3.2.1 is true. Then, the
higher the Temptation of a past game, the more the capital stock increases with
positive past experience in this game, and the larger the increase in the probability of
placing trust in the current game.
Hypothesis 3.3.2 [Complex Stock] Assume Hypothesis 3.2.2 is true. Then, the
higher the Temptation of a past game, the less the capital stock decreases with negative
past experience in this game, and the less the decrease in the probability of placing trust
in the current game.
Information from past outcomes has another interesting property that we expect to ¯nd
in the experimental data. Kahneman (1994) argues that experimental as well as real life
evidence shows that peoples' evaluation of the past is biased towards recent outcomes.
That is, people tend to put more weight on the more recent outcomes in assessing the
overall experience from the past. To take this fact into account, we argue that past
outcomes are discounted.7 Discounting could also be interpreted as the trustor's recall
of past outcomes. Not only do people `forget' past outcomes, but memory could work
selectively and, for instance, recall bad outcomes more easily than good ones. This
would even make it necessary to de¯ne two di®erent discount parameters for di®erent
outcomes (i.e. abused and honored trust, respectively). Kahneman (1994) also reports
a similar e®ect: people seem to remember extreme past outcomes more than average
ones.
Hypothesis 3.4 [Simple and Complex Stock] Assume Hypotheses 3.2.1 and 3.2.2
are true and the probability of placing trust in the current game increases with positive
past experience and decreases in bad past experience. The further back in the past these
outcomes, the less their impact on the probability of placing trust in the current game.
The assumption of discounting the outcomes forming the stock leads to three straight-
forward and important conclusions. First, a trustor will eventually `forget' defective
7There may be other reasons to discount information from more distant outcomes. Older infor-
mation can become less relevant than newer one if the object one is learning about changes over
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moves by the trustee (i.e. she is not resentful). Second, even good outcomes will be-
come less important and mutual trust must be maintained by the trustee by further
honoring placed trust. Third, social capital deteriorates over time if no interactions
between the trustor and the trustee take place. That is, the longer the breaks in be-
tween two interactions, the less likely it will be that the trustor places trust in a next
encounter.
While the ¯rst two points should show up in the experimental data (e.g. smaller
or statistically not signi¯cant coe±cients), the latter will not (directly) be observable
in the experiments since we did not consider breaks of di®erent length in between the
games in our experiment. We can, however, address a related consideration about
`not playing the game'. At the beginning of any new relation, the capital stock is per
de¯nition simply a function of the future. Assume now that the trustor withholds trust
in the ¯rst game. Since the trustee is forced to refrain from any action, the trustor
cannot learn anything from such a game. Hence, her social capital with this trustee will
only change because the (length of the) future becomes di®erent. By the same token,
this holds true for any following and consecutive game(s) in which she withholds trust.
Hypothesis 3.5 [Simple and Complex Stock] The probability of placing trust in
a situation without a past (i.e. the current game is the ¯rst game to be played) must be
equal to the probability of placing trust in a current game with a past of withheld trust
only.
Of course this hypothesis does not hold true for situations in which trust is withheld
only after trust has been placed at least once beforehand. In such situations, social
capital is no longer a function of the future only. To test Hypothesis 3.5, we furthermore
have to make sure that the future is the same for both types of situations.
3.3.3 Repeated Encounters: E®ects of the Future
Although Schelling argues in favor of mutual trust as a focal point from which it is
hard to deviate, he further argues that even a successful past seems not to be enough
to maintain trust (Schelling 1960: 45). He claims that many agreements are only en-
forceable because of the recognition of future opportunities which will be eliminated if
trustworthiness is not maintained. Put di®erently, abusing trust can lead the trustor
to withhold trust (for one or more transactions) in the future which, in turn, should be
anticipated by the trustee. This mechanism of control is often called reciprocity (Blau
1964; Emerson 1981; Gouldner 1960; Homans 1961), conditional cooperation (Taylor
1987), or tit{for{tat by analogy with one of the strategies supplied to Axelrod's (1984)
computer tournament. A common future provides a trustor with opportunities to re-
taliate and punish deviant behavior by the trustee. Likewise, the future also o®ers the
possibility to reward cooperative behavior by the trustee through positive sanctions. If
placed trust was honored by the trustee in preceding games, the trustor can continue to
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from experiments in which possibilities of bilateral punishment helped to maintain co-
operative behavior even in the most tempting (large payo®s) situations. Oliver (1984)
presents experimental results which show the signi¯cant impact of punishment on in-
creasing cooperation. The `successful' combination of reciprocity and punishment has
long been put forward (based on animal experiments) in biology and psychology as
`reinforcement learning' (e.g. Walker 1987: ch. 7): rewards should be repeated while
responses that bring about punishments should be stopped.
Under the assumption that the trustor's threat to withhold trust in the future is
seen as credible by the trustee (control e®ect), the future enters the capital stock as the
collection of possibilities for the trustor to retaliate deviant behavior by the trustee.
The trustee should anticipate the likelihood of such punishment by the trustor and see
his future gains at risk. Consequently, the more possibilities exist to punish abused
trust, the more risk can be taken by the trustor in the current game.
Hypothesis 3.6 [Simple and Complex Stock] The probability of placing trust in
the current game increases in the length of the mutual future of a dyadic relation.
According to Hypotheses 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, the past adds or subtracts from the stock
through cooperative and defective moves of the trustee. Since his future moves are not
known, the future cannot in°uence the stock via outcomes. However, the longer the
future the more possibilities for the trustor to retaliate possible deviant behavior by
the trustee and the larger the dyadic social capital stock.
The argument of Hypothesis 3.6 uses the number of future games. The future,
however, contains more information than its length only. Following the de¯nition
of the complex stock, we are now taking into account the incentive structure of the
future games as well. Since a common future provides the trustor with opportunities
to sanction the trustee's deviant behavior in past and current games, our argument to
include payo®s again runs along the lines of Temptation. For the trustee, punishment
is something to be avoided, more so the more severe the sanctions will be. We argue that
the higher the Temptation of the expected future games, the stronger the trustor's
punishment in cases she withholds trust in the respective future games. A trustor
who can credibly `threaten' the trustee with severe punishment should then be more
inclined to take higher risks in the current game.
Hypothesis 3.7 [Complex Stock] Assume Hypothesis 3.6 is true and the probability
of placing trust in the current game increases in the length of the future. This probability
is even higher the higher the Temptation of the future games.
Consequently, the capital stock of a trustor with a future of games of mainly high
Temptation will be larger than the stock of a trustor with games of mainly low
Temptation. Hence, everything else being equal, the former trustor will be more
likely to place trust than the latter. Table 3.1 summarizes our hypotheses.
At this point, let us brie°y relate our considerations about past and future e®ects to
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Table 3.1 Hypotheses with respect to the probability of placing trust (I).
Probability to place trust
Independent variable Predicteda Hypothesis
Current
Stakes in current game { 3.1
Past
Honored trust + 3.2.1
Honored trust £ stakes + 3.3.1
Abused Trust { 3.2.2
Abused trust £ stakes { 3.3.2
Having a past £ discounting honored trust + 3.4
Having a past £ discounting abused trust { 3.4
No past v. trust withheld 0 3.5
Future
Length of future + 3.6
Length of future £ stakes + 3.7
Note: Stakes refer to Risk and Temptation as de¯ned in Subsection 3.3.1.
a{ : the probability of placing trust decreases. + : the probability of placing trust increases. 0 : the
probability of placing trust is not a®ected.
Trust Game with complete information, the unique equilibrium behavior is that trust
will never be placed and would never be honored if it would be placed (viz. Luce and
Rai®a 1957: 97{102). However, cooperation (trust being placed and honored) until
near the last period can occur as equilibrium behavior if certain characteristics of the
game or of the trustee are unobservable for the trustor (`incomplete information').8 In
an in¯nitely repeated Trust Game, conditional cooperation is possible as long as `the
shadow of the future' is long enough so that conditional cooperation of the trustor is
credible (see also Friedman 1986: 88{89).
3.4 Empirical Evidence
To test our hypotheses, we use data from a laboratory experiment in which subjects
played a series of repeated Trust Games using the `strategy method'. We ¯rst introduce
the experimental setup in more detail. Subsequently, we discuss the construction of
the variables and the statistical model that we use. Finally, we present the results.
8How `near' to the last period cooperation should be uphold depends on the parameters of the
game such as its payo®s (Kreps et al. 1982).64 Chapter 3 Trust over Time
3.4.1 Experimental Design and Subjects
Background: The experiment was conducted at the Ludwig{Maximilians University
Munich, Germany, in June 2000. The experiment on the repeated Trust Game was part
of a larger experimental session consisting of seven di®erent parts (for more details, see
`Design' below).
Subjects: Students of an introductory sociology course were informed repeatedly for a
period of about four weeks prior to the experiment about the possibility to participate
in an experiment on decision making. Students could sign up for one of the eight
experimental sessions scheduled to take place during a one week period. Each session
was planned to include 20 students. In announcing the experiment, students were
promised a participation fee of DM 10 (German Marks, about
e 5:10 or US$ 5 at
the time of the experiment). Moreover, they were informed that they would have the
possibility to earn more than DM 100 in about 30 minutes time. One week prior to
the experiment, a total of 144 students had signed up for one of the eight sessions.
Eventually, 83 students showed up for the experiment. Subjects were mostly freshmen.
On average, they were about 25 years old (s.d. 6 years). One third of the participants
were women, 24% had had economics as part of their high school graduation package
and 59% had heard about game theory.
On arrival at their session, participating students were brie°y instructed orally by
the experimenter about the tasks to perform|to make decisions with consequences
depending on the decisions of an unknown other. The subjects were not informed
about our interest in the e®ects of temporal embeddedness on trust. In addition, they
were told that two subjects in the session would earn more than the participation fee,
namely, up to a maximum of DM 150, depending on their choices in one of the parts
of the experiment. All necessary instructions for the experiment were printed on the
¯rst three pages of the experiment booklet (see Appendix A). Additional instructions
regarding the tasks in the parts of the experiment were outlined in short introductions
at the beginning of each of those parts. In addition, all game parts contained graphical
representations of the given situation. Care was taken to avoid references to `trust',
`risk', or related concepts.
Design: The experiment was a paper and pencil experiment divided into ¯ve di®erent
game parts. The experiment booklet likewise contained two questionnaires, a set of
items on trust and related concepts (Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994) and 23 items
measuring the reliability of the subjects answers (`test attitude scale', Wilde 1970),9
and several questions on sociodemographic variables. As described in the previous
section, our interest is in the behavior of the trustor. Because we paid in accordance
with actual choices at the end of the experiment, we randomly chose one subject to
9The test attitude scale was designed to measure a subject's self{defensive versus his or her self-
critique attitude in answering questions regarding opinions on certain statements or conceptions. The
scale can also be used to judge the reliability of the subject's answers on a questionnaire of interest
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play as the trustee.10 The experiment booklet for the trustee subjects was an appropri-
ately adapted version of the booklet for the trustor. Throughout the experiment, the
instructions in the booklet constantly reminded the subjects that they should imagine
that the `other person' they played against is actually an unknown other person in the
room. It was not known to the subjects in which role (i.e. trustor or trustee) the other
persons in the room would play.
Subjects ¯rst played two one{shot Trust Games, followed by a once repeated Trust
Game (i.e. two games in a row). Following the ¯rst two game parts, they ¯lled in the
`test attitude scale'{items. Subsequently they played a twice repeated Trust Game (i.e.
three games in a row). Finally, they received the item{battery on trust and related
concepts. Together with the sociodemographic variables, these trust{items were used
to measure the subjects' basic tendency to trust (trustfulness, see note 5). Subjects
¯nished the experiment by playing a one{shot Continuous Trust Game that will not
be discussed or analyzed in this chapter. The experiment was scheduled to last 50
minutes. On average, subjects ¯nished in about 37 minutes. Due to time problems,
four subjects did not play the Continuous Trust Game.
The ¯rst two one{shot Trust Games only di®ered in terms of their payo®s, such
that we had a game of low and high stakes, respectively. The ¯rst set of payo®s was
as follows: S = 10, P = 20, R = 40, and T = 140, which implies that Temptation =
T¡R
T¡S =0 :77 and Risk = P¡S
R¡S =0 :33. We will refer to this set of payo®s as high stakes.
The second set of payo®s was S =5 ,P = 20, R = 70, and T = 90, which implies
Temptation = 0.24 and Risk = 0.23. We will refer to this set of payo®s as low
stakes. We also used these low and high stakes payo®s in the once and twice repeated
Trust Game. In each session we used di®erent combinations of the low and high stake
games. The combination of games of di®erent length and stakes allows us to vary the
parameters necessary to test our hypotheses. Since we have (repeated) games of length
one, two, and three, we are able to test the subjects' behavior in situations where they
were embedded in various temporal settings: no past, a past of one game played, and
a past of two games played. The same holds true regarding the subjects' future: no
future, a future of one game, and a future of two games. The use of two di®erent
sets of payo®s (low and high stakes) in combination with the two one{shot games, the
once repeated game, and the twice repeated game leads to 2 £ 2 £ 4 £ 8 = 128 payo®
combinations, of which we used 8 (see Table 3.2). These payo® combinations were
chosen so that the resulting set of experimental conditions permitted a test of all of
our hypotheses. Stakes as well as length of play in all game parts of the experiment
were common knowledge to the subjects.
Strategy Method: To collect information about the subjects' behavior in the re-
peated games, we used the so{called strategy method. This method was ¯rst proposed
by Selten (1967). Rather than observing the subject's behavior in only those nodes he
10The random selection of the trustee as well as the trustor, and the respective part of the experiment
for the additional payment of these two participants was made prior to the begin of each session. Of
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Table 3.2 Experimental design and stakes in the Trust Games (TG).
Session First TG Second TG Once{repeated TG Twice{repeated TG
1 low high low, low low, low, low
2 high low low, low low, low, high
3 low high low, low high, low, low
4 high low low, high low, low, high
5 low high low, high high, low, high
6 high low high, low high, low, high
7 low high high, low high, low, low
8 low high high, high low, low, low
Note: `low' and `high' refer to the respective Temptation of the game, as de¯ned by T¡R
T¡S. Payo®s
for the low stakes game are S =5 ,P = 20, R = 70, and T =9 0( Temptation=0.24); the high stakes
games have payo®s S = 10, P = 20, R = 40, and T = 140 (Temptation=0.77).
or she reaches, the strategy method asks for a decision of the subject in every node of
the game (see below for an example). Roth (1995: 322{323) discusses some pros (e.g.
observing subjects' entire strategies) and cons (e.g. subjects are forced to think about
behavior in each node which could lead to di®erent outcomes than had the game been
played in an ordinary manner) of the strategy method. The method surely adds some
complexity. Subjects must clearly understand that their moves are not independent of
the partner's moves (i.e. the simulated trustee in our experiment). Boone and Macy
(1999) observed that already in ordinary laboratory experiments, subjects sometimes
have problems understanding the fact that their decision is not independent of their
partner's decision. Since the strategy method so much relies on the understanding of
the interdependent situation, extensive written information and graphical representa-
tions of the games to be played were provided in the experiment booklet. In addition,
the instructions of each of these part of the experiment contained a comprehension
check.11 Personal communication with a sample of subjects after the experiment indi-
cated that none of them had experienced problems with the experimental design.
Example: We now illustrate the strategy method using the once repeated Trust Game
as an example. Figure 3.2 shows a condensed version of the graphical representation
of 4 pages of the experiment booklet. For each decision the subject had to take, we
reserved one page in the experiment booklet. After answering the question, subjects
were routed to the page (number) of the respective next question. The graphical
representation was such that the decision node the subject was in was clearly marked by
11A possible path (i.e. moves of the trustor and the trustee) through the game(s) of the given
part of the experiment was sketched. Subjects were asked to calculate and write down the payo®s
of the trustor and the trustee for each game on the path. They could verify their answers on the
following page. If their answers were right, subjects were asked to start with the respective part of
the experiment. Otherwise, they were urged to re{read the instructions and contact the experimenter
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Figure 3.2 The strategy method applied to the once repeated Trust Game.
a double{edged box (see Figure 3.2). Paths not used in the (past) game were printed
in shaded gray. The graphical representation belonging to question 1 is depicted in
quadrant Q1 of Figure 3.2. The subject (in the role of the trustor) was asked to decide
between moving `Right' or `Down'. Assume ¯rst that the subject chose `Right' (i.e.
no trust). He was then routed to question 2 which was accompanied by the graphical
representation in quadrant Q2 of Figure 3.2. The subject additionally received the
information that he chose `Right' in round 1 and the `Other Person' therefore had had
no chance to move. Again the subject was asked whether he would choose `Right' or
`Down' in round 2. The once repeated Trust Game ended after the subject's choice.
He was routed to the ¯rst battery of questions to be answered.
Assume now that the subject did not choose `Right' in round 1 but chose to play
`Down' (i.e. place trust). Under these circumstances, he was directly routed to question
3 graphically represented by the games in quadrant Q3 of Figure 3.2. The subject
received the information that he chose `Down' in round 1 and that the `Other Person'
therefore had to choose between `Down' and `Right' as well. He was then told that he
should ¯rst assume that the `Other Person' had chosen `Right' in round 1 (i.e. the other
person abused trust). Given this situation, the subject was asked to choose between
`Right' and `Down' in the second round. After answering this question, the subject
was routed to question 4 which was accompanied by the graphical representation in
quadrant Q4 of Figure 3.2. It was carefully explained to the subject that because68 Chapter 3 Trust over Time
he chose `Down' in round 1, the `Other Person' could also choose between `Down' and
`Right' and that in the previous question we assumed that this `Other Person' decided
to play `Right' in round 1. We now asked the subject to assume that the `Other Person'
did not choose `Right' in round 1 but `Down'. The subject was then again asked to
choose between `Right' and `Down' in round 2, given this new situation. After making
this decision, the game ended and the subject was routed to the next part of the
experiment.
3.4.2 Variables
To test our hypotheses, we need variables that represent the stakes of the current
game, the outcomes and the stakes of the past games, and the stakes and the length
of the mutual future. Seven independent variables contain the necessary information
of the experimental situations. What is to be explained is whether or not trust is
placed in the current game. The dependent binary variable TRUST is 1 if trust is placed
and 0 otherwise. With regard to the payo®s of the current game, we argued that
the behavior of the trustor should depend on Risk and Temptation. Since only
two types of payo®s are used in the experiment, Risk and Temptation do not vary
independently of each other. For reasons of collinearity, one of them has to be omitted
in the statistical analysis. We chose to include Temptation in the analysis.
CURRENT STAKES de¯nes whether the current game (i.e. the game in which the decision
whether or not to place trust is made) is a low stakes or a high stakes game,
that is, whether the Temptation is low or high. CURRENT STAKES is a dummy
variable where 0 = `low stakes' and 1 = `high stakes'.
Past variables:
PAST STAKES is a nominal variable representing the stakes of the past game(s): 0 =
`no past', 1 = `one low stakes game', 2 = `one high stakes game', 3 = `1st game
low stakes; 2nd game low stakes', and4=` 1 st game high stakes; 2nd game low
stakes'.
PAST OUTCOMES is a nominal variable representing the subject's behavior in the past
games. PAST OUTCOMES contains the information about the chosen path but not
about the stakes of the past games. The labels describe the path through the
game(s) before reaching the current game at t: 0 = `no past', 1 = `no game at
t¡2; withheld trust at t¡1', 2 = `no game at t¡2; placed and abused trust at
t ¡ 1', 3 = `no game at t ¡ 2; placed and honored trust at t ¡ 1', 4 =`withheld
trust at t ¡ 2; withheld trust at t ¡ 1', 5 = `withheld trust at t ¡ 2; placed and
abused trust at t ¡ 1', and so on till, 12 = `placed and honored trust at t ¡ 2;
placed and honored trust at t ¡ 1'.
PAST COMPLETE combines PAST STAKES and PAST OUTCOMES and contains the information
about the twelve possible paths in combination with the stakes of past games.
Again, the nominal variable PAST COMPLETE is 0 if the current game is the ¯rst to
be played (`no past'). Including `no past', PAST COMPLETE has 25 values.3.4 Empirical Evidence 69
Future variables:
FUTURE DUMMY de¯nes a dummy variable which is 0 if there was no future after the
current game (i.e. it is the last game) and 1 if either a future of one or two games
laid ahead.
FUTURE LENGTH makes a di®erence between a short (i.e. one game) and a long (i.e.
two games) future. The ordinal variable FUTURE LENGTH takes the values 0 = `no
future', 1 = `short future', and 2 = `long future'.
FUTURE STAKES additionally takes into account the stakes of the future games. We
have again a nominal variable with values 0 = `no future', 1 = `short future: low
stakes', 2 = `short future: high stakes', 3 = `long future: 1st game low stakes,
2nd game low stakes', and 4 = `long future: 1st game low stakes, 2nd game high
stakes'.
By construction of the variables, it follows that PAST STAKES and PAST OUTCOMES are
`nested' in PAST COMPLETE, FUTURE DUMMY is `nested' in FUTURE LENGTH as well as FUTURE
STAKES, and FUTURE LENGTH is `nested' in FUTURE STAKES.
3.4.3 Statistical Model
To test the hypotheses presented in Section 3.2 by using these experimental data we
need an appropriate statistical model. A subject's decision to either place or withhold
trust is the outcome of a discrete choice. In the one{shot Trust Game, one would
normally use an ordinary logit or probit regression model for the probability that trust
is placed in terms of (a subset of) the independent variables described above. However,
this is not entirely appropriate for our problem since the observations are repeated
within subjects. To deal with this form of clustering, we consider an extension of the
logistic regression model that incorporates (random or ¯xed) subject e®ects.
All subjects in the experiment played two one{shot games, a once repeated, and
a twice repeated game. This adds up to a total of 19 possible decision nodes: one
node in each of the one{shot Trust Game, 4 in the once repeated Trust Game, and 13
in the twice repeated Trust Game. If we additionally take into account the fact that
subjects played games of di®erent stakes (see Table 3.2), the number of di®erent nodes
increases to 7012 out of which every subject reaches at maximum 19, representing the
at most 19 decisions the subject has to make.13 These 70 nodes are the experimental
conditions and they can be de¯ned in terms of the current stakes, the type of past,
12For the analysis it makes a di®erence whether subjects played, for instance, a once repeated game
with (low, low) stakes or the same game with (low, high) stakes. Table 3.2 shows that two one{shot
Trust Games with low and high stakes, respectively, were played. They were followed by a once
repeated Trust Game with either (low, low), (low, high), (high, low), or (high, high) stakes. The twice
repeated Trust Game, ¯nally, had (low, low, low), (low, low, high), (high, low, low), or (high, low,
high) stakes. Therefore, we have 2 + 4 £ 4+1 3£ 4 = 70 possible decision nodes in our experiment.
13A subject withholding trust throughout the experiment only needed to take 9 decisions. All
subjects, therefore, had to made between 9 and 19 decisions.70 Chapter 3 Trust over Time
and the type of future. For instance, one node would be the condition that `trust has
been placed and abused in a high stakes Trust Game, while the decision now is to place
or withhold trust in a low stakes Trust Game, knowing that there are no more Trust
Games to be played afterwards'.
The starting point in formulating the statistical model is the simple Rasch model of
item response theory. The Rasch model describes subject i's binary response at item
j via the di®erence between i's personal parameter µi and a parameter ¯j representing
the `item-di±culty' of that item,
¼ij = Pr(yij =1jµi;¯ j)=
eµi¡¯j
1+eµi¡¯j : (3.1)
Standard applications of the Rasch model involve estimating individual capabilities.
Here we model the choices of subjects in a similar way. Subject i's decision whether
or not to trust is assumed to depend on the di®erence between i's personal parameter
µi, representing a person's `general trustfulness', and a parameter ¯j representing the
condition under which the person made his or her decision. Let yi =( yi1;:::y i70)b e
subject i's choices in each of the 70 conditions, taking the values 1 (placed trust) or 0
(withheld trust). For each subject, minimally 51 = 70¡19 values are missing by design.
The simple Rasch model with the 70 condition parameters ¯j is a saturated model for the
di®erences between the conditions and therefore not suitable to test our hypotheses. It
will, however, be useful as our baseline model with which all other models (i.e. models
using combinations of past{future variables discussed in the preceding subsection) can
be compared.
Our hypotheses are formulated as assertions about di®erences in trusting behavior
between certain classes of nodes or conditions. To test these hypotheses, the conditions
can be represented by the temporal embeddedness variables and the stakes in the
current game. Thus, we model the item di±culty parameter ¯j in terms of the temporal
embeddedness variables and the stakes of the current game in condition j. Such a
parsimonious model can be ¯tted to the data and compared to the saturated model
in order to test whether we have accounted for the di®erences between the conditions
via these variables. In psychometrics14 this specialized version of the Rasch model is
known as the Linear Logistic Test Model (LLTM, see Fischer 1997: 226{227) and it
decomposes the item parameter ¯j as
¯j =
m X
`=1
°`zj` ; (3.2)
where the zj`'s are characteristics of the conditions in terms of temporal embeddedness
and the stakes of the current game, and °` the parameters to be estimated. For example,
the decomposition of the item di±culty parameter into
¯j = °1 CURRENT STAKESj + °2 PAST OUTCOMESj + °3 FUTURE LENGTHj
14Biostatisticians and epidemiologists refer to this model as `conditional logistic regression for
matched case-control groups'. Econometricians refer to it as ¯xed e®ects logistic regression (Cham-
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re°ects that a condition a®ects behavior via additive e®ects of the current stakes, past
outcomes, and the length of the future, but not, for instance, of the stakes of the past
and the future.
We now turn to the subject parameters µi. The ¯rst possibility is to use a ¯xed{
e®ects speci¯cation, and estimate the model using the conditional maximum likelihood
method; the standard maximum likelihood estimator would be inconsistent for the
condition parameters ¯j and °` (see Fischer 1997; Greene 1993: 655{657; Stata manual,
Vol. 1, 2001: 214{215). With this unstructured (`saturated') speci¯cation of subject
e®ects, it is not possible to analyze the di®erences between the subjects. E®ects of
subject{level predictor variables such as age, sex, or education are not identi¯ed. By
the same token, subjects who always withheld or placed trust do not show any within{
subject variation, and hence carry no information regarding di®erences between the
conditions. For the same reason, conditions in which all subjects either placed or
withheld trust are likewise dropped from the estimation.
Alternatively, we may use a random{e®ects speci¯cation for the person parameters,
and estimate the model using marginal maximum likelihood. As with the condition
parameter ¯j, a `structure' is imposed on the person parameters in terms of character-
istics of the subjects and a random component leading to a latent regression model for
the person parameter
µi =
K X
k=1
Ákxik + ²i ; (3.3)
with ²i » N(0;¾2) and Ák the parameters to be estimated. If we dispose of suitable
variables xi to describe individual di®erences, the random{e®ects estimator is often
more e±cient than the ¯xed{e®ects estimator, and we obtain inferences not only about
how temporal embeddedness and stakes a®ect the decision to place or withhold trust,
but also which kind of subjects are more likely to trust in general.
3.4.4 Results
This section o®ers statistical tests of our hypotheses. Results are reported as a number
of ¯ndings, each of which is followed by an elaboration how we arrived at it. As a
starting point and baseline, we ¯tted the simple Rasch model to our data, that is, the
model in which both conditions and subjects are represented by speci¯c parameters
(¯xed{e®ects). The saturated model is estimated on 673 observations (69 subjects)
with an average of 9.8 observations per subject.15 From the 83 subjects showing up for
the experiment, eight are dropped since they played as a trustee. From the remaining
75 subjects, two (four) subjects were dropped from the analysis because they placed
(withheld) trust in all nodes reached. 16 conditions were not taken into account since
either no subject reached it (four conditions) or all subjects reaching the respective
condition either placed or withheld trust (seven and ¯ve conditions, respectively).
15The saturated model has 51 estimable parameters and has a log likelihood of ¡213:2636. This
number has no interpretation per se, but is used to compute likelihood ratio tests reported below.72 Chapter 3 Trust over Time
The theory section proposes that the probability of placing trust depends on the
trustor's dyadic social capital. Dyadic social capital itself is a function of tempo-
ral embeddedness that varies between the conditions. We operationalized temporal
embeddedness in terms of three past variables and three future variables, varying in
complexity. Which of these variables best describes the `true' shadow of the past and
the future of the experiments can only be determined by comparing the ¯t of models
that di®er in the past{future variables. As we were not able to model well the di®er-
ences between the subjects using the characteristics of the subjects that we measured
(a subject's sex, age, education, exposure to game theory), we will only report results
for the `¯xed{e®ects' speci¯cations. As there are nine combinations of the past{future
variables, we therefore ¯tted nine conditional ¯xed{e®ects logit models, all including
CURRENT STAKES as well (see Table 3.3). Comparison of these 9 models with each other
and with the saturated model reveals a ¯rst important ¯nding.
Finding 3.1 Neither past stakes nor future stakes are necessary in explaining the
trustor's probability of placing trust in the current game.
This ¯nding is based on a series of comparisons of models in Table 3.3. To ¯nd the best
¯tting LLTM, we perform likelihood{ratio tests between the nested models. For the
comparison of non{nested models we applied Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) and
Schwarz' Bayesian Information Criterion (SC/BIC) (see Greene 1993; Raftery 1995).
Our starting point is the saturated model. We compare the saturated model with the
one with the most complex speci¯cations of the past and the future. As is seen in
Table 3.3, the model with additive e®ects of past and future ¯ts the data as well as
the saturated model (i.e. the model using PAST COMPLETE and FUTURE STAKES). Thus
additive e®ects of stakes, past, and future su±ce to describe the data. In particular,
we do not `need' interactions between the past and future variables, or between either
the past or future and the current stakes. Next, we consider whether we can simplify
the speci¯cations of the past and future. We `move down' within nested variables:
from PAST COMPLETE to PAST OUTCOMES, and from FUTURE STAKES to FUTURE LENGTH and
¯nally to FUTURE DUMMY. Comparing the likelihood{ratios, we found that the model
using the variables CURRENT STAKES, PAST COMPLETE, and FUTURE STAKES ¯ts the data
just as well as the saturated model. In a ¯rst step, we now replace PAST COMPLETE by
PAST OUTCOMES. This simpli¯es the model without loss of explanatory power. Simpli-
fying from FUTURE STAKES to FUTURE LENGTH again leads to a simpler model with the
same explanatory power. However, any further simpli¯cation in terms of using FUTURE
DUMMY instead of FUTURE LENGTH decreases the ¯t of the model signi¯cantly. In a similar
way we seek to simplify the speci¯cation of the past. Since PAST STAKES is not nested
in PAST OUTCOMES, we cannot improve any further on the model containing CURRENT
STAKES, PAST OUTCOMES and FUTURE LENGTH. This, therefore is the most parsimonious
model which ¯ts the data at least as good as the saturated model, however, using as
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Table 3.3 Model selection based on likelihood{ratio tests: best model uses CURRENT
STAKES, PAST OUTCOMES and FUTURE LENGTH (N = 673).
LR test against
saturated model
PASTa FUTUREa log{likelihood df LR Â2 AIC BIC
saturated model ¡213:2636 53 532.53 771.65
STAKES DUMMY ¡268:3579 6 110.19 (0.0000) 548.72 575.79
OUTCOMES DUMMY ¡231:6306 13 36.73 (0.6181) 469.28 547.91
COMPLETE DUMMY ¡229:5676 23 32.61 (0.3398) 505.14 608.91
STAKES LENGTH ¡265:7337 7 104.94 (0.0000) 545.47 577.05
OUTCOMES LENGTH ¡229:2601 14 31.99 (0.7793) 486.52 549.68
COMPLETE LENGTH ¡227:0624 24 27.60 (0.5395) 502.12 610.41
STAKES STAKES ¡263:6334 9 100.74 (0.0000) 545.27 585.87
OUTCOMES STAKES ¡227:3500 16 28.17 (0.8513) 486.70 558.89
COMPLETE STAKES ¡225:1114 26 23.70 (0.6471) 502.22 619.53
Note: AIC=Akaike's Information Criterion and BIC=Bayesian Information Criterion. CURRENT
STAKES is contained in all models.
a PAST STAKES is a factor with 5 levels, PAST OUTCOMES a factor with 13 levels, and PAST COMPLETE a
factor with 25 levels. FUTURE DUMMY is a dummy, FUTURE LENGTH is a factor with 3 levels, and FUTURE
STAKES a factor with 5 levels.
The model selection process, therefore, reveals that stakes of games played in the
past and stakes of future games seem not to help us explain the subjects' behavior in
the current game. The past a®ects behavior only through outcomes while the future
a®ects behavior simply by its length. Since estimating any of the above models without
CURRENT STAKES signi¯cantly decreases the model ¯t, we can conclude that the only
payo®s that do in°uence the subjects' probability of placing trust are those of the
current game. Consequently, Hypotheses 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 as well as Hypothesis 3.7 are
not supported. Empirically, the simple conceptualization of the social capital stock
seems to capture the e®ects of dyadic social capital on trust.
According to the simple conceptualization of the social capital stock, past stakes
are irrelevant for the emergence or decline of dyadic social capital. If dyadic social
capital is indeed merely a function of (past) outcomes but not of the stakes involved,
we could conclude that small but regular favors are su±cient for creating and main-
taining dyadic social capital. Favors, gifts and cooperative behavior involving high
costs to the donor are then not necessary for creating and maintaining social capital.
Commonplace wisdom manifested in the German saying that `small gifts maintain the
friendship' would then be at the core of social capital. The creation and maintenance
of social capital occurs in a tit{for{tat like manner|cooperative behavior is repaid
by cooperative behavior (reciprocity). Anthropologists, however, have observed that,
in archaic societies, reciprocity evokes obligations between the parties which are some-
times repaid in ever increasing magnitude (e.g. Mauss 1954). Our experimental ¯nding74 Chapter 3 Trust over Time
would suggest that these gifts and favors exchanged between parties indeed unneces-
sarily increase over time. In such archaic societies, however, the situation may be more
complex since the obligations imposed by the norm of reciprocity may vary with the
status, the resources, or the motives of the donor (Gouldner 1960), and the spirit of
the gift itself (Mauss 1954). Moreover, some obligations to repay prescribe that the
gift be returned with interest (Mauss 1994: 40{41) which may to some degree explain
the increase in gifts or favors exchanged. In our Western society, on the other hand,
gift giving is no longer a means to produce and maintain the basic social structures of
society but a more personal and subjective matter to create or maintain social capi-
tal. In this light, and given our experimental ¯ndings, the increase in gifts and favors
exchanged seems unnecessary.
Table 3.4 provides some details of the selected model as Model 1. PAST OUTCOMES
was, of course, entered in the regression as a nominal variable, i.e. expanded into
indicators. The same holds for the variable FUTURE LENGTH. That is, each value of the
variables expands into a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respective node was reached
and 0 otherwise.16 For convenience of notation, we summarize past outcomes within
brackets: `(outcome at t ¡ 2), (outcome at t ¡ 1)' where C1 refers to placed trust and
C2 denotes honored trust. By the same token, D1 refers to withheld trust and D2 to
trust that was placed but abused.
Finding 3.2 The probability of placing trust in the current game decreases in the
stakes of the current game.
Model 1 in Table 3.4 reveals a statistically signi¯cant and negative e®ect of CURRENT
STAKES. Consequently, the probability of the trustor to place trust is smaller if the
current game is a high stakes game. Hypothesis 3.1 is therefore supported.
Finding 3.3 The probability of placing trust increases with placed and honored trust
in the past but decreases in placed and abused trust in the past.
In accordance with the simple conceptualization of social capital, the respective coef-
¯cients of Model 1 in Table 3.4 show that a purely positive past (i.e. (C1,C 2) and
(C1,C 2), (C1,C 2), respectively) signi¯cantly increases the likelihood of placing trust.
Also, we ¯nd a positive e®ect of a (D1), (C1,C 2) past. Maybe somewhat surprising,
the coe±cient of (D1), (C1,C 2) is even slightly larger than the one of (C1,C 2), (C1,
C2). Based on a Wald test we can reject that the coe±cients of these three `good
past'-dummies are di®erent (Â2( 2 )=2 :45;p=0 :2941). The probability of placing
trust rises in a good past and Hypothesis 3.2.1 ¯nds support.
Abused trust in the past signi¯cantly decreases the probability that a subject places
trust in the current game (see the coe±cients of (C1,D 2) as well as (C1,D 2), (C1,D 2),
16Since no subject reached the third (and last) game via path (C1,C2), (D1), no dummy for this
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Table 3.4 Conditional ¯xed{e®ects logit model for the probability of placing trust.
Model 1 Model 2
Regressor Coe±cient p{value Coe±cient p{value
CURRENT STAKES ¡1:63 0.000 ¡1:62 0.000
PAST OUTCOMES
(D1)0 :45 0.309 0:45 0.314
(C1,D 2) ¡1:09 0.001 ¡1:11 0.000
(C1,C 2)0 :90 0.016 0:89 0.016
(D1), (D1)2 :10 0.149 2:12 0.145
(D1), (C1,D 2)0 :90 0.194 0:90 0.193
(D1), (C1,C 2)1 :87 0.013 1:87 0.013
(C1,D 2), (D1)0 :15 0.793 0:16 0.786
(C1,D 2), (C1,D 2) ¡1:64 0.001 ¡1:63 0.001
(C1,D 2), (C1,C 2)0 :22 0.659 0:22 0.654
(C1,C 2), (C1,D 2) ¡1:09 0.010 ¡1:08 0.010
(C1,C 2), (C1,C 2)1 :64 0.002 1:64 0.002
Future
SHORT FUTURE 0:73 0.005
LONG FUTURE 1:57 0.000
FUTURE LENGTH 0:77 0.000
LL = ¡229:2601 LL = ¡229:2813
LR Â2(14) = 160:97(0:000) LR Â2(13) = 160:93(0:000)
Note: Reference category is a low stakes game with no past and no future. Both models are estimated
on N = 673 observations and 69 subjects.
and (C1,C 2), (C1,D 2)o fM o d e l1i nTable 3.4). As would have been expected, the
impact of abusing trust twice is the largest. We conclude that Hypothesis 3.2.2 also
receives support. The probability of placing trust indeed increases after a positive past
but decreases after a negative past. Somewhat surprising, however, is the positive, but
not signi¯cant e®ect of a (D1), (C1,D 2) past. We will discuss this point in more detail
below.
Finding 3.4 The probability of placing trust in the current game increases in the length
of the future.
Table 3.4 shows that a positive and signi¯cant e®ect on placing trust can likewise
be ascribed to the length of the future. Moreover, the longer the future, the higher
the likelihood that trust is placed since the coe±cient of SHORT FUTURE is smaller than
the coe±cient of LONG FUTURE. This ¯nding is in line with Hypothesis 3.6. We can use
a Wald test to check whether the coe±cient of a short future is exactly half of the
coe±cient of the long future (Â2(1) = 0:04;p=0 :8369). Since this null hypothesis
cannot be rejected, we may conclude that the e®ect of a having future is proportional76 Chapter 3 Trust over Time
Table 3.5 Conditional ¯xed{e®ects logit model for the probability of placing trust
without an interaction between the near and distant past outcome.
Regressor Coe±cient p{value
CURRENT STAKES ¡1:61 0.000
PAST OUTCOMES:
(D1)i nt ¡ 10 :53 0.179
(C1,D 2)i nt ¡ 1 ¡1:14 0.000
(C1,C 2)i nt ¡ 10 :89 0.003
(D1)i nt ¡ 21 :65 0.002
(C1,D 2)i nt ¡ 2 ¡0:52 0.130
(C1,C 2)i nt ¡ 20 :32 0.372
FUTURE LENGTH 0:77 0.000
LL = ¡230:6722
LR Â2(8) = 158:15(0:000)
Note: Reference category is a low stakes game with no past and no future. The model is estimated
on N = 673 observations and 69 subjects.
to the length (i.e. number of transactions) of that future. This leads to Model 2 in
Table 3.4. Model 2 is even more parsimonious since it saves another degree of freedom
without sacri¯cing the explanatory power of Model 1.17 The coe±cients for the e®ects
of the past are almost identical between Models 1 and 2 in Table 3.4.
Both models in Table 3.4 can shed light on which past outcomes in°uence the
behavior of the subjects. In addition, they support the alleged e®ect of the shadow
of the future. However, these models cannot be used to test the hypothesis that the
outcome of the more distant time t ¡ 2 is less important that the outcome at the
closer time t ¡ 1. To test this hypothesis, we will seek to impose additional structure
on the past. The fairly complicated speci¯cation of past in Models 1 and 2 allow
for interactions between outcomes at times t ¡ 2 and t ¡ 1. Is such an interaction
supported by the data? To study this, observe that at each previous time point four
possible outcomes could occur, (1) there was no past, (2) trust was withheld, (3) trust
was placed but abused, and (4) trust was placed and honored. We recode the PAST
OUTCOMES variable into eight dummies, four each for the t ¡ 1 and t ¡ 2 past according
to the above distinction. This further reduces the complexity of the conceptualization
of the past. Table 3.5 displays the parameter estimates of the model without the
interaction between the nearer and farther past. By a likelihood{ratio test we can
conclude that the interaction is indeed not signi¯cant (Â2(5) = 2:78;p=0 :7336).
Comparing Tables 3.4 and 3.5, we ¯nd comparable e®ects of CURRENT STAKES and
FUTURE LENGTH. As could have been expected from the coe±cients in Model 2, the e®ect
of abused trust in the previously played game is negative while the e®ect of honored
17A likelihood{ratio test for the linearity hypothesis of the future yields a similar results as the
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trust at t ¡ 1 is positive. Both e®ects are highly signi¯cant and substantial. In addi-
tion, Table 3.5 clearly reveals that the same outcomes at t ¡ 2 do not signi¯cantly
a®ect the probability of placing trust.18 The e®ects are, however, in the right direction
(viz. a negative e®ect of abused trust and a positive e®ect of honored trust). We take
these non{signi¯cant coe±cients of the more distant past as evidence that Hypothe-
sis 3.4 cannot be rejected. If subject's perspective of the past is biased towards recent
outcomes due to discounting, the results would support Hypothesis 3.4.
Finding 3.5 Past outcomes are discounted such that the trustor's behavior is mainly
explained by the more recent t ¡ 1 outcomes while more distant t ¡ 2 outcomes are of
less impact on the trustor's behavior.
The e®ects of (C1,D 2), (D1) and (C1,D 2), (C1,C 2)i nTable 3.4 are in line with
the argument of discounting as well. These coe±cients show that abused trust can
be `forgiven'. The coe±cients of the two regressors are positive but not statistically
signi¯cant. Unfortunately, the outcome (C1,C 2), (D1) has not been observed in the
experiments. This would have been a situation in which trust was not maintained in
the previous game. According to our discounting hypothesis, such a coe±cient should
clearly be smaller than (C1,C 2), (C1,C 2).
Unfortunately, the model in Table 3.5 does not facilitate a formal test of the
hypothesis that more distant outcomes are less important than nearer outcomes, nor
does it provide an estimate of the rate at which the past is discounted. For these
purposes, we propose a ¯nal speci¯cation of the past. Here the e®ect of the past is
modelled as the sum of the e®ect of the `outcome at time t ¡ 1' and the discounted
e®ect of the `outcome at time t ¡ 2'.
Past = !(outcomet¡1)+½!(outcomet¡2)
where ! is de¯ned over the 4 possible outcomes with !(Null) = 0 and ½ is a discount
parameter 0 <½<1.19 The constraint that the past e®ects at time t ¡ 1 are pro-
portional to those at time t ¡ 2 is a nonlinear one. Hence, it cannot be estimated
as a LLTM. The `alternating maximum likelihood' algorithm that is widely used to
estimate bilinear models can be applied to estimate the bilinear version of the logistic
regression model. Table 3.6 provides results for this model. The e®ects of the current
18Note that the e®ect of `(D1)i nt ¡ 2' is highly signi¯cant and positive. This coe±cient may be
`connected' to the surprising and positive e®ect of a (D1), (C1,D 2) past we found in Table 3.4. We
further look into these e®ects below.
19It is of course tempting to speculate that this model can be generalized to a past of more than
three periods s:
Pastt =
X
s
½s!(outcomet¡s)
This speci¯cation can also be written as a recursion describing how the stock at time t depends on
the stock at time t ¡ 1 and the outcome at time t (e.g. Lahno 1995a, 1995b):
Stockt = !(outcomet)+½Stockt¡1 :78 Chapter 3 Trust over Time
Table 3.6 Non{linear conditional ¯xed{e®ects logit model for the probability of placing
trust with discounting of past outcomes.
Regressor Coe±cient Standard Error
CURRENT STAKES ¡1:60 0.2303
PAST:
(D1) past 0:91 0.3437
(C1,D 2) past ¡1:02 0.2044
(C1,C 2) past 0:91 0.2253
FUTURE LENGTH 0:76 0.1602
Discount Parameter ½ 0:64 0.1984
LL = ¡234:0450
LR Â2(8) = 151:4050(0:000)
Note: Reference category is a low stakes game with no past and no future. The model is estimated
on N = 673 observations and 69 subjects.
stakes as well as the future are comparable with the previous models in Table 3.4
and Table 3.5. These e®ects can be interpreted in the same straightforward man-
ner as in the previous models. The e®ects of the three PAST variables, however, now
have a somewhat more complex meaning. Take, for instance, the positive e®ect of the
(C1,C 2) past. It tells us that honoring placed trust in the past increases the probability
of placing trust in the current game, irrespective of the time at which this outcome
occurred. However, the further back in the past, the less the `impact' of a positive past
on the behavior in the current game since past outcomes need to be discounted by the
parameter ½. Honored trust at t ¡ 2 would therefore have an e®ect on the probability
of placing trust in the current game of 0:91 £ 0:64 = 0:58. The other two e®ects of
PAST in Table 3.6 can be interpreted in the same way.
Table 3.6, however, not only allows to estimate the discount parameter and lends
support to Hypothesis 3.4. Each coe±cient of this parsimonious model corresponds
to one of the other hypotheses we already tested using previous models.20 The coe±-
cient of CURRENT STAKES supports Hypothesis 3.1, the PAST coe±cients of (C1,C 2) and
(C1,D 2) support Hypothesis 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, respectively. Finally, Hypothesis 3.6 on
the length of the future is supported by the FUTURE LENGTH coe±cient.
The only hypothesis left to test is Hypothesis 3.5. We argued that withholding
trust and not playing at all (i.e. having no past) should not have a di®erent e®ect on
the probability of placing trust in a current game.21 Remember that if placed trust
20This does not hold true for those hypotheses which proposed an interaction between the past or
the future with its respective stakes. They were rejected by the model selection procedure which led
to Model 1 in Table 3.4.
21I am well aware that in testing Hypothesis 3.5, we commit a sin against one of statistics' general
foundations: never set out to prove anything. We turn the standard logic of hypotheses testing upside
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Table 3.7 A comparison of withholding trust and not having played.
Regressor 1 Regressor 2 Null Hypothesisa Â2 df p{value
(D1) no play zero 0.61 1 0.4336
(D1), (D1) no play zero 2.12 1 0.1453
(D1), (C1,D 2)( C 1,D 2) equal 7.69 1 0.0055
(D1), (C1,C 2)( C 1,C 2) equal 1.45 1 0.2288
simultaneous 10.41 0.0341
Note: Coe±cients are taken from Model 2, Table 3.4.
a zero: the coe±cient is 0; equal: the coe±cient of regressor 1 is equal to the coe±cient of regressor 2.
is honored or abused, this experience contributes information about who the trustee
is|put simply, whether or not he is trustworthy. If the trustor withholds trust, she
foregoes the possibility to learn something about the trustee's behavior. Therefore,
it should not matter for the trustor's capital stock whether there was no past at all
or whether she withheld trust in a past game.22 The social capital stock remains the
same in both situations and the trustor should not change (i.e. cannot update) her
assessment about the trustee's trustworthiness. The respective `(D1) past' coe±cient
in Table 3.6 is signi¯cantly unequal to zero so we should reject this hypothesis. A past
of withheld trust increases the probability of placing trust in a current game. There are
two reasons why we nevertheless should investigate the assessment of Hypothesis 3.5
in some more detail. First, the e®ect of `(D1)' is based on di®erent D1{past outcomes
(viz. Table 3.4). It seems wise to look at them separately as well. Second, Table 3.5
revealed a counterintuitive e®ect of a `D1{past at t ¡ 2'. Its probable e®ect on the
general parameter in Table 3.6 should also be addressed.
To test Hypothesis 3.5 we turn our attention to Model 2 in Table 3.4 and test
whether the coe±cients representing subjects starting o® the (repeated) game by a
D1{move are equal to the respective `no past' counterparts. We provide Wald tests
for these four comparisons in Table 3.7. In addition, we simultaneously test the four
hypotheses (last row in Table 3.7). Such a simultaneous test is actually `equivalent'
to testing whether or not the (D1){parameter in Table 3.6 is zero. That we have to
reject the null hypothesis that there is no di®erence between `not having played' and `no
past' does not surprise if one remembers the signi¯cant (D1){coe±cient in Table 3.6.
Let us now consider the separate hypotheses. The ¯rst row in Table 3.7 reports
the comparison of the one{shot game (no past and no future) with a once repeated
game in which trust was withheld in the ¯rst game. The coe±cient is not statistically
di®erent from zero. Further, we compare a past of twice withheld trust (i.e. (D1), (D1))
with the one{shot Trust Game (second row in Table 3.7). Again, we cannot reject
22Since the capital stock varies with the future, it is of course of importance to keep the future
constant when comparing `no past' and `withheld trust' situations.80 Chapter 3 Trust over Time
the null hypothesis. The comparisons of a one{shot game with, respectively, a once
and twice repeated game of withheld trust thus support Hypothesis 3.5.
Finally, we compare a past where trust was not withheld entirely with its respective
`no past' game. Results from these two comparisons, however, are twofold. In case of a
positive past (i.e. (D1), (C1,C 2) versus (C1,C 2), see row four in Table 3.7), the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected. A negative past (i.e. (D1), (C1,D 2) versus (C1,D 2),
see row three in Table 3.7), however, leads to a strong rejection of the null hypothesis
that `no past' equals `withholding trust'. It is precisely this di®erence that drives the
result of the simultaneous test in the last row of Table 3.7.
It might be that the latter result is driven by the same underlying process as the
statistically signi¯cant and positive e®ect of `(D1)a tt¡2' of Table 3.5. According to
this coe±cient, independent of the outcome at t¡1, not placing trust at t¡2 increases
the probability of placing trust in the current game relative to a situation in which
no decision had to be taken at time t ¡ 2. How can we understand this? We select
those subjects who withheld trust at t ¡ 2( n = 33) and look at their behavior in the
current and the t ¡ 1 game. We see that three subjects withheld trust not only at
t ¡ 2 but also at t ¡ 1. In the current game, one of them placed trust while the other
two withheld trust. Their behavior makes sense. Furthermore, there are 16 subjects
who withheld trust at t ¡ 2 and had placed trust honored at t ¡ 1. Out of these 16
subjects, 12 placed trust in the last game, too. Such behavior is consistent with their
good experience at t ¡ 1. The other four subjects withheld trust in the last game and
thus behaved rationally from a game theoretic point of view (viz. end game e®ect).
The remaining 14 subjects withheld trust at t ¡ 2 but experienced that placed trust
was abused at t¡1. Surprisingly, nine out of these 14 subjects again placed trust in the
last game. Why did they place trust in the last game? For one thing, their trust had
been abused in the previous game. Moreover, they could not learn from the ¯rst game
since trust was withheld. Subjects in this situation should have less reason to assume
that they were facing a trustworthy trustee. In addition, they had to make a decision
knowing that no more future games would be played. One would expect that trust
is not placed in such a last game. It is of little help to provide ad hoc explanations
for their behavior. We must settle with the conclusion that these nine subjects are
clearly responsible for the positive and signi¯cant e®ect of the `D1 at t ¡ 2' coe±cient
in Table 3.5 and the statistically signi¯cant di®erence between the `(D1), (C1,D 2)'
and `(C1,D 2)' coe±cient of Table 3.4.23
Based on this elaborated comparison of the `withheld trust' versus `no past' situa-
tions, we put forward the ¯nal ¯nding of this chapter.
23We can run the regression model of Table 3.5 without these nine subjects and test whether the
coe±cients of this model are systematically di®erent from the coe±cients reported in Table 3.5. Using
Hausman's speci¯cation test, we ¯nd no systematic di®erence in the parameter estimates between this
`reduced' (i.e. only 60 subjects) model and the model in Table 3.5. The signi¯cant coe±cient of `D1
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Finding 3.6 The data o®er strong but not entirely conclusive evidence that there is
no di®erence in the trustor's behavior between situations of `no past' and situations of
a past of withheld trust.
To conclude the empirical section, let us in short address a point raised in connection
with Hypothesis 3.4. It has been claimed that social capital should decrease more, the
longer the breaks in between two interactions of the trustor and the trustee. In other
words, the shorter the time in between games, the smaller the discount rate. Consider
the following situation. Trustor A and trustee B play two Trust Games with one time
period between games. Another trustor C plays two Trust Games with trustee D with
two time periods in between. Both trustors place trust in the ¯rst game and both
trustees react the same. Given that past outcomes are discounted, trustor A's social
capital is larger (smaller) than trustor C's if the trustee honored (abused) placed trust.
Consequently, the probability for trustor A to place trust in the second game should
be higher (smaller) than the respective probability of trustor C.
The experimental design did not allow for di®erent amounts of time between two
games. In other words, we studied the behavior of trustor A and trustee B but cannot
say anything about behavior of trustor C and trustee D. An approximation of the
situation of trustor C and trustee D may nevertheless be possible with the data at hand.
Assume that withholding trust in the second of three games `transforms' the situation
into one in which two Trust Games are played, however, in between which two time
periods elapse. We can then compare the e®ects of a (C1,D 2) past and a (C1,D 2), (D1)
past on placing trust, taking the (D1){move as a proxy for an additional time period
elapsing in between two games. A Wald test shows that the null hypothesis of equal
coe±cients can indeed be rejected at a 5% signi¯cance level (Â2(1) = 4:29;p=0 :0383).
A quick glance on the respective coe±cients of Model 2 in Table 3.4 shows that the
probability that trustor A places trust is indeed smaller than the one of trustor C.24
3.5 Conclusion
We proposed a social capital approach to the study of trustworthiness in repeated
interactions between two actors. This idea is based on Coleman's (1988, 1990) consid-
eration that trustworthiness in dyadic relations should be seen as social capital. We
conceptualized dyadic social capital as a capital stock used by the trustor to determine
her behavior. The trustor's capital stock is not only a function of her past experience
with the trustee, but also a function of the expected future interactions. Since this
capital stock is a `summary' of the past outcomes and expectations about the future,
it can be used by the trustor to decide whether or not to place trust in a current game.
More precisely, we postulated that trust is placed whenever the capital stock is large
24Unfortunately, the `(C1,C 2), (D1)' path was not observed in the experiment and can therefore
not be compared with (C1,C 2).82 Chapter 3 Trust over Time
Table 3.8 Hypotheses with respect to the probability of placing trust (II).
Probability to place trust
Independent variable Predicteda Hypothesis Results
Current
Stakes in current game { 3.1 supported
Past
Honored trust + 3.2.1 supported
Honored trust £ stakes + 3.3.1 not supported
Abused trust { 3.2.2 supported
Abused trust £ stakes { 3.3.2 not supported
Having a past £
discounting honored trust + 3.4 supported
Having a past £
discounting abused trust { 3.4 supported
No past v. trust withheld 0 3.5 supported
Future
Length of future + 6 supported
Length of future £ stakes + 3.7 not supported
Note: Stakes refer to Risk and Temptation as de¯ned in Subsection 3.3.1.
a { : the probability of placing trust decreases. + : the probability of placing trust increases. 0 : the
probability of placing trust is not a®ected.
enough to cover the peril of the current game, as indicated by the payo® ratios Risk
and Temptation.
Table 3.8 summarizes the results of all tests of our hypotheses. The experimental
data reveal three important ¯ndings. First, as in the analysis of one{shot Trust Games
(e.g. Snijders 1996; Snijders and Keren 2001), the stakes of the game to be played are
an important factor in the trustor's decision whether or not to place trust. The higher
these stakes, the smaller the probability of placing trust.
Second, e®ects of the past can be interpreted as reinforcement learning: abusing
trust in the past decreases the probability of placing trust in a current game while
placed and honored trust in the past increases this probability. Moreover, we also
found evidence that past outcomes are discounted. In addition, the data support our
hypothesis that a longer future increases the probability of placing trust in a current
game.
Third, besides past outcomes and the length of the future, neither the stakes of
the past games nor the stakes of the future games a®ect the trustor's behavior in the
current game. A simple conceptualization of the capital stock seems to capture the
e®ects of dyadic social capital on trust. Placing or withholding trust seems to be a
simple function of whether trust was honored or abused and of the length of the future.Chapter 4
E®ects of Temporal Embeddedness
in Buyer{Supplier Relations¤
\In Contracts, the right passeth, not onely where the words are of
the time Present, or Past; but also where they are of the Future:
because all Contract is mutuall translation, or change of Right;
and therefore he that promiseth onely, because he hath already
received the bene¯t for which he promiseth, is to be understood
as if he intended the Right should passe: for unlesse he had been
content to have his words so understood, the other would not
have performed his part ¯rst. And for that cause, in buying, and
selling, and other acts of Contract, a Promise is equivalent to a
Covenant; and therefore obligatory."
Thomas Hobbes (1651: 95)
4.1 Introduction
The procurement management of ¯rms is a good example of how real{world actors
deal with issues of trust. This can be seen most easily by acknowledging the fact that
many economic transactions involve a time delay between the promise to deliver and
the actual delivery. Contingencies may arise in the time in between, and there are
many other possible reasons why what was promised may eventually not materialize.
Being willing to deal with this uncertainty, handing over the control of the situation
to another party, is an act of trust. For some transactions, uncertainty is high and
a lot of trust is asked for. This arises, for instance, when the transaction is of a
large volume and would therefore have a substantial impact on a ¯rm's pro¯t if things
went wrong, or when the quality of a delivered good is known beforehand to be hard
to assess. Our assumption is that ¯rms can actively try to decrease the amount of
trust necessary by investing time and e®ort in ex ante management of a transaction.
Examples of ways to do this are investing time and e®ort in the search for the right
business partner, investing time and e®ort in the writing of a detailed contract, or
investing time and e®ort in knowledge about the technical aspects of a product (so
¤This chapter is co{authored with Chris Snijders.
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Figure 4.1 Extensive form of the Trust Game (R1 >P 1 >S 1 and T2 >R 2 >P 2;
double lines indicate equilibrium path of play).
that the quality of the product delivered can be adequately measured). Implementing
some kind of ex ante management therefore diminishes the trust that is necessary to
complete the transaction. Hence, ceteris paribus, the extent to which ¯rms invest in ex
ante management, can be seen as a measure of (lack of) trust (cf. Batenburg, Raub,
and Snijders 2000).
The correspondence of ¯rms' ex ante management with trust provides a real life
setting in which to test the hypotheses on the dynamics of trust relations from the
previous chapter. For convenience, and to ensure that the present chapter is self-
contained as much as possible, we brie°y reiterate the setup of the previous chapter.
To study trust in the sociological laboratory, we used the Trust Game (Dasgupta
1988; Kreps 1990a). In this sequential two{player game depicted in Figure 4.1, the
trustor chooses ¯rst between `trust' or `no trust'. The game ends if the trustor chooses
not to trust. If she chooses to trust, the trustee can choose between `honor' or `abuse'.
Abusing trust leads to a larger payo® for the trustee than honoring trust, but to the
smallest payo® for the trustor. This makes that the trustor must deal with the idea
that the trustee has a real incentive to abuse trust if it is given. Hypotheses were
developed with regard to behavior in repeated Trust Games, and tested on the basis
of experimental results of subjects playing such Trust Games at most three times in a
row (see Chapter 3).
In the present chapter, we model a purchase transaction between a buyer and a
supplier as a (variant of a) Trust Game (see Figure 4.2). The buyer has to choose to
trust the supplier to deliver the product in due time and according to speci¯cations,
and the supplier has a subsequent incentive to `shirk'. The supplier could try to get
away with, for instance, late delivery, inferior quality of the product, or a lack of4.1 Introduction 85
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Figure 4.2 Purchase transaction between buyer and supplier as an extensive form
Trust Game (R1 >P 1 >S 1 and T2 >R 2 >P 2). Curved dotted lines indicate that the
buyer's and the supplier's decision is a continuous one where the solid lines indicate
their respective extreme decisions.
after{sales assistance. Whereas we feel the Trust Game captures the essentials of a
purchasing transaction quite well, the ¯t between real life purchasing and the abstract
Trust Game is not seamless. Whereas trust is an all{or{nothing decision in the Trust
Game, it is actually an interval measure in the case of buyer and supplier, because,
as mentioned above, we consider the degree of ex ante management as the measure of
the trust of the buyer in the supplier. Moreover, the trustee in the Trust Game is the
only player who has a possibility to abuse trust. For most purchasing transactions,
it is quite imaginable that not only the supplier (the trustee) but also the buyer (the
trustor) has at least some incentives to abuse trust. For instance, a buyer might change
or even cancel his order, or delay payment.
Purchase transactions and other inter{¯rm relations are being studied extensively in
(transaction cost) economics (Coase 1937; Williamson 1985, 1996), economic sociology
(Granovetter 1985; Smelser and Swedberg 1994), and the sociology of law (Macaulay
1963). In fact, to a large extent our analysis of purchasing transactions is closely
related to these literatures (see Batenburg, Raub, and Snijders 2000 for a detailed
discussion). While this chapter can be conceived as a contribution to the literature
on buyer{supplier relations, we choose to focus primarily on the opportunity to test
the previous chapter's theory. That is, the main aim of the present chapter is to see
whether the hypotheses from the previous chapter on trust in dynamic settings can
withstand a test using `real life' data on purchase transactions between a buyer and
a supplier. In a way, one could say that we leave the sociological laboratory, setting
out to ¯nd out how our theory on trust as a social capital stock compares with reality
outside the laboratory.86 Chapter 4 Embeddedness in Buyer{Supplier Relations
4.2 Trust over Time: Theory and Experimental
Evidence
There is ample evidence that actors' behavior in a Trust Game depends on the payo®
structure of the game to be played (e.g. Buskens 1999; Coleman 1990; Snijders 1996).
In a setting of repeated games, however, theoretical arguments suggest that there are
also e®ects of the past (see arguments by, for instance, Granovetter 1985; Hardin 2001;
Lazaric and Lorenz 1998a; Schelling 1960) and the future (Axelrod 1984; Blau 1964;
Gouldner 1960; Homans 1961; Schelling 1960; Taylor 1987) on actors' behavior in the
current Trust Game. While focusing on the behavior of the trustor in a repeated Trust
Game, the previous chapter proposed that learning and control e®ects contribute to
the formation of a dyadic social capital stock. The core of this idea is that behavior of
the trustor is guided by a comparison of the available social capital stock within the
relation with the stakes involved in the current game (\Can our relationship withstand
a trust problem of this magnitude?"). Technically, the `stakes involved' refer to the
probability that placed trust is abused given the payo®s of the game as represented by
Risk and Temptation. These ratios are de¯ned as Risk := P1¡S1
R1¡S1 and Temptation
:= T2¡R2
T2¡S1 and are further referred to as the stakes of the game.1
Based on this capital stock model, the previous chapter deduces several hypotheses
on the e®ects of the temporal embeddedness of actors on the trustor's behavior. We
recap the hypotheses and their underlying arguments in brief.
The behavioral premise that the capital stock must outweigh the stakes of the
current game straightforwardly leads to the ¯rst hypothesis: The probability of plac-
ing trust in the current game decreases in the stakes of the current game (H3.1). A
common past allows the actors to rely on their knowledge from earlier transactions
(learning e®ects). The trustor uses the past to update her beliefs about the trustee's
trustworthiness, thereby adapting the social capital stock. From this, the next two hy-
potheses follow directly: The probability of placing trust in the current game increases
with positive past experiences (H3.2.1), while the probability of placing trust in the cur-
rent game decreases with negative past experiences (H3.2.2). Hypotheses 3.2.1 and 3.2.2
state the main e®ects of sharing a past with your interaction partner. A good past
increases trust and a bad past decreases it. For our buyer and supplier this means that
a good past implies, for instance, that time and money can be saved on the writing
of detailed contracts since the increased trust is supposed to cover the loss of detail in
the contract. In this scenario, a bad past would logically lead to an increased e®ort in
ex ante management of the next transaction: the buyer has been fooled once, but will
take care to prevent this from happening a next time.2 Both hypotheses do not take
1On how to derive them from a given Trust Game, see for instance Snijders (1996) or page 56 in
the previous chapter.
2As shown below, our data reveal that most ¯rms follow a di®erent strategy. When not satis¯ed
with the behavior of the supplier, ¯rms do not increase their management e®ort but instead ¯nd
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into account the payo® structure of the past games. Each of these past games once
was a `current game' and back then, stakes did matter for the trustor's decision. How
come they should not matter in retrospect? When considering more complex versions
of a social capital stock, not only past outcomes but also past stakes should be taken
into account when updating the stock. Hypothesis 3.3.1 can then be formulated as an
interaction e®ect as follows. Suppose that a trustor has placed trust and saw his trust
honored by the trustee; trustor and trustee subsequently interact in a Trust Game
again. Then, the higher the Temptation of a past game, the more the capital stock
increases with positive past experience in this game, and the larger the increase in the
probability of placing trust in the current game (H3.3.1). It also works the other way
around. Suppose a trustor has had his trust abused by the trustee; trustor and trustee
subsequently interact in a Trust Game again. Then, the higher the Temptation of
a past game, the less the capital stock decreases with negative past experience in this
game, and the less the decrease in the probability of placing trust in the current game
(H3.3.2). Based on the idea that peoples' evaluation about the past is biased towards
recent outcomes (e.g. Kahneman 1994), we argued in the previous chapter that the
further back in the past these outcomes, the less their impact on the probability of plac-
ing trust in the current game (H3.4). In other words, past outcomes are discounted
and an abuse of trust can be forgiven by the trustor as time progresses; the downside
is that positive outcomes are `forgotten' as well. For completeness|unlike the others,
this hypothesis will not be tested in the present chapter|we add that the capital stock
model argues that the probability of placing trust in a situation without a past (i.e. the
current game is the ¯rst game to be played) must be equal to the probability of placing
trust in a current game with a past of withheld trust only (H3.5).
Axelrod's (1984) claim that a mutual future can establish trust is at the heart
of Hypothesis 3.6. A longer expected future or, more precisely, a larger probability
of future business dealings, makes opportunistic behavior less attractive because the
punishment that will follow on uncooperative behavior in the current Trust Game will
last longer (Matthews, Kordonski, and Shimo® 1983; Oliver 1984). Stated this way,
reciprocity ensures that likely future interactions have a positive e®ect on trust. Taking
this argument loosely, this implies that the probability of placing trust in the current
game increases in the length of the mutual future of a dyadic relation (H3.6). A more
subtle e®ect of future interactions is laid out in Hypothesis 3.7.A si nHypotheses 3.3.1
and 3.3.2, we claim that not only the likelihood of future interactions, but also the
kind of future interactions matter. The argument runs as follows. When future Trust
Games involve relatively large temptations to behave opportunistically, the trustee can
be more certain that opportunistic behavior in the current transaction will have a
detrimental impact on future business deals. This is because the trustee can anticipate
that the trustor needs a relatively large capital stock in these future interactions and
is therefore less likely to be able to a®ord to lose some of its capital stock now. In
other words: when the trustee knows that future dealings will require a large amount
of trust from the trustor, it makes sense for the trustee to invest in a good relationship.88 Chapter 4 Embeddedness in Buyer{Supplier Relations
The trustor knows this and can rest assured that the trustee will not abuse trust in
the current transaction.3 This leads to the following hypothesis. Suppose trustor and
trustee face each other in a Trust Game, knowing that n other Trust Games will follow
after the current one. Assume Hypothesis 3.6 is true and the probability of placing
trust in the current game increases in the length of the future. This probability is even
higher the higher the Temptation of the future games (H3.7).
4.3 The Link with Trust in Buyer{Supplier
Relations
We now `translate' the hypotheses for interactions in (repeated) Trust Games in Chap-
ter 3 to business dealings between a buyer and a supplier. For each hypothesis we add
whether it was supported or rejected using the experimental data from the previous
chapter. A summary is shown in Table 4.1.
Hypothesis 4.1 A buyer's ex ante management increases with increasing volume and
increasing opportunism potential (supported in the experimental data).
As when Trust Games were concerned, this is the most basic of all our hypotheses. It
states that buyer and supplier's behavior are a®ected by what is at stake in the current
transaction.
Hypothesis 4.2.1 A buyer's ex ante management decreases when buyer and supplier
have done business to their mutual satisfaction before (supported in the experimental
data).
Hypothesis 4.2.2 A buyer's ex ante management increases when buyer and supplier
have had bad experiences with each other in the past (supported in the experimental
data).
Hypotheses 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 state the main e®ects of sharing a past with your interaction
partner. A good past increases trust and a bad past decreases it. For our buyer and
supplier this means that a good past implies, for instance, that time and money can
be saved on the writing of detailed contracts since the increased trust is supposed to
cover the loss of detail in the contract. In this scenario, a bad past would logically lead
to an increased e®ort in ex ante management of the next transaction: the buyer has
been burnt once, but will take care to prevent this from happening a next time.
3Note that this line of reasoning di®ers from Axelrod's (1984) reasoning on cooperation in the
inde¯nitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. There, cooperation depends on the threshold ratio T¡R
T¡P ,
where the T stems from the focal transaction and not from the future transactions. This implies that
for a given shadow of the future, the threshold for cooperation depends on T in the focal transaction
only (or, if you prefer, on T ¡ R in the focal transaction only), suggesting that the probability of
cooperation does not depend on future temptation (cf. Raub and Weesie 1993).4.3 The Link with Trust in Buyer{Supplier Relations 89
Hypothesis 4.3.1 Suppose a buyer and supplier have done business to their mutual
satisfaction before. Then, ex ante management in the current transaction is less when
the opportunism potential in the previous transaction was larger (not supported in the
experimental data).
Hypothesis 4.3.2 Suppose a buyer and supplier have done business before that was
not to their liking. Then, ex ante management in the current transaction is less when
the opportunism potential in the previous transaction was larger (not supported in the
experimental data).
Hypotheses 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 di®erentiate between the kinds of past dealings buyer and
supplier may have had. Hypothesis 4.3.1 suggests that when a buyer has done business
with a supplier and was satis¯ed with the supplier's performance, this satisfaction will
be larger when the temptation for the supplier to behave opportunistically was larger.
In other words: the buyer is extra pleased in the situation where he knew he was at
a huge risk of being treated opportunistically, but ¯nds out the supplier was able to
withstand the temptation. Hypothesis 4.3.2 uses a similar argument. When a supplier
has abused trust in the past, this does not re°ect badly on the supplier when his
temptation to abuse was large (\anyone would have caved in for such a temptation").
Therefore, the capital stock will not decrease as much as compared to the case where
the supplier abused trust in a situation with only a small temptation to abuse (\he
caved in even for small temptations").
Hypothesis 4.4 Suppose the ex ante management in the current transaction is indeed
in°uenced by experiences between buyer and supplier in the past. Then, the longer ago
these experiences, the smaller the impact on ex ante management (supported in the
experimental data).
Hypothesis 4.4 is our equivalent of the idea that memories fade. Nice and not so nice
behavior of the partner get forgotten over time; moreover, the longer ago the previous
behavior was, the less it is taken as indicative for future behavior.
Hypothesis 4.5 Ex ante management is independent of whether ¯rms have been po-
tential (but not actual) suppliers to a buyer (supported in the experimental data).
The straightforward idea is that as long as you have not interacted with your business
partner (and have no information about his behavior in encounters with others), you
cannot learn about this partner. This hypothesis is not tested in this chapter.
Hypothesis 4.6 Ex ante management decreases with increasing probability of future
business dealings (supported in the experimental data).
Although the generalization of Axelrod's (1984) reasoning on the e®ect of reciprocity in
buyer{supplier relationships may seem logical, there are compelling arguments to argue
against this e®ect in the case that buyer and supplier have not done business with each
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in the sociological laboratory and the real world repeated encounters between buyers
and suppliers is that in repeated Trust Games, nothing tangible that was done or paid
out in a previous game is of use in the next one.4 Typically, buyers and suppliers
who face each other for the ¯rst time have an extra incentive to make more ex ante
investments. This investment e®ect occurs because (part of) the investments can be
carried over to following business deals. The most clear{cut example that comes to
mind is that parts of contracts can be used again, so that investment in writing one
is relatively attractive the more likely it is that it can be of use in future interactions.
As shown in Batenburg, Raub, and Snijders (2000), this may be the reason why an
increasing expectation of future business dealings decreases the investment in ex ante
management, but only when buyer and supplier have done business before. By that
time, the set{up investments have already been carried through, which ensures that
the e®ect of the `shadow of the future' becomes more important.
Hypothesis 4.7 Suppose buyer and supplier deal with each other in a focal transac-
tion, both anticipating that they will deal with each other again in the future. The ex
ante management in the focal transaction decreases with increasing opportunism poten-
tial in the anticipated future transactions (not supported in the experimental data).
A subtle e®ect of future interactions is laid out in Hypothesis 4.7. As argued above,
we claim that not only the likelihood of future interactions, but also the kind of future
interactions matter. The argument runs as follows. When future business deals involve
relatively large temptations to behave opportunistically for the supplier, the supplier
can be more certain that opportunistic behavior in the current transaction will have
a detrimental impact on future business deals. This is because the supplier needs a
relatively large capital stock in these future interactions and is therefore less likely
to be able to a®ord to lose some of its capital stock now. In other words: when
the supplier knows that future dealings will require a large amount of trust from the
buyer, it makes sense for the supplier to invest in a good relationship with the buyer.
The buyer knows this and can rest assured that the supplier will not abuse trust in the
current transaction. On the other hand, arguments following from the investment e®ect
elucidated in connection with Hypothesis 4.6 might also be applicable here. If the buyer
expects future business with large opportunism potential, it would eventually pay for
the buyer to invest more into current ex ante management and carry the investment
over to future deals.
4.4 Data and Variables
The data at hand (`The External Management of Automation', MAT) result from a
survey on the purchase of IT{products (software and hardware) by Dutch SMEs (small
4We write \nothing tangible" instead of just \nothing" because one could, of course, rightfully
argue that what can be of use in next rounds is, for instance, knowledge about the behavior of the
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Table 4.1 Hypotheses with respect to the buyer's investment in managing the current
transaction (I).
Investment in management Experimental
Independent variable Predicteda Hypothesis resultsb
Focal transaction
Volume and opportunism potential + 4.1 supported
Past transactions
Successful past transactions { 4.2.1 supported
Unsuccessful past transactions + 4.2.2 supported
Successful past transactions £ past
volume and opportunism potential { 4.3.1 not supported
Unsuccessful past transactions £ past
volume and opportunism potential { 4.3.2 not supported
Having a past £
discounting past experience + 4.4 supported
Potential vs. actual supplier 0 4.5 supported
Future transactions
Future transactions { 4.6 supported
Future transaction £ future
volume and opportunism potential { 4.7 not supported
a { : the investment in management decreases. + : the investment in management increases. 0 : the
investment in management is not a®ected.
b Experimental results refer to the analyses in Chapter 3.
and medium sized enterprises; between 5 and 200 employees) that was collected in two
waves, namely in 1995 (MAT95) and in 1998 (MAT98). See Batenburg (1997a, 1997b)
for a brief introduction to MAT95, Batenburg and Van de Rijt (1999) for an overview
on MAT98, and Buskens and Batenburg (2000) for information on the combined data
set of MAT95 and MAT98. In the following, we provide a brief introduction to the
data, based on the descriptions mentioned above. For a more elaborated discussion of
the data see Rooks (2002: ch. 3). The data analyzed in this chapter are based on the
combined MAT95 and MAT98 data set.
4.4.1 IT{Transactions of SMEs: MAT95 and MAT98
The Dutch IT{market at the time of the data collection was a typical seller's market:
the substantial risk associated with the purchase of IT{products (e.g. the complexity
of the products, monitoring problems of the buyer, opportunistic behavior of suppliers,
high switching costs for the buyer once a product has been bought, and relatively
little expertise of the SMEs) can lead to problematic transactions for the buyer (Raub,
Batenburg, and Snijders 2000; Rooks 2002: ch. 3). We therefore choose to see these92 Chapter 4 Embeddedness in Buyer{Supplier Relations
IT{transactions as one{sided trust problems with the supplier in the role of the trustee
and the SME in the role of the trustor.5
Sampling Frame and Procedure
The sampling frame was a business{to{business database of Dutch SMEs.6 The
database contains about 80% of all Dutch SMEs and is representative for the pop-
ulation of Dutch small and medium sized enterprises (see Batenburg 1997a).
To be able to collect information on di®erent IT{transactions (i.e. software as well
as hardware, complex as well as less complex transactions), the sampling procedure in
1995 was subject to three strati¯cation criteria:
1. The type of IT{products in use by the ¯rm: either standard IT{products, or
standard as well as complex (tailor made) IT{products.
2. The number of IT{specialists employed by the ¯rm: no specialist, only part{time
specialists, or one or more full{time specialists.
3. The network embeddedness of the buyer, that is, the extensiveness of the net-
work of inter¯rm relations within the sector (whether or not ¯rms communicate
with each other about other ¯rms in the sector, about other suppliers, or about
mutual business contacts) as judged by 21 independent business experts. This
lead to sectors being classi¯ed as having either weak, medium, or strong inter¯rm
relations.
Following this sampling procedure results in a sampling design with 2£3£3 = 18 cells.
To sample the respondents, a randomization procedure was used until at least 30 cases
per cell were collected. This results in a minimum of 18 £ 30 = 540 questionnaires to
be distributed. Due to good response rates half way into the ¯eld work, it was decided
to oversample transactions on complex IT{products.
Questionnaire and Field Work in 1995
In 1995, the ¯eld work began with a short computer assisted telephone interview
(CATI). By this, some key information of the sampled ¯rms was collected and co-
operation was asked for an interview on an IT{purchase. The key information of those
¯rms not willing to take part in the survey was used for a non{response analysis. For
the ¯rms that wanted to participate, an IT{transaction from within the last 10 years
was randomly selected. In most cases, an interviewer personally brought the question-
naire to the respondent and returned with the ¯lled out questionnaire as soon as the
respondent had completed it. Some respondents preferred to have the questionnaire
5That SMEs have little chance to avoid such risky transactions is supported by their lack of the
possibility of an in{house production of the necessary IT{products (i.e, make or buy decision). Only
in 4% of all transactions could the buyer have easily or very easily produced the purchased product
in{house.
6The database is developed and owned by Directview, a Dutch ¯rm specialized in IT marketing.4.4 Data and Variables 93
mailed. Most respondents were IT{managers. At the end of the questionnaire it was
asked whether or not the respondent was willing to ¯ll in a second questionnaire on
another IT{purchase. If yes, an additional IT{transaction was chosen by selecting the
most innovative and complex transaction from within the last 10 years. In this case,
the questionnaire was, without exception, sent by mail. This leads to an additional
batch of questionnaires on complex IT{products.
The questionnaire used in 1995 contained several segments. First, it covered the
main characteristics of the product and the transaction, followed by questions regard-
ing the search for a suitable product and supplier, and the relation with the supplier
previous to the focal transaction. Next, the questionnaire covered the agreement used
and the terms of trade regarding the transaction. Finally, there were questions re-
garding the period after the transaction had been completed and some questions on
characteristics of the buyer ¯rm and the respondent (see also Rooks 2002: ch. 3).
In total, the 1995 sample consisted of 1788 SMEs of which 1325 were suited for
the survey. From those 1325, 892 were willing to take part in the survey (673 were
visited and 219 received the questionnaire by mail). In total, 778 questionnaires were
returned (response rate = 59%). From the 892 respondents, 327 were willing to ¯ll out
an additional questionnaire regarding a second IT{transaction, of which 183 question-
naires were returned. Including a pretest of 10 transactions, this leads to a data set
with information from 788 ¯rms on 971 transactions. A non{response analysis showed
no signi¯cant di®erences between the response and non{response group on the key
variables gathered during the CATI{interview.
Questionnaire and Field Work in 1998
In 1998, a second survey with an almost identical questionnaire as in 1995 was con-
ducted. All 1995{respondent ¯rms were again contacted by use of CATI. From the
778 respondent ¯rms in 1995, 664 ¯rms were reached. If possible, the same respon-
dent as in 1995 was contacted. If this was not possible, a respondent within the ¯rm
was searched who was well informed on the 1995 transaction(s). In this telephone
interview, additional questions regarding the 1995 transaction(s) and cooperation for
a new survey was asked. This procedure resulted in 560 informants who were willing
to answer additional questions on their 1995 transaction(s). From those 560 respon-
dents, 463 were willing to ¯ll in the 1998 questionnaire on a new IT{transaction. If
possible, a transaction with the same supplier as in 1995 was selected. Otherwise, a
transaction with a new supplier was chosen. In both cases a transaction as complex
as possible was selected. The questionnaires were sent by mail and 281 were returned
(response rate = 42%). Again, a non{response analysis (also with the response and
non{response groups of 1995) showed no signi¯cant di®erences between key variables
of the participating and non{participating ¯rms.
In total, combining the ¯eld work in 1995 and 1998, we have information from
788 ¯rms on a total of 1252 IT{transactions. The number of questionnaires per ¯rm
ranges from one to three. More precisely (see Table 4.2), there are 404 ¯rms that only94 Chapter 4 Embeddedness in Buyer{Supplier Relations
Table 4.2 Number of buyers and transactions per buyer.
Number Transactions Total number of
Questionnaire of buyers per buyer transacions
First in 1995 404 1 404
First and second in 1995 103 2 206
First in 1995 and 1998 201 2 402
First and second in 1995 and, 1998 80 3 240
Total 788 1252
answered the ¯rst 1995 questionnaire (404 transactions). There are 103 ¯rms that ¯lled
out two questionnaires in 1995 (206 transactions). There are 201 ¯rms that ¯lled out
one questionnaire in 1995 and one in 1998 (402 transactions). Finally, there are 80 ¯rms
that ¯lled out all three questionnaires, two in 1995 and one in 1998 (240 transactions).
4.4.2 Transactions and Buyer{Supplier Dyads
The MAT{data on IT{transactions resemble the experimental data of the previous
chapter in the sense that the data contain single transactions between a buyer and
supplier (`one{shot games') as well as repeated transactions between the same buyer
and supplier (once and twice `repeated games').
The combined MAT95 and MAT98 data set contains information on 1252 transac-
tions (or cases). Table 4.2 reveals 404 buyers with one transaction only, 103 + 201 =
304 buyers with two transactions (i.e. 206+402 = 608 cases) and 80 buyers with three
transactions (i.e. 240 cases). The 404 respondents with one questionnaire ¯lled out
form the basis of the `one{shot transaction' cases. For the remaining 384 ¯rms, we
thus have information on more than one transaction (namely on two or three). In the
following, we rearrange the data such that we end up with dyads of buyer{supplier
couples which have done repeated transactions. Buyers with more than one transac-
tion, but each transaction with a di®erent supplier, will be added to the 404 buyers
with only one transaction.
The combined MAT{data disclose that out of the 304 buyers with two transactions
(second and third row in Table 4.2), there are 197 buyers with two transactions with
two di®erent suppliers (146=2 = 73 with two transactions in 1995 and 248=2 = 124
buyers with one transaction in 1995 and one in 1998), and 30 + 77 = 107 buyers with
two transactions with the same supplier. The latter, therefore, form 107 `real dyads' in
the sense of our Trust Game experiments with two transactions. The right{hand side
of Table 4.3 (row three and ¯ve, respectively) shows that 30 buyers reported on those
two transactions in MAT95 while the other 77 buyers informed on one transaction
in MAT95 and the other in MAT98. Those 197 buyers that reported information
on two IT{transactions with di®erent suppliers can be treated as 394 additional one{
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Table 4.3 Number of transactions within a buyer{supplier couple (dyad).
Total number of Repeated transactions in dyad
Questionnaire buyers transactions First TA Second TA Third TA
One in 1995 404 404 404
Two in 1995 103 206 146
30 30
One in 1995, one in 1998 201 402 248
77 77
Two in 1995, one in 1998 80 240 121
34 34
17 17 17
Total 788 1252 1077 158 17
respectively) shows that 146 transactions (from 73 buyers) were reported in MAT95
while 248 transactions (from 124 buyers) were reported ¯rst in MAT95 and second in
MAT98. This increases the number of `one{shot transactions' to 404 + 394 = 798.
This leaves us with 80 buyers with three transactions (i.e. 240 cases; see row four in
Table 4.2). Out of these 80 buyers, 29 buyers reported on three transactions with three
di®erent suppliers. We consider them as 29 £ 3 = 87 `one{shot transactions'. Further,
there are 34 buyers that reported on two transactions with the same supplier (row seven
on the right{hand side of Table 4.3) and a third transaction with another supplier.
The latter 34 transactions are added to the `one{shot transactions' (87 + 34 = 121,
row six on the right{hand side of Table 4.3), which increases the one{shot games to a
total of 404 + 394 + 87 + 34 = 919. Consequently, we also increase the buyer{supplier
dyads with two transactions to a total of 107 + 34 = 141. Finally, there are 17 buyers
in the data set with three transactions with the same supplier. These form 17 dyads
with three transactions (row eight on the right{hand side of Table 4.3).
In sum, we now have 919 transactions that serve as the equivalent of our one{
shot Trust Games, 141 buyer{supplier relations with two transactions serving as the
equivalent of a once repeated game, and 17 buyer{supplier relations with three trans-
actions serving as the equivalent to a twice repeated game. Table 4.3 summarizes
how Table 4.2 `translates' into transactions within buyer{supplier dyads.
Though the parallel with the setup of the experimental data is straightforward, the
di®erences are just as apparent. In the experimental data, subjects formed a ¯xed
dyad as trustor and trustee; they had no choice but to interact repeatedly. This is
of course not the case in the MAT{data. Although perhaps at some cost, buyers can
choose the supplier they prefer and can also switch to another supplier. The MAT{
data therefore show us behavior under incentive problems when one is free to choose96 Chapter 4 Embeddedness in Buyer{Supplier Relations
a partner, whereas this was clearly not the case in the experiments of the previous
chapter.7
This construction of buyer{supplier couples immediately points out a problem with
how we treat the data. We suppose that the buyer had had no other contacts to any
other third parties. We neglect the fact that the buyer might have gotten information
on possible suppliers from other buyers or suppliers and, therefore, had been given
the chance to process information on the supplier (learning) even before they ¯rst
interacted. More important, we also disregard the circumstance that the buyer may
have done business with the actual or another supplier prior to the ¯rst transaction,
between the transactions, or after the last transaction we have in the data. Unfortu-
nately, the MAT{data do not provide information on any transactions not reported in
the respective questionnaire.
4.4.3 Operationalization of Variables
As mentioned before, we consider the buyer's level of investment in safeguarding a
transaction the equivalent of (lack of) trust. Our dependent variable in the buyer{
supplier analyses is therefore not binary as in Trust Games, but on an interval scale.
On average, buyers invested 4 mendays in arranging and negotiating the contract
with the supplier. About 13% of all buyers invested 5 or more mendays in the ex ante
management of the transaction. The ¯nancial volume of a transaction was on average
NLG 117,000 (Dutch Guilders, about
e 53;100) and 25% of all transactions had a
¯nancial volume larger than NLG 75,000. The buyer, on average, was a ¯rm with
about 80 employees and roughly 10% of all buyers had 150 or more employees.
These ¯gures are not very di®erent for those buyers that reported to have done
business with the current supplier in the past. These buyers have done business with
the current supplier for, on average, 6.5 years, and indicated that business with this
supplier has occurred regularly. They invested a little bit more than 3 mendays in
arranging and negotiating the contract with the supplier. About 9% of these buyers
invested 5 or more mendays in the ex ante management of the transaction. The ¯nancial
volume of a transaction was about NLG 134,000 and 25% of all these transactions had
a ¯nancial volume larger than NLG 75,000. At the time of the transaction, there were
on average 80 people employed in the buyer's ¯rm and 10% of the buyer ¯rms had 160
or more employees.
7In fact, for those dyads in the MAT{data which represent repeated transactions, it seems likely
that these are all relations with a mainly positive past. The MAT{data support this idea. On
a satisfaction scale ranging between 1 and 10, the supplier on average scored a 7.21 (7.33 for the
suppliers in dyads of repeated transactions), and about 89.4% of all suppliers received a grade of 6
or higher (for the repeated transactions, 91.2% scored 6 or higher). Roughly, grades of 6 and higher
indicate `satisfactory' or `good' performance; a grade below 6 indicates `bad' performance.4.4 Data and Variables 97
Investment in Management
Our dependent variable is the principal component of questions regarding the number
of person{days involved in contracting, whether or not the used contract was tailor{
made or standard, the number of departments involved in contracting, whether or not
external legal help was used, the number of product related technical speci¯cations
arranged in the contract, the number of contract issues discussed, and the number of
contract issues ¯nally agreed on orally or written (cf. Batenburg, Raub, and Snijders
2000).8,9
We next need to identify suitable variables that can represent what in the experi-
ments ful¯lled the role of the stakes of the current transaction as well as the temporal
embeddedness of the buyer and the supplier.
Volume and Opportunism Potential
We argued that an IT{transaction can be seen as a one{sided Trust Game with the
buyer in the role of the trustor. The behavior of the trustor in a Trust Game was
said to be dependent on Risk := P1¡S1
R1¡S1 and Temptation := T2¡R2
T2¡S1 while the trustee's
behavior was assumed to be dependent on Temptation only (previous chapter, Sec-
tion 3.3.1; Snijders 1996). We choose to represent these stakes through two variables:
the volume of the focal transaction and its opportunism potential.10 The volume of
the transaction serves as an overall measure for the buyer's loss if trust is abused (i.e.
P1 ¡ S1 versus R1 ¡ S1) and also as a measure for the supplier's incentive to abuse
trust after it is given (i.e. T2 ¡ R2). The supplier's opportunism potential is derived
as a weighted average of the damage potential and the buyer's monitoring problems
(as well as the ¯nancial volume of the transaction). The damage potential covers `how
bad it would be' if it turns out that the delivered product cannot be used productively
and directly re°ects the S1{value. It is measured using questions on the importance
of the product for the automation and pro¯tability of the ¯rm, the importance that
the product was delivered on time, the long{time perspectives regarding support, suit-
ability and compatibility of the product, and the damage in terms of time and money
(new product, new data entry, training personnel, idle production) in°icted on the ¯rm
8See Appendix B: Q4.11, Q4.12, Q4.13, Q4.14a, Q4.14b, Q4.16, Q4.17, and Q4.18
9In a similar analysis using only MAT95, Buskens (1999: ch. 5) operationalizes `lack of trust' by
using the number of safeguards speci¯ed in the buyer's contract (i.e. the number of orally agreed or
written contract issues). He intentionally neglects the buyer's e®ort in writing up the contract since
he argues that \[...] predictions of the game{theoretic model are mainly based on the incentives of the
supplier to abuse trust" and that therefore the focus should be on \the type and number of safeguards
[rather] than on the e®ort invested by the buyer." (p. 131). However, we argue that the buyer's
assessment about the supplier's incentive to abuse trust is not only represented by the completeness
of the contract but also by the buyer's time invested in writing up the contract. The buyer's (lack
of) trust in the supplier is therefore not only a function of how complete a contract is but also how
carefully it is planned and executed.
10The ¯nancial volume and the opportunism potential are also referred to as the `problem potential
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if the product had failed.11 Monitoring problems, on the other hand, summarize the
buyer's ability to judge the quality of the product, to screen the market for alternative
suppliers or products, and to assess the complexity of the product as a whole, thereby
re°ecting the di®erence T2 ¡ R2 and thus the supplier's incentive to abuse trust if
placed.12
Temporal Embeddedness
We choose two di®erent approaches to the operationalization of the temporal embed-
dedness of the transaction between the buyer and the supplier. The ¯rst approach will
make use of the information on the past and future as provided by the respondent in
the questionnaire on the focal transactions (Method A). The second approach makes
use of the fact that we can identify true buyer{supplier dyads in the combined data
of MAT95 and MAT98 (Method B). We ¯rst introduce these two approaches in more
detail.
Method A: Method A is actually the standard way of using cross{sectional ques-
tionnaires. To operationalize the temporal embeddedness of the buyer and the
supplier, we simply use the information on the past13 and future14 as collected in
each of the 1252 questionnaires on the focal transactions.
Method B: Since we can identify buyer{supplier dyads in the data, we can make use
of this in constructing the temporal embeddedness of the buyer and the sup-
plier. Method B actually postulates that the di®erent dyads in the data (single
transactions, once repeated transactions with the same buyer, and twice repeated
transactions with the same buyer) can be seen as the direct equivalent of the ex-
perimental setup. To construct the dyad's past and future, we now apply the
following procedure. First note that any transaction is either the ¯rst, second,
or third in a stream of transactions with the same supplier: we have no buyer{
supplier dyads in the data with more than three joint transactions. For a focal
transaction that is a ¯rst transaction, we boldly assume that buyer and supplier
have no past. If a transaction is the second or third in a stream of transactions,
the past variables are constructed using the information provided in the question-
naire(s) on the previous transaction(s), and we disregard the information about
the past in the focal questionnaire. To de¯ne the future we follow a similar pro-
cedure. For transactions that are last in a stream of two or three we assume that
buyer and supplier have no mutual future. For other transactions the variables
describing the future are constructed by using the information provided in the
11See Appendix B: Q1.6a, Q1.6b, Q1.10, Q1.12a, Q1.12b, Q1.12c, Q1.13a, Q1.13b, Q1.13c, and
Q1.13d.
12See Appendix B: Q1.2, Q1.7, Q1.8, Q1.15, Q2.8, Q2.9, Q2.10, Q6.3ab, and Q6.3bb.
13See Appendix B: Q3.7, Q3.8, and Q3.9.
14See Appendix B: Q3.13.4.4 Data and Variables 99
questionnaire(s) on the future transaction(s), thereby disregarding the informa-
tion on the possibility of future interactions in the questionnaire on the focal
transaction.
In short, in Method B all 919 buyer{supplier couples with only one transaction in
MAT95 and MAT98 are, regardless of the information in the questionnaire, treated as
`one{shot transactions' with no mutual past and no mutual future. And, all `x-times
repeated' transactions are treated as a set of x + 1 interactions between a buyer and
a supplier who had not done business before, and who knew they would do business
exactly x + 1 times.
Both methods have their pros and cons (see below). As far as possible, we test
each hypothesis using both methods, so that support or rejection of each hypothesis
is backed up by di®erent ways of looking at the data. We now provide an overview of
the variables used in the analyses and for each variable we provide the numbering of
questions as used in Appendix B.
Temporal Embeddedness using Method A
Method A is easiest, both to implement and understand. When operationalizing the
variables, we stick to the information in the questionnaire as provided by the respon-
dent.
Past: We choose the simplest operationalization here: a binary variable covering
whether or not buyer and supplier had done business before (question Q3.7).
In the analysis of those dyads with more than one transaction, we also include
the frequency of former transactions with the supplier (Q3.8). Note that we have
information on past transactions even for those buyers with only one transaction
in MAT95 or MAT98.
Past Stakes: The stakes of past transactions are not directly measured in the ques-
tionnaire. We approach the stakes of the past transactions by using the informa-
tion on how extensive past business with the supplier was (Q3.9).
Future: The future is operationalized by the buyer's expectation, prior to the current
transaction, about possible future business with the same supplier (Q3.13).
Future Stakes: Only the MAT98 questionnaire contained information on the ex-
pected volume of future transactions. We therefore have information on the
future stakes in 281 cases only. Exclusion of missing cases in the regression anal-
yses decreases the number of cases to an unacceptable level which prohibits the
use of Method A in testing hypotheses regarding future stakes.
Temporal Embeddedness using Method B
For Method B we operationalize the variables by extracting the necessary information
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about future business for a focal transaction are taken from later transactions in the
database between the same buyer and supplier. This implies, as mentioned before,
that one{shot transactions in MAT95 and MAT98 are treated as having no temporal
embeddedness (even though information as provided in the questionnaire on this focal
transaction might indicate, for instance, that there have been prior business dealings
between buyer and supplier).
Past: Again, we introduce a dummy{variable to test for the e®ect of having a shared
past of business dealings versus not having done business before. In addition,
we operationalize length of the past by using a count variable representing the
length of the past, constructed as the number of past transactions between the
supplier and the buyer (either 0, 1 or 2). Further, we include a variable that gives
the years elapsed since the ¯rst transaction between the buyer and the supplier.
Past Stakes: We can construct precise variables for the stakes of the past transactions
by using the volume and the opportunism potential of the previous transactions
(for the variables used, see description above). To make this more clear: suppose
we consider a transaction that is the last one of a set of three between buyer and
supplier. For `past stakes' we then use the ¯nancial volume and opportunism
potential as indicated in the questionnaires on the two previous transactions.
Future: As with the past, we construct a count variable for the length of the future
by counting the number of future transactions between buyer and supplier in the
data (either 0, 1 or 2).
Future Stakes: As with past stakes, we use the information on the volume and the
opportunism potential as provided in the questionnaires on the transactions at
t+1 and, if applicable, t+2 to indicate the future stakes of the current transaction
in time period t.
Using Method B, we create|though admittedly in a somewhat arti¯cial way|a data
set on buyer{supplier dyads `playing Trust-Games' either once, twice, or three times.
Pros and Cons of Method A and Method B
Method A o®ers a simple and straightforward approach to operationalize variables
regarding the temporal embeddedness. We make use of the summarized information
on the whole past and expected future (Q3.13) with a given supplier. Consequently,
we obtain information on the whole past and the future for all respondent ¯rms, even
for those with only one questionnaire ¯lled out. However, this approach does ask for
inferences of the respondent about the past or future some time ago (`what kind of past
did you have a year ago' or `how likely was it that you would do business again before
the transaction actually started'), which are di±cult for respondents to make. Clearly,
this is a downside of Method A. Method B does not have this °aw|it has others, no
doubt|because it measures actual information about past and future dealings directly,4.4 Data and Variables 101
Table 4.4 Overview of variables and descriptive statistics.
Variable name N Mean s.d. Min Max
Dependent variable
Investment in managementa 1252 0 1 ¡2:08 3.00
Focal transaction
Volumeb 1236 ¡0:80 1.21 ¡2:08 5.77
Opportunism potentiala 1252 ¡0:04 1.37 ¡3:18 3.82
Past transactions
Past (dummy)d 1252 0:53 0.50 0 1
Volumeb 1252 ¡0:04 1.37 ¡3:18 3.82
Frequencyc 1252 1:76 1.86 0 5
Lengthe 1252 0:15 0.40 0 2
Year of ¯rst transactionf 1227 5:57 2.97 0 20
Volume at t ¡ 1c 1252 0:34 0.99 0 5
Volume at t ¡ 2c 1252 0:03 0.32 0 4
Opportunism potential at t ¡ 1a 1252 0:01 0.49 ¡3:18 2.98
Opportunism potential at t ¡ 2a 1252 0:00 0.14 ¡1:79 2.83
Future transactions
Expected future businessc 1228 2:89 1.32 1 5
Future (dummy)d 1252 0:14 0.35 0 1
Lengthe 1252 0:15 0.40 0 2
Control variables
Standardization in contractingc 1179 2:57 1.15 1 5
Availability own legal expertised 1252 0:19 0.39 0 1
Size buyerb 1213 3:69 1.03 0 8.70
Size supplierb 1228 3:36 1.41 1 5
Network activitiesa 1220 ¡0:05 1.76 ¡3:82 5.86
Note: N = Number of cases; s.d. = standard deviation; Min = minimum value; Max = maximum value.
a Standardized factor score.
b Natural log of ¯nancial volume in 100,000 guilders; natural log of number of employees, respectively.
c Five point scale.
d Dummy, 1=yes.
e Number of transactions.
f Years since ¯rst transaction with the current supplier.
using the available information in the questionnaires prior and past the focal transaction
between the same buyer and supplier. By making use of these variables, we also secure
compliance with the setup of the experiments in the previous chapter: the data format
is then such that we have one{shot, once repeated and twice repeated interactions
as in the experimental data from the previous chapter. This immediately points out
the drawbacks of Method B. We arti¯cially put a `time frame' of at maximum three
transactions on a buyer{supplier relationship that may in fact involve many more
transactions. It is possible that buyer and supplier have done business either before
the transaction that is the ¯rst in the data, between the transactions that we have in
the data, or after the last of their transactions that we have in the data.102 Chapter 4 Embeddedness in Buyer{Supplier Relations
Control Variables
We control for several transaction and ¯rm speci¯c characteristics available in the data,
most of them related to possible di®erences between buyer{supplier dyads with regard
to the e±ciency with which ex ante management can be implemented. First, the size of
the respondent buyer ¯rm and the supplier (Q3.2 and Q6.1b). Second, the availability
of legal expertise for the buyer (Q6.3ac, Q6.3bc, and Q6.3cc). Additionally, we control
for the buyer ¯rm's standardization in its procedures around contracting (Q4.20) and
the buyer's network activities (Q6.4, Q6.5, Q6.6, and Q6.7). We refer the reader to
Batenburg, Raub, and Snijders (2000) for a more thorough discussion of these control
variables.
Table 4.4 presents an overview of the variables. The scale of most of the variables is
rather meaningless since they are either a weighted average of several questions (factor
score) or measured on a ¯ve point scale (see also Batenburg, Raub, and Snijders 2000).
4.5 Results
As much as possible, we test all hypotheses using both Method A and Method B. More-
over, we separately run all analyses on two sets of cases. First, we analyze all buyer{
supplier dyads in MAT95 and MAT98 (Table 4.5). Second, we restrict the analyses
to buyer{supplier dyads with a history of shared business dealings (Table 4.6). This
leaves us with 650 cases in the Method A analysis. In the analyses using Method B
(Table 4.6), we also exclude the transactions that are the ¯rst in a stream of dealings
between buyer and supplier, but where the data reveal that buyer and supplier had
done business in the past before. Loosely speaking, these are the cases where the setup
in the data does not match the experimental setup of the previous chapter. When we
exclude these transactions (where there was a history of business dealing between buyer
and supplier, but information regarding this history is not available in the data), we
use Method B in a `clean' way: only those cases are included where information about
past transactions is taken from previous questionnaires on business dealings between
buyer and supplier. The downside is that this leaves us with only 161 cases in the
analysis.
The MAT{data surveyed 788 ¯rms with a maximum of three transactions per ¯rm.
We thus have a data set that is comparable to the experimental data of the previous
chapter. The experimental subjects made repeated decisions on whether or not to place
trust while the buyers in the MAT{data made repeated decisions on their investment
in ex ante management. The dependent variable in the analyses of this chapter is
thus no longer a binary variable (place or withhold trust) but an ordinal variable
measuring the buyer's investment in his ex ante management of the focal transaction.
This forbids to use a logistic model such as the ¯xed{e®ects logistic regression of the
previous chapter (see Section 3.4.3). However, we can use a similar method for interval
dependent variables, namely, a cross{sectional time{series regression model (Stata's
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Table 4.5 Maximum likelihood random{e®ects linear regression coe±cients on the
buyer's investment in management.
Method A Method B
Regressor Coe±cient p{value Coe±cient p{value
Focal transaction
Volume 0:129 0:000 0:127 0:000
Opportunism potential 0:267 0:000 0:272 0:000
Past transactions
Past (dummy) ¡0:178 0:091 ¡0:096 0:032
Volume 0:017 0:626
Future transactions
Expected future business ¡0:009 0:605
Future (dummy) 0:184 0:317
Lengtha ¡0:202 0:215
Control variables
Standardization in contracting 0:065 0:001 0:064 0:001
Availability own legal expertise 0:118 0:039 0:115 0:045
Size buyer ¡0:006 0:803 ¡0:006 0:814
Size supplier 0:060 0:001 0:059 0:001
Network activities 0:035 0:008 0:035 0:008
Constant ¡0:074 0:566 ¡0:114 0:348
Variance on dyad level (¾À)0 :4997(0:000) 0:5051(0:000)
Variance on transaction level (¾²)0 :5527(0:000) 0:5503(0:000)
Fraction of variance due to ¾À (½)0 :4497 0:4573
LL = ¡1271:4335 LL = ¡1281:5655
LR Â2(11) = 511:82(0:000) LR Â2(10) = 509:43(0:000)
Note: Method A is based on N = 1147 observations from 989 buyers with on average 1.2 transaction. Method B is
based on N = 1154 observations from 996 buyers with on average 1.2 transactions.
a The length of the future is an ordinal variable counting the number of future transactions between the buyer and the
supplier.
of the current game', the MAT{data also contain information on characteristics of
buyer ¯rms. Given that we have more and adequate measurements of buyer ¯rm
characteristics, we can now use a random{e®ects estimator (see Section 3.4.3 for more
information). We thus obtain inferences not only about how temporal embeddedness
and ¯nancial volume and opportunism potential a®ect the buyer's ex ante management,
but also which buyer ¯rms are more likely to trust the supplier in general (see section
Control Variables).
In the following, we discuss the results of the statistical tests. First we present
the in°uence of the current stakes on investment in management. We then outline the
e®ects of the past as well as the future15 and ¯nally discuss the e®ects of the control
variables.
15Note that Table 4.6 reports past and future variables not used in the analyses of Table 4.5. The
analyses in Table 4.6 refer to those buyer{supplier dyads with a past only. This allows, especially
for Method B, to construct additional variables such as, for instance, the length of the mutual past
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Table 4.6 Maximum likelihood random{e®ects linear regression coe±cients on the
buyer's investment in management for buyer{supplier dyads with a past.
Method A Method B
Regressor Coe±cient p{value Coe±cient p{value
Focal transaction
Volume 0:140 0:001 0:053 0:556
Opportunism potential 0:263 0:000 0:341 0:000
Past transactions
Frequency ¡0:079 0:010
Length 0:008 0:988
Year of ¯rst transaction ¡0:001 0:969
Volume 0:046 0:228
Past £ :::
:::Volume at t ¡ 10 :029 0:687
:::Volume at t ¡ 2 ¡0:028 0:882
:::Opportunism potential at t ¡ 10 :006 0:943
:::Opportunism potential at t ¡ 20 :013 0:948
Future transactions
Expected future business ¡0:016 0:573
Future (dummy) ¡0:099 0:612
Control variables
Standardization in contracting 0:058 0:019 0:117 0:037
Availability own legal expertise 0:083 0:248 0:129 0:403
Size buyer 0:002 0:957 ¡0:111 0:116
Size supplier 0:046 0:036 0:011 0:805
Network activities 0:016 0:349 ¡0:004 0:907
Constant 0:011 0:947 0:186 0:790
Variance on dyad level (¾À)0 :4791(0:000) 0
Variance on transaction level (¾²)0 :5421(0:000) 0:7051(0:000)
Fraction of variance due to ¾À (½)0 :4385 0
LL = ¡701:5884 LL = ¡172:1850
LR Â2(10) = 285:96(0:000) LR Â2(14) = 70:87(0:000)
Note: Method A is based on N = 650 observations from 558 buyers with on average 1.2 transactions. Method B is
based on just N = 161 observations from 147 buyers with on average 1.1 transactions because it also excludes the cases
that are the ¯rst in a stream of transactions between buyer and supplier in the data.
Effects of the Stakes of the Focal Transaction
Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 both reveal a statistically signi¯cant and positive e®ect
of the ¯nancial volume as well as of the opportunism potential on ex ante manage-
ment. Moreover, the e®ects of the ¯nancial volume and the opportunism potential are
similar across all analyses. Hypothesis 4.1 is therefore clearly supported, as it was in
the previous chapter and in earlier analyses on the MAT{data using di®erent opera-
tionalizations (e.g. Batenburg, Raub, and Snijders 2000; Buskens 1999). Trust in the
supplier decreases as the current stakes become larger. Or, perhaps more aptly put, the
need to increase trust between buyer and supplier through the use of ex ante manage-
ment increases when the stakes of the current transaction are larger. This result is also
supported by Blumberg (1997) who focuses on the explanation of ex ante management
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Main Effects of Past Transactions
Hypothesis 4.2.1 argues that a positive past decreases the buyer's investment in ex
ante management. In the data, `having a past' is equal to `having a good past' with
the supplier (in general, `not having a good past' causes buyers to use a di®erent
supplier for future transactions). The dummy whether buyer and supplier have done
business dealings before shows the predicted negative e®ect on the buyer's investment
in management, both under Method A (p =0 :091) and under Method B (p =0 :032).
These ¯ndings support Hypothesis 4.2.1. The data suggest, as mentioned before, that
most buyers are satis¯ed with their suppliers. Consequently, the e®ect of a negative
past on ex ante management (Hypothesis 4.2.2) cannot be tested.
Now we turn our attention to whether it matters|given that buyer and supplier
have done business before|what the stakes were in the previous transactions. Ta-
ble 4.6 discloses that Method B does not lend support to the predicted negative e®ect
of past stakes on current investment in management (Hypothesis 4.3.1). We tried var-
ious other ways to test the e®ect of past stakes, none of which showed any evidence
that the kind of past matters.16 We must therefore reject Hypothesis 4.3.1. Since
buyers are generally satis¯ed with their past, the interaction e®ect between a negative
past and the respective past stakes on ex ante management cannot be tested with the
MAT{data (Hypothesis 4.3.2).
Effects of Future Transactions
Next, we focus on the e®ect of (the probability of) future transactions. None of our
analyses lends support to the idea that (the probability of) future transactions are
related to the investment in ex ante management. This means that neither evidence
in favor of the investment e®ect nor the reciprocity e®ect can be found in the data.
Moreover, regardless of the cases we use, the size of the coe±cient is small in all
analyses except in Method B of Table 4.5, where it is somewhat larger but still far
from signi¯cant. This ¯nding is in line with results in Batenburg, Raub, and Snijders
(2000), Blumberg (1997) as well as Buskens (1999) to the extent that they also do not
¯nd a main e®ect of future business when all MAT{cases are used. Nevertheless, the
result is at odds with Batenburg, Raub, and Snijders to the extent that they do ¯nd
an e®ect of (the probability of) future business dealings for cases with a shared past,
which supports the existence of a reciprocity e®ect.
On grounds of the insigni¯cant future coe±cients in all models, we have to reject
Hypothesis 4.6. Our results are at odds with the experimental ¯ndings in the previous
16For instance, we also tried to test the e®ect on a set of cases being a hybrid of Method A and
Method B. We additionally included the one{shot transactions where the questionnaire informed us
that business with the same dealer has been done in the past. For lack of information on the precise
past volume, we coded past volume of such `¯rst transactions' as zero. Also we tried to impute past
volume of these additional cases as a function of the information we have. However, none of these
extra analyses showed an e®ect of past stakes. Additionally, we tested past volume using Method A.
However, for lack of suitable variables in the MAT{data, we could only use the extensiveness of
past business with the supplier (see Appendix B: Q3.9) as a proxy for past volume. Table 4.5 and
Table 4.6 show that neither analyses support Hypothesis 4.3.1.106 Chapter 4 Embeddedness in Buyer{Supplier Relations
chapter, where the length of the future signi¯cantly increased the probability of plac-
ing trust in the current game. Remember, however, that in the laboratory only the
reciprocity e®ect characterized the in°uence of the future on the probability of placing
trust.
Using Method B, we can test the interaction between having a future and its respec-
tive stakes (Hypothesis 4.7). We argued theoretically that larger future stakes should
go together with less ex ante management in the focal transaction. The MAT{data,
however, give no indication whether or not the stakes of possible future transactions
were known at time of the current transaction. In the focal questionnaire, it was only
asked to what extent the buyer would expect to continue business with the supplier
before the purchase of current product (see Appendix B: Q3.13). Since this question
cannot be used for the construction of the future stakes, we boldly decided to construct
the ¯nancial volume and the opportunism potential of future transactions according to
the construction of the past stakes. That is, we used the information from the second
and, if available, the third transaction to de¯ne the future volume and opportunism
potential in the current transaction. Unlike the experimental data where subjects knew
the stakes of the future games, assuming the buyer's knowledge of future stakes during
or even prior to the current transaction is a daring move of us. We nevertheless run
the analysis (not reported) but found no e®ect of the future stakes on current invest-
ment in management. However, since neither the reciprocity e®ect nor the investment
e®ect is clearly visible in the data, it comes as no surprise that neither the ¯nancial
volume nor the opportunism potential of future transactions a®ect the e®ect of the
shared future. Since the construction of the variables measuring the future stakes can
be considered a `wild guess', we are forced to conclude that a test of Hypothesis 4.7
using these variables would be inadequate.
Unfortunately, the structure of the MAT{data does not allow to test Hypothesis 4.4
on the discounting of past experience and Hypothesis 4.5 on the e®ect of current sup-
pliers being potential but not actual suppliers in the past.
Effects of Firm{Specific Control Variables
We did not formulate any hypotheses regarding the control variables. They were
simply added to account for possible heterogeneity of the respondent ¯rms (see dis-
cussion above). Adding these control variables indeed improves the ¯t of the mod-
els (Method A: all cases Wald Â2(5) = 342:46;p =0 :000 and past only Wald
Â2(5) = 199:36;p=0 :000; Method B: all cases Wald Â2(5) = 448:24;p=0 :000
and past only Wald Â2( 5 )=6 5 :95;p=0 :000) as compared to the models without
control variables. Remember that in the previous chapter, individual characteristics
did not improve the estimation of the probability to place trust in the experiments
discussed in the previous chapter.
It is worthwhile to ¯rst mention that the e®ects of all control variables are of about
the same size independent of the method used. Only the e®ects of standardization
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larger in magnitude. The control variables reveal several interesting e®ects. First,
we ¯nd that standardization in contracting and the availability of own legal expertise
increases the investment in management. Apparently, when one has `cheap' or `easy'
access to necessary contracting resources, this goes with an increased investment in
ex ante planning. This is in line with the hypothesis and the empirical results in
Batenburg, Raub, and Snijders (2000). Second, we ¯nd that investments in ex ante
management increase when larger suppliers are concerned. One could argue that this
is in line with the idea that larger ¯rms make for larger internal communication costs
(Macaulay 1963) and therefore tend to incur higher ex ante investments, but this is
completely post{hoc. Finally, there is some evidence that the buyer's network activities
have a signi¯cant and positive e®ect on his investment in contracting if the focus is
on all cases (see Table 4.5), but not so much when only buyer{supplier dyads with a
shared history of business dealings are concerned. It seems as if the availability or the
amount of third{party information leads to more carefulness in managing transactions.
The statistical signi¯cance of this e®ect vanishes when we focus on those dyads with
a past only (see Table 4.6). It looks as if information from the network becomes less
important as soon as own experience with the supplier is available.17 Table 4.7 shows
an overview of the tests of our hypotheses.
4.6 Conclusion and Discussion
We analyzed the extent to which buyers of IT{products invest in ex ante management
of their transactions, as a means to test the previous chapter's hypotheses on trust over
time in a real life setting. We assume that a transaction between a buyer and a supplier
of IT can be seen as a (repeated) Trust Game and that the size of the investment in
ex ante management of the current transaction can be interpreted as a measure for
trust in the supplier. In the previous chapter we analyzed how the behavior of people
in Trust Games depends on previous and future Trust Games to be played, together
with characteristics of the focal Trust Games. Likewise, we analyze here how a shared
history and shared future between buyer and supplier, together with characteristics of
a transaction, in°uence the decision on the investment in ex ante management.
The analysis is based on 1252 transactions between buyers and their suppliers in the
Dutch IT{business. The data contain several buyers with two or even three transactions
with the same supplier. The presence of such dyads in the data is precisely what allows
for a comparison with theoretical and experimental evidence stemming from repeated
Trust Games. Table 4.8 shows an overview of the results from the survey test and
the experimental test conducted in the previous chapter.
17Theoretically, one would expect that a higher network embeddedness leads to more trust since
information on malevolent behavior by the trustee (i.e. the supplier) is spread in the network, dam-
aging his reputation and preventing him from doing future business with any of the trustors in the
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Table 4.7 Coe±cients from the analyses on the buyer's investment in managing the
current transaction.
Resultsb
Investment in management All cases Past only
Independent variable Predicteda Hypothesis A B A B
Focal transaction
Financial volume + 4.1 ©©© +
Opportunism potential + 4.1 ©©© ©
Past transactions
Successful past (dummy) ¡ 4.2.1 ªª
Frequency of past transactions ¡ 4.2.1 ª
Length of past ¡ 4.2.1 +
Year of ¯rst transaction ¡ 4.2.1 ¡
Successful past £ ...
...past volume ¡ 4.3.1 ++
...volume t ¡ 1, t ¡ 2 ¡ 4.3.1 +;¡
...opportunism potential t ¡ 1, t ¡ 2 ¡ 4.3.1 +;+
Future transactions
Expected future ¡ 4.6 ¡¡
Future (dummy) ¡ 4.6 + ¡
Future length ¡ 4.6 ¡
a { : the investment in management decreases. + : the investment in management increases.
b Reported are the signs (+ or ¡) of the respective coe±cients. © and ª refer to positive and negative
coe±cients, respectively, if signi¯cant on at least p =0 :1. `A' and `B' refer to the coe±cients of
Method A and Method B, respectively.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First of all, investment in ex ante
management increases with what is at stake, both in abstract Trust Games and in
buyer{supplier relations. This is in fact a robust ¯nding in all our experimental and
¯eld studies (Batenburg, Raub, and Snijders 2000; Buskens 1999; Blumberg 1997).
More important for our purposes, investment in ex ante management decreases when
buyer and supplier have done business together before, both in Trust Games and in
buyer{supplier relations. In fact, when we focus on buyer{supplier dyads with a shared
past, we see that it is not the length of the past but the frequency of transactions that
decreases the buyer's e®ort in contracting. However, we do not ¯nd any evidence
for the importance of the kind of shared history between actors (as long as it is a
successful one). Both in the Trust Games and in buyer{supplier relations we see that
when actors have had a successful interaction before, it does not matter to what extent
this interaction was a transaction that necessitated a high or a low degree of trust. In
other words, if a previous interaction was extremely `di±cult' (in the sense that there
was a high incentive for the abuse of trust) but nevertheless completed successfully,
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Table 4.8 Hypotheses with respect to the buyer's investment in managing the current
transaction (II).
Investment in management Results
Independent Variable Predicteda Hypothesis Experimentb Survey
Focal transaction
Volume and opportunism potential + 4.1 supported supported
Past transactions
Successful past transactions ¡ 4.2.1 supported supported
Unsuccessful past transactions + 4.2.2 supported not tested
Successful past transactions £ past not not
volume and opportunism potential ¡ 4.3.1 supported supported
Unsuccessful past transactions £ past not not
volume and opportunism potential ¡ 4.3.2 supported tested
Having a past £
discounting past experience + 4.4 supported not tested
Potential vs. actual supplier 0 4.5 supported not tested
Future transactions
Future transactions ¡ 4.6 supported not supported
Future transaction £ future not not
volume and opportunism potential ¡ 4.7 supported tested
a { : the investment in management decreases. + : the investment in management increases. 0 : the
investment in management is not a®ected.
b Experimental results refer to the analyses in Chapter 3.
management will be just as much lower in following interactions in the case where the
previous transaction did not have such a high problem potential. To take this point
home: it matters that actors had a successful transaction before; given that, it does
not matter much what the characteristics of that transaction were. With respect to the
shadow of the future the ¯ndings are less conclusive. We focused on two e®ects. The
¯rst one is an investment e®ect: the longer the shared future, the longer the period
over which one can depreciate the investments, and hence the more attractive it is
to invest in ex ante management. The experimental data show evidence in favor of
the other e®ect, that of reciprocity along the lines of Axelrod (1984): the longer the
shared future, the more trust and therefore the less ex ante management is necessary
because mutually cooperative behavior is safeguarded by possible future sanctioning.
This reciprocity e®ect was also found in Batenburg, Raub, and Snijders (2000) after
controlling for the investment e®ect. However, in our setup we hardly ¯nd evidence
supporting either the reciprocity or the investment e®ect. In any case, as with the e®ect
of the shared past, there does not seem to be any support for the assertion that the kind
of future matters much. By and large, we can conclude|as we did in Chapter 3|that
we ¯nd some support for what was there called the `simple stock' model: what is at
stake in°uences trust, and so does having a positive past. We do not ¯nd support for110 Chapter 4 Embeddedness in Buyer{Supplier Relations
the `complex stock' model: information about the kind of past or the kind of future
cannot be shown to have an e®ect on trust.
One can come up with evident points of criticism regarding the analysis based on the
experimental data of the previous chapter, as well as regarding this chapter's ¯eld data.
To emphasize the latter (see the previous chapter for a discussion on the experimental
setup): to ensure compatibility with repeated Trust Games, we assumed that the buyer
alone decides on the amount of ex ante management invested in securing a transaction.
This may not be a realistic approach for all IT{transactions, let alone for transactions
on other markets.18 The analysis would improve if one would be able to take into
account more explicitly that both buyer and supplier in°uence that amount of ex ante
management (Raub and Snijders 2001). Second, as outlined above in Section 4.4.3,
both ways of analyzing the data (Methods A and B) are mere approximations of the
kind of data one would want to have. Method B measures the temporal embeddedness
of the buyer and the supplier on the basis of actual data on transactions between
a buyer and supplier, but neglects that transactions can have taken place before, in
between, or after the transactions we have represented in the data. Method A does not
su®er from this, but only allows to approximate the temporal embeddedness of buyer
and supplier on the basis of information on previous transactions elicited through
retrospective subjective estimates. In short, by using any of these two methods we pay
a certain price. The strong point of our analyses lies in the fact that under di®erent
circumstances (experimental data, and ¯eld data under di®erent ways of analysis), we
¯nd results that are remarkably similar with respect to the stakes involved and the
e®ect of a shared past.
18Though, as pointed out by Rooks (2002), at least for the Dutch IT{market during the period of
research, this assumption may not be that far{fetched.Chapter 5
Who Gets How Much in Which
Relation? A Non{Cooperative
Bargaining Approach to Exchange
Networks¤
\Justice of Actions, is by Writers divided in Commutative, and
Distributive: [...] And Distributive, in the distribution of equall
bene¯t, to men of equall merit. As if it were Injustice to sell dearer
than we buy; or to give more to a man than he merits."
Thomas Hobbes (1651: 105)
5.1 Introduction
Potential employers and employees, lawyers and clients, or di®erent business ¯rms
often determine their contracts in dyadic negotiations. Exchange theories re°ect this
pattern|they explain individual pro¯ts as the result of dyadic bargaining on the distri-
bution of at least one perfectly divisible resource (e.g. cake, dollar). Following Cook et
al. (1983), sociologists usually consider a situation in which a given network structure
limits matches between bargaining partners, propose formal models to predict out-
comes of negotiated exchange, and test those predictions in laboratory experiments.
However, there are not just di®erent theories, but also many controversies|a selection
of important contributions and discussions includes Bienenstock and Bonacich (1992,
1993, 1997), Bonacich and Bienenstock (1995), Bonacich (1998, 1999), Bonacich and
Friedkin (1998), Burke (1997), Friedkin (1992, 1993, 1995), Lovaglia et al. (1995),
Markovsky et al. (1993, 1997), Markovsky, Willer, and Patton (1988, 1990), Skvoretz
and Fararo (1992), Skvoretz and Lovaglia (1995), Skvoretz and Willer (1991, 1993),
¤This chapter is an adapted version of Braun and Gautschi (2000, 2001).
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Thye, Lovaglia, and Markovsky (1997), Yamagishi and Cook (1990), Yamagishi, Gill-
more, and Cook (1988) as well as Yamaguchi (1996, 1997, 2000).1
Despite their di®erences, sociological exchange theories (see, for overviews, several
contributions in Willer 1999) have common features. First, practically all theories ne-
glect interindividual heterogeneity (in terms of, e.g. age, education, gender, or wealth)
in favor of the e®ects the given network structure has for exchange outcomes. More
precisely, they explain how the structural positions in the bargaining network a®ect the
exchange patterns between adjacent actors and their bilateral splits of cakes of given
sizes. Power inequalities due to di®erent structural positions manifest themselves in the
negotiated distributions of exchange pro¯ts and, at least partly, in the actual trading
patterns between connected actors.
Second, according to Bonacich and Friedkin (1998), only few theoretical approaches
can account for variations in the value of relationships (i.e. heterogeneity in terms of
the size of the cake to be partitioned). And, experimental research has focused almost
exclusively on those relations which concern the split of an identical surplus. Since
such `equally valued' relations are rare in everyday life, Bonacich and Friedkin point
out correctly that a su±ciently realistic approach to the study of exchange networks
should refer to a scenario in which bilateral relations may vary with respect to the
amount of surplus to be divided.
Third, the application of sociological exchange models often is not straightforward.
Partly due to additional experimental evidence, older models have been successively
adjusted or revised such that ad hoc assumptions and di±cult prediction procedures
characterize their updated versions. And, pro¯t predictions from new approaches re-
quire either speci¯c computer simulations (Burke 1997) or applications of an iterative
computational algorithm in which a key parameter has to be set by the researcher
(Yamaguchi 1996).
Fourth, few theories (e.g. Willer and Skvoretz 1999; Yamaguchi 1996) allow for
di®erent types of network connections. Most theories for exchange networks exclusively
deal with a scenario in which an actual exchange in one relation tends to prevent
transfers in others. Put di®erently, they refer to exchange networks with substitutable
relations only. This focus is narrow because, in accordance with Cook et al. (1983),
Cook and Emerson (1978), as well as Emerson (1972), one can distinguish between
positively and negatively connected exchange relations|a positive connection exists if
a resource transfer in one relation promotes transfers in others (e.g. communication
networks), whereas a negative connection exists if a resource transfer in one relation
tends to preclude transfers in others (e.g. dating networks).2 Yamagishi, Gillmore, and
Cook (1988) justly emphasize that real networks often are mixtures of both types. It
1Special issues of journals (cf. Social Networks 14, No. 3{4, 1992 and, at least partly, Rationality
and Society 9, No. 1{2, 1997) contain additional articles and controversies.
2Willer and Skvoretz (1999) present an alternative categorization of network connections which, as
they emphasize, di®ers from the positive/negative classi¯cation. Their distinction embraces ¯ve types
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makes sense that researchers, while designing experiments, decide to look at positively
and negatively connected relations separately. Theory formation, however, was closely
associated with experiments on negatively connected systems only. As a consequence,
there is just one exchange model which explicitly deals with negatively and positively
connected relations (Yamaguchi 1996).3
Fifth, the experimental evidence indicates that negatively connected networks with
structurally distinct positions vary in terms of exchange outcomes.4 Sociologists have
suggested several explanations for this variation (e.g. Bienenstock and Bonacich 1992;
Cook and Yamagishi 1992; Friedkin 1992, 1993; Lovaglia et al. 1995; Markovsky,
Willer, and Patton 1988; Markovsky et al. 1993). According to Skvoretz and Willer
(1993), these contributions have in common that they identify, more or less explicitly,
the exclusionary potential associated with a particular network position as the crucial
explanatory factor. And, Markovsky et al.'s (1993) distinction of weak and strong
power networks has become a popular classi¯cation in this context (cf. Bonacich 1999;
Lovaglia et al. 1995; Skvoretz and Willer 1993; Thye, Lovaglia, and Markovsky 1997).
Another common feature of sociological exchange theories is the assumption that
negotiation partners pursue their self{interests. Although social psychological consid-
erations sometimes are taken into account as well (e.g. Lovaglia et al. 1995, Skvoretz
and Willer 1993), most exchange theorists prefer a rational actor perspective. Apart
from a few exceptions (e.g. Yamaguchi 1996), however, they usually do not specify
an optimization problem. It is thus often not clear where network features enter the
choice calculus and how they in°uence decision{making. And, since interactive choices
characterize negotiations, Bienenstock and Bonacich (1992, 1997) justly emphasize the
relevance of game{theoretic ideas for the analysis of exchange networks. However, only
a few contributions explicitly refer to the game{theoretic bargaining literature (cf. for
a recent review, Muthoo 1999) in this context.
least partly, unique to their theoretical approach. Like other authors (e.g. Bonacich 1999; Yamaguchi
1996), we therefore adopt the standard terminology of negative or positive connections.
3Modifying and extending Coleman's (1973, 1990) competitive equilibrium approach, Yamaguchi
(1996) equates negative (positive) connections with closely substitutable (complementary) exchange
relations and introduces a °exible continuous parameter for substitutability/complementarity (viz.
the elasticity of substitution). Yamaguchi's theory thus embraces situations in which exchange in
one relation tends to prevent or promote transfers in others. Its application requires, however, an
ad hoc speci¯cation of the elasticity of substitution. And, it is limited to the analysis of either
substitutable or complementary relations in a given network. Combining basic ideas of his original
model with additional assumptions, Yamaguchi (2000) presents a theoretical analysis of structures
characterized by the simultaneous presence of both substitutability and complementarity among the
multiple exchange relations of an actor.
4We use the term structurally distinct, and thus also structurally equivalent, in a slight abuse of
its true meaning. We use `structurally equivalent' to refer to actors that occupy indistinguishable
structural locations in the network. According to Wasserman and Faust (1994: 468{473), this de¯ni-
tion actually refers to automorphic equivalence. We will denote `structural network positions' using
capital letters A,B,C,D,E. Actors on structurally equivalent positions will be distinguished by numeric
subscripts, for instance, A1 and A2.114 Chapter 5 Who Gets How Much in Which Relation?
Moreover, just a subset of current exchange theories (e.g. Bonacich and Bienenstock
1995; Friedkin 1995; Simpson and Willer 1999) systematically predicts why and when
speci¯c links to bargaining partners lead to actual deals if, as is often assumed in
experiments, actors may complete at most one exchange per round. In such an extreme
case of negatively connected networks, actors may have several bargaining partners,
but face an exogenously given restriction with respect to the acceptable number of
exchange partners (e.g. monogamy rule). That is, they may have to select their actual
exchange partners from a larger set of potential exchange partners. An appropriate
theory for negatively connected relations thus has to predict the exchange patterns
between adjacent actors. In particular, it should answer why and when individual
choices of actual exchange partners create a relational structure which deviates from the
given network of potential exchange partners. Such answers are particularly desirable
if one follows Cook and Whitmeyer's (1992) suggestion and advocates a theoretical
approach that uses exchange theory to explain network structure.
The literature additionally reveals that competing theories di®er with respect to
their performance in predicting experimental pro¯t splits. Systematic comparisons of
established approaches suggest that among the best ¯tting theories are usually those
based on `resistance' (e.g. Heckathorn 1983; Willer 1981) concepts. According to
Skvoretz and Willer (1993), a relatively successful model for negatively connected net-
works with uniformly valued relations rests on the idea that two bargaining partners
agree on the outcome to which they are equally resistant (Exchange Resistance). In an-
other test series for such networks, Lovaglia et al. (1995) found that the best predictions
result from combining the resistance logic with a measure for the chance that a net-
work position can be excluded from exchange. Speci¯cally, they modi¯ed the Graph{
theoretic Power Index (GPI, see Markovsky, Willer, and Patton 1988; Markovsky et
al. 1993) for negotiation resistance and positional degree in the network of bargaining
partners. Although it exclusively focuses on negatively connected relations, the ap-
plication of this GPI{Resistance Degree (hereafter, GPI{RD) model is cumbersome,
however.
In sum, this discussion indicates properties a su±ciently general theory of exchange
networks should have. First of all, such a model should be parsimonious and simple
to apply. At the same time, it should o®er unique point predictions for negotiation
outcomes which closely ¯t the available experimental evidence. It also should allow for
unequally valued relations (i.e. variations in terms of the surplus to be partitioned).
Moreover, an appropriate theory should systematically predict whether and, if so, how
actual exchange structures deviate from the exogenously given bargaining network
when the focus is on settings with negative connections. However, it should not be
limited to the analysis of negatively connected settings. Finally, if the theory is based
on the rationality postulate, it should clarify how structural features (i.e. the network)
a®ect the actors' decision{making and how their interactive choices determine the nego-
tiation outcomes. And, since interactive choices characterize negotiations, Bienenstock
and Bonacich (1992, 1997) justly emphasize the relevance of game{theoretic ideas for5.1 Introduction 115
the analysis of exchange networks. Such a strategic approach should explain, however,
how sel¯sh bargaining partners arrive at mutual cooperation.5 As a consequence, the
focus should be on a non{cooperative bargaining scenario.6
We present and apply such a model in the remainder of this chapter. In contrast to
previous approaches, this model generates point predictions for negotiation outcomes
in negatively connected, positively connected, and mixed networks. Its predictions
result from an equilibrium analysis in the sense of non{cooperative game theory. And,
contrary to other work on exchange networks, the approach also uniquely predicts
whether and, if so, how the actual exchange structures deviate from the exogenously
given bargaining network.7
The presentation and application of the model requires several steps. The next
section describes Rubinstein's (1982) Alternating O®ers Game and Binmore's (1985,
1987, 1998) re¯nement. This re°ects that our approach draws heavily on their ideas
about non{cooperative bargaining between two rational egoists. The third section
speci¯es how the network embeddedness in exogenously given bargaining networks
a®ects the behavior of negotiation partners and the exchange outcomes. It combines
the non{cooperative bargaining logic with the sociological idea that structural positions
matter for negotiation and exchange.
Following the presentation of the model in the next section, we substantiate its em-
pirical relevance via three applications. In doing so, we follow the practice of exchange
theorists (e.g. Burke 1997; Friedkin 1995; Yamaguchi 1996) and rely on published
experimental results for empirical validation. More precisely, we compare predictions
from the new model with available experimental ¯ndings and relevant predictions from
other approaches.
After a description of typical features of experiments on exchange structures and our
data selection criteria, the ¯rst application refers to experimental results on bilateral
pro¯t splits in negatively connected networks (Lovaglia et al. 1995; Skvoretz and
Fararo 1992; Skvoretz and Willer 1993). It shows that, while predictions of the new
model are straightforward to obtain, they are at least as consistent with the evidence
as predictions of the currently best ¯tting theories.
5Bienenstock and Bonacich (1992, 1997) conceptualize a network of potential exchange partners as
a cooperative game with transferable utility such that binding agreements and commitments are, by
de¯nition, always feasible before distribution problems are solved. No matter which solution concept
from cooperative game theory (e.g. core, kernel) is applied, this approach thus does not explain how
cooperation between rational egoists emerges in the ¯rst place. This argument loses its force if the
focus is on a non{cooperative scenario in which, by de¯nition, binding agreements and commitments
are not feasible at the outset (e.g. Rasmusen 1994).
6There is an additional argument in favor of the non{cooperative approach: if one follows Nash
(1950, 1951, 1953) in regarding non{cooperative games as more fundamental than cooperative games,
the analysis of a non{cooperative bargaining game may suggest an appropriate cooperative solution
concept for the negotiation problem at hand.
7Also, the model can be extended to the case in which interindividual variation (i.e. heterogeneity
not attributable to structure) matters as well. This point will be addressed in footnotes.116 Chapter 5 Who Gets How Much in Which Relation?
The second application refers to experimental ¯ndings on power distributions in neg-
atively and positively connected settings as reported by Cook et al. (1983), Markovsky
et al. (1997), Markovsky, Willer, and Patton (1988), Skvoretz and Fararo (1992), and
Yamagishi, Gillmore, and Cook (1988). It demonstrates that the new model ¯ts better
than Yamaguchi's (1996) theory, the only other model for positively and negatively
connected exchange relations.
The third application refers to experiments on deviations between bargaining and
exchange structures in negatively connected settings (Markovsky, Willer, and Patton
1988; Simpson and Willer 1999; Skvoretz and Willer 1993). It identi¯es misinterpreta-
tions of experimental results in the literature and shows that the new model correctly
predicts the empirical observations.
Despite its generality, the new approach does not address all aspects of network
exchange, however. And, like any other model, it rests on several strong premises. We
therefore conclude with a brief discussion of desirable extensions.
5.2 Dyadic Bargaining Situation
Consider an exogenously given network with m mutual ties between a ¯nite number
of rational egoists (i;j;k =1 ;2;:::;n). Assume that each actor knows the symmetric
relations between all network members.8 These relations limit the matches of potential
partners for bilateral negotiations and exchanges. To specify the bargaining situation
for each separate pair of actors, we rely on Rubinstein's (1982) and Binmore's (1985,
1987, 1998) game{theoretic work on non{cooperative bargaining. Speci¯cally, we as-
sume that the actors i and j bargain over the partition of a surplus of given value
vij = vji. When xij represents i's negotiated share of the value vij, it holds that
0 · xij · vij and xij + xji = vij.9 Put di®erently, xij denotes i's negotiated exchange
pro¯t in the relation with j.
5.2.1 The Alternating O®ers Game
Each bargaining session refers, by postulate, to the bilateral distribution of a ¯xed
quantity (i.e. surplus) of a perfectly divisible resource (e.g. money, pie). Exchange
appears here, in accordance with sociological approaches (e.g. Skvoretz and Willer
1993), as an agreement of two rational actors on the division of a given surplus. A
player i's pro¯t from a dyadic exchange relation can also be expressed as his fraction
of the surplus, pij, obtained. Note that pij coincides with xij if and only if vij =1 .
8This assumption of complete information about the overall shape of the network structure may
be replaced by a weaker postulate. As will become clear below, it su±ces to assume that each actor
is informed about his `immediate vicinity' in the network under study.
9If the actors perpetually disagree, they do not get a proportion of the surplus. That is, the payo®
associated with disagreement is 0 for both network partners. Put di®erently, there is no outside option
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To further describe the situation, we follow Rubinstein (1982) and assume that,
once two sel¯sh actors i and j are matched, they play a non{cooperative game in
which they alternate in proposing how to divide the pie with one time period elapsing
between each o®er. This Alternating O®ers Game refers to a bargaining situation with
complete information in the sense of common knowledge (i.e. everybody knows the
payo®s and rules of the game and everybody knows that everybody knows, and so
on). It explicitly models the bargaining procedure as a dyadic negotiation with an
indeterminate time horizon. That is, i o®ers a piece of cake to player j which j can
either accept or reject; if j rejects i's o®er, j makes a proposal which i can either accept
or reject, and so on. Note that, despite the open time horizon, the alternating o®ers
game is not an in¯nitely repeated game. Rather, it ends as soon as one player accepts
an o®er (e.g. Rasmusen 1994).10
As a consequence, only the accepted o®er is important for the players' payo®s
(but not earlier proposals). Speci¯cally, each actor's utility linearly increases with the
share obtained and decreases with the time elapsed until an agreement. The latter
assumption deviates from sociological exchange approaches. It re°ects that time is
modelled explicitly|each bargaining partner is assumed to be impatient such that
getting a speci¯c piece of cake in the future is less bene¯cial than now. More precisely,
i's utility of receiving the pro¯t share pij in the match with j during the t{th bargaining
period is
uij (pij;t)=±
t
i pij for all i 6= j; (5.1)
where t denotes discrete time units (t =0 ;1;2;:::) and the discount factor ±i,0<± i < 1
measures i's impatience: the smaller ±i gets, the less patient or more impatient i
becomes.
The Rubinstein model therefore refers to bargaining situations in which delays in
agreement are costly for negotiation partners (e.g. losses due to a strike's duration in
the case of wage bargaining between unions and employer organizations). It apparently
does not ¯t situations in which bargaining occurs quickly such that the amount of time
between o®ers and the delay of agreement are negligible. The latter features charac-
terize laboratory experiments on network exchange (e.g. Bienenstock and Bonacich
1993; Lovaglia et al. 1995; Skvoretz and Willer 1993). As will become clear below,
however, the Alternating O®ers Game can be adjusted to the problem of dyadic ex-
change in exogenously given negotiation networks. To introduce this adjustment, some
implications of the original bargaining game are important.
A fundamental result of the game{theoretic analysis concerns the bargaining strat-
egy played by rational actors with complete information. Rubinstein (1982) showed
that, everything else being constant, only `stationary strategies' matter for the bar-
gaining solution in the alternating o®ers game with open time horizon. Actor i plays
10A ¯nite{horizon version of this game was proposed by Stº ahl (1972).118 Chapter 5 Who Gets How Much in Which Relation?
a stationary strategy if he makes the same proposals when it is his turn to make o®ers
and if he rejects proposals unless they give him at least his reservation level.11
Starting from this insight, Rubinstein proved that the alternating o®ers bargaining
game with indeterminate time horizon has a unique subgame{perfect Nash equilib-
rium.12 Accordingly, the surplus is to be divided in the ¯rst bargaining period, where
the actors' pro¯t shares solely depend on their discount factors. This Pareto{e±cient
equilibrium for the match between i and j rests on the postulate that always one time
period elapses between proposals. As a consequence, the equilibrium payo®s depend
on the sequence of o®ers.13 From actor i's perspective, the negotiation with j in the
Rubinstein game thus yields the equilibrium pro¯t share
pij =
(
zij if i makes the ¯rst o®er
±i zij if j makes the ¯rst o®er
; where zij :=
1 ¡ ±j
1 ¡ ±i±j
: (5.2)
A closer inspection of these equilibrium payo®s reveals that even if both players have
identical preferences (i.e. if they have a common discount factor ±i = ±j), they will not
receive equal bene¯ts|the ¯rst mover gets a larger piece of cake even if the players are
equally patient. Since in many bargaining situations the order of play will be arbitrary,
the ¯rst mover advantage appears as a serious shortcoming of Rubinstein's game. This
arti¯cial asymmetry of payo®s seemingly prevents, together with the afore{mentioned
observation that the alternating o®ers game apparently does not apply to situations in
which bargaining occurs quickly, that Rubinstein's alternating o®ers game is relevant
for the analysis of network exchange. Fortunately, Binmore has provided a plausible
solution for these problems.
5.2.2 The Limiting Equilibrium Solution
Binmore (e.g. 1985, 1987) starts from the intuition that, if the reduction in utility
from deferring agreement by one period becomes smaller, so that delay becomes less
important, the ¯rst mover advantage should vanish. To clarify this idea, we follow
Gravelle and Rees (1992) and imagine that the original bargaining period (say, a day)
is split into ` shorter periods (say, minutes). Let ±i continue to be i's daily discount
factor and let ±i` denote i's discount factor for a period of (1=`){th of a day. If player i
is to have the same attitude to pie in one day's time, it must be true that ±i` =
11More precisely, a rational egoist i o®ers 1 ¡ zij to his bargaining partner j and accepts any o®er
which does not fall short of his reservation value ±i zij, where zij denotes the maximum fraction of
the pie i can obtain in the match with j (cf. eq. (5.2)).
12A Nash equilibrium refers to a stable situation in which su±ciently experienced actors play their
best reply strategies (Nash 1951). Since the alternating o®ers scenario is an extensive form game with
many Nash equilibria (viz. any agreement), Rubinstein additionally requires subgame perfectness. A
strategy pro¯le is a subgame{perfect Nash equilibrium if it is a Nash equilibrium for the entire game
and every subgame (Selten 1965). This standard re¯nement of the Nash equilibrium concept rules
out strategy pro¯les based upon incredible threats.
13If actor i makes the ¯rst o®er, the equilibrium payo® vector is (zij;1¡zij); if not, it is (1¡zji;z ji).5.2 Dyadic Bargaining Situation 119
(±i)(1=`). Inserting ±i` into the above payo® functions (eq. (5.2)) gives subgame{perfect
equilibrium outcomes as functions of the length of period (1=`). Taking the limit as
` !1(and applying L'Hopital's rule), player i's equilibrium pro¯t share in the match
with j tends to (see, e.g. Binmore 1998; Osborne and Rubinstein 1990)
pij =
ln±j
ln±i +l n±j
for i 6= j; (5.3)
where ln denotes the natural logarithm. This limiting equilibrium solution ensures that
neither player enjoys a ¯rst mover advantage. And, it predicts an equal division of the
surplus if the players have identical preferences (i.e. a common one{day discount factor
±i = ±j).
Notice that the limiting equilibrium of the alternating o®ers game results if the
amount of time that elapses between proposals is allowed to recede to zero. This
scenario corresponds with the typical experimental setting of network exchange in
which the amount of time between o®ers is negligible and the delay of agreement
imposes practically no costs. Hence, as long as the focus is on its limiting equilibrium
solution, we can adopt the alternating o®ers game as a strategic model for bargaining
sessions between two sel¯sh network partners.
In doing so, it has to be recognized that the discount factors ±i and ±j refer to a
much longer time horizon than the bargaining periods actually considered. From the
perspective of the typical network exchange setting, ±i and ±j thus apply to a coun-
terfactual scenario|they measure the actors' impatience if the sequence of o®ers and
countero®ers would delay agreements for days (instead of, say, minutes) and therefore
would impose non{negligible costs to the partners.14 According to eq. (5.3), however,
the one{day discount factors ±i and ±j a®ect negotiated exchanges even when the fo-
cus is on situations with extremely short bargaining periods (e.g. seconds)|±i and ±j
remain important parameters for the bargaining solution if there are no costly delays
of agreement. Binmore (1985: 273) therefore suggests a de¯nition of i's bargaining
power bi in terms of i's impatience at long delays in agreement:15
bi := ¡
1
ln±i
for all i: (5.4)
Accordingly, there is always a positive relationship between i's bargaining power bi
and his one{day discount factor ±i. For expository convenience, we therefore will often
refer to the concept of bargaining power only. Combining eqs. (5.3) and (5.4) gives a
14This indicates, among other things, that the discount factors ±i and ±j fundamentally di®er
from resistance concepts|neither Skvoretz and Willer's (1993) `Exchange Resistance' nor Lovaglia et
al.'s (1995) `Negotiation Resistance' have something to do with time preferences in alternating o®ers
bargaining. Put di®erently, resistance concepts do not measure utility losses associated with long
delays of agreement.
15Formally, bi is the reciprocal of the discount rate ½i corresponding to the discount factor ±i.I t
thus holds ½i = ¡ln±i or ±i = e¡½i, where e denotes the base of natural logarithm. Impatient actors
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version of the limiting equilibrium solution for the Alternating O®ers Game in terms
of the actors' bargaining powers when they negotiate over the partition of a given cake
of size vij = vji:
xij =
Ã
bi
bi + bj
!
vij = pij vij for i 6= j; (5.5)
where pij := bi=(bi + bj) de¯nes i's relative bargaining power in the relation with j.16
And, since pji =1¡pij holds by de¯nition, i's partner j can receive xji =( 1¡pij)vij =
pjivji.
Accordingly, the optimal partition of the given surplus depends critically on the
combination of bi and bj. Put di®erently, the bargaining power of just one partner is
irrelevant for the negotiation outcome|it is the relative bargaining power (i.e. pij or
pji =1¡ pij) which matters for the pro¯t split. Notice, however, that pij does not
coincide with xij when vij 6= 1. Since xij = pij vij and xji =( 1¡ pij)vij, a comparison
of actor i's pro¯t share with that of his bargaining partner j yields the following chain
of equivalent conclusions:
xij
>
< xji () xij
>
<
1
2
vij () pij
>
<
1
2
() bi
>
< bj for i 6= j: (5.6)
Put verbally, a symmetric distribution of bargaining powers (bi = bj or pij = 1
2 = pji)
always yields an equal split of the pie (xij = 1
2 vij = xji). There will be an unequal pro¯t
division, however, when the power of the two negotiation partners di®ers. Speci¯cally,
i's exchange pro¯t xij dominates j's exchange pro¯t xji such that i gets more than half
of the pie if and only if pij exceeds pji. Because of pij +pji = 1, the latter is satis¯ed if
and only if i's relative bargaining power in the relation with j exceeds 1
2. And, this is
equivalent to the condition that i's absolute bargaining power bi exceeds j's absolute
bargaining power bj.
Concrete predictions for such cases require, of course, information about the bar-
gaining powers which, by de¯nition, depend on the one{day discount factors. Before
we can predict outcomes of negotiated exchanges via the limiting equilibrium solu-
tion, we thus need to determine these exogenous parameters of the alternating o®ers
bargaining game. It is precisely here where the basic idea of theories for exchange
networks (see, for overviews, Lovaglia et al. 1995 as well as Skvoretz and Willer 1993)
comes in|from a sociological perspective, the actors' bargaining powers result from
their structural positions in the given negotiation network.
16As Binmore (1985, 1998) observes, the limiting equilibrium outcome (eq. (5.5)) solves the opti-
mization problem max x
bi
ij (vij¡xij)bj. The latter is a weighted version of Nash's (1950) bargaining so-
lution from cooperative game theory. The subgame{perfect Nash equilibrium for the non{cooperative
Alternating O®ers Game therefore suggests a corresponding cooperative solution concept if the amount
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5.3 Network Structure and Dyadic Bargaining
Bargaining relations re°ect, as assumed, the existence of m mutual ties between n
rational egoists. Taking the negotiation network as a starting point for the determi-
nation of the actors' bargaining powers, we focus on a situation in which each pair of
connected actors separately plays an Alternating O®ers Game with negligible amounts
of time between proposals. That is, we combine Emerson's (1971, 1982) idea that
network embeddedness matters for negotiation and exchange (see Chapter 1) with the
limiting equilibrium solution of the Alternating O®ers Game for each exogenously given
relation between two rational egoists. As will become clear, this approach gives point
predictions for negotiation outcomes in negatively connected, positively connected, and
mixed networks. And, it helps to uniquely predict whether and, if so, how the actual
exchange structures deviate from the exogenously given bargaining network.
To reach these goals, we have to introduce additional assumptions and concepts.
Before we go into details, it is useful to list our basic premises:
1. Depending on their structural positions in the exogenous bargaining network and
the values of their relations (i.e. the size of the cakes to be partitioned), actors
di®er in terms of their `network control' (i.e. the extent to which an actor controls
the relations to him by his relations to others).
2. Depending on an actor's assessment of the relation he has with a potential ex-
change partner (i.e. the type of connection he perceives), his network control
positively or negatively a®ects his individual bargaining power.
3. Depending on the actors' individual bargaining powers in the bilateral match
under consideration, their pro¯t shares result via the limiting equilibrium solution
of the alternating o®ers game.
4. Depending on the ranking of negotiated pro¯t shares, actors with negatively
connected relations select their actual exchange partners from the relevant set of
bargaining partners.
In accordance with this chain of postulates, we now successively present the assump-
tions and implications of our approach. Starting from a given negotiation structure,
the actors' network control is to be determined ¯rst.
5.3.1 Bargaining Structure and Network Control
Let the n £ n matrix V with main diagonal elements vii = 0 for all i and o®{diagonal
elements vij ¸ 0 for all i 6= j represent the exogenously given network of m valued
bargaining relations between the n actors. While the relation between the bargaining
partners i and j is always symmetric, an actor's relations with distinct partners may
di®er with respect to the values at stake|the corresponding o®{diagonal elements
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is they can divide. Formally, it holds vij = vji > 0 in the presence of a bargaining
relation between i 6= j, but vij = vji = 0 in its absence.17
Even if matrices of valued adjacencies di®er, they may represent the same relational
structure. A standardization thus is reasonable. Let R be the n£n matrix of standard-
ized actor relations such that rij := vij=
Pn
k=1 vkj ¸ 0 for all i;j, and
Pn
k=1 rkj =1
for all j. That is, R is the column{stochastic matrix derived from the valued graph.
Its o®{diagonal element rij measures i's fraction of the systemwide valued relations to
j. In other words, rij represents i's degree of `control' over the valued relations to j
in the system. Speci¯cally, it holds 0 · rij · 1, where rij = 0 indicates that i has no
control over j (i.e. absence of a tie between i and j) and rij = 1 re°ects that i has
complete control over j (i.e. i is j's only bargaining partner).
The i{th row of the matrix R informs about i's control over each other actor in
the system, whereas the i{th column of R informs about each other's control over i.
Adding up the relevant pairwise elements of R de¯nes the `network control' of actor i:
ci :=
n X
k=1
rik rki for all i: (5.7a)
Put verbally, ci is the degree to which i controls the valued relations to him by his valued
relations to others. For example, ci = 3
4 means that actor i controls, via his valued
relations to others, 3/4{th of their valued relations to him. The control fraction ci thus
may be interpreted as i's `structural autonomy' as well.18 And, given information about
i's valued relations and those of his partners, its calculation is straightforward (see, for
illustrations, Figure 5.1 below). As a consequence, we do not have to assume that
every actor has complete information about the overall shape of the network structure.
For the determination of the control distribution in the system, it su±ces to postulate
that everyone has complete information about his own valued relations and those of
his network partners.
Equally Valued Relations
Nearly all laboratory experiments focus on networks with equally valued relations.
That is, each bilateral bargaining session concerns the division of an identical surplus
vij = vji = v for all i 6= j. In such cases, the n £ n matrix V reduces to the n £ n
adjacency matrix A with main diagonal elements aii = 0 for all i and o®{diagonal
elements aij 2f 0;1g for all i 6= j representing the exogenously given and symmetric
17In the basic scenario, each pair of connected actors bargains over the partition of just one cake
with a speci¯c size. In a slightly more complicated case, there may be more than just one reciprocated
tie between each pair of connected actors in the network (e.g. each dyad can divide two pies per round
of negotiated exchanges). If so, the sum of the relevant surpluses determines the o®{diagonal elements
of matrix V.
18The de¯nition of network control (cf. eq. (5.7a)) shows that the ci's are the positive main diagonal
elements of the n £ n matrix C := RR. That is, ci = cii > 0 for all i. Like R, C is a column{
stochastic matrix. That is, 0 <c i · 1 and 1 ¡ ci =
P
k6=i cki ¸ 0 for all i. Since the upper bound of
ci is 1, its complement 1 ¡ ci measures i's `structural dependence' (i.e. the degree to which the other
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bargaining relations. More precisely, aij is a binary measure for the absence or presence
of a mutual tie between the actors i and j (i.e. aij = aji is coded as 0 or 1 for all i 6= j).
Let again R be the n £ n matrix of standardized actor relations such that rij :=
aij=
Pn
k=1 akj ¸ 0 for all i;j, and
Pn
k=1 rkj = 1 for all j. In the case of equally valued
relations, R is the column{stochastic matrix derived from the adjacencies with the
same properties as described above.
Then, the calculation of ci is even more straightforward. A closer look at eq. (5.7a)
then shows that ci may be alternatively expressed as the mean of the i{th row in
the matrix R. In other words, i's network control is the mean of i's control over the
systemwide relations to his partners. Formally,
ci =
1
ni
n X
k=1
rik =
1
ni
n X
k=1
aik
mk
for all i; (5.7b)
where ni denotes the number of i's negotiation partners and mi the number of i's ties in
the network structure under consideration.19 Since the number of positive elements in
the i{th row in R is always ni, the relevant control distribution can be practically read
o® from the standardized actor relations (see, for illustrations, Figure 5.1 below).
The number of i's bargaining partners, ni, coincides with the number of positive
elements in the i{th row of the adjacency matrix A, too. As indicated by the far
right{hand side of eq. (5.7b), information about i's network relations and the number
of his partners' ties therefore su±ces for the computation of i's network control as well.
Put di®erently, the distribution of network control can be determined when each actor
knows his connections and the connections of his partners.
The concept of network control thus requires only weak assumptions about the
structural information of network members. This becomes more obvious if ci is ex-
pressed in still another way. When Si denotes the set of the ni bargaining partners of
actor i, it is possible to rewrite eq. (5.7b) as follows:
ci =
1
ni
X
k2Si
1
nk
=
1
(ni=
P
k2Si (1=nk))
for all i: (5.7c)
Stated di®erently, i's network control ci re°ects how many negotiation partners actor i
and his partners have. Hence, information about the number of i's bargaining partners
and the numbers of their partners allows the calculation of i's network control.20
19In the basic scenario of an adjacency matrix, the number of each actor's negotiation partners ni
is equal to the number of his ties mi (i.e. ni = mi for all i). If, however, more than just one cake per
round is to be divided by each pair of connected network members, every actor has more ties than
partners (i.e. ni <m i for all i). For instance, if i has ni = 3 bargaining partners where two cakes per tie
can be divided, we have that mi = 6. We can alternatively write rij := aij=
Pn
k=1 akj = aij=mj ¸ 0
for all i;j.
20For the determination of the distribution of network control, we thus do not have to assume that
every actor has complete information about the overall shape of the network structure. It su±ces to
postulate that either everyone has complete information about his own relations and his partners' ties
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A closer inspection of the far right{hand side of eq. (5.7c) shows, moreover, that
the concept of network control is compatible with a rational actor perspective|ci is
simply the reciprocal of the estimate a rational actor i will have for the mean number
of partners of his partners in a given network.21 For example, ci = 3
4 expresses that
the average number of bargaining partners of i's partners is 4
3 =1 :333. Clearly, i's
network control ci decreases if the mean number of partners of i's partners increases.
And, ci rises if the mean number of bargaining partners of i's partners falls. In the
limit case, the mean number of bargaining partners of i's partners equals 1 (i.e. actor i
is their only negotiation partner) such that i has full network control ci = 1. So, when
the assumption is made that i's behavior re°ects his network control or structural
autonomy, it is postulated, in e®ect, that he takes account of the mean number of
partners of his partners.
Whether or not we focus on bargaining structures with equally valued relations, the
weak informational requirements re°ect that i's network control captures the structure
only two steps from i (but neglects structural e®ects which are three or more steps
away). The degrees of network control thus may be seen as parsimonious indicators for
the actors' structural positions. They are, by postulate, essential determinants of the
individual bargaining powers. That is, actor i's network control ci a®ects bi, i's level of
individual bargaining power. The direction of the relationship between network control
ci and bargaining power bi depends, however, on i's categorization of the respective
network relation.22
5.3.2 Relational Assessments and Bargaining Power
As described, most work in the ¯eld exclusively focuses on situations in which each
agreement tends to prevent other resource transfers (due to, e.g. exchange restric-
tions like the monogamy rule). The respective theories for such negatively connected
exchange relations rest on the (usually implicit) assumption that everyone knows the
relevant restrictions and behaves accordingly. From a more general perspective, the
type of network connections is, in e®ect, an exogenously given component in these
theories.
Our approach deals not only with negatively connected relations, but with positively
connected and mixed networks as well. For that purpose, we need a more explicit
assumption about network connections than previous theories. Our postulate re°ects
that the people decide about the type of their connections in reality|we assume that
every system actor who has two or more ties in the given negotiation network classi¯es
21Feld (1991) explains why friends always seem to have more friends than oneself. For the scenario
in which this `class size paradox' is fully understood, he also derives the appropriate estimate for the
mean number of friends of an individual's friends. The latter corresponds with the denominator of
the far right{hand side of eq. (5.7c).
22Irrespective of i's categorization of his network relations, i's relative bargaining power in match
with j (eq. (5.5)) is a®ected by ci as well as cj. From i's point of view, the calculation of his relative
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each of his relations as either a negative or a positive connection, while each actor
with just one bargaining relation adopts the classi¯cation of his only partner.23 To
keep things as simple as possible, however, the actors' assessments of relations are
exogenous components in our model.24
It is clear that the individual classi¯cations of potential exchange relations may
coincide or deviate. A match between i and j thus will be either one of the pure types
(i.e. a pure negatively connected or a pure positively connected relation) or a mixture
of them. And, the whole system may be composed out of subnetworks which embrace
either negatively or positively connected relations, but overlap somewhere. A mixed
exchange network thus may easily result. According to Yamagishi, Gillmore, and Cook
(1988), a mixture of positive and negative connections often characterizes real exchange
systems (e.g. exchange in the Kula Ring as described by Malinowski 1922).
Starting from this insight, we now can specify how network control a®ects individual
bargaining power. For that purpose, imagine ¯rst a system with negatively connected
relations. Such a network has two essential features: depending on the values involved,
i's bargaining relations are more or less substitutable and compete with the relations of
i's partners to others (`friends of friends are enemies').25 Both features suggest that i's
absolute bargaining power rises with his network control|by de¯nition, more control,
that is, more structural autonomy means that i depends less on his current negotiation
partner for exchange and that i's bargaining partners tend to have fewer and/or less
valued relations. For the case of negatively connected relations, it thus can be assumed
that i's bargaining power bi rises with i's network control ci.26
It is reasonable to postulate just the contrary for the opposite scenario of positively
connected relations. In a setting with positive connections, concluded exchanges pro-
23Notice that this assumption does not exclude that the individual classi¯cations of network con-
nections simply re°ects systemwide incentives. Our postulate therefore should not create problems in
experimental work as long as test persons (have learned to) systematically react to incentives. Sup-
pose, in accordance with the usual design of network exchange experiments (e.g. Skvoretz and Willer
1991), that subjects' monetary compensation for participation explicitly depends on their bargain-
ing success. We expect that these incentives ensure, at least after several training rounds, relational
assessments in the sense of the experimenters.
24Following the usual practice in the ¯eld, we thus predict exchange pro¯ts and structures only.
This clearly simpli¯es the model|apart from the actors' structural positions (e.g. just one potential
exchange relation or several bargaining relations), the assessments of relations may re°ect the network
type (e.g. dating or communication network), the number and type of goods to be divided (e.g.
substitutes or complements), and the existence of systemwide restrictions (e.g. laws, norms, rules).
25Negatively connected relations usually refer to a situation in which bargaining sessions with dif-
ferent partners concern the distribution of just one homogeneous good. Note that, if there are at least
two distinct resources, negative connections are also possible|negotiation partners then have to be
willing to substitute one good for the other on a one{to{one basis (perfect substitutes).
26In a network of equally valued relations, actor i's network control ci increases if the mean number
of partners of i's partners decreases (cf. eq. (5.7c)). Assuming, in general, a positive relationship
between bargaining power and network control thus re°ects a basic property of a negatively connected
system: friends of friends are enemies.126 Chapter 5 Who Gets How Much in Which Relation?
mote transfers with others.27 Relations with di®erent partners are complementary for
the resource °ow through the system. If an actor's structural autonomy is lower, the
others more a®ect, via their links to one another, the relations to him. And, the ex-
change partners of an individual's partners appear as intermediaries (`friends of friends
are friends'). These features of positively connected relations suggest that i's bargain-
ing power increases if i's network control decreases. If an actor's structural autonomy
is lower, the others more a®ect, via their valued links to one another, the valued rela-
tions to him. Put di®erently, if his network control is smaller, an individual has, by
de¯nition, a higher structural dependence. This creates additional opportunities in a
positively connected setting. Due to the others' transactions, a less autonomous actor
may serve as a broker. And, he may crucially a®ect the resource °ow through the
system. For the case of positively connected relations, it thus can be assumed that i's
bargaining power bi rises if i's network control ci falls.28
To formalize these ideas, we take into account that bi depends positively on the
one{day discount factor ±i (see, eq. (5.4)). It thus su±ces to relate ±i and ci in a
way which corresponds with the above reasoning. Moreover, it holds 0 <c i · 1, but
0 <± i < 1. Actor i's discount factor thus has to be a weighted version of i's network
control. It is therefore assumed that
±i =
(
wci if i classi¯es a relation as negatively connected
1 ¡ wci if i classi¯es a relation as positively connected
(5.8)
where we use the shorthand
w :=
m + n
1+m + n
: (5.9)
The latter is a network{speci¯c fraction which rises with the number of mutual ties
in the network, m, and the number of network members, n. In eq. (5.9), the weight
w scales the degrees of network control or structural autonomy such that ±i and bi,
respectively, are always positive numbers.29
27Positively connected relations may be characterized by the property that exchanges with distinct
partners increase individual bene¯ts. Such a situation exists, for example, if the focus is on pairwise
distributions of di®erent goods which are always consumed together in ¯xed proportions (perfect
complements)|since every actor only cares about the combination of those goods, he will successively
engage in a series of dyadic bargaining sessions to obtain as much as he can from each good. Note,
however, that positive connections do not necessarily involve distinct goods: exchanges between, say, a
professional athlete and his agent as well as complementary relations between the agent and organizers
of athletic events may involve money only.
28As mentioned, ci increases if the mean number of partners of i's partners decreases. The postulate
of a negative relationship between bargaining power and network control therefore re°ects a basic
property of a positively connected system, regardless of the surplus values: friends of friends are
friends.
29There are three reasons for eq. (5.9), the speci¯c de¯nition of w. First, since network control is
measured on a ratio scale (see, eqs. (5.7a), (5.7b), and (5.7c)), the only admissible transformations for
it are those which just change the unit of scale. The weight w clearly ful¯lls this requirement. Second,
any bargaining network may be characterized by the number of mutual ties, m, and the number
of system actors, n. It thus is reasonable to de¯ne the scaling factor w in terms of these system5.3 Network Structure and Dyadic Bargaining 127
Starting from the distribution of network control, each actor's bargaining power
results from combining eq. (5.4) with eqs. (5.8) and (5.9) for either relational classi-
¯cation he may have. In accordance with our basic ideas, actor i's bargaining power
bi increases with i's network control ci when he sees a potential exchange relation as
a negative connection. If he classi¯es such a relation as a positively connected one,
however, his bargaining power bi decreases with his network control ci.30
These assumptions ensure that the network structure determines the actors' bar-
gaining powers. In accordance with other theories for exchange networks, we thus
focus on the e®ects structure has for bargaining results.31 This becomes clear when we
specify the implications of our postulates for the negotiation outcomes in the di®erent
types of relations.32
5.3.3 Negotiation Outcomes and Relational Types
The actors' bargaining powers depend, by postulate, on their network embeddedness
and relational classi¯cation. As a consequence, the model implications for the dis-
tributions of relative bargaining power and surplus in any given match re°ects these
determinants. The individual pro¯t from a speci¯c match results, as mentioned, via
the limiting equilibrium solution of the alternating o®ers game.33 Substituting eqs.
parameters. Third, weighting should preserve the essential role of network control in our approach.
The weight w is a systemwide constant which, at most, moderately changes the original values of
network control|because of m ¸ 1 and n ¸ 2, it holds that 0:75 · w<1.
30Stated di®erently, i's bargaining power bi will be larger if he sees a relation as a positive connection
and has a higher structural dependence 1 ¡ ci.
31While the study of structure justly is at the center of theories for exchange networks, experimental
results from other disciplines show that divisional bargaining does not vary with structure alone.
Eckel and Grossman (1998) ¯nd, for example, that men and women bargain di®erently|while men
apparently accept lower o®ers from women than from men, women seem to accept lower o®ers from
women. In the future, it thus may be important to assess the relative strength of individual and
structural e®ects on exchange outcomes or to ask similar questions (e.g. which individual e®ects
reinforce which structural e®ects, which structural e®ects `survive' the introduction of individual
e®ects?).
32A more sophisticated approach would postulate that discount factors depend on both individual
and structural variables. For example, if i classi¯es a relation as a negatively connected one, the
assumption ±i = °wc i +( 1¡ °)di could be made. Here, di with 0 <d i < 1 would represent i's
`baseline' patience which, in turn, may be understood as a function of i's characteristics. In accordance
with Becker and Mulligan's (1997) conclusions from an endogenization of time preference, for example,
it can be expected that younger, less educated, and poorer persons will be less patient. And, the
parameter ° with 0 · ° · 1 would measure the degree to which structural positions determine the
bargaining partners' discount factors. From this perspective, the above model focuses, due to eq.
(5.8), on the extreme case ° = 1. While restrictive, the latter scenario ensures compatibility with
the available experimental evidence on exchange networks. Such results usually rest on experimental
designs that eliminate e®ects of interindividual di®erences.
33Stable transaction patterns thus are not an assumption, but a conclusion of our approach. This
is important because, as Bonacich and Bienenstock (1995) point out, theories for exchange networks
often just assume the emergence of stable exchange patterns.128 Chapter 5 Who Gets How Much in Which Relation?
(5.4) and (5.8) into eq. (5.5), we can distinguish four relational types each of which
allows speci¯c conclusions about the e®ects structure has on relative bargaining powers
and negotiated exchange pro¯ts. For clari¯cation and later reference, it is useful to
consider the scenario of a pure negatively connected relation in greater detail.
Negative{Negative Connection: If the relation between actors i and j is, from
their perspective, a pure negatively connected one, then i's relative bargaining
power over j is
pij =
bi
bi + bj
=
(¡1=ln(wci))
(¡1=ln(wci) )+( ¡1=ln(wcj))
=
ln(wcj)
ln(wci)+l n ( wcj)
: (5.10)
As a consequence, i's negotiated exchange pro¯t in the match with j results from
xij = pij vij =
Ã
ln(wcj)
ln(wci)+l n ( wcj)
!
vij for i 6= j: (5.11)
Hence, i's relative bargaining power and exchange pro¯t in a negatively connected
relation with j rise, everything else being constant, when either i's network control
ci increases or j's network control cj decreases.34
Combining eqs. (5.4), (5.8) and (5.5) for the other con¯gurations of relational classi¯ca-
tions in an analogous way, we obtain three other predictions for the relative bargaining
powers and the negotiated exchange pro¯ts.
Negative{Positive Connection: If i classi¯es the relation to j as negatively con-
nected and j categorizes the relation as positively connected, then actor i's pro¯t
in the match with j is
xij = pij vij =
Ã
ln(1 ¡ wcj)
ln(wci)+l n ( 1¡ wcj)
!
vij for i 6= j: (5.12)
For such a mixed relational orientation, actor i's relative bargaining power and
negotiated pro¯t increase if, everything else being constant, either ci or cj rises.
Positive{Negative Connection: If i classi¯es the relation to j as positively con-
nected and j categorizes their relation as negatively connected, then actor i's
pro¯t in the match with j is
xij = pij vij =
Ã
ln(wcj)
ln(1 ¡ wci)+l n ( wcj)
!
vij for i 6= j: (5.13)
In this mixed relation i's relative bargaining power and pro¯t share increase,
everything else being constant, when either ci or cj falls.
34These conclusions re°ect that @pij=@ci > 0, @pij=@cj < 0, @xij=@ci > 0 and @xij=@cj < 0. The
signs of these partial derivatives re°ect the reaction of i's relative bargaining power pij and i's pro¯t
share xij in the match with j when exogenous structural changes a®ect either i's network control ci
or j's network control cj, but preserve the valued relation between i and j.5.3 Network Structure and Dyadic Bargaining 129
Positive{Positive Connection: If the relation between actors i and j is, from their
perspective, a pure positively connected one, then actor i's pro¯t in the match
with j results from
xij = pij vij =
Ã
ln(1 ¡ wcj)
ln(1 ¡ wci)+l n ( 1¡ wcj)
!
vij for i 6= j: (5.14)
Consequently, if their relation is a pure positive connection, actor i's relative
bargaining power and negotiated pro¯t increase, everything else being constant,
if either i's network control ci falls or j's network control cj rises.
Since w := (m + n)=(1 + m + n) and ci :=
P
k rik rki hold by de¯nition and rij
measures i's fraction of the systemwide valued relations to j, we thus may uniquely
predict the distributions of relative bargaining power and negotiated pro¯t for any given
combination of relational orientations in each exogenously given bargaining network
with m valued ties between n actors. A comparison of the four model conclusions
shows, moreover, that the negotiated pro¯ts associated with the distinct relational
types just di®er in terms of pij, i's relative bargaining power in the match with j.
And, the calculation of relative bargaining powers and negotiated pro¯ts requires, in
principle, just a pocket calculator.
However, some of the negotiated pro¯ts may not be realized|negatively connected
relations may re°ect the existence of exogenous restrictions (e.g. one{exchange rule).
In such settings (and mixed exchange networks as well), at least one system member
may select his actual exchange partners from a larger set of potential exchange partners.
That is, depending on the negotiation outcomes, he may never complete transfers with
one or more of his negotiation partners. The analysis of such exclusionary behavior
yields testable conclusions about coincidences or deviations between bargaining and
exchange structures.35
5.3.4 Bargaining and Exchange Structures
Suppose that a bargaining network persists over several rounds of negotiated exchanges
and that at least one system member i classi¯es his valued relations as negative con-
nections. By assumption, i knows his negotiation outcomes with two di®erent partners
j and k, but can complete (for whatever reason) just one exchange per connection and
round.36
35The term \exclusionary behavior" refers to a situation in which at least one actor never exchanges
with one or more of his bargaining partners (consistent or permanent exclusion). It does not refer to
a situation in which actors alternately exclude each of their potential partners in di®erent rounds of
negotiated exchanges (temporary exclusion).
36This simple scenario captures the essential features of all situations in which network partners may
be consistently excluded. If the number of pies to be divided is smaller than the number of negotiation
partners, potential exchange partners may be successively excluded via pairwise comparisons of the
negotiation results.130 Chapter 5 Who Gets How Much in Which Relation?
We are interested in conclusions about situations in which i never completes trans-
actions with his bargaining partner j, but always exchanges with j's competitor k.
If i is a sel¯sh pro¯t{maximizing actor with substitutable exchange relations, he will
decide about j's permanent exclusion on the basis of the exchange pro¯ts he could
realize. It thus is assumed that i chooses his actual exchange partners via a systematic
comparison of the negotiation results he can realize with each potential partner.37
Theorem 5.1 If i is as sel¯sh pro¯t{maximizing actor with substitutable exchange
relations, i will consistently exclude j if
(a) there is an alternative bargaining partner k which guarantees, from i's perspective,
a more favorable deal than j, and
(b) i's pro¯t from the match with k in the case of exclusionary behavior towards j
exceeds the pro¯t i could obtain in the relation with k if he would at least occa-
sionally exchange with his negotiation partner j as well.
Proof: The proof of this theorem can be found in Appendix C. 2
Notice that Theorem 5.1 is fairly general|it is not restricted to pure negatively con-
nected relations and a speci¯c calculation of negotiated pro¯ts.38 In fact, the result
holds true for mixed and pure negatively connected networks and any model of nego-
tiated exchanges which generates, based upon the postulate of individual rationality,
point predictions for pro¯t divisions.
Having speci¯ed such a model and the respective network type, we therefore can
predict di®erences between the given bargaining network and the actual exchange
structures by examining the whole system on its basis. According to Theorem 5.1,
the exchange structures will di®er from the negotiation network if and only if (see
Appendix C)
x
¤
ik >x ik >x ij for at least one i with negative connections to j 6= k; (5.15a)
where x¤
ik denotes i's negotiated pro¯t in the match with k if i always exchanges with
actor k (i.e. x¤
ik refers to the subnetwork which results from removing the link between
i and j in the initial structure). Otherwise, the exchange network will coincide with
the given bargaining network.
In combination with our exchange model, the inequality (5.15a) may be used to
predict, as will be illustrated below, whether and, if so, how actual exchange structures
37Of course, there are other ways to deal with exclusionary behavior. One could, for example, follow
Binmore (1985) and analyze a non{cooperative bargaining game with `outside options' (i.e. exchange
opportunities with others) for at least one partner. Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) discuss some basic
results associated with this very complicated scenario.
38These features re°ect that the formal derivation of this conclusion (see, Appendix C) does not
depend on the modeling of bargaining and exchange. In addition, its derivation does not require
assumptions about non{trivial probability values (e.g. probability of inclusion).5.3 Network Structure and Dyadic Bargaining 131
deviate from given bargaining relations.39 Before the condition is routinely applied,
however, its most important implications have to be discussed.
First, from the perspective of our approach, inequality (5.15a) is equivalent to a
condition in terms of relative bargaining powers and cake sizes.40 Accordingly, devia-
tions between exchange and negotiation structures may occur because of di®erent cake
sizes and/or di®erent relative bargaining powers in i's relations with j and k. Suppose,
for purpose of clari¯cation, that i's relative bargaining power in the match with j is
much smaller than that in the match with k. Then, actor i may refrain from exchang-
ing with j if the cakes to be divided with j and k have a similar size. If, however, i
and j bargain over the partition of a large cake, whereas i and k negotiate over the
division of a small surplus, it may be favorable for i to keep his relation with j|even
if i does not get much of the large pie he divides with j, this share may be absolutely
larger than that he could obtain in the relation with k.
Second, the inequality (5.15a) re°ects that deviations between negotiation and ex-
change structures emerge because restricting attention to a smaller set of partners is
more bene¯cial for at least one individual i than concluding exchanges with all ini-
tial partners. The permanent exclusion of a partner thus means that i can improve
his bargaining situation for the remaining matches without su®ering losses. In other
words, actor i can change, without incurring costs to himself, the distribution of net-
work control to his advantage. And, if i selects a proper subset of his initial partners
for transactions, he a®ects the network control of his partners and their partners (cf.
eq. (5.7a)). The permanent exclusion of at least one negotiation partner from exchange
therefore also in°uences the pro¯t divisions in others' relations.
Third, the original condition for di®erences between exchange and negotiation struc-
tures may be split into the necessary part xik >x ij and the su±cient part x¤
ik >x ik
(see, Appendix C). The former identi¯es the subset of substitutable initial relations
with a potential for exclusion. The latter selects those relations from this subset which,
in fact, will be characterized by non{exchange.41 Analyses of concrete network struc-
39From the perspective of our approach, the inequality (5.15a) is equivalent to a condition in terms
of bargaining powers. Accordingly, the exchange structures will di®er from the given negotiation
network if and only if b¤
i=b¤
k >b i=bk >b i=bj for at least one i with negative connections to j 6= k.
Here, b¤
i and b¤
k denote the bargaining powers of i and k in the subnetwork which results if the tie
between i and j in the initial structure is removed.
40This reformulation of inequality (5.15a) re°ects eq. (5.5). Accordingly, the exchange relations
will di®er from the given negotiation network if and only if p¤
ik vik >p ik vik >p ij vij for at least one
i with negative connections to j 6= k. Here, p¤
ik denotes i's relative bargaining power in the relation
with k if the tie between i and j has been removed from the initial structure.
41In larger negotiation structures, several of actor i's ties may ful¯ll the necessary part of inequality
(5.15a). If so, actor i will successively compare all relevant bargaining partners with respect to the
feasible payo®s. To realize the most favorable situation, he will apply inequality (5.15a) `bottom{up',
starting with the least favorable deal and moving up in the ranking of negotiation outcomes as long
as the su±cient part of (5.15a) is not met.132 Chapter 5 Who Gets How Much in Which Relation?
tures illustrate, as will become clear below, the straightforward application of (the
necessary and su±cient part of) the condition for exclusionary behavior.
Equally Valued Relations
In the case of equally valued relations vij = vji = v for all i 6= j, inequality (5.15a)
reduces to an expression in relative bargaining powers
p
¤
ik >p ik >p ij for at least one i with negative connections to j 6= k; (5.15b)
where p¤
ik refers to i's relative bargaining power in relation with k if the link between
i and j has been removed. Analogue to inequality (5.15a), (5.15b) can be split into
the necessary part pik >p ij and the su±cient part p¤
ik >p ik. In the simple (and
experimentally relevant) scenario of equally valued relations, exclusionary behavior
may occur, if at all, in speci¯c networks only. To avoid super°uous work, essential
properties of the relevant networks therefore should be explicitly speci¯ed. And, since
exclusion usually is discussed in the context of pure negatively connected systems, such
a characterization is particularly desirable for networks with negative connections and
equally valued relations only.
Theorem 5.2 From the perspective of our exchange approach, the relevant negatively
connected networks with equally valued relations for the application of inequality (5.15b)
are those in which
(i) at least one actor i has three or more negotiation partners, and
(ii) these partners have two or more structurally distinct positions, one of which may
be equivalent to i's.
Proof: The proof of this theorem can be found in Appendix C. 2
That is, when a negatively connected network does not ful¯ll (i) and/or (ii), the condi-
tion for deviations between negotiation and exchange networks (i.e. inequality (5.15b))
is violated for sure. If, however, (i) and (ii) are met, there is at least one actor i who
may avoid exchanges with at least one of his original negotiation partners|analyzing
the negatively connected network via inequality (5.15b) then will be informative.42
In the following, analyses of concrete network structures illustrate, among other
things, the straightforward application of (the necessary and su±cient part of) the
condition for exclusionary behavior. To compare such theoretical predictions with em-
pirical observations, we ¯rst need to describe and select relevant experimental studies.
42Exclusionary behavior reduces, in e®ect, one's own subnetwork to a smaller and more bene¯cial
exchange structure. From the perspective of our approach, it is clear that only speci¯c network
positions provide opportunities for a pro¯table selection of exchange partners. Important features of
such structural positions are described by (i) and (ii).5.4 Experiments and Data Selection 133
5.4 Experiments and Data Selection
There are various experimental results with regard to pro¯t distributions in exchange
networks (e.g. Bienenstock and Bonacich 1993; Lovaglia et al. 1995; Skvoretz and
Fararo 1992; Skvoretz and Willer 1993; Yamagishi, Gillmore, and Cook 1988). There
are also di®erent experimental results with regard to deviations between negotiation
and exchange relations (e.g. Markovsky, Willer, and Patton 1988; Simpson and Willer
1999). Since many experiments have been conducted, several exchange theorists (e.g.
Burke 1997; Friedkin 1995; Yamaguchi 1996) substantiate the empirical relevance of
new theoretical ideas by referring to an appropriate subset of the published ¯ndings. We
also adopt this strategy of empirical validation. To specify the relevant data selection
criteria, it is reasonable to brie°y describe features of experimental studies on exchange
networks.
5.4.1 Experimental Work
Starting point of an exchange network experiment is a speci¯c bargaining structure
which limits matches between potential exchange partners. Experimenters are inter-
ested in the e®ects the network embeddedness has on pro¯t splits and/or exchange
patterns between adjacent nodes. The presentation of experimental ¯ndings there-
fore refers to the types of structural positions (A,B,C,D,E) the di®erent actors have.
Individuals located at structurally equivalent positions are normally distinguished by
numeric subscripts (e.g. A1,A 2).
Figure 5.1 depicts negotiation structures most of which are popular in laboratory
experiments. Nearly all of those experiments focus on networks with equally valued
relations (i.e. each bilateral bargaining session concerns the division of an identical
surplus). To prepare the application of our model to such structures, Figure 5.1 also
informs about the relevant column{stochastic matrices R with elements rij and the
associated control vectors c with entries ci :=
P
k rik rki for all i.
The design of experiments on exchange networks has common features (see, e.g.
Skvoretz and Willer 1991). All experiments consist of several rounds of negotiation and
exchange, while the relational structure is kept constant. Bargaining sessions involve
adjacent network positions only, where usually a surplus of identical size (normally 24
`pro¯t points') is to be split in any bilateral match. After a series of o®ers and coun-
tero®ers, negotiations stop when an agreement is reached. Partly due to a computerized
setting, proposals can be made within seconds and bargaining sessions do not last long
(viz. agreement in less than a few minutes). Most experiments concern negatively
connected networks. The experimental design often restricts the number of exchanges
per connection and round|empirical research usually refers to those negatively con-
nected settings in which every actor is subject to the same exchange restriction (e.g.
one{exchange rule).
Subjects are usually undergraduates who participate for pay (monetary compen-
sation according to bargaining success). They receive general information about the134 Chapter 5 Who Gets How Much in Which Relation?
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Figure 5.1 Network structures, relational matrices R, and control vectors c.
purpose and the number of rounds of the experiment. Training and practice rounds
serve to ensure their understanding of the bargaining situation. And, there is no mis-
direction. Subjects normally possess complete information about the bargaining rules,5.4 Experiments and Data Selection 135
the earnings of their partners, the shape of the negotiation structure, and their own
positions within the network.43
To eliminate possible e®ects of interindividual heterogeneity, researchers apply dif-
ferent procedures, however. Some authors (e.g. Bonacich and Friedkin 1998) randomly
assign subjects to ¯xed network positions and prevent face to face encounters (i.e. sub-
jects sit in separate rooms and interact through computer terminals). Others (e.g.
Lovaglia et al. 1995) ensure an impersonal experimental setting as well, but rotate
subjects through all network positions during the experiment. In addition, both proce-
dures should help inhibit, partly in combination with other aspects of the experimental
design (e.g. lack of information on other players' earnings), possible e®ects of individ-
ual preferences for equality in earnings over the entire experiment. It is not clear,
however, whether these precautions are fully e®ective or, if not, which procedure is
more appropriate.44
Nevertheless, experimental results are often interpreted as e®ects the given network
structure has on exchange patterns and/or pro¯t divisions between adjacent positions.
As a matter of fact, however, they are averages of what happened over a limited num-
ber of negotiated exchanges. Experimental ¯ndings on deviations or coincidences of
negotiation and exchange structures are reported as observed proportions of exchanges
between speci¯c positions over a series of rounds. And, results on exchange pro¯ts are
routinely represented by the means of pro¯t points the advantaged positions in given
matches could realize over several rounds of the experiment. Occasionally, they are re-
ported as systemwide fractions of power associated with structural positions (i.e. in our
terminology, the relative bargaining powers of position holders are standardized over
all matches such that they add up to unity over all network members). Before we can
compare predictions from our theoretical model with such experimental observations,
it is necessary to say a few words about our choice of data.
5.4.2 Selection of Experiments
Several aspects characterize our choice of empirical data. First, although our model
can handle exchange networks with heterogeneously valued relations, we focus on
those experiments which concern identically valued relations. The reason is simple:
Bonacichand Friedkin (1998) present the only experimental study which systemati-
cally varies, for each of four network structures, the size of the cake to be partitioned
in speci¯c bilateral relations. They do not report precise numerical ¯ndings, however.
43There exist some experimental studies in which the subjects did not know the overall shape of
network structures, their own network positions, or the other players' earnings (e.g. Bonacich and
Friedkin 1998; Thye, Lovaglia, and Markovsky 1997).
44This conclusion re°ects statements of experimenters who apply the di®erent procedures. To
rationalize speci¯c empirical results, Lovaglia et al. (1995) refer to the potential problem of subjects'
preferences for equity in experimental research. Bonacich and Friedkin (1998) also mention that their
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We therefore cannot systematically compare their data with predictions from our model
and other theories.45
Second, we restrict our attention to those experimental studies in which subjects
possess complete information about the bargaining rules, the earnings of their partners,
the shape of the negotiation structure, and their own positions within the network. This
decision simply re°ects the assumptions of our theory|actors have to know at least
their own valued relations and those of their partners as well as the numbers of mutual
ties and actors in the network.
Third, apart from one exception, we compare theoretical predictions with exper-
imental results on negatively connected structures. This re°ects, as noted by Yam-
aguchi (2000), that empirical research on mixed exchange networks is absent and that
Yamagishi, Gillmore, and Cook (1988) is the only experimental study of a positively
connected setting. In addition to empirical work on negative connections (e.g. Cook et
al. 1983; Markovsky, Willer, and Patton 1988), we therefore refer to the latter in our
comparison with Yamaguchi's (1996) theory, the only other model for both negatively
and positively connected relations.
Fourth, because of the relatively large number of experiments on negatively con-
nected structures, we select a subset of those studies. This subset is characterized by a
similar design|our focus will be on experiments in which (I) each position holder faces
the same exchange restriction (e.g. one{exchange rule), and (II) subjects are rotated
through all network positions. The selection criterion (I) re°ects that the above version
of our model does not refer to networks in which actors at distinct structural positions
di®er with respect to the number of exchanges they can complete per period.46 Rather,
it is concerned with networks in which each actor is subject to the same restriction.
The selection criterion (II) re°ects a methodological point. As mentioned, exper-
imenters try to inhibit possible e®ects of subjects' desire for equality in earnings via
two distinct procedures (random assignment to ¯xed positions versus rotation of sub-
45Bonacich and Friedkin (1998) present diagrams to contrast their ¯ndings with predictions from
Bienenstock and Bonacich's (1992, 1993) game{theoretic core model, Cook and Yamagishi's (1992)
Equi{Dependence approach, and Friedkin's (1993, 1995) Expected Value theory. A rough comparison
with their ¯gures shows that our model ¯ts their data worse than the latter, but better than the
Equi{Dependence approach. And, the model predictions for the relative bargaining powers always
fall into the range predictions of the core.
46This feature does not characterize a slightly generalized version of our model which is based on the
introduction of an experimentally adjustable parameter. Let gi ¸ 1 represent the exogenously given
number of actor i's admissible exchange relations per period. Using the additional parameter gi, we can
extend our assumption on individual bargaining power bi. In the case of negatively connected relations,
eq. (5.4) may be replaced by bi = ¡1=(gi ln±i). Starting from this more general postulate, we obtain,
after substituting into eq. (5.5) and some algebra, xij = pijvij = gj ln(wcj)vij=(gi ln(wci)+gj ln(wcj)).
This equation for i's negotiated exchange pro¯t in a negatively connected relation with j reduces to
eq. (5.11) whenever gi = gj for i 6= j. Additionally, it allows pro¯t predictions for those negatively
connected networks in which actors at distinct structural positions di®er with respect to the number
of exchanges they can complete per period. A systematic comparison with empirical ¯ndings for such
networks (Lovaglia et al. 1995; Skvoretz and Willer 1993) shows that the relevant pro¯t predictions
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jects through all structural positions)|the more appropriate procedure is not known
yet, however. To avoid biases as far as possible, we therefore ¯x the procedure and
mainly refer to such studies on negatively connected structures in which subjects were
rotated through networks positions.47 While this selection criterion may seem restric-
tive, there are enough published data for a systematic comparison of predictions from
our Non{Cooperative Bargaining (hereafter, NCB) model and other theories.
5.5 Applications
5.5.1 Pro¯t Splits in Negatively Connected Networks
Using experimental results obtained by Skvoretz and Willer (1993) as reference point,
Table 5.1 compares NCB{predictions for dyadic exchange outcomes in popular net-
works (4{Line, Stem, Kite, 3{Branch, see Figure 5.1) with those of alterna-
tive approaches. The latter are Lovaglia et al.'s (1995) GPI{RD, Yamaguchi's (1996)
power model (Y), Skvoretz and Willer's (1993) Exchange Resistance theory (ER),
Friedkin's (1986, 1992) Expected Value theory (EV), Cook and Yamagishi's (1992)
Equi{Dependence theory (ED), and Burke's (1997) Identity Simulation model (IS).48
The observations listed in Table 5.1 refer to estimated means of pro¯t points of struc-
tural position B, where 24 pro¯t points per match had to be divided.
The associated NCB{predictions follow, for the given size of the cake of 24, from
inserting the actors' degrees of structural autonomy (cf. Figure 5.1) and the network{
speci¯c weight into eq. (5.11), the equation for dyadic pro¯t shares in a pure negatively
connected relation. To illustrate the procedure, let us take a look at the 4{Line struc-
ture and compute the relevant pro¯t points. Figure 5.1 informs about the structural
autonomy levels or degrees of network control: cA1 =0 :5=cA2 and cB1 =0 :75 = cB2.I t
also gives the number of mutual ties (m = 3) and the number of system actors (n =4 )
such that w =( m+n)=(1+m+n)=0 :875. Substituting into eq. (5.11) yields, when
numeric subscripts are dropped for notational convenience, the pro¯t point prediction
for B in the match with A:
xBA = pBA £ 24 =
Ã
ln(0:875 £ 0:5)
ln(0:875 £ 0:75) + ln(0:875 £ 0:5)
!
£ 24 = 15:9
such that xAB =( 1¡ pBA) £ 24 = 24 ¡ 15:9=8 :1 gives the pro¯t points for
A in the relation with B. In addition to such NCB{predictions, Table 5.1 contains
pro¯t point predictions from other models. To compare the empirical performance
of the theories, we use two `goodness{of{¯t' measures, viz. the `Absolute Deviation'
47The only exception is Cook et al.'s (1983) study. In their experimental setting, subjects were nei-
ther rotated nor informed about their partners' earnings. Following Yamaguchi (1996) and Markovsky
et al. (1997), we include the Cook et al. data in our comparison with Yamaguchi's theory.
48We selected those approaches because, in contrast to other published theories (e.g. Bienenstock
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Table 5.1 Observed and predicted dyadic pro¯ts for negatively connected network
structures.
Theoretical Predictionsa
Network Match NCB GPI{RD Y ER EV ED IS Observedb
4{Line B:A 15.9 14.5y 13.3y 16.0 21.1 16.0 13.8y 14.1 (0.40)
Stem B:A 16.8y 15.6y 14.4y 18.3 22.0 18.0 15.6y 15.3 (0.82)
B:C 15.7y 13.7y 13.2y 15.2y 19.5y 14.4y 12.9y 16.5 (2.64)
Kite B:A 13.9y 13.7y 12.8y 12.5y 12.0 12.0 12.1 14.1 (0.77)
3{Branch B:A 21.7y 23.0c 18.0 21.2y 22.0y 24.0 21.9y 21.6 (0.49)
ADd 0.88 1.06 1.98 1.64 3.84 2.24 1.30
MDd 0.50 0.64 1.04 0.83 2.07 1.01 0.83
Notes: Experiments took place under an overall one{exchange rule, where 24 pro¯t points per match had to be divided.
Predictions and observations are for pro¯t points of structural position B. Pro¯t points for positions A and C in the
match with B result from (24 { pro¯t of B), respectively.
NCB = Non{Cooperative Bargaining model; GPI{RD = Graph{theoretic Power Index with Resistance and Degree
(Lovaglia et al. 1995); Y = Yamaguchi's (1996) power model, predictions based on the parameter choice s =8
(elasticity of substitution); ER = Exchange Resistance theory (Skvoretz and Willer 1993); EV = Expected Value theory
(Friedkin 1986, 1992); ED = Equi{Dependence theory (Cook and Yamagishi 1992); IS = Identity Simulation model
(Burke 1997).
a Pro¯t predictions, except for GPI{RD, Y, and IS, are taken from Skvoretz and Willer (1993, Table 2); predictions
for GPI{RD, Y, and IS are taken from Lovaglia et al. (1995, Table 1), Yamaguchi (1996, Table 3), and Burke (1997,
Table 1), respectively.
b Experimental results with standard errors in brackets, as reported by Skvoretz and Willer (1993, Table 2).
c Own calculation, based on Lovaglia et al. (1995).
d AD = Absolute Deviation (the sum of absolute distances between observed and predicted pro¯t points relative to
number of comparisons); MD = Mean Deviation (the Euclidean distance between observed and predicted pro¯t points
relative to number of comparisons).
y Daggers indicate that predicted values fall within the 95% con¯dence interval of the observed values. Put di®erently,
these predictions ¯t the observations at the p<0:05 signi¯cance level (two-tailed tests).
(AD) and the `Mean Deviation' (MD). Whereas AD is the average absolute di®erence
between observed and predicted pro¯t points over all matches under consideration, MD
is the Euclidean Distance between observed and predicted pro¯t points relative to the
number of comparisons.49
According to the MD and AD values in Table 5.1, all theories make acceptable
pro¯t point predictions. Nevertheless, they di®er in terms of predictive accuracy. In
particular, Friedkin's (1986, 1992) Expected Value theory (EV) seems, at ¯rst sight, to
be an outlier. A closer look reveals, however, that EV predicts poorly with respect to
just two matches (viz. the 4{Line and the B:A relation in the Stem network). These
relations also turn out to be problematic for Skvoretz and Willer's (1993) Exchange
49While the calculation of AD is straightforward, an example for the computation of MD may be
helpful. To obtain the value of MD for the NCB model (see, Table 5.1), we determine the sum of
squared deviations between observations and predictions: (14:1 ¡ 15:9)2 + (15:3 ¡ 16:8)2 + (16:5 ¡
15:7)2 + (14:1 ¡ 13:9)2 + (21:6 ¡ 21:7)2 =6 :18. Taking the square root and dividing the result by the
number of comparisons (i.e.
p
6:18=5) gives the reported MD of 0.50.5.5 Applications 139
Resistance theory (ER) as well as Cook and Yamagishi's (1992) Equi{Dependence the-
ory (ED). While Burke's (1997) Identity Simulation model (IS), Lovaglia et al.'s (1995)
GPI{RD, and Yamaguchi's (1996) power model (Y) o®er much better predictions for
those links, they do not closely ¯t the empirical results for others.50 And, even though
the NCB model has the lowest AD and MD, it is also not completely in line with the
experimental evidence. This can be seen from the more standard test of ¯t reported
in Table 5.1 as well. Following Skvoretz and Willer (1993) and Yamaguchi (1996), it
is asked there whether predictions fall within the 95% con¯dence intervals of the em-
pirically observed means. According to this test, the NCB{prediction for the 4-Line
structure does not ¯t the experimental data. The other NCB{predictions correspond
with the evidence, however.
This is important for a speci¯c reason. The empirical observations in Table 5.1
indicate that negatively connected networks with equally valued relations and struc-
turally distinct positions may considerably di®er in terms of pro¯t divisions. Compare,
for example, the mean pro¯t points obtained by position B in matches with actors at
position A in the 3{Branch and Kite networks: B gets, on average, 21.6 pro¯t points
(i.e. 90% of the available resources) in the 3{Branch network, but 14.1 pro¯t points
(i.e. 58% of the available resources) in the Kite structure. Because of the experimental
design, such variations of pro¯t splits can be attributed to structural e®ects.51 Accord-
ing to the NCB model, they re°ect that, apart from unequal numbers of actors and ties,
the structures under consideration are associated with di®erent distributions of net-
work control|while the Kite network has more nodes and links than the 3{Branch
structure, the distribution of network control is more unequal in the latter than in the
former. As a consequence, the pro¯t di®erentiation in the 3{Branch network will
be more extreme than in the Kite structure.52 For a more elaborated discussion on
50All theories fail to predict that the structural position B in the Stem network apparently gets a
larger pro¯t in the match with C than in the relation with A. It should be noted, however, that the
mean of pro¯t points associated with the B:C relation in Table 5.1 is, in comparison to the empirical
results for all other matches, based on a low number of exchanges and associated with a large standard
error. Skvoretz and Lovaglia (1995) discuss, among other things, the relatively rare occurrence of B:C
exchanges in the Stem structure.
51As Skvoretz and Willer (1993) point out, most established exchange theories identify, more or
less explicitly, the `exclusionary potential' associated with a particular network position as the crucial
explanatory factor for the pro¯t di®erentiation in negatively connected networks with equally valued
relations and structurally distinct positions.
52The NCB model predicts a maximum di®erentiation of pro¯ts in speci¯c networks only. For
negatively connected structures with equally valued relations between distinct positions, eq. (5.11)
implies that the pro¯t division approaches maximum di®erentiation if and only if there is a su±ciently
large number of network members and mutual ties and the advantaged actor has full control over his
relations (monopoly position). An example is the negatively connected 100{Branch structure in
which 100 actors solely depend on actor i for the split of an identical value v. This straightforward
extension of the 3{Branch logic from Figure 5.1 is characterized by m = 100, n = 101, ci = 1, and
cj =0 :01 for all j 6= i such that xij = pij v =0 :999v determines i's pro¯t share in the negatively
connected relation with j. Notice that, while the predicted pro¯t division in small networks (i.e.
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the variation of negotiation results among negatively connected structures, see Braun
and Gautschi (2000). They address the question why exchange outcomes in di®erent
negatively connected networks vary as much as they do. Notice that, if the empirically
observed means of pro¯t points are taken as measuring rods, the NCB model closely
predicts the pro¯t splits in both networks.53
And, the acceptable ¯t of the NCB model is not limited to these empirical ¯ndings.
This becomes clear if one follows Burke (1997) and combines the data of Skvoretz
and Willer (1993) with those of Lovaglia et al. (1995) as well as Skvoretz and Fararo
(1992).54 Speci¯cally, we calculate the means of all the experimental results for each
of the four network structures: 4{Line 13.7; Stem B:A 15.2, B:C 15.9; Kite 13.2; 3{
Branch 20.7. A systematic comparison of these means with the theoretical predictions
listed in Table 5.1 shows that the NCB model produces the smallest deviations (AD
= 1.14; MD = 0.60). Again, the NCB predictions are relatively close to the average
observations for the networks under consideration. It is to be asked whether this
conclusion may be extended to other networks and types of connections.
5.5.2 Power Distributions in Negatively and Positively
Connected Structures
Negotiated distributions of exchange pro¯ts re°ect power inequalities due to di®erent
structural positions. Usually, the power of one position over another is measured by
the proportion of value obtained by the former position in the match with the latter.
This procedure is compatible with the NCB approach: it holds pij = xij=vij for i 6= j
because of eq. (5.5). Additionally, the NCB model provides, for each of four relational
con¯gurations, a simple formula according to which i's relative bargaining power in
the relation with j depends on structural features (cf. the di®erent expressions for pij
in eqs. (5.11) { (5.14)). Actor i's systemwide power share pi thus may be obtained via
always ensures a relatively extreme pro¯t di®erentiation in favor of i if the focus is on negatively
connected structures.
53It is sometimes argued that structures like the 3{Branch are characterized by a process of
competitive bidding between those position holders who are threatened by exclusion. Accordingly,
there will be steadily increasing di®erences in pro¯ts between exchanging actors in consecutive rounds
of experimental bargaining and exchange|since theoretical predictions usually are understood as
equilibrium outcomes, means of pro¯t points may be inappropriate indicators for comparison. If
this argument is valid, however, it is surprising that experimenters report means of pro¯t points
only. Clearly, the median would be a more appropriate measure for the typical experimental outcome
whenever the distribution of observed pro¯t splits is highly skewed or if errors are not evenly distributed
about the mean.
54The combination of these data neglects, however, that the studies vary, despite similar designs,
in terms of the experimental results reported. For example, while Lovaglia et al. (1995) report
simple arithmetic means of pro¯t splits in network relations from the last rounds of experiments only,
Skvoretz and Willer (1993) estimate means of pro¯t points via a constrained regression technique from
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Table 5.2 Observed and predicted power of positions for selected networks.
Network Positions
Network C B A WD
5{Line, negatively connected
Predicted (NCB) .1649 .3351 .0825 .0043a
Observed (Cook et al. 1983) .2097 .3059 .0892 |
Observed (Cook et al. 1983, corrected)b .1436 .3303 .0978 |
Observed (Markovsky et al. 1997) .1159 .3464 .0957 |
Mean of Observations .1564 .3275 .0942 |
Predicted (Yamaguchi 1996)
parameter choice s = 1 .1667 .2500 .1667 .0301a
parameter choice s = 8 .1764 .2500 .1618 .0294a
31{Star, negatively connected
Predicted (NCB) .1923 .2051 .0641 .0188a
Observed (Skvoretz and Fararo 1992)c .1021 .2583 .0410 |
Observed (Markovsky et al. 1988, 1997) .0635 .2355 .0767 |
Mean of Observations .0828 .2469 .0589 |
Predicted (Yamaguchi 1996)
parameter choice s = 1 .1250 .1667 .1250 .0264a
parameter choice s = 8 .1383 .1667 .1205 .0262a
5{Line, positively connected
Predicted (NCB) .3264 .1736 .1632 .0071
Observed (Yamagishi et al. 1988)d .3133 .1931 .1503 |
Predicted (Yamaguchi 1996)
parameter choice s = ¡1 .5000 .2500 .0000 .0588
parameter choice s = ¡8 .4961 .2500 .0020 .0579
Notes: WD = Weighted Deviation (the average weighted Euclidean Distance between observed and predicted systemwide
pro¯t shares, where the weights refer to the number of indicated positions in the network). NCB = Non{Cooperative
Bargaining model. Applying Yamaguchi's theory requires a speci¯cation of the elasticity of substitution (s).
a The calculation of WD refers to the mean of observations.
b Corrections by Markowsky et al. (1997, Table 1).
c The original values have been re{scaled to sum to 1.0.
d Following Yamaguchi (1996) and Markowsky et al. (1997), the result from the ¯rst trial block (see Table 1 in
Yamagishi, Gillmore, and Cook 1988, p. 843) was considered as an extreme outlier and therefore excluded.
adding up i's relative bargaining power for all matches and standardizing the result by
m, the number of mutual ties in the respective network. Formally,
pi =
1
m
n X
k=1
pik for all i (5.16)
such that
Pn
k=1 pk =1 : Table 5.2 reports relevant predictions of the NCB model for
the negatively connected networks 5{Line and 31{Star as well as for the positively
connected 5{Line structure (see again Figure 5.1 for graphs, relational matrices, and
control vectors).
Using experimental observations for each network (Cook et al. 1983; Markovsky,
Willer, and Patton 1988; Markovsky et al. 1997; Yamagishi, Gillmore, and Cook
1988) as reference points, Table 5.2 contrasts NCB{predictions with those from142 Chapter 5 Who Gets How Much in Which Relation?
Yamaguchi's (1996) power model (i.e. the other theoretical approach dealing with
both negatively and positively connected relations). For the comparison of the the-
ories' predictive accuracy, we use the average weighted Euclidean distance between
observed and predicted systemwide pro¯t levels associated with distinct positions in
any particular network as the `goodness{of{¯t' measure. This `Weighted Deviation'
(WD) takes into account that speci¯c network positions may exist several times in
the structure under consideration. To demonstrate its computation, let us take a look
at the NCB{predictions for the negatively connected 5{Line. As displayed in Ta-
ble 5.2, NCB assigns the systemwide power levels pC =0 :1649, pB =0 :3351, and
pA =0 :0825 to the positions C, B, and A, respectively.55 The latter are compared
with the average observations (Table 5.2) for this structure. Since the 5{Line con-
sists of just one position C, but two positions A and B, the sum of squared deviations
is (0:1564 ¡ 0:1649)2 +2£ (0:3275 ¡ 0:3351)2 +2£ (0:0942 ¡ 0:0825)2 =0 :000462.
Taking the square root and dividing the result by the number of comparisons (i.e. p
0:000462=5) yields the reported WD of 0.0043.
Together with the other WD values from the last column of Table 5.2, this result
indicates that the NCB{predictions are closer to the experimental observations than
predictions from Yamaguchi's model for di®erent parameter choices. In particular, the
NCB model performs well in regard to the only published experiment on a positively
connected exchange network (Yamagishi, Gillmore, and Cook 1988).56 The latter fo-
cused on the °ow through exchange of two di®erent goods in a 5{Line structure, with
one °owing from the left{hand side and the other °owing from the right{hand side
of the network. Positively connected relations were ensured by incentives|the extent
to which an actor acquired both goods determined his payo®. Following Yamaguchi
(1996) and Markovsky et al. (1997), Table 5.2 reports the experimental observations
in standardized form. The NCB predictions for the power levels of the three positions
55The calculation of the systemwide power levels may be illustrated as well. Take, for example,
position B in the negatively connected 5{Line network. Because of the structural features and the
degrees of network control displayed in Figure 5.1, position B has the relative bargaining power
pBA =0 :6701 = pBC in matches with positions A and C, respectively. Positions in the 5{Line
structure are connected by four mutual ties (m = 4). Evaluating eq. (5.16), B's systemwide proportion
of power is then pB =( 1 =4) £ (0:6701 + 0:6701) = 0:3351.
56Willer and Skvoretz (1999) report experimental results for speci¯c `inclusive' exchange networks.
The latter are related, but not identical to positively connected settings. Loosely speaking, inclusive
exchange networks are structures in which each actor has as much admissible and bene¯cial relations
as he has exogenously given network ties. Because of the complementarity aspect associated with such
a con¯guration, this speci¯c class of networks may be analyzed via a slightly generalized version of eq.
(5.14). Speci¯cally, if gi ¸ 1 represents the experimentally adjustable number of exchange relations per
period in which actor i can bene¯t, we can extend our assumption on individual bargaining power bi
for the case of a positively connected relation: bi = ¡gi=ln±i for all i 6= j. Starting from this extended
version of eq. (5.4) (and taking into account eqs. (5.8) and (5.9)), we obtain, after substituting into
eq. (5.5) and some algebra, xij = pijvij = gi ln(1 ¡ wcj)vij=(gi ln(1 ¡ wcj)+gj ln(1 ¡ wci)). This
equation for pro¯t predictions in inclusive structures reduces to eq. (5.14) if gi = gj for i 6= j. And,
its application to Willer and Skvoretz's inclusive networks gives predictions which closely ¯t their
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result from combining the network features (m =4 ,n = 5) and the degrees of network
control (cf. Figure 5.1) in eq. (5.8) and inserting the results into eq. (5.14). They
correspond closely with the empirical evidence.
In comparison to its predictive performance for 5{Line structures, the NCB model
gives a relatively inaccurate prediction for the power distribution in the 31{Star
network. Table 5.2 lists the NCB predictions and informs about the relevant obser-
vations of Skvoretz and Fararo (1992) and Markovsky et al. (1988, 1997). While the
NCB predictions for the power levels of the positions A and B are reasonably close to
the empirically observed means, the prediction for C's power is too large. But, as far
as we know the literature, neither theory does better with respect to point predictions
for all positions in this particular structure.
In sum, the NCB model predicts the e®ects of network embeddedness for exchange
pro¯ts at least as well as the best ¯tting published theories. It also answers whether a
given bargaining structure gives rise to the same exchange network and, if not, which
position will be responsible for such a deviation and what exchange structures will
result. To clarify, we now focus on such structural questions.
5.5.3 Deviations between Bargaining and Exchange
Structures
As mentioned, exclusionary behavior exists if at least one network member always re-
fuses to exchange with a bargaining partner. Such non{exchange may be expected if
there are, like in most experiments, exchange restrictions (e.g. one{exchange rule).
That is, negatively connected settings may be associated with deviations between the
given bargaining network and the resulting exchange structures. As was already de-
scribed in detail, there is a condition for exclusionary behavior which may be split
into a necessary and a su±cient part (see, Appendix C). Accordingly, exclusionary
behavior towards a speci¯c network partner requires that (a) exchange with an alter-
native partner guarantees a higher pro¯t (necessity), and (b) the pro¯t from the match
with the alternative partner in the case of exclusionary behavior exceeds the pro¯t
from the relation with the alternative partner in the case of non{exclusionary behavior
(su±ciency).
The inequality (5.15a) concisely expresses these requirements. From the perspective
of the NCB model, its application is straightforward when the focus is on the empirically
relevant case of negatively connected structures with uniformly valued relations. This
simplicity has two reasons. First, if each matched pair of actors divides an identical
cake (i.e. vij = vji = v for all i 6= j), inequality (5.15a) reduces to the simpler condition
in terms of relative bargaining powers, that is, inequality (5.15b): p¤
ik >p ik >p ij for
at least one i with negative connections to j 6= k. Second, it can be shown (see
Appendix C) that this condition can only be ful¯lled in those negatively connected
networks with uniformly valued relations in which (i) at least one actor i has three or
more negotiation partners, and (ii) i's partners have two or more structurally distinct144 Chapter 5 Who Gets How Much in Which Relation?
positions, one of which may be equivalent to i's (cf. Theorem 5.2). That is, the NCB
model immediately predicts that a given negatively connected structure with equally
valued relations will be robust (i.e. bargaining and exchange ties will coincide) if all
actors have at most two negotiation partners or only structurally equivalent partners.
To illustrate the application of this result, take a look at the structures with equally
valued relations displayed in Figure 5.1 and assume negative connections only. There
is just one network for which we cannot immediately predict a coincidence of bargaining
and exchange structures|apart from the Stem network, all structures in Figure 5.1
are robust because (i) and/or (ii) are not ful¯lled. We thus have to apply the inequality
(5.15b) just to the Stem structure. Such a closer analysis reveals that the Stem
network is also a robust structure in the sense of a coincidence of bargaining and
exchange network|no position holder will consistently exclude a speci¯c bargaining
partner.
For the subset of networks listed in Table 5.1, these structural predictions are
in line with the available evidence on the number of exchanges between positions (cf.
Lovaglia et al. 1995; Skvoretz and Willer 1993). Several authors (e.g. Bienenstock
and Bonacich 1993; Markovsky, Willer, and Patton 1988; Simpson and Willer 1999;
Skvoretz and Lovaglia 1995) report and discuss `breaks' of other experimental networks,
however. To illustrate such deviations and the application of the NCB model for their
identi¯cation, we now analyze a speci¯c network (T{Shape) with negative connec-
tions and uniformly valued relations in detail and then contrast model predictions for
di®erent structures with experimental ¯ndings.
5.5.3.1 Identifying Structural Deviations
Figure 5.2 depicts the single{link and double{link T{Shape negotiation structures
each of which refers to equally valued relations. The former (latter) represents a situa-
tion in which connected position holders engage in one (two) bargaining session(s) per
round. While the value matrices VS and VD in Figure 5.2 capture these di®erences,
they actually represent the same relational structure. As displayed in Figure 5.2 as
well, there is a common matrix of standardized actor relations R and, consequently,
just one vector of network control c. Because of the di®erent number of mutual ties
(mS =4 ,mD = 8), however, there are di®erent weights for the calculation of pro¯t
shares (viz. wS =0 :900, wD =0 :929). The concrete pro¯t predictions for both negoti-
ation networks thus di®er.
The pro¯t rankings for the analysis of exclusionary behavior are identical in both
structures, however. We therefore can postulate the existence of a one{exchange rule
and examine just the potential decay of the single-link T{Shape structure into at least
two separate exchange subnetworks. Its inspection shows that the requirements (i) and
(ii) are met|it is worthwhile to ask for exclusionary behavior on the basis of inequality
(5.15b). It also shows that the positions A and D cannot induce a structural deviation
between negotiation and exchange patterns|both have just one potential partner so5.5 Applications 145
Single{Link T{Shape
sss
s
s
A1 A2 B
C
D
Double{Link T{Shape
sss
s
s
A1 A2 B
C
D
VS A1 A2 BCD
A1
A2
B
C
D
0
B B
@
00 24 00
00 24 00
24 24 0 24 0
00 24 0 24
000 24 0
1
C C
A
VD A1 A2 BCD
A1
A2
B
C
D
0
B B
@
00 48 00
00 48 00
48 48 0 48 0
00 48 0 48
000 48 0
1
C C
A
R A1 A2 BC D
A1
A2
B
C
D
0
B B
@
00:33 00
00:33 00
11 0 :5 0
00:33 0 1
00 0 :5 0
1
C C
A
c
A1
A2
B
C
D
0
B B
@
:3333
:3333
:8333
:6667
:5000
1
C C
A
Figure 5.2 Single{link and double{link T{Shape bargaining structures with cor-
responding value matrices VS and VD, common relational matrix R, and associated
control vector c.
that the inequality (5.15b) does not apply. The latter is to be used, however, for
analyzing B's and C's selection of actual exchange partners.
To identify a potential deviation between negotiation and exchange structures via
inequality (5.15b), we determine the actors' relative bargaining powers by inserting the
weight and the degrees of network control (cf. Figure 5.2) into eq. (5.10). In the
structure under consideration, position B would get a more pro¯table deal with actors
at position A than with the actor at position C because pBA =0 :8071 >p BC =0 :6397.
And, due to pCD =0 :6099 >p CB =0 :3603, C would realize a higher pro¯t share with
D than with B. That is, the necessary condition for exclusionary behavior is ful¯lled
for both B and C.
We further have to examine whether the su±cient condition for exclusionary be-
havior is satis¯ed for at least one position as well. First, let us discuss the decision
problem of C. If C exclusively exchanges with D, they will end up in a Dyad structure.
Given C's exclusion of B, p¤
CD =0 :5 thus represents C's relative bargaining power in
the relation with D.57 But if C keeps the link to B, C's pro¯t level from the relation to
D will be larger (because pCD =0 :6099 >p ¤
CD =0 :5). Hence, C's exclusion of B would
57Since both actors in a Dyad structure have a network control of 1, their relative bargaining powers
are 0.5 for all relational types.146 Chapter 5 Who Gets How Much in Which Relation?
not pay and, consequently, C will not exclude B (i.e. the su±cient condition for C's
exclusionary behavior towards B is not met).
The same line of reasoning now is applied to position B. If the latter always refrains
from exchange with C, a 3{Line network will result|by excluding C, B thus can
increase his relative bargaining power in the match with position A from pBA =0 :8071
to p¤
BA =0 :8276. Since the necessary and the su±cient condition for B's exclusionary
behavior are ful¯lled, B's choice of exchange partners induces a deviation of bargaining
and exchange structures. That is, the NCB model predicts that the single{link T{
Shape network is not robust, but decays into two robust exchange structures (viz. the
3{Line A{B{A and the Dyad C{D). And, because of the invariance of pro¯t rankings,
this conclusion holds true for the double{link T{Shape as well.
Both predictions correspond closely with empirically observed exchange frequencies
and pro¯t point distributions. Markovsky, Willer, and Patton (1988, p. 227) report that
in 100 negotiation rounds within a single{link T{Shape network only three exchanges
occurred between B and C. Moreover, for a cake of 24 pro¯t points, B realized, on
average, 19.14 pro¯t points in matches with A (NCB predicts 19.86) and C received
11.88 pro¯t points in matches with D (NCB predicts 12.0). Skvoretz and Willer (1993,
pp. 809{810) present similar results for a double{link T{Shape bargaining network.
In their experiments, only four exchanges (out of a total of 307) involved both B and
C. Here, the relevant mean pro¯t points between B and A were 20.67 pro¯t points in
favor of B (NCB predicts 20.66) and 12.86 pro¯t points for C in the relation with D
(NCB predicts 12.0). Due to the corroborant evidence, the NCB model seems to be a
useful tool for structural predictions which may be applied to other networks as well.
5.5.3.2 Structural Predictions and Observations
Figure 5.3 depicts negatively connected networks with equally valued relations for
which the NCB approach predicts a deviation between bargaining and exchange struc-
tures in the presence of a systemwide one{exchange rule. Here, dotted lines indicate
non{exchange between positions. Apart from H{Shape, the necessary part of the con-
dition for exclusionary behavior is ful¯lled for di®erent positions in all structures. The
su±cient part of the condition is met only for position B, however. That is, accord-
ing to the NCB model, B's choice of partners is responsible for the deviation between
bargaining and exchange structures.
In most of the displayed cases, the NCB model predicts that B dissolves the initial
structure to end up in the pro¯table center of a 3{Line exchange network. There
are only two exceptions: in the Stack 4{Line structure, B increases his payo®s by
excluding C, but cannot realize an extremely bene¯cial situation for himself; in the
VBox{XBox network, B further improves his pro¯table situation without splitting
the initial network into separate exchange networks.
All negotiation structures are simple enough to become robust after one tie is re-
moved. Of course, larger structures may ¯rst decay into non{robust subnetworks. With5.5 Applications 147
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Figure 5.3 Non{robust network structures with equally valued and negatively con-
nected relations under a one{exchange rule (dotted lines indicate non{exchange).
respect to large networks, it therefore may be necessary to iteratively apply the logic
of the NCB model until robust exchange structures emerge.58
Before larger structures are examined, however, one should ask for the empirical
relevance of the NCB{predictions in Figure 5.3. While there is no evidence for the
three structures in the upper part of Figure 5.3, Simpson and Willer (1999) report
relevant experimental results for the other ¯ve networks. Apart from one exception
to be addressed shortly, Table 5.3 reproduces these ¯ndings|it contains data from
Simpson and Willer's experiments for the ¯rst four networks displayed in the lower
part of Figure 5.3. Speci¯cally, Table 5.3 reports the relative frequencies or observed
proportions of exchange (P) in B:C ties of those structures as well as the number of
experimental rounds (N).
In addition, it informs about ¦, the expected proportion of exchange when the
subjects at positions B and C make independent random draws from their subsets of
potential partners. Since ¦ is due to chance, it can serve as the baseline against which
to assess whether the observed proportion of exchange (i.e. the relative frequency P)
signi¯cantly di®ers from the NCB prediction. The test idea is simple: if a standard
z{test for equality of proportions suggests that P is signi¯cantly greater than ¦, then
the NCB prediction (no exchanges in the B:C ties) can be rejected. The last column
in Table 5.3 shows the test results. For each of the networks under consideration, the
58For larger networks the straightforward computations thus may become tedious. There is, how-
ever, a Microsoft Visual Basic program for NCB calculations which runs under any version of Microsoft
Windows. The program is available from the author on request.148 Chapter 5 Who Gets How Much in Which Relation?
Table 5.3 Proportions of exchange in B:C ties in speci¯c negatively connected net-
works.
Experimental Dataa Random Choice
Rounds Observed Proportion Proportionb
Network NP ¦ z{testc
V{Triangle 450 .053 .125 ¡4:618¤
X4{Line 270 .031 .083 ¡3:110¤
XU{Shape 310 .046 .125 ¡4:250¤
Y{Triangle 360 .094 .111 ¡1:027y
Notes: The Non{Cooperative Bargaining (NCB) model predicts the absence of exchanges in all of these ties. Simpson
and Willer's (1999) Optimal Seek (OS) method predicts no exchanges in the B:C ties of the V{Triangle and the
X4{Line networks, but exchanges between B and C in the XU{Shape and the Y{Triangle structures.
a The experimental data (i.e. the number of rounds, N, and the relative frequency or observed proportion of exchange,
P) are taken from Simpson and Willer (1999, p. 278 as well as Table 10.1 and Table 10.2).
b The proportion ¦ is calculated by assuming that each actor randomly chooses his exchange partner from available
network partners (see also Markowsky et al. 1993; Skvoretz and Lovaglia 1995). More precisely, ¦ represents the
expected proportion of exchange when the subjects at positions B and C make independent random draws from their
subsets of potential partners.
c The expected proportion of exchange between randomly choosing actors, ¦, serves as the baseline against which to
assess whether the observed proportion of exchange (i.e. the relative frequency P) in a speci¯c network is compatible
with the prediction of no exchange. The test statistic is z =( P ¡ ¦)=
p
(¦(1 ¡ ¦)=N). If P is signi¯cantly greater
than ¦, the prediction of no exchange in the B:C tie can be rejected.
¤ The observed relative frequency of exchange is signi¯cantly lower than the proportion of exchange which results if
trading partners randomly choose one another (p<: 001, one{tailed test).
y At the .05 level, the observed relative frequency of exchange does not signi¯cantly di®er from the proportion of
exchange which results if trading partners randomly choose one another (p = :152, one{tailed test).
NCB prediction cannot be falsi¯ed|the observed proportion P is never signi¯cantly
greater than ¦, the expected proportion of exchange if the actors would randomly
select partners.
Interestingly, Simpson and Willer's (1999, Table 10.1 and Table 10.2) data analy-
sis does not yield the same conclusions for all four networks under study. Contrary
to our ¯ndings, Simpson and Willer report that the B:C ties in the XU{Shape and
the Y{Triangle networks are robust. To rationalize the di®erent conclusions, it is
necessary to brie°y describe their data analysis. Simpson and Willer start from the
null hypothesis of no exchange (i.e. H0 : E(P) = 0, where E denotes the expectation
operator with respect to the proportions of exchange). They conduct adjusted z{tests
for proportions to falsify the assertion that the expected value falls within the con¯-
dence limits of the observed.59 However, this procedure neglects important statistical
facts|since z{tests for proportions are based on an approximation of a binomial dis-
tribution by a normal distribution, they only can be used if speci¯c conditions are met:
59Simpson and Willer (1999, p. 284, note 10) face the problem that the test statistic of the standard
z{test is not de¯ned if the expected proportion vanishes (i.e. z =( P ¡E(P))=
p
(E(P)(1 ¡ E(P))=N)
does not exist for E(P) = 0). To avoid division by zero, they treat the expectation as the observation
and vice versa. Because of this adjustment, they argue that their test refers to the assertion that the
expected falls within the con¯dence limits of the observed.5.5 Applications 149
NP ¸ 5, N(1¡P) ¸ 5, and E(P)(1¡E(P))N ¸ 10 (cf. Blalock 1972; Riedwyl 1992).
Simpson and Willer's test procedure always violates at least one of these conditions.
Therefore, their test results do not allow any valid conclusion about the robustness of
ties.
The latter statement holds true for Simpson and Willer's analysis of the B:B relation
in the H{Shape structure as well. In this case, however, our test method cannot be
applied either. Because N = 405 and P =0 :007 are the empirical data for the B:B tie in
this network (cf. Simpson and Willer 1999, Table 10.1), we have NP =2 :835 ¼ 3 < 5
such that a z{test for the equality of the proportions P and ¦ is inappropriate. To check
the ¯t between the NCB prediction and the empirical observation of B:B exchanges in
the H{Shape structure, the theoretical probability for three or more exchanges has to
be computed. Such a calculation gives a value of 0.008.60 Since the latter corresponds
closely to the empirically observed proportion of P =0 :007, the NCB prediction (no
exchange in the B:B tie of the H{Shape network) cannot be rejected.
In sum, the data analyses suggest that the NCB predictions for the ¯ve networks
displayed in the lower part of Figure 5.3 correspond with the empirical observations.
This is important for an additional reason. In their article, Simpson and Willer (1999)
suggest the so{called `Optimal Seek' (OS) method for the prediction of deviations be-
tween bargaining and exchange networks. Their application of the OS method suggests,
in accordance with the NCB predictions, that exchanges will be absent in the B:B tie of
the H{Shape structure as well as the B:C ties of the V{Triangle and the X4{Line
networks. In contrast to the NCB model, however, OS predicts exchanges between
B and C in the XU{Shape and the Y{Triangle structures. That is, Simpson and
Willer's theory implies that the XU{Shape and the Y{Triangle networks are robust
structures. As was demonstrated above, however, appropriate statistical tests indicate
the contrary. The empirical evidence therefore supports the NCB model over Simpson
and Willer's OS approach.
In addition, the NCB model is comparatively simple to apply. And, as shown
by the non{robust networks in the upper part of Figure 5.3, it encourages further
experimental work. Like any other model, however, the NCB theory rests on several
strong premises. It thus is reasonable to conclude with a brief discussion of the pros
and cons of the model.
60From a statistical point of view, the NCB prediction suggests that exchanges between actors at
position B are extremely rare events. The number of exchanges thus may be interpreted as a random
variable Y with discrete values y =0 ;1;2;::: which approximately follows a Poisson distribution
f(Y = y)=( ¸y=y!)e¡¸ with rate ¸ = ¼N, where e is the base of natural logarithm and ¼ denotes
the small probability of exchange. Suppose, in accordance with the NCB prediction, that ¼ =0 :001.
Then, ¸ =0 :405 and f(Y ¸ 3 )=0 :008.150 Chapter 5 Who Gets How Much in Which Relation?
5.6 Conclusion and Discussion
In this chapter, we have presented an alternative approach to the study of exchange
structures. In accordance with other theories, the latter re°ects the idea that rational
actors take advantage of their structural positions in negotiations. Contrary to other
sociological models, however, we have combined Rubinstein's (1982) game{theoretic
work on non{cooperative bargaining and its re¯nement (Binmore 1985, 1987, 1998)
with the assumption that both relational features and network positions a®ect exchange
outcomes. More precisely, negotiated exchange was conceptualized as a one{shot Al-
ternating O®ers Game in which the actors' levels of structural autonomy or degrees of
network control determine their bargaining powers. And, since we have di®erentiated
with Cook et al. (1983) between negatively and positively connected relations, the
approach refers to situations in which one exchange relation prevents and/or promotes
another.
The resulting model uniquely predicts, via an equilibrium analysis in the sense of
non{cooperative game theory, power and pro¯t distributions for all relational con¯gu-
rations when, in addition to the surpluses to be divided, the actors' network ties and
the types of their relations are ¯xed. It identi¯es, moreover, coincidences or deviations
between exchange and negotiation structures. That is, the robustness or decay of a
structure results as the product of the interdependent choices of position holders in a
network. In accordance with Cook and Whitmeyer's (1992) suggestion, the model thus
takes a modest ¯rst step in using exchange theory to explain network structure.
At the same time, the model has desirable properties. First, it is as parsimonious
as established ones, but simpler to apply. Second, the approach precisely speci¯es
how structural aspects in°uence choices. Third, it links sociological exchange ideas
to the game{theoretic bargaining literature and, by doing so, takes into account that
interactive choices characterize negotiations. Fourth, its predictions correspond with
optimizing behavior of bargaining partners such that agreements between sel¯sh ratio-
nal actors are not assumed, but explained. Fifth, it allows for variations in the value
of relationships (i.e. heterogeneity in terms of the size of the cake to be partitioned).
Sixth, while broader in explanatory scope, the model predicts experimental ¯ndings
with respect to the e®ects of network embeddedness for exchange outcomes at least as
well as the best ¯tting established theories.
It has to be emphasized, however, that the approach rests on strong premises.
The latter ensure, on the one hand, a close correspondence between the theoretical
model and the arti¯cial conditions in laboratory research on exchange networks. They
prevent, on the other hand, that the current model captures all relevant aspects of real
negotiation and exchange systems. It thus is reasonable to discuss brie°y important
restrictions and desirable modi¯cations of the approach.
A ¯rst shortcoming of the model is its focus on the e®ects of network positions and
relational assessments for exchange outcomes. More speci¯cally, position holders are
assumed to be homogenous up to their relational categorization. A similar postulate5.6 Conclusion and Discussion 151
characterizes most sociological work on exchange networks. However, interindividual
heterogeneity with respect to, say, age or gender may matter for negotiation results as
well (e.g. Eckel and Grossman 1998). A more realistic model version therefore would
start from the idea that bargaining powers depend on both individual and structural
variables.
A second limitation of the approach is its behavioral postulate. According to the
model, each actor is a sel¯sh pro¯t maximizer. This postulate ¯ts the typical design of
experiments on exchange networks. However, it excludes fairness considerations and/or
e®ects of relative standing in terms of pro¯ts. According to experimental research
from di®erent disciplines, such additional motivations seem to play an important role
in speci¯c settings (see, for a review, Rabin 1998). The recent progress in behavioral
game theory (e.g. Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Camerer 1997) may be a helpful starting
point for their incorporation into the analysis of exchange networks.
A third shortcoming of the model is its neglect of potential side{e®ects of ongoing
exchanges in dyads. While this feature is typical to many theories of network exchange
and their laboratory tests, it is surely not a realistic one. According to Lawler and
Yoon's (1996) experiments, for instance, people who engage in repeated exchanges may
form attachments and make commitments. Such an increase in relational cohesion can
stabilize established network relations and, possibly, change long run outcomes. These
aspects of durable exchange relations deserve attention because of their importance
in everyday life. Their analysis requires, from a theoretical perspective, a dynamic
modeling approach. For example, one could follow Muthoo (1999) who studies, among
other things, an in¯nitely repeated bargaining game and its di®erences to the static
bargaining scenario.
A ¯nal shortcoming of the model is its neglect of network extensions. While it
predicts whether or not a given structure reduces to one or more subnetworks, it
ignores the potential growth of networks. For the analysis of positively connected
relations, however, the issue of network extension may be as important as exclusion is
in the context of negatively connected relations. And, as emphasized by Yamagishi,
Gillmore, and Cook (1988), real exchange systems often are mixtures of positive and
negative connections. Therefore, an appropriate theory of exchange networks has to
address the issue of structural growth. To deal with network extensions, the model
may be generalized such that actual system members at distinct positions have, for
example, random contacts with potential bargaining partners and decide, depending
on their relational assessments and pro¯t expectations, whether they accept or reject
the newcomers. Such a model generalization is a worthwhile task for future work.blubChapter 6
Summary and Conclusions
In this book, we examine how a surplus is provided and divided between two actors.
A surplus is an `additional something' which, if produced, can be divided between two
actors in some way with the division leaving both actors better o® than if they had
not produced and divided the surplus. The book addresses the provision and division
of a surplus based on two scenarios. In Chapter 1, we introduce these scenarios. The
¯rst part of this book, Chapters 2 through 4, analyzes the provision and division of
a surplus in the context of delayed exchange. This scenario can be seen as a trust
problem between two actors (e.g. Coleman 1990). The main focus here is on whether
trust will be placed, and whether the provision of valuable resources for the production
of a surplus will occur. More speci¯cally, we study e®ects of temporal embeddedness
on the provision of a surplus. Section 6.1 stipulates the reasons for incorporating
temporal embeddedness into the analysis of trust and delayed exchange. This section
also discusses the theoretical and empirical results of Chapters 2 to 4 and makes some
suggestions for further research.
The second part of the book, Chapter 5, focuses on the division of a given surplus
rather than on the provision. The scenario involves two actors who determine their
shares of the surplus by bargaining where a delay in agreement on the division of the
surplus is costly for them. The bargaining scenario corresponds with the Alternating
O®ers Game introduced by Rubinstein (1982). The question is who gets how much
of the surplus if its division is negotiated. The costs for the actors caused by a delay
in agreement determine the division. Though the costs are exogenous in Rubinstein's
game, we try to derive them endogenously. We argue that the costs can be determined
if the focus is not on a single dyad but on a negotiation network in which dyadic
negotiations on the division of a surplus are possible. An actor's costs of delaying
an agreement are a function of the actor's position in such a negotiation network.
Section 6.2 sheds some light on the theoretical background of bargaining and network
embeddedness. We summarize the experimental tests on network bargaining with
delayed agreement and conclude with suggestions for further research.
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6.1 Delayed Exchange: The Provision of a Surplus
Consider the basic scenario of delayed exchange with a trustor who has valuable re-
sources to invest in the production of a surplus by the trustee. A trustee, once he
receives the resources, can either use them for his own bene¯t or for the mutual bene¯t
of the trustor and trustee. In other words, he can divide the surplus produced by the
trustor's investment of resources in two ways: either keep the whole surplus or divide it
in such a way that both actors bene¯t. If the trustor has no right of co{determination
in the division of the surplus, she must anticipate how the trustee will divide the sur-
plus when deciding on whether to make an investment. The provision and division of
a surplus can then be seen as a trust problem in the sense of Coleman (1990: 97{99).
In this book, we conceptualize this type of trust problem as a Trust Game (Dasgupta
1988; Kreps 1990a).
In our analysis of the basic scenario of delayed exchange, we make three crucial
assumptions. First, an actor's utility is determined by the actor's share of the cake
and an actor prefers a larger share of the cake to a smaller one. Second, actors be-
have according to game theoretic rationality or at least follow some other principle
of incentive guided behavior.1 Third, an encounter between two actors is isolated in
the sense that it is not connected to any previous or future exchanges or interactions
between the trustor and trustee, nor to any previous or future interactions involving
other actors. Hence, we consider the basic scenario of a one{shot Trust Game. The
prediction then is that trust is not placed, and if it were placed, it would be abused.
To see this, assume the trustee has received the trustor's resources. Given our ¯rst
assumption, he would rather use them to his own bene¯t than to the mutual bene¯t
of himself and the trustor. Given our second assumption, the trustor can anticipate
the trustee's behavior. She will thus not provide the resources, and, consequently, the
surplus will not be provided. Both actors are then worse o® than if the resources are
provided (trust is placed) and the surplus is divided in such a way that both actors
bene¯t (trust is honored).
Empirical research and everyday observation show that the Pareto improvement
with trust placed and honored, that is, a surplus is provided and divided so that both
actors bene¯t, sometimes occurs. In the ¯rst part of this book, we investigate how this
can be explained. Several approaches are possible. One could, for instance, relax the
assumption about `utility is own share of the cake' and incorporate fairness, relative
payo®s or other `soft' aspects into the actors' utility functions (see, for example, Bolton
and Ockenfels 1998, 2000; Camerer 1997; Kelley and Thibaut 1978; Nelson 2001; Rabin
1993, 1998; Snijders 1996). Theorists such as Emerson (1972, 1981) argue that a more
sociological approach would focus on variations in social conditions rather than utility.
In this book, we choose this more sociological approach and rather than primarily
1Game theoretic rationality is basically conceptualized as Nash equilibrium behavior (Nash 1951).
This means roughly that each actor maximizes utility, given the other actor's behavior. See, for
instance, Rasmusen (1994: 22{28) for technical details.6.1 Delayed Exchange: The Provision of a Surplus 155
challenge assumptions about utility, we investigate the role of social conditions. We
therefore relax the third assumption but adhere as far as possible to the ¯rst and the
second assumption. We consider situations where two actors repeatedly meet over time
and exchange between them is embedded in a temporal sense (Granovetter 1985; Raub
and Weesie 2000b). `Temporal embeddedness' thus refers to a sequence of exchanges
between the two actors. In terms of the abstract Trust Game, this means the one{
shot game is repeated a ¯nite or in¯nite number of times. Consequently, the general
research question of the ¯rst part of the book is: Given that the provision and division
of a surplus is conceptualized as a situation of trust between two actors, which aspects
of temporal embeddedness a®ect the placement of trust and how (i.e. positively or
negatively) do these aspects a®ect the placement of trust?
Trust: History Effects
Chapter 1 presents our reasons to focus on temporal embeddedness in explaining the
provision of a surplus. One element of temporal embeddedness, namely `the shadow
of the future', has been relatively well studied in the literature (e.g. Axelrod 1984;
Maynard Smith 1982; Taylor 1987; Trivers 1971). An actor's current behavior has been
shown to be dependent on the anticipated e®ects of this behavior in future interactions.
Chapter 2 takes this result as given. We then examine whether the `shadow of the
past' additionally in°uences an actor's current behavior. These past e®ects have been
less well studied in the literature. However, if we advocate temporal embeddedness as a
possible `solution' to the provision and division of a surplus, we need to know whether
and how the past a®ects an actor's current behavior. To begin with, we choose to
study the e®ects of the past on decision making in social dilemma situations. A social
dilemma is a situation where individual and collective interests clash and rational and
sel¯sh actors end up in an ine±cient (Pareto inferior) equilibrium. The Trust Game
and the Prisoner's Dilemma Game are examples of dilemma situations. The focus of
Chapter 2 is on the comparison of two situations that are identical in all but one aspect:
one situation has a past, or history and the other does not. In all the other aspects,
that is, alternatives and payo®s, the situations are the same. Moreover, at least one of
the situations is a social dilemma.
We present a simple theory based on the theory of games with complete information
that predicts no di®erence in behavior between the `no history' and the `with history'
situation. The argument is straightforward. If actors behave in accordance with the
behavioral assumptions presented above, the history does not contain any information
to induce actors to make di®erent decisions than in the `no history' situation. Their
behavior should consequently be the same in the `no history' as in the `with history'
situation.
More formally, we ¯rst introduce a situation referred to as Game A and then present
a second, more complicated situation referred to as Game B. This latter game resembles
the situation captured by Game A but is characterized by preceding actions of the actors
of Game A or other actors. These preceding actions, called history, extend Game A in156 Chapter 6 Summary and Conclusions
such a way that Game A is a subgame of the larger Game B.2 This subgame is called
Game AB (read `Game A in B'). Since our simple theory requires that Game AB and
Game A are identical, the `preceding actions' in Game B only extend Game A in two
ways. First, Game B may be a repeated version of Game A. Second, for at least one
actor, the `preceding actions' are not available in Game A. Consequently, Game B
becomes a game where Game AB is one of several possible subgames. Predictions that
behavior will not di®er in Game A and Game AB are confronted with ¯ndings from three
di®erent experiments.
First, we compare a variant of a Dictator Game (Game A) with a Trust Game
(Game B). In both games, there are two actors, ego and alter. In the variant of the
Dictator Game, alter can split a surplus equally between himself and ego or keep the
surplus himself. Ego is a dummy player who does not move in the Dictator Game. In
the Trust Game, ego starts by choosing between withholding or placing trust. If ego
withholds trust, the game ends with certain payo®s to both actors. However, if ego
places trust, a subgame Game AB starts that is identical to the variant of the Dictator
Game. If alter behaves in accordance with the above assumptions, his behavior should
be equal in Game AB and Game A, even though it is ego's move in Game B that gives
alter the chance to make a decision in Game AB. However, experimental ¯ndings
(Snijders and Keren 1997) contradict our theory. Experimental subjects playing as
alter in Game B divide the surplus equally in 73.5% of the cases. In other words, they
mainly honor placed trust. In Game A, however, only 35.5% of the alters choose an
equal distribution of the surplus.
Second, we focus on ego's behavior in a Trust Game (Game A) compared to his
behavior in a Hostage Trust Game (Game B). In the Hostage Trust Game, alter decides
whether to post a hostage prior to ego's decision on whether to place trust. Posting
a hostage makes it less favorable for alter to keep the surplus rather than split it
equally.3 This in turn makes placing trust safer for ego. For our study of history
e®ects, we focus on situations where alter does not post the hostage. Ego and alter
then play a subgame Game AB which is identical to Game A, namely the Trust Game.
Experimental evidence (Snijders 1996) shows that alter's decision not to post a hostage
decreases ego's probability of placing place trust by 0:10 compared to her probability
of placing trust in Game A, averaged over di®erent game payo®s.
Third, we compare ego's behavior in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game (Game A) with
his behavior in a Hostage Prisoner's Dilemma Game (Game B). In both games, ego and
alter simultaneously decide between cooperation or defection. Prior to this decision,
2Loosely speaking, a subgame is the part of the entire game that follows upon the history played
so far. For a formal de¯nition of a subgame see, for example, Rasmusen (1994: 94).
3A hostage is of value to the trustee and by abusing trust if placed, the trustee loses the hostage,
consequently decreasing the gain from keeping the whole surplus. See, for example, Schelling (1960)
for a discussion of hostages in social interactions, Raub and Keren (1993) for a theoretical analysis
and prior experimental evidence, and Raub and Weesie (2000a) and Weesie and Raub (1996) for a
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the latter game allows ego and alter to post a hostage, which later makes defection an
unattractive move. If both ego and alter refrain from posting a hostage, they reach the
subgame Game AB identical to Game A, the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. Experimental
evidence from Mlicki (1996) shows that defection is chosen more often in Game AB than
in Game A: namely about 91% versus 74%.
The analysis of these three di®erent experiments shows that behavior in the `no
history' situation di®ers from behavior in the `with history' situation. We conclude
from the analysis in Chapter 2 that history does indeed matter. A theory on behavior
that does not take the history of a game into account obviously leads to inadequate
predictions about behavior. We suggest two main elaborations on the theory presented
in Chapter 2. First, we address how to explain the experimental ¯ndings using more
complex utility arguments that relax the assumption on `utility is own share of the
cake'. Since it is not our primary aim to challenge assumptions about utility and we
would much rather explain variations in behavior by variations in social situations, we
concentrate on the more complex information structure that evolves from the game's
history. In other words, the history of Game B is assumed to disclose information
to an actor in Game AB. According to our simple theory however, this information
should not be relevant. Experimental subjects, on the other hand, seem to behave as
if they attach importance to such information and adapt their behavior accordingly.4
Chapter 3 builds upon the ¯nding that history matters. We present a model in which
actors learn from past information and, additionally, take their expected future into
account to determine their behavior in a current situation.
Trust and Dyadic Social Capital: Theory
Chapter 3 addresses the e®ects of the past and future on behavior alike. We explore
which e®ects of temporal embeddedness facilitate or prevent the provision of a surplus.
The provision of a surplus is once again conceptualized as a Trust Game. By repeating
the Trust Game, we can systematically study which aspects of the past and future
a®ect the provision of a surplus. Our hypotheses on the trustor's behavior are based
on a simple idea. Whether a trustor invests in the production of a surplus depends
on her amount of social capital in relation to the trustee. We assume that social
capital accumulates through past interactions with the trustee (i.e. learning) but also
re°ects the mutual future of their relation (i.e. control). The trustor's behavior is
then supposed to follow a simple behavioral guideline: the higher the stakes of the
current game, the more social capital is needed to induce the trustor to provide the
necessary resources for the production of a surplus. The stakes of the game give an
indication of how much the trustor can win or lose by placing trust, and of what the
trustee can win by abusing placed trust. We use the payo® ratios Risk := P1¡S1
R1¡S1
4An example may help illustrate this. Ego's decision in a Trust Game where trust has been
placed resembles a Dictator Game (see ¯rst experiment described above). Since alter's move in the
Trust Game leaves ego's alternatives and payo®s unchanged, ego's behavior should not di®er from
his behavior in a Dictator Game. Obviously, however, alter's decision to place trust induces ego to
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and Temptation := T2¡R2
T2¡S1 to measure the stakes of a game.5 Risk can be derived
from a Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) consideration (Snijders 1996: ch. 2; Coleman
1990: 97{102) and Temptation follows from a model of guilt (Snijders 1996: ch. 2).
Snijders presents experimental evidence from one{shot Trust Games that the trustor's
probability of placing trust decreases in Risk and Temptation.
The outcomes of past interactions, that is, the realized division of a surplus, provide
information which allow for learning. Information from past experience can either be
negative or positive. Information is negative if the trustee `con¯scated' the full surplus.
Information is positive if the surplus is divided in such a way that the trustor and the
trustee both bene¯t. We assume that the capital stock decreases in negative outcomes
but increases in positive outcomes. How much the capital stock shrinks or grows is
assumed to depend on the situation in the past, that is, how high or low the stakes of
the past game were. Assume, for instance, that the trustee keeps the entire surplus and
abuses trust. The larger the surplus, the larger the temptation for the trustee and the
more the trustor can expect the trustee to keep all the surplus. An outcome where the
trustee keeps a large surplus is thus less surprising to the trustor. Consequently, social
capital is assumed to decline, but less than in a situation where the trustee keeps a
small surplus. A trustee who keeps a small surplus is thus considered less trustworthy
than a trustee who keeps a large surplus. In the same vein, dividing a large surplus
contributes more to an increase in the trustor's social capital than dividing a small
surplus. Moreover, we assume that a trustor considers recent outcomes on the division
of a surplus more important than those experienced further back in the past: the
trustor discounts past outcomes.
The second aspect of temporal embeddedness is the mutual future of the trustor and
trustee. The future enables the trustor to reciprocate the trustee's current behavior.
Successful dealings with the trustee can be rewarded by further providing the necessary
resources for the production of more surpluses. Unsuccessful dealings, on the other
hand, can be penalized by the failure to provide further resources for one or more
future interactions. The trustee would then forfeit possible shares of future surpluses.
The longer the mutual future, the larger the trustor's social capital since there will
be more opportunities to reciprocate the trustee's behavior. This is called the control
e®ect of the future. The e®ectiveness of this control e®ect depends on the size of the
possible future surpluses. For example, eventually forfeiting a large surplus is a harsher
penalization for the trustee than forfeiting a small surplus. So, the more large surpluses
may materialize in the future, the larger the trustor's current capital stock.
The social capital theory developed in Chapter 3 proposes conditions for trust,
given temporal embeddedness. A real{world application of how actors deal with issues
of trust is illustrated in the procurement management of ¯rms. Chapter 4 therefore
5In the Trust Game, if the trustor withholds trust, she and the trustee earn P1 and P2 respectively.
If placed trust is honored, the trustor and trustee earn R1 and R2, respectively. If placed trust is
abused, the trustor receives S1 and the trustee T2. Payo®s are ordered R1 >P 1 >S 1 and T2 >R 2 >
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addresses relations between buyers and suppliers. It is assumed that their transactions
can be seen as a (variant of a) Trust Game. In general, economic transactions involve
some kind of time delay between the promise to deliver and the actual delivery. This
time delay leaves room for all kinds of things going wrong that are beyond the buyer's
control (problem potential). For example, goods may be delivered late, broken, or
not all. For certain transactions, this problem potential is high, for instance, if the
transaction volume is large or the impact on the buyer's performance is enormous if
delivery is late. A buyer who is willing to accept uncertainties hands over control to
the supplier and thus commits an act of trust. Chapter 4 assumes that buyer ¯rms seek
to decrease the necessary trust by investing time and e®ort in ex ante management of
the transaction. For example, they invest time and e®ort in negotiating contractual
arrangements. More thorough transaction management indicates a lack of trust in the
supplier. On the other hand, Macaulay (1963) notes that buyers and suppliers often
reduce their contractual investments in favor of trust. If the buyer deals repeatedly
with the same supplier (temporal embeddedness), the buyer's investment in ex ante
management is not only determined by the problem potential of the current transaction,
it is also shaped by their mutual past and expected future.6 Chapter 4 suggests that
the social capital theory on trust can also be used to predict the buyer's investment in
ex ante management of the focal transaction. Chapter 4 consequently uses variants of
the hypotheses from Chapter 3 for the speci¯c case of buyer{supplier relations.
Trust and Dyadic Social Capital: Empirical Results
First and foremost, the hypotheses on the trustor's behavior in a temporal setting
are tested using laboratory experiments (Chapter 3). The experimental subjects
were mainly freshmen, following an introductory course in sociology at the Ludwig{
Maximilans University in Munich, Germany (see Appendix A for the experiment book-
let). The subjects were confronted with several repeated Trust Games and had to make
decisions in the role of the trustor: they thus had to decide whether to place trust.
The experiment recorded the subjects' decisions using the strategy method (see Roth
1995). At any given moment in the game, a subject was asked to make decisions, one for
each history possible up to the current game. This method made it possible to collect
information on a subject's behavior in di®erent settings of temporal embeddedness.
Second, we want to know whether our hypotheses on trust in a temporal set-
ting can withstand a test outside the sociological laboratory. Chapter 4 uses data
on buyer{supplier relations in the Dutch IT{industry (`The External Management of
6The problem potential of a transaction can be linked to payo®s or payo® di®erences in the Trust
Game. The problem potential of a transaction is operationalized via the ¯nancial volume of the
transaction and the supplier's opportunism potential inherent to the transaction. The ¯nancial volume
serves as an overall measure of the buyer's loss if trust is abused (i.e. P1 ¡S1 versus R1 ¡S1) and as
a measure of the supplier's incentive to abuse trust after it is given (i.e. T2 ¡ R2). The opportunism
potential is derived as a weighted average of the damage potential and the buyer's monitoring problems
problems (as well as the ¯nancial volume of the transaction). The damage potential covers `how bad
it would be' if it turns out that the delivered product cannot be used productively and directly re°ects
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Table 6.1 Hypotheses on trust in temporally embedded relations.
Independent Variable Resultsa
Experiment Survey Exp Sur
Current stakes
H3.1 ¡ Stakes H4.1 + Volume and opportunism potential s s
Past
H3.2.1 + Honored trust H4.2.1 ¡ Successful past transactions s s
H3.2.2 ¡ Abused trust H4.2.2 + Unsuccessful past transactions s nt
H3.3.1 + Honored trust H4.3.1 ¡ Successful past transaction £ past
£ stakes volume and opportunism potential ns ns
H3.3.2 ¡ Abused trust H4.3.2 ¡ Unsuccessful past transaction £ past
£ stakes volume and opportunism potential ns nt
H3.4 ¡ Having a past £ H4.4 + Having a past £
discount past outcomes discount past outcomes s nt
H3.5 0 No past vs. H4.5 0 Potential vs.
trust withheld actual supplier s nt
Future
H3.6 + Length of future H4.6 ¡ Future transactions s ns
H3.7 + Length of future H4.7 ¡ Future transactions £ future
£ stakes volume and opportunism potential ns nt
Note: The ¯rst column gives the numbering of the hypotheses used in Chapter 3. The signs refer to
the proposed e®ect on the probability of trust being placed: increase (+), decrease (¡) and no e®ect
(0). The third column gives the numbering of the hypotheses used in Chapter 4. The signs refer to
the proposed e®ect on the buyer's ex ante investment in management.
a Experimental results (Exp) refer to the analyses in Chapter 3 and survey results (Sur) refer to
analyses in Chapter 4. s : hypothesis is supported. ns : hypothesis is not supported. nt : hypothesis
is not tested.
Automation', MAT, see Buskens and Batenburg 2000). As outlined above, the buyer's
investment in ex ante management of the transaction can be seen as a proxy for the
buyer's lack of trust in the supplier. The data contain enough information to calculate
the amount of time and e®ort the buyer invested in ex ante management of a focal
transaction.
Table 6.1 gives an overview of our hypotheses and the results of the experimental
and survey tests. The last two columns of Table 6.1 show that the ¯ndings from our
two tests are quite similar. The hypothesis on a negative e®ect of increased risk in
a current transaction (Hypothesis 3.1 and Hypothesis 4.1, respectively) is supported
in both data sets. Experimentally, it holds true that an increase in the stakes of
the current game (i.e. Risk and Temptation) decreases the trustor's probability of
placing trust. Likewise, the survey data show that an increase in the volume of the
current transaction as well as in the opportunism potential of the current transaction
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thus reduces the buyer's willingness to trust the supplier and induces more investments
in ex ante management of the current transaction.
There is also evidence con¯rming the proposed learning e®ect of the past in the ex-
perimental as well as the survey data. The experimental data show that the trustor's
probability of placing trust in the current game increases if there was a successful
past where placed trust was honored by the trustee (Hypothesis 3.2.1). There is also
evidence of a negative e®ect on the trustor's probability of placing trust after placed
trust was abused in the past (Hypothesis 3.2.2). Unfortunately the survey data do not
make it possible to distinguish between positive and negative past dealings. Buyers
depicted in the data set as having several transactions with the same supplier generally
report successful past transactions. Negative past experience can be assumed to have
led buyers to look for new suppliers. The survey data thus only allow for a direct test
of Hypothesis 4.2.1 but not of Hypothesis 4.2.2. Having a good past with the current
supplier decreases the buyer's investment in management and thus supports Hypothe-
sis 4.2.1. For those buyer{supplier dyads with a past, we further examine whether the
frequency of past transactions additionally decreases the buyer's investment in safe-
guarding a focal transaction. The data do indeed support this proposition. Buyers
who reported to have a mutual past with the current supplier signi¯cantly decreased
their investment in ex ante management the more frequent their mutual transactions
were (see Table 4.6 in Chapter 4).
Due to the absence of the necessary variables in the survey data, two hypotheses
on the e®ects of the past can only be tested on the experimental data. First, we
suggest that past outcomes are discounted (Hypothesis 3.4). Evidence to support this
hypothesis is found in the experimental data. Second, we assume that the trustor's
probability of placing trust does, ceteris paribus, not depend on whether trust was
withheld in a past game or whether this game was not played at all (Hypothesis 3.5).
The experimental data o®er some, though not conclusive evidence that there was indeed
no di®erence between the trustor's behavior in situations of `no past' and situations
of a past of withheld trust. In terms of the buyer{supplier data, this means that as
long as the buyer has not interacted with the supplier (and has no information about
the supplier's behavior in encounters with others), he cannot learn anything about the
supplier. The survey data do not make it possible to test this hypothesis. The MAT{
data do not contain information on whether the supplier of the focal transaction was
a potential supplier, be it not an actual one, in the previous `time period'.
Both data sets, however, make it possible to test the hypothesis about the control
e®ect of the future. Hypothesis 3.6 suggests that the longer the expected future, the
greater the likelihood of a trustor placing trust. The experimental data support this
control e®ect. The buyer{supplier data do not demonstrate an e®ect of the future.
However, this result may re°ect a substantive di®erence between the experiment dis-
cussed in Chapter 3 and the buyer{supplier relations from Chapter 4. Experimentally,
we are testing the `true' control e®ect that works via the tit{for{tat mechanism of reci-
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should likewise lead to less investment in management. However, the buyer's procure-
ment management may also depend on what we call the investment e®ect. Such an
e®ect should lead to more investment the longer the expected future. The idea is that
investment in the management of the focal transaction can be re{used in safeguarding
future transactions. The control e®ect may have been counteracted by the investment
e®ect in such a way that the MAT{data no longer demonstrate an e®ect of expected
future transactions on the ex ante management of the focal transaction.
Lastly, there are two hypotheses that are not supported by either of the data sets.
On the one hand, we propose an interaction between past outcomes and the stakes of the
respective past game. On the other hand, we suggest an interaction between the length
of the expected future and the stakes of the future games. The experimental data do
not show any interaction between positive past outcomes and Temptation (Hypoth-
esis 3.3.1), nor between negative past outcomes and Temptation (Hypothesis 3.3.2).
Likewise, the past volume and opportunism potential do not show a signi¯cant inter-
action with successful past transactions (Hypothesis 4.3.1).7 There is similarly nothing
in the experimental data to support the proposed interaction between the length of the
expected future and the Temptation in these future games (Hypothesis 3.7). Since
the ¯eld data do not contain the necessary information to construct future stakes,
Hypothesis 4.7 cannot be tested.
In sum, the empirical test of our hypotheses suggests that whether a trustor or
buyer places trust is theoretically best described as a function of three distinct char-
acteristics of temporal embeddedness: the stakes of the current game, the discounted
past outcomes, and the length of the future. A social capital stock that incorporates
these three characteristics is referred to as the simple social capital stock in Chapter 3.
The so{called complex social capital stock also takes past and future stakes into ac-
count. Our data indicate that the simple social capital model su±ces to account for
the observed behavior in experimental Trust Games and IT{transactions.
Trust: Some Suggestions for Further Research
Neither the experimental nor the empirical data provide evidence of the importance of
past and future stakes. As we discuss at greater length in Chapter 4, the survey data
do not contain the necessary variables to properly construct past and future stakes (i.e.
past and future monetary volume and opportunism potential). The experimental data
do however allow for a clear and straightforward conceptualization of past and future
stakes via Risk and Temptation. How come we do not ¯nd an e®ect of past and
future stakes? Bear in mind that only two di®erent payo® structures were considered
in the experiments. In planning the experiments, there were good reasons to con¯ne
ourselves to only two payo® structures (see Section 3.4.1). Further research, however,
should study the e®ect of monetary stakes on behavior in repeated Trust Games more
thoroughly. This requires setting up experiments using repeated Trust Games with nu-
7Bear in mind that the MAT{data do not contain information on unsuccessful past dealings with
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merous di®erent Risk and Temptation ratios. If we deal with more than just low and
high stakes, however, the possible payo® combinations increase tremendously.8 Even
though one need not use every payo® combination, an experimental design with a larger
variance in the games' stakes consequently requires a larger number of experimental
subjects.
Second, in formulating the capital stock model, past outcomes are assumed to be
discounted. As is noted above, an assumption like this has some plausible consequences,
for instance, that an abuse of trust can be forgiven or that even a functional (trustful)
relation needs certain e®orts to be made to maintain its good state. As the analyses
in Chapter 3 show, we ¯nd evidence that past outcomes are discounted.9 It is now
tempting to generalize this ¯nding to more than two time periods and propose a social
capital model that assumes exponential discounting of past outcomes. A model with
exponential discounting is indeed just one option. We know that forward{looking ratio-
nal choice models generally assume time{consistent behavior that implies exponential
discounting (e.g. Becker 1996). On the other hand, experimental as well as survey
evidence (e.g. Braun 1998: ch. 4; Fehr and Zych 1998; Loewenstein and Elster 1992)
suggests that time{inconsistent behavior is sometimes observed. This kind of behavior
is predicted by hyperbolic discounting models. Would these empirical ¯ndings there-
fore suggest that the past is also discounted hyperbolically instead of exponentially?
The experimental results of Chapter 3 are based on at most two repetitions of the
constituent Trust Game. A conclusive answer on how the past is discounted cannot be
given based on the experimental data at hand. The question, however, is an interest-
ing one and it would be worthwhile to repeat the study using Trust Games that are
repeated several more times. Of course, `several more times' is vague. It is hard to stip-
ulate a precise number of repetitions of the constituent Trust Game that would allow
for a satisfactory test of di®erent hypotheses on discounting. A Trust Game repeated
four times would probably be a good start, though of course repeating the game ten
times would be much better. A useful design for simultaneously addressing the e®ects
of the stakes of past and future games as well as the discounting issue would be a four
times repeated Trust Games with more than only two di®erent payo® structures.
One ¯nal comment pertains to the deduction of the hypotheses in Chapter 3 and
Chapter 4. In both chapters the trustor's and buyer's behavior, respectively, was
assumed to be dependent on a social capital stock. As the empirical ¯ndings show,
this assumption is largely con¯rmed. However, we arrived at the hypotheses basically
by using verbal theory. Consequently, the model in Chapter 3 does not allow for point
predictions on the trustor's behavior, such as predictions on precisely how much the
capital stock grows after a positive outcome in a game of high stakes represented by
8Remember that we already had 2£2£4£8 = 128 payo® combinations using low and high stakes
in combination with two one{shot games, a once repeated game, and a twice repeated game.
9To distill a discount parameter, we propose modeling the e®ect of the past as the sum of the e®ect
of the `outcome at time t ¡ 1' and the discounted e®ect of the e®ect of the `outcome at time t ¡ 2'
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a Temptation of say, 0.85. A formal model might also make it possible to predict
the relative e®ect of learning versus control. In other words, one might be able to
say whether the past or the future is more important in a given situation. Finally,
such a model should conceptualize the trustor's decision on whether to place trust as
a consequence of maximizing behavior given the speci¯c temporal embeddedness.
6.2 Delayed Agreement and Bargaining:
The Division of a Surplus
The second part of this book, Chapter 5, addresses the division of a surplus as an
Alternating O®ers Game in which two actors negotiate their shares of the surplus
(Rubinstein 1982). The game assumes that ego and alter successively make o®ers and
countero®ers on the division of a surplus until they reach an agreement. Whenever ego
makes an o®er, alter can either accept it or reject it. If she rejects it, she can make
a countero®er one time period later. Ego can then accept or reject alter's o®er and
proceed, again one time period later, to make a new countero®er and so on and so
forth. However, delaying the agreement until later time periods is costly to the actors.
These costs are captured by the actors' discount factors that give an indication of the
actors' patience in delaying the agreement on the division of the surplus.
As in the ¯rst part of the book, certain assumptions are made on the behavior of
ego and alter. First, the actors are assumed to not have to worry about the provision
of the surplus. The surplus to be divided is available to them beforehand. Second, an
actor's utility is once again assumed to be determined by the actor's share of the cake
and an actor is assumed to prefer a larger share of the cake to a smaller one. Finally,
actors are assumed to behave according to game theoretic rationality in the sense of
Nash equilibrium behavior.
In line with these assumptions, Rubinstein (1982) shows that in equilibrium, the
division of the surplus depends on the ratio of the actors' discount factors only. Put
di®erently, in equilibrium the surplus is divided according to the actors' patience in
delaying their agreement on the division of the surplus. An actor who has lower costs
is more patient and can consequently wait longer for the surplus to be divided. He or
she then gets the larger part of the surplus. We show in Chapter 5 how being patient
translates into an actor's absolute bargaining power.
The actors' costs of delaying an agreement, and thus their absolute bargaining pow-
ers, are exogenous in Rubinstein's model. To make predictions on the division of the
surplus and test them using experimental evidence, we need information on the actors'
bargaining powers. We enrich the scenario of dyadic bargaining with a sociologically
relevant extension from which the actors' bargaining powers can be inferred. In Chap-
ter 5, we follow Emerson (1972, 1981) and assume that exchange between two actors
should not be considered independently of their relations to other actors. Dyadic bar-
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partners. Following Emerson, we propose that ego's and alter's network embeddedness
can be seen as the source of their bargaining powers. From an actor's point of view,
networks determine the alternatives for dyadic exchange. Consequently, networks de-
¯ne di®erences in opportunity structures between actors that are then re°ected in the
actors' bargaining powers. The main research question of the second part of the book
is: How does an actor's embeddedness in a network of negotiation partners determine
his or her share of the surplus in relations with his or her partners?
Being embedded in a network gives actors with more than one partner access to
di®erent bargaining partners with whom they can divide a surplus. As is explained
in detail in Chapter 5, in some networks, actual exchange may be restricted to one
relation in keeping with exogenously given rules (e.g. a monogamy rule). Thus, an
additional research question is: With whom of his or her connected partners does an
actor divide a surplus if restrictions in a network prescribe that the actor can only
divide one surplus at a time?
Bargaining and Exchange: Structurally Embedded Relations
As a starting point in determining the actors' absolute bargaining power, we focus on
an exogenously given network of actors. This network describes bargaining relations
between connected actors. A position in a negotiation network can be `described' by
three distinct elements. It is only by simultaneously considering them that an ac-
tor's absolute bargaining power can be de¯ned. First, each position in a network is
characterized by a speci¯c number of available negotiation partners. Relations pro-
vide opportunities for exchange. An actor with numerous negotiation relations is less
dependent on one speci¯c adjacent exchange partner. Second, each of the bargaining
partners has their own bargaining partners with whom they can negotiate the division
of surpluses as well. So it is also important how many partners one's own partners have.
The fewer partners ego's partners have, the more they depend on ego for exchange.
Lastly, it is important whether bargaining ties in a network are negatively or positively
connected (relational assessment). Ties are negatively connected if, from one's own
point of view, the partners are alternatives (Emerson 1972: 70{71). Exchange in one
of these relations then prevents exchanges in the rest of the relations. Emerson argues
that relations can be positively connected as well. This means that exchange in one
relation tends to stimulate exchanges in other relations. In that case, partners are
complementary for exchanges.
Once the network is known and its relations are classi¯ed as either negative or
positive, we can determine each actor's absolute bargaining power. In a negatively
connected network, ego's absolute bargaining power increases in the number of his
relations but decreases in the number of his partners' relations. In a positively con-
nected network, however, relations are complementary and an exchange in one relation
promotes transfers in other relations. In a network of this kind, being dependent on
others is an advantage. Ego's absolute bargaining power thus increases in the number
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However, the absolute bargaining power does not determine ego's share of the sur-
plus in relation with alter. Ego's share of the surplus in relation with alter is dependent
on his relative bargaining power with respect to alter, that is, ego's absolute bargaining
power in relation to alter's absolute bargaining power (see eq. 5.5 in the previous chap-
ter). Thus a high absolute bargaining power does not automatically secure a larger
share of the pie. Actors with equal absolute bargaining powers (such as structurally
equivalent actors) split the cake evenly.
Inserting the absolute bargaining powers into the equilibrium solution of the Al-
ternation O®ers Game yields point predictions for the division of a surplus in all the
negotiation relations of the network under study. To test our theoretical predictions, we
rely on published results from sociological network exchange theory (for an overview,
see for instance Willer 1999). Moreover, we confront our predictions with those of
prominent exchange theories.
Bargaining and Exchange: Experimental Results
We test our predictions on the division of a surplus using experimental results pub-
lished in the literature (Burke 1997; Cook et al. 1983; Lovaglia et al. 1995; Markovsky,
Willer, and Patton 1988; Markovsky et al. 1997; Skvoretz and Willer 1993; Yamag-
ishi, Gillmore, and Cook 1988; Yamaguchi 1996). Laboratory experiments on network
exchange normally follow a standardized protocol. Subjects are assigned to a speci¯c
position within a network structure determined by the experimenter. The network
structure is common knowledge. After a thorough introduction and a test round, sub-
jects can negotiate the division of a surplus of 24 points with each of their linked
neighbors. In general, about 20 rounds of negotiation and exchange are played. With
one exception (Yamagishi, Gillmore, and Cook 1988), experiments assume negative
connections and generally restrict the number of exchanges per actor and round to one
(i.e. one{exchange rule).
The empirical performance of our model is tested in three distinct steps. In each
of these steps, we also compare our predictions to those of alternative approaches: Lo-
vaglia et al.'s (1995) GPI{RD, Yamaguchi's (1996) power model, Skvoretz and Willer's
(1993) Exchange Resistance theory, Friedkin's (1986, 1992) Expected Value theory,
Cook and Yamagishi's (1992) Equi{Dependence theory, and Burke's (1997) Identity
Simulation model. In a ¯rst step, we compare our pro¯t point predictions on the divi-
sion of a surplus in negatively connected networks to the respective empirical results.
In a second step, we compare our predictions on pro¯t splits in positively connected
networks to the one experiment on positively connected networks reported in the lit-
erature. These two steps thus focus on the ¯rst research question of Chapter 5. Some
negatively connected network structures with a one{exchange rule have been exper-
imentally observed to `break'. In other words, at least one actor was observed to
permanently refrain from exchange with at least one bargaining partner. In a third
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whether our model consistently predicts observed deviations between negotiation and
exchange structures.
Predictions on the division of a surplus in negatively connected networks are com-
pared to experimental ¯ndings on four network structures (see Section 5.5.1): 4{Line,
Stem, Kite, and 3{Branch.10 Observed splits of the surplus in these negatively con-
nected networks match fairly well with the predictions of all the theoretical approaches
we consider in our analysis. However, the theories di®er in terms of predictive accu-
racy. Not all the theories perform equally well with regard to the same networks. Every
theory has at least one network where predictions ¯t the data poorly. Our theory, for
instance, is less on target in the 4{Line structure. From a surplus of 24 points, we
predict that ego will get 15.9 points. Experiments, however, only report 14.1 points in
favor of ego. With regard to the other three networks, our theory makes predictions
that all fall within the 95% con¯dence interval of the experimentally observed values.
To compare the overall empirical performance with regard to all four negatively con-
nected networks, we use two distinct goodness{of{¯t measures: the mean deviation and
the absolute deviation. Comparing the theoretical approaches on these two measures
shows that our predictions correspond closest to the experimentally observed results.
In a second step, we test our predictions on dividing a surplus in positively connected
networks (see Section 5.5.2). Empirical results on positively connected networks are
sparse and we have to rely on one single experiment on a 5{Line structure (Yamagishi,
Gillmore, and Cook 1988). From the vast body of theories, only Yamaguchi's (1996)
power model is capable of making pro¯t point predictions for positively connected
networks. Yamagishi et al. report their ¯ndings as an actor's systemwide pro¯t share.
This means they add up an actor's pro¯ts attained in all of his or her dyadic bargaining
relations and standardize the result in such a way that the systemwide pro¯t shares
of all the actors add up to one. Pro¯t shares for positions in the positively connected
5{Line A{B{C{B{A are reported to be: A = 0.1503, B = 0.1931, and C = 0.3133.
For all positions, we predict pro¯t splits that correspond closely with this empirical
evidence: A = 0.1632, B = 0.1736, and C = 0.3264. These predictions are also better
in line than predictions by Yamaguchi: A = 0.0020, B = 0.2500, and C = 0.4961.
In a third step, we test our predictions on deviations between bargaining and ex-
change structures (see Section 5.5.3). In some exchange experiments, the experimenter
kept track of the number of times linked actors participated in exchange with each
other. Based on these results, some authors (e.g. Bienenstock and Bonacich 1993;
Markovsky, Willer, and Patton 1988; Simpson and Willer 1999; Skvoretz and Lovaglia
1995) report and discuss deviations between the negotiation and exchange structure.
A prominent candidate for such `breaks' is the T{Shape structure (see Figure 5.2
in Chapter 5), which connects two peripheral actors A1 and A2 to actor B who is fur-
ther connected to actor C, who is also connected to peripheral actor D. Markovsky,
Willer, and Patton (1988: 227), for instance, report a break of this structure. In 100
10See Figure 5.1 in the previous chapter for a graphical depiction of these networks.168 Chapter 6 Summary and Conclusions
negotiation rounds, only three exchanges occurred between B and C. The network thus
degenerates into a 3{Line A1{B{A2 and a Dyad C{D. Our model not only correctly
predicts this decay, it also accurately predicts the division of the surpluses in the re-
sulting subnetworks. Out of a surplus of 24 pro¯t points, B was observed to realize,
on average, 19.14 pro¯t points in relation to the actors at position A.11 We predict
19.86 pro¯t points in favor of B. C was observed to receive 11.88 pro¯t points in match
with D. We predict an equal division of 12.0 pro¯t points each. Simpson and Willer
(1999) report alternative networks for which experimental evidence on the number of
exchanges in all relations is available, namely, Y{Triangle, XU{Shape, X4{Line,
V{Triangle, and H{Shape (see Figure 5.3 in the previous chapter). Our model
predicts breaks in all these negotiation networks. Statistical tests on Simpson and
Willer's data support our predictions. For the XU{Shape and the Y{Triangle net-
work, however, Simpson and Willer do not draw the same conclusion. Their statistical
tests suggest that these two networks do not break. As we argue in Chapter 5, their
conclusion may be due to a statistical mistake.
Apart from pro¯t point predictions on the division of a surplus and predictions on
network breaks, our model allows for further theoretical conclusions. First, actors in
a Dyad always split their surplus evenly since they are structurally equivalent and do
not have any alternative exchange partners. Due to this lack of alternative exchange
partners, the Dyad is a robust network (i.e. the exchange structure coincides with
the given negotiation structure and does thus not break). The available experimental
data support these predictions. Second, not all negatively connected networks can
break. If we focus on those negatively connected networks where all the relations
negotiate a surplus of equal value, the structure can only break if it meets with the
following condition: (i) the network has to contain at least one actor with three or
more exchange partners, and (ii) these exchange partners have to be located on at
least two structurally di®erent positions. Consequently, networks with equally valued
surpluses, where all the actors have at most two exchange partners, are thus always
robust. Networks of this kind are either ring or line structures. The experimental
evidence supports this conjecture. Third, relations in positively connected networks
are complementary and these structures are thus always robust. Since exchange in
one relation stimulates exchange in other relations, rational and sel¯sh actors never
exclude any of their possible exchange partners. The lack of experiments on positively
connected networks makes it impossible to either con¯rm or refute this prediction.
Fourth, whether or not an actor initiates a break depends on the relative bargaining
power in all his matches with his partners. If the surpluses to be divided are not equal
in all the relations, the possibility of a break also depends on the size of the surpluses to
be divided. In unequally valued relations, it may sometimes be more advantageous to
obtain a smaller part of a large surplus than a larger part of a small surplus or parts of
11The B subjects realized almost identical pro¯ts with both A1 and A2 throughout the experiment.
The cited 19.14 pro¯t points are an average of pro¯ts realized in relation to A1 and A2.6.2 Delayed Agreement and Bargaining: The Division of a Surplus 169
one or more smaller surpluses. An actor might thus sometimes choose to be exploited
in a large surplus relation. There is no empirical evidence to enable us to address this
prediction. Fifth, there are negotiation networks where an actor has a latent monopoly
position. Such an actor has full control over two or more of his bargaining partners|
they have no other bargaining partner|but is also connected to at least one partner he
does not completely control, since this partner has one or more alternative bargaining
partners. An actor with this type of latent monopoly position always excludes at least
one of his less dependent bargaining partners. In other words, he would like to establish
a pure monopoly position. Experiments using network structures with latent monopoly
positions do indeed demonstrate the predicted behavior of the `monopoly actor'.
Bargaining and Exchange: Some Suggestions for Further Research
We saw that the theory developed in Chapter 5 performs better or at least as well as
established sociological exchange theories. These conclusions are based, however, on
experimental evidence from small and simple network structures. We o®er some predic-
tions for larger networks, especially in connection with our results on network breaks.
We will only know whether these predictions on the division of a surplus are accurate
after further experiments with more complex network structures have been conducted.
In addition, new experiments could reveal whether the weak information assumption
of our model (`locally complete information' instead of complete information on the
network structure) is also su±cient for precise predictions in large structures.
Further, predictions of our model are based on the assumption that bargaining
power is a function of structure alone. This assumption is in line with Emerson's (1972)
basic idea and also ful¯lls the premises of network exchange theory. Experimental
results suggest that our theory clearly illustrates the in°uence of structure on individual
behavior. This is why it is tempting to add a further step, especially if one seeks to
explain real world bargaining behavior. Eckel and Grossman (1998) note, for instance,
that men and women behave di®erently when bargaining. They report that men tend
to accept lower o®ers from women than from other men. Women, on the other hand,
apparently accept lower o®ers from women. One the grounds of Becker and Mulligan's
(1997) results on the endogenization of time preference, younger or less educated people,
for example, can be expected to be less patient. It can thus be concluded that they make
less advantageous deals when bargaining. Moreover, it does not seem too farfetched to
assume that wealth e®ects can also play an important role in bargaining. Rich people,
for instance, can be expected to bargain less forcefully if the cake is small, and poor
people will gladly accept a tiny share of a larger pie. This suggests that bargaining
power is also a function of e®ects other than structure alone. Future research on
network exchange should therefore also address e®ects of actor characteristics.
Finally, if Emerson's (1972) suggestion that exchange theory explains exchange
structure is taken seriously, new theories should be able to explain how and when actors
initiate exchange relations with new partners outside the given negotiation structure
(`network extension'). Cook and Whitmeyer (1992) also suggest that network exchange170 Chapter 6 Summary and Conclusions
theory should put more emphasis on explaining changes in network structures rather
than solely predicting pro¯t splits. In dealing with positively connected network struc-
tures, it might be as important to focus on network extensions as it is to study network
breaks in negatively connected networks. In positively connected networks, actors are
complementary in exchange, and having more relations might increase one's own bar-
gaining power. A more complete theory on network exchange should therefore `allow'
new actors to enter a given negotiation structure, and should de¯ne a behavioral con-
cept on the individual level for the acceptance or rejection of these new negotiation
partners. Whether actors in positively connected networks behave according to such
assumptions can subsequently be tested in laboratory experiments.Appendix A
The Repeated Trust Game
Experiment
This appendix contains a concise translation of selected parts of the German experiment
booklet used to collect the data discussed in Chapter 3. The original experiment
booklet contained the following parts:
Introduction The basic game, a one{shot the Trust Game, was explained and further
information on the experiment was given to enable the experimental subjects to
perform the experiment without further assistance. This part is contained in this
appendix.
Part 1 A decision as the trustor in a one{shot Trust Game had to be taken by the
experimental subjects. Payo®s of this game were either high stakes or low stakes
(cf. Chapter 3). This part is contained in this appendix.
Part 2 A second decision as the trustor in a one{shot Trust Game had to be taken
by the experimental subjects. If Part 1 contained the low stakes game, this part
contained the high stakes game and vice versa. Otherwise, Part 2 was identical
to Part 1 and is thus omitted from this appendix.
Part 3 Decisions as the trustor in a once repeated Trust Game had to be taken by the
experimental subjects. The strategy method (see Chapter 3, page 65) was used
to route the subjects through the game and record their decisions. This part is
contained in this appendix.
ABV Questions A battery of 23 questions from the Amsterdamse Biogra¯sche Vra-
genlijst (ABV, `test attitude scale', Wilde 1970) was presented to the subjects.
The ABV scale measures how reliable subject's answers on questions regarding
opinions and statements are, for example, on the Trust Items presented to the
subjects in a following part of the experiment. This part is omitted from this
appendix.
Part 4 Decisions as the trustor in a twice repeated Trust Game had to be taken by
the experimental subjects. The strategy method was again used to route the
subjects through the game and record their decisions. Besides the fact that the
Trust Game is repeated twice instead of once, Part 4 is identical to Part 3 and
thus omitted from this appendix.
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Trust Items An item{battery on trust and related concepts (Yamagishi and Yamag-
ishi 1994) was presented to the subjects. This item{battery was developed by
Yamagishi and Yamagishi to measure how trustful and trustworthy, respectively,
subjects are. This part is omitted from this appendix.
Part 5 A decision as the trustor in a Continuous Trust Game had to be taken. This
game is also called an Investment Game (e.g. Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe
1995). This part was only added to the experiment booklet as a pre{test for
further experiments. It is thus omitted from this appendix.
Demographics This part of the experiment booklet contained questions on the sub-
jects' age, sex, secondary education, being a blood donor, and whether they have
heard about game theory prior to the day of the experiment. This part is omitted
from this appendix.
Payment Procedure The last part of the experiment booklet contained a detailed
explanation on how two subjects were chosen to be paid in accordance with their
decisions in one part of the experiment. This part is omitted from this appendix.
The parts of the experiment booklet omitted from this appendix were either not rele-
vant for the analysis in Chapter 3 or follow the same logic as those parts contained in
the appendix. Part 1 and Part 2 only di®ered in terms of the payo®s used. Part 3 and
Part 4 both used a repeated version of the Trust Game; these parts thus di®ered in the
number of repetitions of the constituent game. Part 3 and Part 4 were further di®erent
with respect to the payo® combinations used and we conducted the experiment using
eight di®erent versions of the experiment booklet that varied with regard to the sets of
payo® combinations used in Part 3 and Part 4. The logic of the strategy method used
in the once repeated Trust Game of Part 3 was adapted to the twice repeated game of
Part 4.
The original experiment booklet in German as well as a concise English translation is
available for download in Adobe PDF ¯le format from http://www.fss.uu.nl/soc/iscore
as ISCORE Paper No. 193: An Experiment on Decision Making in Repeated Trust
Games: Experimental Booklet.Appendix A The Repeated Trust Game Experiment 173
Introduction to the Experiment
This experiment can be done with only the material just given to you. We ask you
not to speak during the session. Conferring with others is also not allowed during the
experiment. If you have any questions reading the instructions or during the course of
the session, please rise your hand. The experimenter will try to help you out. Please
try not to disturb the others.
This experiment consists of di®erent independent parts, as you will ¯nd out while
reading the instruction text. You can go about the instruction text and these di®erent
parts of the experiment in your own pace. In the main part of the experiment,
you will be asked to make choices that have to do with money. We want to emphasize
that there is no \right" nor \wrong" choice. We are only interested in what you
consider to be the most appropriate choice. Your choices are important because
it is possible that you will be paid in accordance with your choices in the
main part of the experiment. After everyone has completed the experiment, two
persons will be chosen by lot. These two persons will be paid in accordance with their
choices made in one of the experiments in the main part (hereafter called \situations").
Which situation is chosen is again determined by lot. Everyone of you has the same
probability of being one of these two persons. The payment procedure will be explained
in more detail in the instruction text at the end of the experiment. Independent of
your performance, everyone will be paid a participation fee of DM 10.{1
Explanation of the Basic Game
We would now like to make you familiar with the game that forms the basis of the
experiment. The game is played by two players, you (\Player 1") and an unknown
other person (\Player 2"). Both players have to make choices in this game. In all
situations of this experiment, we will ask you some questions about your
behavior as \Player 1". The questions will, in general, be of the following kind:
In this situation, I choose
2 Right
2 Down
You will only have to decide how you would choose as Player 1. Eventually,
your decisions will depend on previous decisions of the other person (\Player 2"). We
will thus sometimes ask you what you would do, given the other person has behaved
in a certain manner.
In Figure 1, you see a graphical representation of the basic game used in this
experiment. We explain the game on the basis of this example. The game starts with
a decision by you (\Player 1"). You can choose between two directions: Right or
Down. If you choose Right, the game ends. You and the other person both earn
1TG: At the day of the experiment, DM 10.{ was about US$ 5.{ or
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Figure 1 The Basic Game of the Experiment
You Player 1:
Right
Down
-
?
Other
Person
Player 2:
Right
Down
-
-
You Other
Person
35 35
10 65
55 55
DM 35.{ as you can see in Figure 1. The other person's choice does not matter in this
case. If you choose Down, however, the other person also gets the chance to choose
between Right and Down. In both cases, the game ends. If the other person chooses
Right, you earn DM 10.{ and the other person earns DM 65.{ If the other person
chooses Down, both of you earn DM 55.-
As you can see in Figure 1, your and the other person's choice lead to monetary
rewards. The value of the monetary rewards depend on the choices of you and the
other person. The monetary rewards are located to the right of the graphical depiction
of the game. Your rewards are in the column labelled \You" and the other person's
rewards are in the column labelled \Other Person". Note that the monetary rewards
used in the experiment will be di®erent from the ones just used in the above example.
Carefully study the picture and make sure you completely understand the game. If you
have any questions regarding the basic game, please rise your hand. The experimenter
will try to answer your questions.
To make sure that you understood the game, please answer the following
question about Figure 1. Assume that you choose Down and that the other person
chooses Right. What are the rewards to you and the other person? Please write them
down here:
You receive DM
The other person receives DMAppendix A The Repeated Trust Game Experiment 175
Check your answer at the bottom of the following page. If your answer was correct,
please continue reading the instructions. Otherwise, please study the basic game again.
If you have any further questions, consult to the experimenter.
If you do not have any other questions, please start with the experiment on the next
page. Again, there are neither right nor wrong decisions. We will only ask you to
take your decisions as Player 1. Always make the choice you think to be the best one,
given the respective situation. For reasons of clearness, we will address Player
1 with \You" and Player 2 with \Other Person" throughout the rest of the
experiment. Again, it may be that you will be paid in accordance with your choices
in one of the situations in this experiment.
Please start with the experiment on the next page.
Answer to Question: You receive DM 10.{ and the other person receives DM 65.{176 Appendix A The Repeated Trust Game Experiment
Part 1
You are in a situation described by the game depicted below. Please study the game
carefully and take a decision: either Right or Down. If you take your decision, think
of the other person as somebody in this room. However, you do not know which person.
Indicate your choice by marking the respective box.
You
Right
Down
-
?
Other
Person Right
Down
-
-
You Other
Person
20 20
10 140
40 40
In the situation depicted above, I choose2
2 Right
2 Down
Please continue with the experiment on page :::
2TG: Depending on the subject's answer, the experiment booklet routed the subject to the next
part or to the respective question in case of the repeated games in Part 3 and Part 4 of the experiment.Appendix A The Repeated Trust Game Experiment 177
Part 3
We will confront you with yet another situation. Please take a thorough look at the
¯gure \The Game in Part 3" on the opposite page. As you can see, it is the game we
discussed in the introduction to this experiment and which you have already played
in the ¯rst and second part of this experiment. In Part 3, however, this game is
repeated once. You are playing a total of two rounds. You are playing the same
other person in both rounds. Think of the other person as somebody in this room.
However, you do not know which person. It is, however, not the same person as in the
previous two parts. Please take a good look at both rounds of the game depicted on
the opposite page. Take into account that the monetary rewards may di®er between
rounds.
You start in Round 1. Each question will be accompanied by a graphical represen-
tation. These representations will tell you in which round you are and which decisions
have been taken by you and the other person. In each of these representations, a box
with doubled edges will mark your position in the game. In addition, the branches
of the game you and the other person did not choose are marked in gray. After each
of your answers, we will tell you with which question you have to continue.
Take a look at the game on the opposite page and answer the following question.
You can check yourself whether you understood the game. Assume that in Round 1,
you choose Right. The other person, therefore, cannot take a decision. In Round 2,
you choose Down and the other person chooses Right. What are the monetary
rewards to you and the other person? Please write them down here:
Round 1 Round 2
You receive DM DM
The other person receives DM DM
Check your answer at the bottom of this page.3 If your answer was right, please
continue with the third part of the experiment on page 179. Indicate your choice by
marking the respective box. Otherwise please study the game again. If you have any
further questions, consult to the experimenter.
Answer to Question Part 3:
You and the other person earn DM 20.{ each in Round 1. In Round 2, you earn DM 10.{ and the
other person earns DM 140.{
3TG: In the experiment booklet, the answer was on a blank page prior to Question 1 of Part 3.
Throughout the experiment booklet, all questions, as well as the di®erent parts, were separated by
blank pages.1
7
8
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
A
T
h
e
R
e
p
e
a
t
e
d
T
r
u
s
t
G
a
m
e
E
x
p
e
r
i
m
e
n
t
The Game in Part 3
Round 1
You
Right
Down
-
?
Other
Person Right
Down
-
-
You Other
Person
20 20
59 0
70 70
Round 2
You
Right
Down
-
?
Other
Person Right
Down
-
-
You Other
Person
20 20
10 140
40 40Appendix A The Repeated Trust Game Experiment 179
Question 1
You start in Round 1 and continue to Round 2. In both rounds, you play with the
same other person. Always indicate your choice by marking the respective box.
Remark: Assume that all your decisions are immediately disclosed to the other
person. This also holds true for all decisions by the other person, on which you will
be informed immediately. You and the other person are therefore, at any time in the
game, informed about the choices made in the course of the game and the respective
rewards.
Round 1
You
Right
Down
-
?
Other
Person Right
Down
-
-
You Other
Person
20 20
59 0
70 70
Round 2
You
Right
Down
-
?
Other
Person Right
Down
-
-
You Other
Person
20 20
10 140
40 40
You are in Round 1. You start the game. Please take a decision. Either choose
Right or Down.
In Round 1, I choose
2 Right (continue with question 2 on page 180)
2 Down (continue with question 3 on page 181)180 Appendix A The Repeated Trust Game Experiment
Question 2
Round 1
You
Right
Down
-
?
Other
Person Right
Down
-
-
You Other
Person
20 20
59 0
70 70
Round 2
You
Right
Down
-
?
Other
Person Right
Down
-
-
You Other
Person
20 20
10 140
40 40
You are in Round 2. Due to your choice of Right in Round 1, the other person
has no possibility to choose. What are you doing in Round 2? Either choose Right
or Down.
In Round 2, I choose
2 Right
2 Down
(This was the last question of Part 3. Continue on page :::)Appendix A The Repeated Trust Game Experiment 181
Question 3
Round 1
You
Right
Down
-
?
Other
Person Right
Down
-
-
You Other
Person
20 20
70 70
59 0
Round 2
You
Right
Down
-
?
Other
Person Right
Down
-
-
You Other
Person
20 20
10 140
40 40
You are in Round 2. Due to your choice of Down in Round 1, the other person
could choose between Right and Down in Round 1. Assume the other person has
chosen Right. What are you doing in Round 2? Either choose Right or Down.
In Round 2, I choose
2 Right
2 Down
(continue with question 4 on page 182)182 Appendix A The Repeated Trust Game Experiment
Question 4
Due to your choice of Down in Round 1, the other person could also choose between
Right and Down in Round 1. In the previous Question 3, you took a decision in
Round 2 under the assumption that the other person has chosen Right in Round 1.
Now assume that in Round 1, the other person, after your choice of Down, has
chosen Down as well instead of Right. Please again indicate your decision in Round 2
given these new circumstances.
Round 1
You
Right
Down
-
?
Other
Person Right
Down
-
-
You Other
Person
20 20
59 0
70 70
Round 2
You
Right
Down
-
?
Other
Person Right
Down
-
-
You Other
Person
20 20
10 140
40 40
You are in Round 2. Due to your choice of Down in Round 1, the other person
could choose between Right and Down in Round 1. Assume the other person has
not chosen Right but Down as well in Round 1. What are you doing in Round 2?
Either choose Right or Down.
In Round 2, I choose
2 Right
2 Down
(This was the last question of Part 3. Continue on page :::)Appendix B
Information on the MAT
Questionnaire
This appendix contains translations of questions from the Dutch survey on IT{
transactions (`The External Management of Automation', MAT) as far as they are
relevant for Chapter 4. For the most part, these translations are taken from Buskens
(1999). Below, the questions are given followed by the response categories in paren-
theses. The questions are ordered as they were actually included in the questionnaire.
The numbering of questions follows the codebook by Buskens and Batenburg (2000).
For further information on and analyses with the MAT{data, see for instance,
Batenburg (1997b), Batenburg, Raub, and Snijders (2000), Blumberg (1997), Buskens
(1999), Raub (1997), and several articles in Weesie and Raub (2000).
Section 1. The Product
Q1.2: Which of the following products/services were delivered at that time? (stan-
dard software, adjusted software, tailor-made software, sector-speci¯c software,
personal computers, workstation, network con¯guration, mini computer, main-
frame, computer-controlled machines, side equipment, cabling, design, training,
instruction, consultation, documentation, support)
Q1.4: How much was paid to the supplier, not including later supplements? (up to
NLG 25,000, NLG 25,000{50,000, NLG 50,000{100,000, NLG 100,000{200,000,
more than NLG 200,000)
Q1.6a: How important was this product for the automation of your ¯rm? (unimpor-
tant, hardly important, moderately important, very important, of major impor-
tance)
Q1.6b: How important was this product for the pro¯tability of your ¯rm? (unimpor-
tant, hardly important, moderately important, very important, of major impor-
tance)
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Q1.7: Was it easy or di±cult for you and your employees to judge the quality of the
product at the time of delivery? (very easy, easy, somewhat di±cult, di±cult,
very di±cult)
Q1.8: Compared to other ¯rms in your sector, how much experience did your ¯rm
have with automation? (none, little, some, much, very much)
Q1.10: How important was it that the product delivery time was met? (unimportant,
hardly important, moderately important, very important, of major importance)
Q1.12a: How important was the long{term suitability of this product? (unimportant,
hardly important, moderately important, very important, of major importance)
Q1.12b: How important was long{term support by the supplier? (unimportant,
hardly important, moderately important, very important, of major importance)
Q1.12c: How important was the long{term compatibility of this product with other
hardware and software? (unimportant, hardly important, moderately important,
very important, of major importance)
Q1.13a: What would have been the damage, in terms of money and time spent on
purchasing a new product, if the product had failed to function and had had to
be replaced? (very small, small, moderate, large, very large)
Q1.13b: What would have been the damage, in terms of money and time spent on
training personnel, if the product had failed to function and had had to be re-
placed? (very small, small, moderate, large, very large)
Q1.13c: What would have been the damage, in terms of money and time spent on
data entry, if the product had failed to function and had had to be replaced?
(very small, small, moderate, large, very large)
Q1.13d: What would have been the damage, in terms of money and time wasted in
idle production, if the product had failed to function and had had to be replaced?
(very small, small, moderate, large, very large)
Q1.15: Did your ¯rm have the possibility to make or adapt this product? (no, very
di±cult, di±cult, easy, very easy)
Section 2. The Choice of Product and Supplier
Q2.8: Was it di±cult for your ¯rm to compare tenders? (very easy, easy, somewhat
di±cult, di±cult, very di±cult)
Q2.9: Was it di±cult for your ¯rm to compare the product with other products? (very
easy, easy, somewhat di±cult, di±cult, very di±cult)Appendix B Information on the MAT Questionnaire 185
Q2.10: Was it di±cult for your ¯rm to compare the price{quality relation of potential
suppliers? (very easy, easy, somewhat di±cult, di±cult, very di±cult)
Section 3. The Relation with the Supplier
Q3.2: How many employees were working at the supplier's ¯rm at that time? (less
than 5, 5{9, 10{19, 20{49, more than 50)
Q3.7: For how long has your ¯rm done business with the supplier before the purchase
of this product? (about ... years)
Q3.8: How frequently has your ¯rm done business with the supplier before the pur-
chase of this product? (once, occasionally, quite regular, regular, often)
Q3.9: How extensively has your ¯rm done business with the supplier before the pur-
chase of this product? (minimal, small, quite extensive, extensive, very extensive)
Q3.13: To what extent did you expect, before the purchase of this product, that your
¯rm would continue business with this supplier? (no business, incidental business
of limited size, some business of limited size, regular and/or extensive business,
very regular and/or very extensive business)
Section 4. The Contract
Q4.11: Was the main contract a more or less standard contract or was it a more or
less tailor made contract? (standard contract, more or less written by ...;tailor
made contract, more or less written by ...)
Q4.12: Was the main contract a more or less adapted version of a contract that your
¯rm used before? (no, yes)
Q4.13: For each of the following technical speci¯cations of the product, can you indi-
cate how detailed they were arranged in the contract? (hardly, to some extent,
to a moderate extent, detailed, very detailed)
General issues (4): security, user friendliness, de¯nition of system limits, de¯ni-
tion of system functions.
Hardware issues (8): mainboard, memory (RAM and harddrives), speed (CPU
and RAM), communication with other hardware, hardware environment, addi-
tional hardware (co{processor, videocard etc.), installation procedure, quality
monitor (resolution).
Software issues (12): operating system, additional software, implementation,
memory and harddrive usage, system analysis, system methodology, structure
and type of data, modules and procedures, conversion old data, operation and
performance monitoring, benchmark and system tests, programming language.186 Appendix B Information on the MAT Questionnaire
Q4.14a: For each of the following ¯nancial and legal clauses, can you indicate how
much attention was payed to these issues during negotiation of the contract?
(less, normal, much)
Issues (24): price determination, price level, price changes, terms of payment,
sanctions on late payment, delivery time, liability supplier, force majeure, war-
ranties supplier, quality (norms), intellectual property, protection against privacy,
restrictions on product use, non{disclosure, insurance supplier, duration service,
reservation spare{parts, duration maintenance, updating, arbitration, calcula-
tion R&D costs, joint management during transaction, technical speci¯cations,
termination.
Q4.14b: For each of the following ¯nancial and legal clauses, can you indicate how
they were arranged? (only verbally, in a written document, not at all arranged)
Issues (24): see Q4.14a.
Q4.16: During negotiating and arranging the contract, did your ¯rm use external legal
help? (no, yes)
Q4.17: Which of yours and the supplier's departments or employees were involved in
contracting? (our ¯rm, the supplier)
Issues (7): CEO's, IT department or employees, ¯nancial department or employ-
ees, production, purchases, selling, legal department or employees.
Q4.18: In total, how much time have you and your colleagues invested in arranging
and negotiating the contract with the supplier? (about ...mendays)
Q4.20: Every ¯rm has its standard procedures. Regarding the negotiations and agree-
ments with this supplier concerning the product as a whole: To what extent
could these be considered to be standard procedures? (hardly, to some extent,
to a moderate extent, largely, completely)
Section 6. About Your Firm and Yourself
Q6.1b: How many full{time employees were working at your ¯rm at the time of the
purchase of this product? (number of full{time employees: ...)
Q6.3ab: Does your ¯rm have employees with expertise on automation? (no, yes)
Q6.3bb: Does your ¯rm have an automation department? (no, yes)
Q6.3ac: Does your ¯rm have employees with expertise on legal issues? (no, yes)
Q6.3bc: Does your ¯rm have a legal department? (no, yes)
Q6.3cc: Does your ¯rm have external advisors with expertise on legal issues? (no,
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Q6.4: Some ¯rms are very active in their own industry and are involved in many
activities such as congresses, exposition, meetings etc. Others are less active. How
active would you consider your ¯rm to be? (not active, little active, moderately
active, active, very active)
Q6.5: To what degree is your ¯rm an active member of di®erent organizations within
the industry? (not active, little active, moderately active, active, very active)
Q6.6: How often do you or other IT employees of your ¯rm visit events in the ¯eld of
IT? (never, incidentally, once in a while, regularly, very regularly)
Issues (3): Expositions, seminars or workshops, congresses.
Q6.7: How often do you or other IT employees of your ¯rm visit clubs where business
partners meet each other in an informal environment? (never, incidentally, once
in a while, regularly, very regularly)
Issues (3): Lions and Rotary Club, local business club, social clubs.blubAppendix C
Mathematical Details¤
C.1 Condition for Structural Di®erences between
Negotiation and Bargaining Structure
Proof of Theorem 5.1 (page 130). Starting from the assumptions in Chapter 5 and
using the same notation, we show that inequality (5.15a) is the condition for di®erences
between exchange and bargaining structures. Note that the proof of inequality (5.15b)
is equivalent to the proof of (5.15a) since xij = pij vij. In this case, the focus is on
equally valued relations, vij = vji = v =1 .
To derive inequality (5.15a), suppose that i is a sel¯sh and rational actor with
substitutable relations in a given negatively connected or mixed network. His overall
welfare thus may be conceptualized as an additively separable function of the utility
contributions from each match. And, if the latter are linear in the shares of the pie
under consideration, i's maximization of total welfare just involves the comparison of
potential pro¯t levels. Actor i thus will decide about j's exclusion on the basis of the
pro¯ts he could realize in actual exchanges. From this perspective,
xik >x ij (C.1)
is a necessary condition for i's consistent exclusion of j.
It is, however, not a su±cient condition. To see that, assume that actor i decides
about his actual exchange partners by comparing the (expected) pro¯t levels from j's
non{exclusion and exclusion. When actor i exchanges with probability qij with j, his
pro¯t from non{exclusionary behavior is qij xij +( 1¡qij)xik. The latter is compared
to x¤
ik, i's pro¯t from the relation with k if i exclusively exchanges with actor k,
that is, when i never exchanges with j such that the exchange network di®ers from
the bargaining network. Clearly, i will exchange with both j and k if and only if his
pro¯t from non{exclusionary behavior does not fall short of his pro¯t from exclusionary
behavior:
qij xij +( 1¡ qij)xik ¸ x
¤
ik : (C.2)
¤This appendix is adapted from Braun and Gautschi (2000).
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Now, if xik >x ij, rearranging yields the following condition for i's non{exclusionary
behavior towards actor j:
qij ·
x¤
ik ¡ xik
xij ¡ xik
=: q
¤
ij; (C.3)
where q¤
ij denotes the critical value for qij, the probability of i's exchange with j.A s
long as qij · q¤
ij is met, actor i will complete transfers in di®erent rounds with j and
k although xik >x ij is ful¯lled. Hence, the latter inequality does not su±ce for i's
consistent exclusion of j.
To obtain a su±cient condition, we take into account that qij = 0 holds by de¯nition
when i always avoids exchanges with j. And, since qij · q¤
ij has to be satis¯ed in the
case of non{exclusionary behavior, i's consistent exclusion of j requires then q¤
ij < 0.
Due to the de¯nition of q¤
ij and the necessary condition xik >x ij, q¤
ij < 0 if and only if
x¤
ik >x ik. The latter inequality is the su±cient condition for i's consistent exclusion
of j. Hence
x
¤
ik >x ik >x ij (C.4)
for at least one actor i with negative connections to distinct negotiation partners j and
k is the general condition for di®erences between exchange and negotiation structures.
This proofs that inequality (5.15a) represents the necessary and su±cient condition for
a deviation between the negotiation and exchange structures. 2
C.2 Network Characterization
Starting from the non{cooperative bargaining model for pro¯t divisions as presented in
Chapter 5, we now prove that the condition for structural di®erences (viz. inequality
(5.15b)) can only be ful¯lled for those negatively connected networks with equally valued
relations in which (i) at least one actor i has three or more negotiation partners, and
(ii) i's partners are located on two or more structurally distinct positions (one of which
may be equivalent to i's).
Proof of Theorem 5.2 (page 132). The proof of (ii) is straightforward. It su±ces to
show that those negatively connected networks with equally valued relations are robust
(i.e. bargaining and exchange relations will coincide) in which the actors' bargaining
partners do not vary in terms of structural position. For that purpose, we start from
the fact that pik >p ij is, in the presence of an alternative partner k, necessary for i's
permanent exclusion of j. Since both pik and pij can be expressed in terms of network
control (see, eq. (5.11)), substituting and rearranging yields
pik >p ij () cj >c k : (C.5)
That is, the necessary condition for i's consistent exclusion of j is ful¯lled if and only if
j's network control cj exceeds k's network control ck. Structurally equivalent partners
always possess the same degree of network control (cf. eqs. (5.7a), (5.7b), (5.7c)). So,Appendix C Mathematical Details 191
if network members have only structurally equivalent partners (like, e.g. the actor at
the structural position B in the 3{Line A{B{A), they will never consistently exclude
a speci¯c actor and the respective negatively connected network will be robust. This
completes the proof of (ii).
To prove (i), it su±ces to show that those negatively connected structures with
distinct positions are robust in which all actors have at most two negotiation partners.
Such a bargaining structure is always a line, the smallest being the 3{Line (which, as
we already know, is robust). We therefore have to prove that exclusionary behavior
does not occur in a structure in which n>3 actors are chained.
Three features of line or chain structures simplify this task. First, there is always a
(¯ctitious or actual) center at which the left{hand side of the line may be distinguished
from its right{hand side. The sequence and type of structural positions (A,B,C,D) on
both sides of this center coincide, of course, and the position associated with the center
depends on the number of actors. Second, each line has two endpoints|an actor
located at the very end of the line (i.e. at position A) is, in contrast to all others, tied
to just one partner. Such an actor will never consistently exclude his only partner.
Third, if at all, exclusionary behavior will be displayed by those actors that are at
most two positions away from the end of the line. The reason is simple: the neighbor
of the actor residing at the end of the line has no incentives to consistently exclude his
fully dependent partner and his other neighbor (if he would permanently exclude the
latter, he would end up in a less pro¯table Dyad structure with the former).
We therefore can restrict the analysis to the part of the left{hand side of line
structures that begins with position B. And, the focus can be on just three actors
(j, i, k) who are consecutively chained (additional actors are indexed by h). Speci¯cally,
we assume that actor j is always at position B and that i, his neighbor at the right{
hand side, always is adjacent to actor k. This scenario re°ects that only the decision
situation of actor i with respect to the consistent exclusion of j has to be examined.
A closer look at short line structures is instructive:
4{Line: A{B{B{A or, written in terms of actors, h{j{i{k
The actors j and i are located at the same position, whereas j and k are not structurally
equivalent. Combining eqs. (5.7b), (5.8), (5.9) and (5.10), we therefore ¯nd
pik >p ij =0 :5 () cj = ci >c k : (C.6)
That is, the necessary condition for i's consistent exclusion of his neighbor j is ful¯lled.
However, the su±cient condition for the permanent exclusion of j is violated|i's ex-
clusionary behavior towards j would put him into a Dyad structure with k (i.e. he
would obtain just half of the pie in the match with k). Since he cannot improve his
situation by exclusionary behavior, i maintains the relation to j.192 Appendix C Mathematical Details
5{Line: A{B{C{B{A or, written in terms of actors, h1{j{i{k{h2
Here, the actors j and k are structurally equivalent. Because of eqs. (5.7b), (5.8), (5.9)
and (5.10), we therefore have
pik = pij () cj = ck ; (C.7)
the necessary condition for exclusionary behavior is not met. So, i does not exclude j.
6{Line: A{B{C{C{B{A or, written in terms of actors, h1{j{i{k{h2{h3
The actors j and k are not structurally equivalent, but i and k are. Combining eqs.
(5.7b), (5.8), (5.9) and (5.10), we therefore obtain
pik =0 :5 >p ij () cj >c k = ci : (C.8)
That is, the necessary condition for i's consistent exclusion of j is ful¯lled. However,
if i would always exclude j, he would be located at the endpoint of a 4{Line. And,
since k would be then i's only exchange partner, this situation would be associated
with a lower pro¯t p¤
ik than the status quo (in which he gets pik =0 :5). This violation
of the su±cient condition for exclusionary behavior ensures, of course, that i maintains
his relations with j and k.
7{Line: A{B{C{D{C{B{A or, written in terms of actors, h1{j{i{k{h2{h3{h4
The actors j, i, and k now reside at structurally distinct positions. Nevertheless, i and k
control their relations to the same degree (ci =0 :5=ck). This `control equivalence'
results because either actor has two partners each of which has the same number of
relations as well. Because of eqs. (5.7b), (5.8), (5.9) and (5.10), we therefore have
pik =0 :5 >p ij () cj >c k = ci : (C.9)
Again, the necessary condition for i's consistent exclusion of j is met. But if i would
permanently exclude j, he would be located at the very end of a 5{Line. And, since k
would be then his only exchange partner, his pro¯t share p¤
ik would be lower than
pik =0 :5. As a consequence, i will not exclude j.
In sum, neither of these lines decays into separate subnetworks. To complete the proof,
it remains to be shown that longer chains are also robust. Interestingly, the scenario
of the 7{Line is paradigmatic for each longer line structure. That is, in all chains
with n>7 actors, the pattern of the 7{Line can be found: while the actors j, i,
and k have structurally di®erent positions, there is always a control equivalence of i
and k. It therefore holds that pik =0 :5 >p ij () cj >c k = ci (C.9) such that
the necessary condition for i's consistent exclusion of j is met. If i would exclude j,
however, he would be located at the very end of a line with n ¡ 2 actors such that
p¤
ik <p ik =0 :5; this violation of the su±cient condition prevents, of course, that i
excludes j. In combination with the above results, this conclusion completes the proof
of (i). 2Samenvatting¤
In dit boek bestuderen we de productie van een surplus door, en de verdeling van dit
surplus tussen twee actoren. Een surplus is `iets extra' dat, indien geproduceerd, op de
een of andere manier tussen twee actoren verdeeld kan worden waarbij beide actoren
beter af zijn dan wanneer ze het surplus niet geproduceerd en verdeeld hadden. Het
boek stelt de productie en verdeling van een surplus volgens twee scenario's aan de
orde. In hoofdstuk 1 introduceren we deze scenario's. In hoofdstuk 2 tot en met 4
worden de productie en verdeling van een surplus in de context van sequentiele ruil
geanalyseerd. Dit scenario kan gezien worden als een vertrouwensprobleem tussen twee
actoren (Coleman 1990). De vraag of vertrouwen al dan niet wordt geschonken en of
daarom de productie van waardevolle hulpbronnen voor de productie van een surplus
al dan niet tot stand komt, staat in deze hoofdstukken centraal. Preciezer gezegd: we
bestuderen de e®ecten van temporele inbedding op de productie van een surplus.
Het tweede deel van het boek, hoofdstuk 5, richt zich op de verdeling van een
gerealiseerd surplus in plaats van op haar productie. Het scenario betreft twee actoren
die hun aandeel in het surplus middels onderhandelen bepalen, waarbij een vertraging
in het tot een overeenkomst komen over de verdeling van het surplus kostbaar is voor
de actoren. Dit onderhandelingsscenario komt overeen met het Alternating O®ers
Game,g e Ä ³ntroduceerd door Rubinstein (1982). De vraag waar wij een antwoord op
proberen te vinden is wie hoeveel van het surplus krijgt als over de verdeling wordt
onderhandeld. De kosten van de actoren die worden veroorzaakt door een vertraging
in het tot een overeenstemming komen, bepalen de verdeling. Deze kosten zijn exogeen
in Rubinstein's spel, terwijl wij ze juist endogeen proberen af te leiden. We stellen
dat deze kosten kunnen worden bepaald wanneer we niet een enkel paar actoren maar
een heel onderhandelingsnetwerk centraal stellen waarin paarsgewijze (dwz. dyadische)
onderhandelingen over de verdeling van een surplus mogelijk zijn. De kosten van het
uitstellen van een overeenkomst zijn voor een actor dan een functie van de positie van
die actor in zo'n onderhandelingsnetwerk.
¤I would like to thank Arount van de Rijt for translating the English version of this summary.
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Sequentiele ruil: de productie van een surplus
Laten we het basisscenario van sequentiele ruil beschouwen waarin een vertrouwengever
waardevolle hulpbronnen bezit die zij kan investeren in de productie van een surplus
door de vertrouwennemer.1 Een vertrouwennemer kan, zodra hij de hulpbronnen heeft
ontvangen, deze in zijn eigen belang of in het gemeenschappelijke belang van zichzelf
en de vertrouwengever gebruiken. Met andere woorden, hij kan het surplus dat ge-
produceerd is door de vertrouwengever op twee manieren verdelen: het hele surplus
voor zichzelf houden of het zo verdelen dat beide actoren ervan pro¯teren. Wanneer
de vertrouwengever geen medebeschikkingsrecht heeft bij de verdeling van het surplus,
moet zij bij het besluiten tussen wel of niet investeren inschatten hoe de vertrouwen-
nemer het surplus zal verdelen. De productie en de verdeling van een surplus kunnen
zo gezien worden als een vertrouwensprobleem in de zin van Coleman (1990: 97{99). In
dit boek conceptualiseren we zo'n vertrouwensprobleem als een vertrouwensspel (`Trust
Game', Dasgupta 1988; Kreps 1990a).
In onze analyse van het basisscenario van sequentiele ruil maken we drie cruciale
aannames. Ten eerste wordt het nut van een actor bepaald door zijn `stuk van de
taart' en geeft de actor de voorkeur aan een grote `taartpunt' boven een kleinere. Ten
tweede gedragen actoren zich volgens speltheoretische rationaliteit of volgen zij in ieder
geval een of ander principe van doelgericht handelen. Ten derde nemen we aan dat een
ontmoeting tussen twee actoren geÄ ³soleerd plaats vindt. Dat wil zeggen, er waren geen
eerdere of toekomstige interacties tussen de vertrouwengever en de vertrouwennemer,
noch waren er eerdere of toekomstige interacties waarbij andere actoren betrokken
waren. Onder deze drie aannames is de voorspelling dan dat vertrouwen niet wordt
geschonken, en als dat toch zou gebeuren, dat het gegeven vertrouwen zou worden
geschonden. Als de vertrouwennemer de hulpbronnen van de vertrouwengever heeft
ontvangen zou hij ze liever voor zijn eigenbelang aanwenden dan voor het gemeen-
schappelijke belang. Dit volgt uit onze eerste aanname. Volgens onze tweede aanname
kan de vertrouwengever op het gedrag van de vertrouwennemer anticiperen en zal zij
dus geen hulpbronnen ter beschikking stellen. Daardoor zal het surplus niet tot stand
komen. Beide actoren zijn dan echter slechter af in vergelijking tot de situatie waarbij
de hulpbronnen wel ter beschikking worden gesteld (vertrouwen wordt geschonken) en
het surplus zo verdeeld wordt dat beide actoren ervan pro¯teren (vertrouwen wordt
gehonoreerd).
Empirisch onderzoek en alledaagse waarneming leren dat de Pareto{verbetering,
waarbij vertrouwen wordt geschonken en gehonoreerd, dus het surplus tot stand komt
en zo wordt verdeeld dat beide actoren pro¯teren, soms feitelijk voorkomt (en dus dat
iets aan onze aannames onjuist is). In het eerste deel van het boek onderzoeken we hoe
dit kan worden verklaard. Er zijn een aantal benaderingen mogelijk. Men kan bijvoor-
1De vertrouwengever is degene die vertrouwen kan geven. De vertrouwennemer kan het gegeven
vertrouwen wel of niet kan honoreren. Ik gebruik vertrouwengever en vertrouwennemer als vertaling
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beeld de aanname dat nut gelijk staat aan de grootte van de `taartpunt' wat verzachten
en eerlijkheid, relatieve uitbetalingen of andere `zachte' aspecten in de nutsfuncties van
de actoren opnemen (zie bijvoorbeeld Bolton en Ockenfels 1998, 2000; Camerer 1997;
Kelley en Thibaut 1978; Nelson 2001; Rabin 1993, 1998; Snijders 1996). Theoretici
zoals Emerson (1972, 1981) stellen dat een meer sociologische benadering zich moet toe-
spitsen op variatie in sociale condities in plaats van op variatie in nut. In dit boek kiezen
we voor deze meer sociologische benadering: we betwisten niet zozeer de aannames over
nut, maar onderzoeken de rol die sociale condities spelen. We verzachten zo de derde
aanname terwijl we zo veel mogelijk vasthouden aan de eerste en de tweede. Hiervoor
nemen we situaties onder de loep waarbij actoren elkaar herhaaldelijk ontmoeten en de
ruil die plaatsvindt tussen hen temporeel ingebed is (Granovetter 1985; Raub en Weesie
2000). `Temporele inbedding' verwijst dus naar een serie uitwisselingen tussen de twee
actoren. In termen van het abstracte vertrouwensspel betekent dit dat het eenmalige
spel een aantal keren wordt herhaald. Dientengevolge is de onderzoeksvraag van het
eerste deel van het boek: Gegeven dat de productie en verdeling van een surplus gecon-
ceptualiseerd kunnen worden als een situatie van vertrouwen tussen twee actoren, welke
aspecten van temporele inbedding zijn dan van invloed op het schenken van vertrouwen
en zijn deze aspecten positief of negatief van invloed op het schenken van vertrouwen?
Vertrouwen: Effecten van het verleden
In hoofdstuk 1 worden argumenten besproken waarom we ons richten op temporele
inbedding bij het verklaren van het tot stand komen van een surplus. Een speci¯ek
aspect van temporele inbedding, `de schaduw van de toekomst', is tamelijk uitvoerig
bestudeerd in de literatuur (zie bijvoorbeeld, Axelrod 1984; Maynard Smith 1982; Tay-
lor 1987; Trivers 1971). Men heeft laten zien dat het gedrag van een actor afhankelijk
is van het verwachte e®ect ervan op toekomstige interacties. In hoofdstuk 2 wordt
deze bevinding als gegeven beschouwd. De vraag is hier of naast de `schaduw van de
toekomst' ook de `schaduw van het verleden' van invloed is op het gedrag van een ac-
tor. Zulke e®ecten van het verleden zijn minder uitvoerig bestudeerd in de literatuur.
Echter, wanneer we temporele inbedding beschouwen als een mogelijke `oplossing' voor
de productie en verdeling van een surplus, moeten we ook weten of, en wanneer dat
zo is, en hoe het verleden het huidige gedrag van een actor beÄ ³nvloedt. Om te begin-
nen kiezen we ervoor de e®ecten van het verleden op beslissingen te bestuderen in de
context van sociale dilemma's. Een sociaal dilemma is een situatie waarin individu-
ele en collectieve belangen con°icteren en rationele en egoÄ ³stische actoren uitkomen
op een ine±ciÄ ent (Pareto suboptimaal) evenwicht. Het vertrouwensspel en het gevan-
genendilemma zijn voorbeelden van zulke dilemmasituaties. Hoofdstuk 2 richt zich op
het vergelijken van twee situaties die op ¶ e¶ en aspect na identiek zijn: de ene situatie
kent een verleden, de andere niet. In alle andere opzichten, zoals de alternatieven en
uitbetalingen, zijn de situaties hetzelfde. Bovendien is minstens ¶ e¶ en van deze situaties
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We presenteren een simpele theorie die gebaseerd is op speltheorie met complete in-
formatie. Deze theorie voorspelt dat er geen verschil in gedrag zou moeten zijn tussen
de situatie zonder verleden en de situatie met verleden. Het argument hiervoor is
eenvoudig. Wanneer actoren zich gedragen in overeenstemming met onze gedragsaan-
names zoals hierboven beschreven, dan bevat het verleden geen informatie die actoren
ertoe zou brengen hun beslissingen zoals genomen in de situatie zonder verleden te ve-
randeren. Hun gedrag zou daarom hetzelfde moeten zijn in de situatie zonder verleden
en die met verleden.
We zetten dit argument iets formeler op en introduceren eerst een situatie genoemd
spel A. Dan presenteren we een tweede, gecompliceerdere situatie, spel B. Dit tweede
spel lijkt op de situatie bij spel A, maar wordt gekarakteriseerd door voorafgaande
acties door de actoren van spel A of andere actoren. Deze voorafgaande acties vormen
een uitbreiding van spel A in de zin dat spel A een deelspel is van het grotere spel B.2
Dit deelspel wordt spel AB (lees: `spel A in B') genoemd. Aangezien het voor onze
simpele theorie nodig is dat spel AB en spel A identiek zijn, vormen de `voorafgaande
acties' in spel B slechts op twee manieren een uitbreiding van spel A. Ten eerste kan
spel B een herhaalde versie van spel A zijn en ten tweede staan de `voorafgaande acties'
niet ter beschikking aan minstens ¶ e¶ en actor in spel A. Op die manier wordt spel B een
spel waarvan spel AB een van de mogelijke deelspelen is. De voorspelling dat het gedrag
in spel A en spel AB niet zal verschillen wordt geconfronteerd met bevindingen van drie
verschillende experimenten.
Eerst vergelijken we een variant van een dictatorspel (spel A) met een
vertrouwensspel (spel B). In beide spelen zijn er twee actoren: ego en alter. In de vari-
ant van het dictatorspel kan alter een surplus evenredigf verdelen tussen zichzelf en ego
of het gehele surplus voor zichzelf houden. Ego is een `dummy' speler die in het dicta-
torspel geen handeling verricht. In het vertrouwensspel begint ego met de keuze tussen
het schenken dan wel onthouden van vertrouwen. Als ego geen vertrouwen schenkt,
eindigt het spel met een zekere uitbetaling voor beide actoren. Echter, wanneer ego
wel vertrouwen schenkt, begint deelspel spel AB dat identiek is aan het dictatorspel.
Wanneer alter zich gedraagt volgens onze bovengemaakte aannames, zou zijn gedrag
in spel AB en spel A gelijk moeten zijn, ook al is het ego's handeling in spel B die alter
de kans geeft een beslissing in spel AB te maken. Experimentele bevindingen (Snijders
en Keren 1997) spreken onze theorie echter tegen. Zij die in experimenten zoals in
spel B de rol van alter vervullen verdelen het surplus in 73.5% van de gevallen gelijk.
Zij honoreren dus in het algemeen vertrouwen. In spel A, echter, kiest slechts 35.5%
van alle alters voor een gelijke verdeling van het surplus.
Op soortgelijke wijze richten we onze aandacht op ego's gedrag in een
vertrouwensspel (spel A) in vergelijking met zijn gedrag in een vertrouwensspel met
onderpand (spel B). In het laatstgenoemde spel besluit alter om al dan niet een onder-
2Simpel gesteld is een deelspel dat stuk van een geheel spel dat volgt op de speelgeschiedenis tot
dat moment. Zie voor een formele de¯nitie van een deelspel bijvoorbeeld Rasmusen (1994: 94).Summary in Dutch 197
pand in te zetten voordat ego de beslissing maakt wel of niet vertrouwen te schenken.
Het inzetten van het onderpand maakt het minder gunstig voor alter om het surplus te
houden in plaats van het evenredig te verdelen.3 Dit maakt vervolgens het schenken van
vertrouwen veiliger voor ego. In onze studie over e®ecten van het verleden, richten we
ons op situaties waar alter geen onderpand inzet. Ego en alter spelen dan een deelspel
spel AB dat identiek is aan spel A, het vertrouwensspel. Experimentele evidentie (Snij-
ders 1996) wijst uit dat een beslissing van alter om geen onderpand in te zetten de kans
dat ego vertrouwen schenkt, gemiddeld genomen over verschillende speluitbetalingen,
met 0:10 vermindert vergeleken met de kans dat zij dat doet in spel A.
Ten slotte vergelijken we ego's gedrag in een gevangenendilemma zonder onderpand
(spel A) met zijn gedrag in een gevangenendilemma met onderpand (spel B). In beide
spelen kiezen ego en alter tegelijkertijd tussen cooperatie en defectie. In het laatste spel
mogen ego en alter voor deze beslissingen een onderpand inzetten dat defectie een on-
aantrekkelijke zet maakt. Als zowel ego en alter het nalaten een onderpand in te zetten
bereiken ze het deelspel spel AB dat identiek is aan spel A, het gevangenendilemma zon-
der onderpand. Experimentele evidentie van Mlicki (1996) toont aan dat defectie vaker
in spel AB wordt gekozen dan in spel A: ongeveer 91% versus 74%.
Uit de analyse van deze drie verschillende experimenten blijkt dat het gedrag in de
situatie zonder verleden verschilt van het gedrag in de situatie met verleden. We con-
cluderen uit de analyse in hoofdstuk 2 dat verleden er inderdaad toe doet. Een theorie
over gedrag die geen rekening houdt met het verleden van een spel leidt duidelijk tot
inadequate gedragsvoorspellingen. We stellen daarom twee hoofduitbreidingen voor
van de theorie zoals beschreven in hoofdstuk 2. Ten eerste wordt besproken hoe de ex-
perimentele bevindingen verklaard zouden kunnen worden wanneer we gebruik maken
van complexere nutsargumenten die de stricte aanname dat nut gelijk is aan de grootte
van de `taartpunt' verzachten. Aangezien we in eerste instantie liever niet nutsaan-
names problematiseren, maar verschillen in gedrag willen verklaren met verschillen in
sociale situaties, concentreren we ons verder op de complexere informatiestructuur die
voortkomt uit het verleden van het spel. Met andere woorden, we nemen aan dat het
verleden van spel B een actor in spel AB informatie verschaft. Zulke informatie zou
echter niet relevant moeten zijn volgens onze simpele theorie. Proefpersonen gedragen
zich echter zo dat het lijkt alsof ze belang hechten aan zulke informatie en hun gedrag
daaraan aanpassen.4 In hoofdstuk 3 bouwen we verder op de bevinding dat verleden
3Een onderpand is de vertrouwennemer wat waard en bij het schenden van vertrouwen verliest hij
het onderpand wat de waarde van het houden van het gehele surplus vermindert. Zie bijvoorbeeld
Schelling (1960) voor een bespreking van onderpanden in sociale interacties, Raub en Keren (1993)
voor een theoretische analyse en eerdere empirisch evidentie, en Weesie en Raub (1996) voor een
algemene verhandeling over onderpanden.
4Een voorbeeld ter illustratie: Ego's beslissing in een vertrouwensspel waar vertrouwen is
geschonken lijkt op een dictatorspel (zie het eerste hierboven beschreven experiment). Aangezien
alter's zet in het vertrouwensspel ego's alternatieven en uitbetalingen onveranderd laat, zou ego's
gedrag niet mogen verschillen van zijn gedrag in een dictatorspel. Alter's beslissing brengt echter ego
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ertoe doet. We presenteren een model waarin actoren van het verleden leren en daar-
naast met hun toekomstverwachtingen rekening houden bij het bepalen van hun gedrag
in een huidige situatie.
Vertrouwen en dyadisch sociaal kapitaal: theorie
Hoofdstuk 3 stelt tegelijkertijd de e®ecten van het verleden en de toekomst op gedrag
aan de orde. We proberen een antwoord te krijgen op de vraag welke e®ecten van tem-
porele inbedding de productie van een surplus bevorderen dan wel in de weg staan.
Net als in hoofdstuk 2 is de productie van een surplus geconceptualiseerd binnen een
vertrouwensspel. Door het vertrouwensspel te herhalen kunnen we systematisch on-
derzoeken welke aspecten van het verleden en de toekomst van invloed zijn op de
productie van een surplus. Onze hypothesen over het gedrag van de vertrouwengever
zijn gebaseerd op een eenvoudig idee. Of de vertrouwengever wel of niet investeert
in de productie van een surplus hangt af van de hoeveelheid sociaal kapitaal in haar
relatie met de vertrouwennemer. We nemen aan dat sociaal kapitaal voortkomt door
de interacties uit het verleden met de vertrouwennemer (het `leer e®ect') maar ook de
gemeenschappelijke toekomst van hun relatie weerspiegelt (het `controle e®ect'). Daar-
bij wordt aangenomen dat het gedrag van de vertrouwennemer een simpele vuist regel
volgt: hoe groter de belangen die op het spel staan, des te meer sociaal kapitaal is nodig
om de vertrouwengever ertoe te brengen de noodzakelijke hulpbronnen te verscha®en
voor de productie van een surplus. De grootte van belangen hangt af van hoeveel de
vertrouwengever kan winnen of verliezen door het schenken van vertrouwen, maar ook
van hoeveel de vertrouwennemer kan winnen door het schenden van vertrouwen. We
gebruiken de uitbetalingsratio's Risico := P1¡S1
R1¡S1 en Verleiding := T2¡R2
T2¡S1 als maten
voor belangen in het spel.5 Het Risico kan uit het idee van subjectief verwacht nut
worden afgeleid (Snijders 1996: h. 2; Coleman 1990: 97{102) terwijl de Verleiding
volgt uit een schuld{model (Snijders 1996: h. 2). Snijders laat met een experiment
met eenmalige vertrouwensspelen zien dat de kans dat de vertrouwengever vertrouwen
schenkt afneemt naarmate Risico en Verleiding groter worden.
De uitkomsten van interacties uit het verleden geven informatie die het mogelijk
maakt te leren. Informatie uit eerdere ervaringen kan zowel van positieve als van
negatieve aard zijn. Informatie is negatief als de vertrouwennemer eerder het gehele
surplus `opeiste'. Informatie is positief als het surplus zo werd verdeeld dat zowel de
vertrouwengever als de vertrouwennemer ervan pro¯teerden. We nemen aan dat de
voorraad sociaal kapitaal afneemt met negatieve uitkomsten maar toeneemt met posi-
tieve uitkomsten. We nemen ook aan dat de mate waarin de voorraad kapitaal krimpt
of groeit afhangt van de eerdere situatie, namelijk, van hoe laag of hoe hoog de belangen
waren die op het spel stonden. Laten we bijvoorbeeld aannemen dat de vertrouwen-
5Als in het vertrouwensspel de vertrouwengever geen vertrouwen geeft, verdienen zij en de
vertrouwennemer respectievelijk P1 en P2. Als geschonken vertrouwen wordt gehonoreerd, verdienen ze
respectievelijk R1 en R2. Als geschonken vertrouwen wordt geschonden, ontvangt de vertrouwengever
S1 terwijl de vertrouwennemer T2 krijgt. De uitbetalingen zijn als volgt geordend: R1 >P 1 >S 1 en
T2 >R 2 >P 2.Summary in Dutch 199
nemer het gehele surplus heeft gehouden en vertrouwen heeft geschonden. Hoe hoger
het surplus was, hoe groter de verleiding voor de vertrouwennemer was en des te meer
het door de vertrouwengever kan worden `geaccepteerd' dat het surplus in zijn geheel
door de vertrouwennemer is gehouden. Een uitkomst waar de vertrouwennemer een
hoger surplus voor zichzelf houdt is dus minder verrassend voor de vertrouwengever.
Het sociaal kapitaal neemt dan af, maar in mindere mate dan wanneer een kleiner
surplus door de vertrouwennemer wordt geÄ ³ncasseerd. We beschouwen een vertrouwen-
nemer die een klein surplus voor zichzelf houdt dus als minder te vertrouwen dan
een vertrouwennemer die een groot surplus voor zichzelf houdt. Op dezelfde manier
draagt het delen van een groot surplus meer bij aan sociaal kapitaal dan het delen van
een kleiner surplus. Daarnaast nemen we aan dat een vertrouwengever meer belang
hecht aan uitkomsten uit het recente verleden dan aan die uit het verre verleden: hij
verdisconteert dus uitkomsten uit het verleden.
Het tweede aspect van temporele inbedding is de toekomst die de vertrouwengever
en vertrouwennemer samen hebben. Als de vertrouwengever en vertrouwennemer elkaar
nog een keer zullen tegenkomen heeft de vertrouwengever de mogelijkheid te reageren
op het huidige gedrag van de vertrouwennemer. Dit wordt reciprociteit genoemd. Goed
gedrag van de vertrouwennemer kan worden beloond door het ter beschikking stellen
van in de toekomst van nut zijnde hulpbronnen. Aan de andere kant kan slecht gedrag
worden bestraft door het niet meer ter beschikking stellen van hulpbronnen in toekom-
stige interacties. De vertrouwennemer loopt dan zijn aandeel in toekomstige opbreng-
sten mis. Hoe langer de wederzijdse toekomst, des te groter het sociaal kapitaal van de
vertrouwengever, aangezien er meer mogelijkheden zijn het gedrag van de vertrouwen-
nemer te beantwoorden. Dit wordt het controle e®ect van de toekomst genoemd. De
e®ectiviteit van het controle e®ect hangt af van de omvang van de mogelijke toekom-
stige opbrengsten. Bijvoorbeeld, een groot surplus aan zich voorbij zien gaan is een
zwaardere sanctie voor de vertrouwennemer dan het mislopen van een kleiner surplus.
Hoe vaker er transacties in de toekomst zullen zijn, des te groter het huidige sociaal
kapitaal van de vertrouwengever.
De theorie van sociaal kapitaal zoals we die in hoofdstuk 3 hebben ontwikkeld voorspelt
hoe het geven van vertrouwen afhankelijk is van temporele inbedding. Een toepass-
ing van hoe actoren in werkelijkheid omgaan met vertrouwenskwesties is te vinden in
het inkoopmanagement van bedrijven. In hoofdstuk 4 staan daarom relaties tussen
inkopers en leveranciers centraal. We nemen aan dat economische transacties gezien
kunnen worden als (een variant van) een vertrouwensspel. In het algemeen is er in
economische transacties sprake van een tijdsvertraging tussen het moment waarop de
transactie geregeld wordt en de werkelijke levering. Deze tijdsvertraging creÄ eert allerlei
onzekerheden voor de inkoper (`probleempotentieel'). Voorbeelden zijn dat goederen
te laat worden geleverd of in het geheel niet. Voor bepaalde transacties zal dit prob-
leempotentieel hoog zijn, bijvoorbeeld als het transactievolume groot is of als de gevol-
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onzekerheden te accepteren laat de controle over aan de leverancier en geeft in die zin
vertrouwen. In hoofdstuk 4 wordt aangenomen dat inkopende ondernemingen proberen
het noodzakelijke vertrouwen te verminderen door tijd en moeite te steken in ex ante
management van de transactie. Zo investeren ze in het onderhandelen over contractuele
overeenkomsten. Het tre®en van veel voorzorgsmaatregelen voor transacties duidt op
een gebrek aan vertrouwen in de vertrouwennemer. Anderzijds beschrijft Macaulay
(1963) dat inkopers en leveranciers vaak zulke contractuele investeringen beperken ten
gunste van vertrouwen in de partner. Wanneer de inkoper herhaaldelijk zaken doet met
dezelfde leverancier (temporele inbedding), wordt de investering van de inkoper in ex
ante management niet alleen bepaald door het probleempotentieel van de huidige trans-
actie, maar ook door hun gemeenschappelijke verleden en hun verwachte toekomst.6
In hoofdstuk 4 stellen we dat de theorie van sociaal kapitaal bij vertrouwen ook ge-
bruikt kan worden voor het voorspellen van de investering van de inkoper in het ex
ante management van de betre®ende transactie. In hoofdstuk 4 worden de hypotheses
uit hoofdstuk 3 getoetst in het speci¯eke geval van inkoper{leverancierrelaties.
Vertrouwen en dyadisch sociaal kapitaal: empirische resultaten
Hypothesen over het gedrag van de vertrouwengever in een temporele setting wor-
den in eerste instantie getoetst met laboratorium experimenten (hoofdstuk 3). De
proefpersonen waren hoofdzakelijk eerstejaars studenten sociologie van de Ludwig{
Maximilian Universiteit in MÄ unchen. Zij kregen een aantal herhaalde vertrouwensprob-
lemen voorgeschoteld en moesten daarbij in de rol van de vertrouwengever beslissingen
nemen; ze moesten dus beslissen al dan niet vertrouwen te schenken. De beslissin-
gen van de proefpersonen werden gemeten met de strategie{methode (zie Roth 1995).
Voor elk mogelijk verloop van het spel moeten proefpersonen aangeven hoe ze zich
zouden gedragen. Deze methode maakt het mogelijk informatie over het gedrag van
de proefpersoon in verschillende condities van temporele inbedding te verzamelen.
Ten tweede bekijken we of onze hypotheses over vertrouwen in een temporele setting
een toets buiten het sociologische laboratorium kunnen doorstaan. In hoofdstuk 4 wor-
den daartoe gegevens over inkoper{leverancierrelaties in de Nederlandse IT{industrie
gebruikt. (`The External Management of Automation', MAT, zie Buskens en Baten-
burg 2000). Zoals boven beschreven, kan de investering van de inkoper in het ex ante
management van de transactie worden gezien als een benadering van het gebrek aan
vertrouwen van de inkoper in de leverancier. De data bevatten informatie om te beo-
6Het probleempotentieel van de transactie kan worden geÄ ³nterpreteerd in termen van de uitbetalin-
gen of verschillen in uitbetalingen in het vertrouwensspel. Het probleempotentieel van een transactie
wordt geoperationaliseerd via het ¯nanciÄ ele volume van de transactie en het opportunismepotentieel
van de leverancier. Het ¯nanciÄ ele volume dient als een algemene maat voor het verlies van de inkoper
wanneer vertrouwen wordt geschonden (nl., P1 ¡ S1 versus R1 ¡ S1) maar ook als een maat voor de
drijfveer van de leverancier om vertrouwen te misbruiken (nl., T2 ¡ R2). Het opportunismepotentieel
wordt afgeleid als een gewogen gemiddelde van het schadepotentieel en de toezichtproblemen (alsmede
het ¯nanciÄ ele volume van de transactie). Het schadepotentieel geeft weer `hoe erg het zou zijn' wan-
neer zou blijken dat het geleverde product niet productief kan worden gebruikt en re°ecteert direct
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ordelen hoeveel tijd en moeite de inkoper heeft geÄ ³nvesteerd in het ex ante management
van de betre®ende transactie.
Tabel 6.1 in hoofdstuk 6 biedt een overzicht van de hypotheses en van de re-
sultaten van de experimenten en het survey{onderzoek. De laatste twee kolommen
van tabel 6.1 laten zien dat onze bevindingen uit beide toetsen redelijk met elkaar
overeenkomen. De hypotheses over het negatieve e®ect van toenemend risico in een
lopende transactie worden bevestigd in beide analyses. In de experimentele toetsing
wordt gevonden dat een toename in de belangen die op het spel staan (Risico en
Verleiding) de kans laat afnemen dat de vertrouwengever vertrouwen schenkt. Ook
de surveydata laten zien dat een toename in zowel het volume als het opportunisme-
potentieel van een lopende transactie een positief e®ect heeft op de investering van de
inkoper in ex ante management. Een meer risicovolle lopende transactie gaat samen
met minder bereidheid van de inkoper om de leverancier te vertrouwen en dit zet hem
aan tot meer investeringen in het ex ante management van de betre®ende transactie.
We vinden in beide datasets ook evidentie voor het veronderstelde leer e®ect van
het verleden. Uit de experimentele data blijkt dat de kans dat de vertrouwengever
vertrouwen schenkt hoger is bij een succesvol verleden waarin vertrouwen werd
gehonoreerd door de vertrouwennemer. Daarnaast vinden we evidentie voor een
negatief e®ect op de kans dat de vertrouwengever vertrouwen schenkt als het ooit eerder
is geschonden. In de surveydata kan helaas geen onderscheid worden gemaakt tussen
positieve en negatieve ervaringen. Voor inkopers die eerder transacties hadden met
dezelfde leverancier waren die transacties over het algemeen genomen positief. We kun-
nen aannemen dat negatieve ervaring inkopers ertoe heeft bewogen nieuwe leveranciers
te zoeken. Met de surveydata kan daarom alleen de hypothese over het e®ect van een
succesvol verleden getoetst worden. Een goed verleden met de huidige leverancier laat
de management{investering van de inkoper afnemen. Voor de inkoper{leverancier re-
laties met een verleden bekijken we verder of het aantal eerdere transacties daarnaast
nog een negatief e®ect heeft op de investering van de inkoper in het beperken van
risico's. De data bevestigen dit inderdaad. Inkopers die aangeven een gemeenschap-
pelijk verleden met de huidige leverancier te hebben investeerden signi¯cant minder
in ex ante management wanneer die transacties frequenter hadden plaatsgevonden (zie
tabel 4.6 in hoofdstuk 4).
Door beperkingen in de surveydata kunnen twee hypotheses over de e®ecten van
het verleden alleen op de experimentele data worden getoetst. Ten eerste stellen we dat
eerdere uitkomsten worden verdisconteerd. Hiervoor wordt ondersteuning gevonden.
Ten tweede nemen we aan dat de kans dat de vertrouwengever vertrouwen schenkt,
ceteris paribus, niet afhangt van of vertrouwen in een eerder spel niet was geschonken
of dat dit spel Ä uberhaupt niet is gespeeld. De experimentele data bieden hiervoor
enige, maar geen eensluidende evidentie. Wat betreft de inkoper{leverancier data zou
dit betekenen dat zolang de inkoper geen interactie heeft gehad met de leverancier (en
ook geen informatie over het gedrag van de leverancier heeft verkregen uit interacties
met anderen), hij niets kan leren over de leverancier. Met de surveydata kan deze202 Summary in Dutch
hypothese niet worden getoetst. De MAT{data bevat geen informatie of leveranciers
in eerdere transacties reeds potentiÄ ele maar geen daadwerkelijke leverancier waren.
De hypothese over het controle e®ect van de toekomst kan echter wel met beide
datasets worden getoetst. Deze hypothese stelt dat hoe langer de verwachte toekomst
is, des te waarschijnlijker het is dat een vertrouwengever vertrouwen schenkt. De exper-
imentele data bevestigen dit controle e®ect. De inkoper{leverancier data laten geen ef-
fect van de toekomst zien. Dit resultaat wijst echter mogelijk op een aanzienlijk verschil
tussen het experiment zoals besproken in hoofdstuk 3 en de inkoper{leverancierrelaties
van hoofdstuk 4. In het experiment toetsen we het `werkelijke' controle e®ect dat
werkt via het tit{for{tat mechanisme van reciprociteit. In de relatie van de inkoper
met de leverancier zouden de verschillende mogelijkheden voor reciprociteit op dezelfde
manier tot mindere investeringen in management moeten leiden. Daarnaast kan het
inkoopmanagement echter ook afhangen van wat we het investeringse®ect noemen.
Zo'n e®ect suggereert meer investeringen bij een langere verwachte toekomst. Het idee
is dat management{investeringen kunnen worden hergebruikt voor het veilig stellen
van toekomstige transacties. Het controle e®ect zou op die manier afgezet moeten
worden tegen het investeringse®ect zodat de MAT{data mogelijkerwijs geen e®ect van
verwachte toekomstige transactie op het ex ante management van de huidige transactie
konden laten zien.
Tenslotte zijn er twee hypothesen waarvoor geen empirische ondersteuning wordt
gevonden in de twee datasets. Enerzijds voorspelden we een interactie tussen uitkom-
sten in het verleden en de inzet van het betre®ende spel in het verleden, anderzijds
tussen de lengte van de verwachte toekomst en de inzet van de toekomstige spelen. De
experimentele data laten noch een interactie tussen positieve uitkomsten in het verleden
en Verleiding noch tussen negatieve uitkomsten in het verleden en verleiding zien.
Ook blijken het eerdere volume en opportunismepotentieel geen signi¯cante interactie
met succesvolle transacties in het verleden te hebben.7 De interactie die we voorspelden
over de lengte van de verwachte toekomst en de Verleiding in deze toekomstige spe-
len wordt ook niet ondersteund door de experimentele data. Aangezien de surveydata
niet de noodzakelijke informatie bevat over toekomstige transacties, kan deze hypothese
hiermee niet worden getoetst.
Samengevat duidt de empirische toets van onze hypothesen erop dat het schenken
van vertrouwen door een vertrouwengever of inkoper theoretisch het best kan worden
omschreven als een functie van drie verschillende kenmerken van temporele inbed-
ding: de inzet van het huidige spel, de uitkomsten in het verleden en de lengte van de
toekomst. Een sociaal kapitaal model dat deze drie kenmerken bevat wordt in hoofd-
stuk 3 een simpel sociaal kapitaal model genoemd. Bij een complex sociaal kapitaal
model wordt ook rekening gehouden met kenmerken van transacties in het verleden
en de toekomst. Onze data wijzen uit dat het simpele sociaal kapitaal model voldoet
7Bedenk hierbij dat de MAT{data geen informatie over onsuccesvolle zaken in het verleden met
de huidige leverancier bevatten. De interactie tussen de belangen die op het spel stonden en een
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voor de verklaring van waargenomen gedrag in experimentele vertrouwensspelen en
IT{transacties.
Vertrouwen: suggesties voor verder onderzoek
Noch de experimentele noch de survey data verscha®en ons evidentie voor het be-
lang van eerdere of latere spelinzetten. Zoals we uitvoeriger bespraken in hoofdstuk 4,
bevatten de surveydata niet de noodzakelijke variabelen om op een goede manier de
belangen die in het verleden en de toekomst op het spel staan of stonden te meten
(nl., het volume en opportunismepotentieel van transacties in het verleden en in de
toekomst). Met de experimentele data daarentegen kunnen inzetten in het verleden en
de toekomst wel worden geconceptualiseerd, door middel van Risico en Verleiding.
Hoe kan het nu dat we geen e®ect van inzetten in eerdere en latere spelen vinden?
Bedenk dat er slechts twee verschillende uitbetalingsstructuren in de experimenten aan
de orde kwamen. Toen we de experimenten ontwierpen waren er goede redenen om ons
te beperken tot twee uitbetalingsstructuren. In verder onderzoek zou het e®ect van
inzetten in het verleden en in de toekomst of gedrag in herhaalde vertrouwensspelen
echter wel grondig moeten worden onderzocht. Hiervoor zijn experimenten nodig met
herhaalde vertrouwensspelen en veel verschillende Risico{e nVerleiding{ratio's.
Wanneer we meer dan slechts lage en hoge inzetten kunnen onderscheiden zal het
aantal experimentele condities echter enorm toenemen.8 Al hoeft men niet elke uitbe-
talingscombinatie te gebruiken, voor een experimenteel design met een grotere variantie
in inzetten is een hoger aantal proefpersonen nodig.
Ten tweede namen we in het kapitaalvoorraadmodel aan dat uitkomsten uit het
verleden worden verdisconteerd. Zoals we hierboven beschreven volgt uit deze assump-
tie bijvoorbeeld dat vertrouwenschending vergeven kan worden of dat ook een goed
lopende (vertrouwensvolle) relatie inspanningen nodig heeft om haar goede staat te
behouden. De analyses in hoofdstuk 3 laten zien dat uitkomsten in het verleden in-
derdaad worden verdisconteerd. Het ligt voor de hand deze bevinding te generaliseren
naar gevallen van meer dan twee tijdsperiodes en naar een sociaal kapitaalmodel met
exponentiÄ ele verdiscontering van vroegere uitkomsten. Een model met exponentiÄ ele
verdiscontering is echter slechts ¶ e¶ en mogelijkheid. Rationele{keuzemodellen nemen
in het algemeen tijdsconsistent gedrag aan. Dit impliceert exponentiÄ ele verdisconter-
ing (zie Becker 1996). Aan de andere kant wijst evidentie uit zowel experimenteel
als survey onderzoek erop (bijv., Braun 1998: h. 4; Fehr en Zych 1998; Loewenstein
en Elster 1992) dat gedrag soms tijdsinconsistent is. Zulk gedrag wordt voorspeld
uit hyperbolische verdisconteringsmodellen. Zouden deze empirische bevindingen dan
suggereren dat ook het verleden hyperbolisch in plaats van exponentieel wordt verdis-
conteerd? De experimentele resultaten van hoofdstuk 3 zijn gebaseerd op maximaal
twee herhalingen van het vertrouwensspel. Een antwoord op hoe het verleden wordt
8Bedenk dat we al 2 £ 2 £ 4 £ 8 = 128 verschillende uitbetalingscombinaties hadden die lage en
hoge inzetten in het verleden hadden in combinatie met twee eenmalige spelen, een een{keer{herhaald
spel, en een twee{keer{herhaald spel.204 Summary in Dutch
verdisconteerd kan daarom niet op basis van de ons ter beschikking staande exper-
imentele data worden gegeven. Het is echter een interessante vraag en het zou de
moeite waard zijn om onderzoek op te zetten waarin vertrouwensspelen vaker wor-
den herhaald dan in onze studie. Uiteraard is `een aantal keer' vaag. Het precieze
aantal herhalingen van het vertrouwensspel waarbij een bevredigende toets van ver-
schillende hypotheses over verdiscontering mogelijk wordt is moeilijk te geven. Een
vier{keer{herhaald vertrouwensspel is waarschijnlijk een goed begin, maar tien keer
herhalen is natuurlijk veel beter. Een bruikbaar design voor het simultaan meten van
de e®ecten van inzetten in het verleden en in de toekomst zou een vier{keer{herhaald
vertrouwensspel zijn met meer dan twee verschillende uitbetalingsstructuren.
Een laatste opmerking betreft de a°eiding van de hypotheses in hoofdstuk 3 en
hoofdstuk 4. In beide hoofdstukken werd aangenomen dat het gedrag van respec-
tievelijk de vertrouwengever en de vertrouwennemer afhankelijk is van een sociaal{
kapitaalvoorraad. Deze aanname wordt in grote mate ondersteund door de empirische
bevindingen. Echter, om tot deze hypotheses te komen gebruiken we verbale theo-
rie. Met het model zoals gepresenteerd in hoofdstuk 3 kunnen geen gedetailleerde
voorspellingen over het gedrag van de vertrouwengever worden gemaakt, zoals voor-
spellingen over hoeveel de kapitaalvoorraad precies groeit na een positieve uitkomst in
een spel met een inzet gerepresenteerd door een Verleiding van zeg 0.85. Een formeel
model zou mogelijk maken het relatieve e®ect van leren ten opzichte van controle te
voorspellen. Anders gezegd, men zou misschien in staat zijn een antwoord te krijgen
op de vraag of het verleden dan wel de toekomst belangrijker is in een bepaalde situ-
atie. Tenslotte zou in zo'n model de beslissing van de vertrouwengever om al dan niet
vertrouwen te schenken moeten worden geconceptualiseerd als een gevolg van maxi-
maliserend gedrag gegeven de speci¯eke temporele inbedding.
Vertraagde overeenkomst en onderhandelen: de verdeling van
een surplus
In het tweede deel van het boek, hoofdstuk 5, wordt de verdeling van een surplus
behandeld als een `Alternating O®ers Game' waarin twee actoren onderhandelen over
hun aandeel in het surplus (Rubinstein 1982). In het spel wordt aangenomen dat ego
en alter om beurten voorstellen en tegenvoorstellen doen over de verdeling van een
surplus totdat ze tot een overeenkomst komen. Elke keer dat ego een voorstel doet
heeft alter de keuze het voorstel of te accepteren of het af te wijzen om vervolgens
op het daaropvolgende tijdstip met een eigen voorstel te komen. Ego kan dan op
zijn beurt alter's voorstel accepteren dan wel afwijzen en later met een nieuw voorstel
komen; enzovoort. Echter, het uitstellen van een overeenkomst levert de actoren kosten
op. Deze kosten komen terug in de verdisconteringsfactoren van de actoren die een
indicatie geven van hun geduld bij het uitstellen van de overeenkomst over de verdeling
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Net zoals in het eerste deel van het boek maken we bepaalde aannames over het
gedrag van ego en alter. Ten eerste nemen we aan dat de actoren zich geen zorgen
hoeven te maken over de totstandkoming van het surplus. Het te verdelen surplus
is beschikbaar. Ten tweede nemen we wederom aan dat het nut van een actor wordt
gegeven door de grootte van zijn of haar taartpunt en dat de actor liever een groot stuk
heeft dan een kleiner stuk. Tenslotte nemen we ook aan dat de actoren zich gedragen
volgens speltheoretische rationaliteit, dat wil zeggen: zij volgen Nash evenwichtgedrag.
Rubinstein (1982) laat zien dat onder deze aannames een evenwicht bestaat waarbij
de verdeling van een surplus alleen afhangt van de ratio van de verdisconteringsfactoren
van de actoren. Anders gezegd, het surplus wordt verdeeld naar rato van het geduld
dat de actoren hebben bij het uitstellen van de overeenkomst over de verdeling van
het surplus. Een actor die geduldiger is ondervindt lagere kosten bij vertraging en
kan langer wachten, wat zijn onderhandelingspositie ten goede komt. We laten in
hoofdstuk 5 zien hoe `geduldig zijn' kan worden vertaald in de absolute onderhand-
elingssterkte (`bargaining power') van een actor.
De kosten van het uitstellen van de overeenkomst, en dus hun absolute onderhan-
delingssterktes, zijn in Rubinstein's model exogeen. Om tot voorspellingen te komen
over de verdeling van het surplus en om die met experimentele evidentie te toetsen
is informatie nodig over de onderhandelingssterktes van de actoren. We verrijken het
scenario van dyadisch onderhandelen met een sociologisch relevante uitbreiding waaruit
de onderhandelingssterktes van de actoren worden afgeleid. In hoofdstuk 5 volgen we
Emerson (1972, 1981) door aan te nemen dat ruil tussen twee actoren niet onafhanke-
lijk moet worden gezien van hun relaties met andere actoren. Dyadisch onderhandelen
wordt beÄ ³nvloed door de inbedding van de actoren in een netwerk van andere onder-
handelingspartners. Emerson volgend stellen we voor dat de netwerkinbedding van ego
en alter kan worden gezien als de bron van hun onderhandelingssterkte. Vanuit het
gezichtspunt van een actor bepalen netwerken de alternatieven voor dyadische ruil. Zo-
doende worden verschillen in opportuniteitsstructuren gede¯niÄ eerd tussen actoren. Die
komen terug in de onderhandelingssterkte van de actoren. De eerste onderzoeksvraag
van het tweede deel van het boek is: Hoe bepaalt de inbedding van een actor in een
netwerk van onderhandelingspartners zijn of haar aandeel in de surplus in relaties met
zijn of haar partners?
Ingebed zijn in een netwerk biedt de actoren met meer dan ¶ e¶ en partner toegang tot
verschillende onderhandelingspartners met wie een verdeling van een surplus mogelijk
is. Zoals in hoofdstuk 5 in detail wordt uitgelegd kan de eigenlijke ruil in sommige
netwerken tot ¶ e¶ en relatie beperkt zijn ten gevolge van exogeen gegeven regels. Een
tweede onderzoeksvraag is daarom: Met wie van zijn of haar partners verdeelt een
actor een surplus wanneer beperkingen ervoor zorgen dat een actor slechts ¶ e¶ en surplus
per keer kan verdelen?206 Summary in Dutch
Onderhandelen en ruil: structureel ingebedde relaties
Als startpunt voor het bepalen van de absolute onderhandelingssterktes van de ac-
toren richten we ons op een exogeen gegeven netwerk van actoren. Dit netwerk be-
schrijft onderhandelingsrelaties tussen actoren. Een positie in een netwerk kan worden
`omschreven' door drie afzonderlijke elementen. Alleen door tegelijkertijd met deze
drie elementen rekening te houden kan de absolute onderhandelingssterkte van een
actor worden bepaald. Ten eerste wordt elke positie in een netwerk gekarakteriseerd
door het aantal beschikbare onderhandelingspartners. Relaties bieden ruilmogelijkhe-
den. Een actor die veel onderhandelingsrelaties heeft is minder afhankelijk van een
speci¯eke partner. Ten tweede heeft elk van deze onderhandelingspartners eigen on-
derhandelingspartners met wie zij ook kunnen onderhandelen. Het aantal partners van
partners is daarom ook belangrijk. Hoe minder partners ego's partners hebben, des
te afhankelijker ego's partners voor ruil van hem zijn. Tenslotte is het belangrijk of
onderhandelingsverbindingen in netwerken negatief of positief zijn (`relational assess-
ment'). Verbindingen zijn negatief wanneer de partners, gezien vanuit de eigen positie,
alternatieven voor elkaar zijn (Emerson 1972: 70{71). Ruil in ¶ e¶ en van deze relaties
verhindert dan ruil in de overige relaties. Emerson stelt dat verbindingen ook positief
kunnen zijn. Dit betekent dat ruil in de ene relatie ruil in andere relaties stimuleert.
In dat geval zijn partners wat ruil betreft complementair.
Wanneer het netwerk eenmaal is bekend en haar verbindingen zijn geklassi¯ceerd
als positief of negatief, kunnen we de onderhandelingssterkte van iedere actor bepalen.
In een negatief verbonden netwerk neemt ego's onderhandelingssterkte toe met het
aantal relaties waarover hij beschikt, maar neemt ze af met het aantal relaties waarover
zijn partners beschikken. In een positief verbonden netwerk, daarentegen, zijn relaties
complementair en ruil in de ¶ e¶ en bevordert die in andere. In zo'n netwerk is afhankelijk
zijn van anderen een voordeel. Ego's absolute onderhandelingssterkte neemt dan dus
toe met het aantal partners dat hij heeft.
De absolute onderhandelingssterkte bepaalt echter niet volledig ego's aandeel in het
surplus in de relatie met alter. Ego's aandeel van het surplus in de relatie met alter
is afhankelijk van zijn relatieve onderhandelingssterkte met betrekking tot alter: ego's
absolute onderhandelingssterkte in relatie tot alter's absolute onderhandelingssterkte.
Een hoge absolute onderhandelingssterkte verzekert niet automatisch een grotere taart-
punt. Actoren met gelijke absolute onderhandelingssterktes (zoals structureel equiva-
lente actoren) verdelen de taart in twee gelijke stukken.
Substitutie van de absolute onderhandelinsgssterktes in de evenwichtsoplossing van
het afwisselende{voorstellenspel levert voorspellingen op voor de verdeling van een
surplus in alle onderhandelingsrelaties in een netwerk. Om onze theoretische voor-
spellingen te toetsen maken we gebruik van gepubliceerde resultaten van sociologische
netwerk{ruiltheorie (voor een overzicht zie bijv. Willer 1999). Verder confronteren we
onze voorspellingen met die van prominente ruiltheorieÄ en.Summary in Dutch 207
Onderhandelen en ruil: experimentele resultaten
We toetsen onze voorspellingen over de verdeling van een surplus door gebruik te
maken van in de literatuur gepubliceerde experimentele resultaten (Burke 1997; Cook
et al. 1983; Lovaglia et al. 1995; Markovsky, Willer, en Patton 1988; Markovsky et
al. 1997; Skvoretz en Willer 1993; Yamagishi, Gillmore, en Cook 1988; Yamaguchi
1996). Bij laboratoriumexperimenten van netwerk{ruiltheorie wordt gewoonlijk een
gestandaardiseerd protocol gebruikt. Proefpersonen worden toegewezen aan een speci-
¯eke positie binnen een netwerkstructuur die wordt bepaald door de experimentleider.
De netwerkstructuur is bij iedereen bekend. Na een inleiding en een testronde kunnen
proefpersonen onderhandelen over de verdeling van een surplus van 24 punten met elk
van de buren waarmee ze zijn verbonden in het netwerk. In het algemeen worden zo 20
ronden gespeeld. Op ¶ e¶ en uitzondering na (Yamagishi, Gillmore, en Cook 1988) worden
bij experimenten negatieve verbindingen verondersteld en in het algemeen wordt het
aantal ruilmogelijkheden per actor en ronde beperkt tot ¶ e¶ en (`one{exchange rule').
De voorspellingen van ons model worden in drie stappen getoetst. Bij elke stap
vergelijken we daarbij onze voorspellingen met voorspellingen van andere benaderin-
gen: Lovaglia et al.'s (1995) GPI{RD, Yamaguchi's (1996) power model, Skvoretz en
Willer's (1993) Exchange Resistance theory, Friedkin's (1986, 1992) Expected Value
theory, Cook en Yamagishi's (1992) Equi{Dependence theory, and Burke's (1997) Iden-
tity Simulation model. Eerst stellen we onze voorspellingen over de verdeling van een
surplus in negatief verbonden netwerken tegenover de betre®ende empirische resul-
taten. Dan vergelijken we onze voorspellingen over winstverdelingen in positief ver-
bonden netwerken met het enig experiment over positief verbonden netwerken dat in
de literatuur is beschrijven. Deze twee stappen hebben betrekking op de eerste onder-
zoeksvraag van hoofdstuk 5. Van sommige negatief verbonden netwerkstructuren met
een enkele{ruil regel is empirisch waargenomen dat ze `breken'. Hiermee wordt bedoeld
dat tenminste een actor voortdurend afziet van ruil met minstens ¶ e¶ en onderhandel-
ingspartner. In de derde stap richten we ons daarom op de tweede onderzoeksvraag
van hoofdstuk 5. We bekijken of ons model afwijkingen tussen onderhandelings{ en
ruilstructuren correct voorspelt.
Voorspellingen over de verdeling van een surplus in negatief verbonden netwerken
worden naast experimentele bevindingen met betrekking tot vier netwerkstructuren
gelegd: 4{Line, Stem, Kite,e n3{Branch.9 De geobserveerde verdelingen van het
surplus kloppen redelijk met de voorspellingen van alle theoretische benaderingen die
we in onze analyse in beschouwing nemen. Ze verschillen echter in de mate van precisie.
Niet alle theorieÄ en doen het bij dezelfde netwerken even goed. Iedere theorie kent in
ieder geval ¶ e¶ en netwerk waar de voorspellingen slecht bij de data passen. Onze theorie
bijvoorbeeld klopt niet goed met de 4{Line structuur. We voorspellen dat van een
surplus van 24, ego er 15.9 krijgt. In werkelijkheid blijkt dit 14.1 te zijn. Met betrekking
tot de andere drie netwerken biedt onze theorie voorspellingen die allemaal binnen het
9Zie figuur 5.1 in hoofdstuk 5 voor een gra¯sche voorstelling van deze netwerken.208 Summary in Dutch
95% betrouwbaarheidsinterval van de experimenteel waargenomen variabelen vallen.
We maken gebruik van twee goodness{of{¯t maten: de gemiddelde afwijking en de
absolute afwijking. Op basis van beide maten passen onze voorspellingen beter by de
data dan die van de andere theorieÄ en.
In de tweede stap toetsen we onze voorspellingen over de verdeling van een sur-
plus in positief verbonden netwerken. Empirische bevindingen over positief verbonden
netwerken zijn schaars en we kunnen ons slechts beroepen op een enkel experiment over
een 5{Line structuur (Yamagishi, Gillmore, en Cook 1988). Uit het enorme aanbod
van theorieÄ en is alleen Yamaguchi's (1996) power model in staat tot voorspellingen te
komen voor positief verbonden netwerken. Yamagishi et al. presenteren naar aanleiding
van hun data alleen de winstaandelen van actoren. Dit betekent dat zij de winsten die
een actor in al zijn dyadische onderhandelingsrelaties verkregen heeft optellen en dan
het resultaat zo standaardiseren dat deze winstaandelen van alle actoren optellen tot 1.
Men rapporteert winstaandelen voor de posities in de positief verbonden 5{Line A{
B{C{B{A als: A = 0.1503, B = 0.1931, en C = 0.3133. Voor alle posities voorspellen
we winstsplitsingen die dicht tegen de data aanzitten: A = 0.1632, B = 0.1736, en C
= 0.3264. Deze voorspellingen passen ook beter dan die van Yamaguchi: A = 0.0020,
B = 0.2500, en C = 0.4961.
In de derde stap toetsen we onze voorspellingen over afwijkingen tussen
onderhandelings{ en ruilstructuren. In een aantal ruilexperimenten heeft de experi-
mentleider bijgehouden hoeveel keer aan elkaar verbonden actoren met elkaar ruilden.
Op basis van de resultaten analyseren enkele auteurs (bijv. Bienenstock en Bonacich
1993; Markovsky, Willer, en Patton 1988; Simpson en Willer 1999; Skvoretz en Lovaglia
1995) de afwijkingen tussen de onderhandelings{ en de ruilstructuur. Een prominente
kandidaat voor zulke `breuken' is de T{Shape structuur (zie figuur 5.2 in hoofd-
stuk 5) waarin twee actoren A1 en A2 ieder met een actor B verbonden is die zelf
verbonden is met een actor C die op zijn beurt verbonden is met een perifere actor D.
Markovsky, Willer, en Patton (1988: 227) doen melding van een breuk in deze struc-
tuur. In 100 onderhandelingsronden kwam slechts drie een keer ruil voor tussen B
en C. Het netwerk viel dus uiteen in een 3{Line A1{B{A2 en een Dyad C{D. Ons
model voorspelt niet alleen op correcte wijze het ontstaan van deze breuk maar ook op
precieze wijze de verdeling van de surplussen in de resulterende deelnetwerken. Van
een surplus van 24 winstpunten bleek B er gemiddeld 19.14 te krijgen in relaties met
de actoren op posities A.10 Ons model voorspelt 19.86 winstpunten in het voordeel
van B. C bleek 11.88 winstpunten te krijgen in de relatie met D|wij voorspelden een
gelijke divisie van elk 12.0 winstpunten. Simpson en Willer (1999) doen melding van
alternatieve netwerken waarvoor experimentele gegevens over het aantal keren ruil in
alle relaties beschikbaar zijn: namelijk, een Y{Triangle, XU{Shape, X4{Line,
V{Triangle, en een H{Shape (zie figuur 5.3 in het vorige hoofdstuk). Ons model
10De proefpersonen B realiseerden gedurende het experiment bijna indentieke winsten met zowel A1
als A2. De gerapporteerde 19.14 winstpunten vormen een gemiddelde van de winsten zoals gerealiseerd
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voorspelt breuken in al deze onderhandelingsnetwerken. Statistische toetsen op de
data van Simpson en Willer ondersteunen onze voorspellingen. Voor het XU{Shape
en het Y{Triangle netwerk hebben Simpson en Willer echter andere conclusies. Hun
statistische toetsen wijzen uit dat deze netwerken niet breken.
Naast voorspellingen over de verdeling van een surplus en voorspellingen over
netwerkbreuken stelt ons model ons tot verdere theoretische voorspellingen in staat.
Ten eerste splitsen actoren in een Dyad hun surplus altijd in twee gelijke aandelen om-
dat ze structureel equivalent zijn en geen alternatieve ruilpartner hebben. Daarom is
de Dyad een robuust netwerk (dwz., de ruilstructuur valt samen met de onderhandel-
ingsstructuur en breekt dus niet). De beschikbare data ondersteunen deze voorspellin-
gen. Ten tweede kunnen niet alle negatief verbonden netwerken breken. Wanneer
we kijken naar die negatief verbonden netwerken waarin in alle relaties bedragen van
gelijke waarde worden verdeeld, dan kan de structuur alleen breken wanneer aan de
volgende voorwaarden wordt voldaan: (i) het netwerk moet minstens een actor met drie
of meer ruilpartners bevatten, en (ii) deze ruilpartners moeten zich op tenminste twee
structureel verschillende posities bevinden. Daaruit volgt dat netwerken met identieke
bedragen waarin alle actoren ten hoogste twee ruilpartners hebben dus altijd robuust
zijn. Zulke netwerken zijn ¶ of ring{ ¶ of lijnstructuren. De beschikbare experimentele
gegevens ondersteunen deze voorspelling. Ten derde zijn relaties in positief verbonden
netwerken complementair en zulke structuren zijn daarom altijd robuust. Aangezien
ruil in de ene relatie die in andere relaties stimuleert, zullen rationele actoren nooit
¶ e¶ en van hun mogelijke onderhandelingspartners buitensluiten. Wegens gebrek aan ex-
perimenten over positief verbonden netwerken kan hierover geen empirisch uitsluitsel
worden gegeven. Ten vierde hangt het optreden van een breuk af van de relatieve
onderhandelingssterkte van een actor in al zijn relaties. Echter, wanneer de te verde-
len bedragen verschillen hangt de kans op een breuk ook af van de grootte van de te
verdelen bedragen. In dergelijke onderhandelingsnetwerken kan het soms voordeliger
zijn een kleiner deel van een groot surplus te krijgen dan een aantal grotere delen van
kleinere surplussen. Een actor kan er soms dus voor kiezen uitgebuit te worden in de
relatie die gekenmerkt wordt door een groot surplus. Er zijn geen empirische gegevens
beschikbaar voor het toetsen van deze voorspelling. Ten vijfde bestaan er bepaalde on-
derhandelingsnetwerken waarin een actor een latente monopoliepositie bekleedt. Zo'n
actor heeft volledige controle over twee of meer van zijn onderhandelingspartners|zij
hebben geen andere onderhandelingspartner|maar is daarnaast verbonden met ten-
minste ¶ e¶ en partner waarover hij geen volledige controle heeft omdat de laatstgenoemde
wel alternatieve onderhandelingspartners heeft. Een actor met zo'n latente monopo-
liepositie zal altijd minstens ¶ e¶ en van zijn minder afhankelijke onderhandelingspartners
buitensluiten. Anders gesteld, zo'n actor zal proberen een pure monopoliepositie te
verkrijgen. Experimenten die netwerkstructuren met latente monopolieposities onder-
zoeken laten inderdaad het voorspelde gedrag van de `monopolie{actor' zien.210 Summary in Dutch
Onderhandelen en ruil: suggesties voor verder onderzoek
We zagen dat de in hoofdstuk 5 ontwikkelde theorie het in het algemeen beter doet
dan de gevestigde theorieÄ en van de sociologische netwerk{ruiltheorie. Deze conclusies
rusten echter enkel op experimenten met kleine en eenvoudige netwerkstructuren. We
komen met enkele voorspellingen voor grotere netwerken, met name in relatie tot onze
resultaten over netwerkbreuken. Deze voorspellingen over de verdeling van een surplus
moeten worden getoetst via experimenten met dergelijke complexere netwerkstruc-
turen. Ook zouden zulke nieuwe experimenten een antwoord kunnen geven op de vraag
of `locale informatie' in plaats van volledige informatie over de hele netwerkstructuur
inderdaad voldoende zijn voor precieze voorspellingen in grotere structuren.
Ten tweede rusten de voorspellingen van ons model op de onderliggende aanname
dat onderhandelingssterkte een functie is van alleen de structuur van het netwerk. Deze
aanname komt overeen met Emerson's (1972) basisidee en vervult ook de voorwaarden
van de netwerk{ruiltheorie. Experimentele resultaten lijken er op te wijzen dat het
redelijk is aan te nemen dat onze theorie ook de invloed van structuur op individueel
gedrag goed beschrijft. Het is daarom verleidelijk een stap verder te gaan, zeker wan-
neer men probeert onderhandelingsgedrag in de werkelijkheid te verklaren. Eckel en
Grossman (1998) vinden bijvoorbeeld dat mannen en vrouwen zich in onderhandelingen
anders gedragen. Mannen accepteren lagere aanbiedingen van vrouwen dan van man-
nen. Vrouwen, daarentegen, accepteren lagere aanbiedingen van vrouwen. Op basis
van Becker en Mulligan's (1997) resultaten over de endogenisering van tijdspreferen-
tie kan worden verwacht dat bijvoorbeeld jongere of lager opgeleide personen minder
geduldig zijn. Zij zouden zo tot minder gunstige overeenkomsten komen. Tenslotte
lijkt het niet ondenkbaar dat ook welvaartse®ecten een belangrijke rol kunnen spelen
bij onderhandelingen. Rijke mensen zullen bijvoorbeeld minder scherp onderhandelen
wanneer het een kleine taart betreft, terwijl arme mensen graag een klein stukje van een
grotere taart zouden accepteren. Hieruit volgt dat onderhandelingssterkte een functie
is van meer dan alleen structuur. Toekomstig onderzoek over netwerkruil zou daarom
ook de e®ecten van zulke actorkenmerken aan de orde moeten stellen.
Als Emerson's (1972) voorstel dat ruiltheorie ook ruilstructuren verklaart serieus
wordt genomen, zouden nieuwe theorieÄ en in staat moeten zijn te verklaren hoe en wan-
neer actoren ruilrelaties met nieuwe partners aangaan buiten de gegeven onderhandel-
ingsstructuur (`netwerkuitbreiding'). Cook en Whitmeyer (1992) stelden ook dat men
bij netwerk{ruiltheorie meer de nadruk zou moeten leggen op het verklaren van veran-
deringen in netwerkstructuren in plaats van enkel winstverdelingen te voorspellen. In
het geval van positief verbonden netwerken zou de aandacht voor netwerkuitbreidin-
gen wel eens net zo belangrijk kunnen zijn als het bestuderen van netwerkbreuken in
negatief verbonden netwerken. In positief verbonden netwerken zijn actoren comple-
mentair in ruil en het hebben van meer relaties kan de eigen onderhandelingssterkte
laten toenemen. Een meer volledige theorie over netwerkruil zou daarom ook moeten
toestaan dat nieuwe actoren een gegeven onderhandelingsstructuur binnenkomen en
zou een gedragsconcept op individueel niveau moeten de¯niÄ eren voor de acceptatieSummary in Dutch 211
dan wel afwijzing van zulke nieuwe onderhandelingspartners. Of actoren in positief
verbonden netwerken zich wel of niet volgens zulke aannames gedragen kan vervolgens
in laboratoriumexperimenten worden getoetst.blubReferences
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